Sir John Jordan and the Afffairs of China, 1906-1916, With Special Reference to the 1911 Revolution and Yuan Shih-k'ai. by Lau, Kit-Ching
Sir John Jordan and the Affairs of China, 1906 - 1916, 
with Special Reference to the 1911 Revolution and Ytian
Shih-k1ai.
submitted for
The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in






INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 11010596
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
2Abstract
Apart from several journalistic articles there is no major work 
on Sir John Jordan who was the British minister to Peking from 1906
to 1920. This can probably be explained by the fifty years1 rule
which had until recently prevented the opening to the public of
Foreign Office materials pertaining to the later years of Jordan1s
service. This thesis is a study of his work as British minister in 
Peking between 1906 and 1916. However, as the title indicates, not 
every aspect of Jordan1s ministry nor every major event in China in
these ten years is dealt with in the thesis. The emphasis is on
those which have a direct bearing on his role in the 1911 revolution 
and his relationship with Yiian Shih-k*ai. This also accounts for 
choosing 1916, when Yilan died, as the closing year of the study.
Jordan*s ministry between 1906 and 1916 is worthy of study in
that it throws light on a vital period of Chinese internal history 
which was crammed with dramatic changes. Institutionally, China changed 
from being a dynasty to a republic and then almost to a dynasty again; 
militarily, she suffered from three civil wars; and politically, she 
was to reap from these ten years decades of internal chaos and strife 
which was only brought to a temporary end with the institution of the 
communist regime in the middle of the century. Jordan, as the British 
representative, as a senior diplomat with great knowledge of China 
and as a friend of Ytfan Shih-k*ai, played an important part in these 
events. The primary purpose of the thesis is to identify and assess 
his role.
3It is also hoped that the thesis will throw light on British 
policy towards China and, to a lesser extent, Japan during these 
years. In this respect, it is important to bear in mind that it 
was during this period that Britain1 s predominance in China, and the 
Far East, was for the first time being seriously challenged.
Finally, Jordan himself is an interesting person to study.
His activities during these ten years serve as a case study of the 
place of personal influence in policy-making in the peculiar political 
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8Introduction
Sir John Newell Jordan'*' was born at Balloo, Ireland, on 
5 September 1852. It was alleged that he owed his sense of justice
and conscientiousness to both his Irish origin and strict Presbyterian
upbringing. His career of forty-four years was exclusively made 
in the Far East, his highest position being British minister in 
Peking, 1906-20. Five and a half years after he retired from China
he died in London on 14 September 1925.
Jordan^ Career
Unlike many, Jordan entered the China Consular Service as a
2
student interpreter in 1876 with an excellent university degree ,
His academic aptitude accounted much for the success he made of the 
Chinese language and the concise and interesting way with which he 
wrote official despatches.
Between 1881 and 1886 Jordan was pro-consul at Canton, acting 
consul at Kiungchou and Amoy respectively. These were the only years 
which Jordan spent in southern China where the anti-dynastic revolu­
tionary movement gradually gathered strength. The period was valuable 
to Jordan in giving him first-hand experience of the sentiment of 
the southern Chinese, something which became particularly useful 
during the crisis of the 1911 revolution.
In 1886 Jordan was transferred to Peking where he at first 
discharged the duties of accountant to the legation. He soon proved 
his mettle and was promoted to assistant Chinese secretary in 1887,
1. The biography of Jordan given here is based on D.H. Hosie, 
"Jordan, Sir John Newell", Dictionary of National Biography, 
supp. 1922-30, (Oxford Univ. Press 1937) pp. 461-^5 Foreign 
Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book for 1920
9and full Chinese secretary in 1891. His seryice as Chinese secretary
especially won the high approval of 0’Conor , then British minister
. 3 .m  Peking . The ten years, until 1895, in the legation were beneficial
in two ways. In the course of the period it was inevitable that
Jordan should become familiar with Chinese politics at the highest
level. It also meant complete mastery over the Chinese language on 
4
Jordan’s part .
In 1896 Jordan went to Korea as the consul-general at Seoul.
He became charge d’affaires in 1898 and minister resident in 1901.
He left in late 1905 s1>c rtlj before the legation was withdrawn on Japan
establishing a protectorate over Korea. Despite his feeling that
between 1896 and 1906 he was "only a distant observer of events in
China"^, Jordan’s Korean days had an indelible effect on his later
service in China. He was frequently apprehensive that China would
follow the tragic steps of Korea. References to Korea were made most
frequently during World War I when China’s sovereignty was severely
6
threatened by Japan.
p.408; and the obituary notes in The Times, 15 Sept. and NCH,
19 Sept. 1925, except where stated otherwise.
2. He obtained a -first Class B.A. honours degree in Classics in 1873 
at Queen’s College, Belfast.
3. N.R. 0’Conor to Sanderson, 4 Feb. 1895, in which 0’Conor describes 
Jordan as "our excellent Chinese secy."; also 0’Conor to
Marquis of Salisbury, 10 Oct. 1895, Ch. Corres., (F.O.17),
vols. 1246 and 1245 respectively.
4. For a brief description of the duties of the first secretary, see 
L. Mar chant, Anglo-Chinese Relations in the Provinces of the West 
River and the Yangtze River Basins 1889 - 1900 (London M.A. thesis^ 
1965) p.64. The duties included daily visits to the Wai-wu Pu 
and being the language expert of the legation.
5. Jordan, "Some Chinese I have known", Nineteenth Century, vol. 88 
(Dec. 1920) p.947.
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From 1906 to 1920 Jordan was again back in Peking, this time as 
the British representative there. There is no direct evidence in the 
Foreign Office on the background to Jordan’s appointment. It appears 
that Dr*G. E, Morrison, The Times correspondent in Peking and respected 
by the Foreign Office, was instrumental in bringingsbout the decision 
in highly recommending the choice to Lansdowne, the foreign secretary 
of state, Tyrrell and Louis Mallet, in charge of the China Depart­
ment. The decision was made in early October 1905 when Morrison was 
in London^. The first ten years of the ministry is the period to be 
studied in this thesis. As a preliminary to this study, it is desirable 
to examine briefly Jordan’s relations with the London Foreign Office; 
his relations with British officials in China; his relations with 
Chinese leaders; and his relations with other foreign ministers in 
Peking.
There is no doubt that the Foreign Office trusted Jordan. After 
all, he started from the lowest rung of the consular ladder and had 
spent thirty years in the Far East, twenty of them in China, when he
g
was appointed as minister . The Foreign Office was headed by Sir
Edward Grey during the entire period concerned, and Grey was extremely
appreciative of Jordan. Writing to Jordan after the 1911 revolution
B.F. Alston, a clerk in the office, said: ”1 found him, though it was
nothing new to me, most enthusiastic about and full of admiration
9
for you - and all you have done”. Three months later, shortly before
6. For example, Jordan to Langley, private, 24 Nov. 1914, Jordan 
Papers, vol. 12.
7. 22 Jul., 29 Sept., 2 Oct., 1905, Morrison Papers, vol. 65.
8. Because of Jordan’s experience E.H. Parker writes in ’’The Fight 
for the Republic in China", Asiatic Review, vol. 15 (1919) p.12 
that Jordan was "probably the ’safest’ minister we have ever had 
in China".
9. Alston to Jordan, private, 4 Aug., 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 2.
Jordan’s leave, Alston wrote again: ”If you only realised the way
the S. of S. always refers to you, as do all those in authority, you
would understand how we here cannot conceive the idea of Peking without
10you there to represent us" . It was only in 1916, under the extra­
ordinary circumstances created by Japanese supremacy in the Far East 
during the War, that Jordan’s anti-Japanese attitude caused some change 
in his relations with the Foreign Office.
Through the long years of official contact since Jordan's Korean
days, a close friendship developed between him and F.A. Campbell, permanent 
under-secretary of state and the head of the China ’Department until the 
end of 1911. W. Langley, Campbell’s successor until 1918, had a marked 
respect for Jordan who was an ’old hand*f, as it were, especially 
during the early years of his headship of the department.
Looking at Jordan’s relationship with the Foreign Office one is also 
bound to ask how much freedom of action Jordan was given and how much 
initiative he possessed. It is evident from the Foreign Office archives 
that Grey, though heavily burdened with European affairs, paid considerable 
attention to Far Eastern matters and exerted a strong influence on 
questions concerning China, especially those involving Japan. Jordan 
on the other hand did not appear to have had great confidence in his own 
influence on the Foreign Office. Sir Valentine Chirol once wrote to 
W.G. Tyrrell, private secretary to Grey: ”1 am obliged you gave poor Jordan 
a K.C.B. for he wanted ’bucking up’ badly. The trouble with him is 
that he is far too diffident and timid and if I may venture to say
so stands in far too great awe of F.Ot He is always saying
10. Alston to Jordan, private 1 Nov. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 2.
12
he thinks he ought to do this, that, and the other, but I don’t know
11whether F.O. would approve" . Jordan’s obituary in The Times is full 
of praise of him but it also says: "Perhaps the one reproach that could
be made to Jordan was his extreme diffidence in advising his own govern­
ment" (15 September 1925). However, these comments were not invariably 
true. On a number of important occasions, as will be seen, Jordan did 
exert his initiative and because he was famous for being careful his 
suggestions were seriously considered.
Throughout his career as minister, Jordan maintained excellent 
relations with the consular service. But he was insistent on the consular 
staff being at all times in close contact with the legation. Consular 
officials had no excuse to be ignorant of their standing. Jordan told 
Campbell: "I am a little anxious about the future of the Chancellery with 
Robertson and Garnett both going home so soon. The work there is at all 
times heavy and I am afraid I make it especially so by insisting that the
consulates, of which there are thirty odd, should be kept fully informed
12 .of all that concerns them" . Jordan also insisted on the consuls making
full reports on all matters pertaining to their posts. For instance,
in 1908, Tebbit, the consul at Newchwang, was reprimanded for failing
13to observe fully Japanese activities m  his area . In 1911 Jamieson,
consul-general at Canton and an official of repute, was chided for want
14of detailed reports on the revolutionary movement in the province
11. Chirol to Tyrrell, private, 29 Jun. 1909, Grey Papers, (F.O. 800). 
vol. 106. Sir V. Chirol was the foreign editor of The Times from 
1899. He was considered an expert on Far Eastern affairs and 
certainly had the ear of the Foreign Office.
12. Jordan to Campbell, private, 28 Nov. 1907, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.
13. Jordan to R.T. Tebbit, private, 6 May,1908, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.
14. Jordan to Jamieson, private, 18 Jun. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
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Largely because of the political situation which dominated the decade
Jordan had a closer contact with the consular officials at Shanghai,
Hankow, Canton, Nanking and Yunnanfu. It is interesting to note
the influence these officials had on Jordan in crises like the 1911
revolution and the monarchical movement of 1915-16.^
As far as other British officials in China were concerned, Jordan
enjoyed throughout the period helpful cooperation from Admiral Winsloe
of the China Station. It was still the gun-boat age in which the
presence of warships was regarded by foreigners in China as the
strongest guarantee for safety. Cooperation between Jordan and the
commander-in-chief of British troops at Tientsin was notable during
the 1911 revolution and, to a lesser extent, the allied occupation
of Tsingtao in 1914.
Jordan’s relations with the Chinese authorities can be divided
into two periods: before and after the 1911 revolution. During the
last five years of the Ch’ing dynasty Jordan was familiar with many of
the important Chinese officials. Prince Ch’ing, Na—t’ung, Ytian Shih-k’ai^
Wang Ta-hsieh, Wu T’ing-fang and others often took Jordan into their
confidence with varying degrees of sincerity. Jordan’s familiarity
with high Chinese official circles increased in the period after the
1911 revolution which was characterised by the autocracy of Ytfan Shih-k’ai.
In both periods it was significant that Jordan was conversant
16with the Chinese language . Of the Ch’ing officials mentioned above
■ 17only Wang Ta-hsieh and Wu Ting-fang knew English, but they were not
15. See Chapters 2-4, and 7.
16. Jordan’s mastery of Chinese is of repute, O’Conor to Marquis of 
Salisbury, 10 Oct. 1895, Ch. Corres., (F.O.17), vol.1245, T*ang 
Shao— i says that he spoke ”first-class Mandarin", NCH, 19 Sept.1925. 
Not all British ministers to Peking knew Chinese; for example,
the language was foreign to O’Conor.
14
the most important representatives of the group. Yuan Shih-k!ai
knew no English, besides a few personal names, but he often asked
for private interviews with Jordan. When he could not see Jordan
personally about important matters it was Yiianfs habit to send his
eldest son, K’o-ting, his henchman, Liang Shih— i, or his private
secretary, Admiral Ts'ai T'ing-kan, to Jordan. All of them spoke
only Chinese. After he had become the president of China, Yuan
sometimes made use of his advisers, notably the Australian, G.E.
Morrison and Sir Richard Dane, in communicating with Jordan. Towards
18the end of the period Wellington Koo , who was to attain international
fame in the Paris Conference of 1911 and who spoke English well, was
also sent to Jordan.
From February 1911, Jordan was the doyen of the Diplomatic Corps
tit Peking. It was the first time that a British minister assumed this
position of seniority there in relation to his diplomatic colleagues.
Although some people sneered at the limited capacity of the Diplomatic 
19
Body, Jordan attached considerable significance to his doyenship.
It usually entailed an extra burden of duties for whosoever assumed 
it, yet an astute manipulation of its prerogatives often caused matters 
to be directed in a manner highly beneficial to the nation the doyen 
represented. Thus Jordan wrote to Tyrrell soon after he became 
senior minister: "it [the doyenshipj is certainly a post which no one
17. Wang at one time was minister to London. Wu was for many years 
minister to Washington and he obtained a Ph.D degree from the 
University of Pennsylvania.
18. Wellington Koo was a councillor of the Wai-chiao Pu when he was 
frequently sent to Jordan by Yuan. He had his Ph.D. degree from 
the University of Columbia.
19. See for example, D. Vare, first secretary, and for many times 
charge d*affaires of the Italian legation 1912-18, Laughing 
Diplomat, (London 1938), pp 126-7 quoting a poem written by
would willingly accept[because of the extra work^ But there are many
important questions, such as the Whangpoo Conservancy, etc , which touch
our interests very closely and which do not always go as we could wish
20when directed by another Legation" . That Jordan was the senior foreign 
minister during the 1911 revolution accounted partly for the shape of 
what it commonly called the policy of neutrality adopted by the powers.
Looking at the ten years here studied from the stand-point of 
periodisation, they can be clearly divided into three periods. The 
first period was from September 1906 to October 1911, when the 
revolution broke out, in which Jordan made his assessment of the 
various elements prominent in Chinese politics. This period was 
significant in that it largely determined Jordan’s reasoning and 
actions during the two following ones. The second period was from 
October 1911 to August 1914, when World War I commenced. Those were 
the revolutionary years in which Jordan’s influence on Chinese affairs 
reached its zenith. The reason for Jordan’s influence then was Ytian 
Shih-k’ai’s acquisition of supreme power after the revolution. The 
third period was from August 1914 to June 1916, when YUan Shih-k’ai 
died. For Jordan it was a period of utter frustration because Japan’s 
ascendancy during the War meant a corresponding decline in Britain’s 
prestige in China and consequently a decline in his influence.
Moreover, Japan’s anti-Yuan policy was in direct conflict with his own
J.O.P. Bland in 1906 "In dejection to the Diplomatic Body at 
Peking", and entitled "A Lullaby".
20. Jordan to Tyrrell, private, Feb. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7,
Marchant, Anglo-Chinese Relations in tfte Provinces of the West 
River and the Yangtze Basins^1889-1900, p. 66 throws light 
on this point indirectly in describing how Hankow was raised 
to the rank of a consulate-general in 1899.
16
pro-Ytian attitude. The death of Yuan, which Jordan regarded as 
a direct outcome of Japanese conspiracy, crowned the frustration of 
those years.
Jordan and British Railway interests in China
The assessment made by Jordan of the different elements of 
Chinese politics during the years before the revolution was determined 
almost entirely by his concept of Britain’s role and position in China. 
During those years Jordan had to deal with many aspects of British 
interests in China, such as opium, the West River piracy, the Whangpoo 
Conservancy, British mining rights and the like. But it was in 
railway matters that his attitudes can be seen most clearly.
Although it had been popularly believed amongst British merchants 
in China that the country was a great potential market, yet until the 
beginning of the twentieth century China’s foreign trade remained 
comparatively small. After the international scramble for concessions 
in 1898 railway interests in China became the chief attraction to 
British investors. It is estimated that besides the Exchange Adjust­
ment Loan of 1905, the Currency Loan of 1911, and a number of
provincial loans, all loans contracted by China from British capita-
21
lists in 1898-1911 were for railways . In 1898 the Hongkong and
Shanghai Bank associated with Jardine, Matheson and Company to formal
. 2 2  .  ^the British and Chinese Corporation to handle railway concessions m
China. The new syndicate was closely identified with the leadership
21. Chung-Sien Chen, British Loans to China 1860-1913, (London 
Ph.D. Thesis), p.84; see also A.P. Winston, **Chinese Finance 
under the Republic”, QuArtferly Journal of Economics, vol*30.
(Aug. 1916), p. 739; and H. Feis, Europei The World’s Banker 
1870-1914, (New York^ l93Q), p. 452 which explains the zeal to 
invest in China.
22. For details about the British and Chinese Corporation until 1913 
see Chung-Sien Chen, British Loans to China, 1860-1913, pp. 171-7;
17
of the China Ass°c;katiPn ~ the spokesman for British China merchants -
and was used by the Foreign Office as an instrument to implement its
policy of limited liability in the Yangtze. The Foreign Office
supported the corporation in obtaining concessions but there was no
question of state finance or management; the concessions obtained
were the private business of the corporation.
Running counter to the increased British railway interests in
China, the rights recovery movement, a product of the birth of national
spirit amongst educated Chinese, was also gathering strength in this
period. Sir Ernest Satow, the minister before Jordan, was impressed
by the new spirit. Before he left China he submitted a memorandum
advising the Foreign Office to abandon the old policy of extorting
railway concessions from China and, if possible, to refrain from
materialising the concessions which the British and Chinese Corporation
23obtained in 1898 . It is difficult to define Grey’s reaction to
Satow’s advice. Although he stated in his instruction to Jordan as
his own opinion that the policy of extorting concessions was no
longer justified, Grey counteracted the statement later in the
despatch by saying that a departure from the policy might be mistaken 
24for weakness . Perhaps because of his long absence*Jordan refrained 
himself from positively objecting to Grey’s vague instructions with 
which he did not at all agree. Between 1906 and 1911 Jordan devoted
also M. Collis, Wayfoong, The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation, (London, 1965), p.118.
23. Satow to Grey, no. 177, v. conf., 2 Jun. 1906, Ch. Corres., vol»35.
24. Grey to Jordan, no. 298, 31 Aug„1906, Ch. Corres., vol*35.
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himself vigorously to helping the British and Chinese Corporation to
put in effect the preliminary agreements which it had made with the
Chinese government on the concessions obtained in 1898. To him,
25railways in China were a "positive obsession" . At moments of utter
despair he might sigh that "Sir E. Grey’s policy of embarking on no
r T 26furtherlrailwayj enterprises ... is the only sound one" , but he
never really meant it.
Apart from the firmly established Russian sphere in North
Manchuria, the Japanese sphere in South Manchuria, the German sphere
in Shantung, and the French sphere in South-west China, railway interests
in China from 1909 became increasingly internationalised. The
Hukuang Railway Loan Agreement was made in the spring of 1911 between
the Chinese government and the quadruple consortium of British,
American, French*and German bankers. The consortium was enlarged in
1912 by including Japan and Russia. Jordan was against any semblance
of cooperation with other countries not only on railway development
but in all industrial and commercial matters in China. He objected in
the summer of 1908 to the Anglo-French loan to the Chinese government
to redeem the Peking-Hankow railway from a nominal Belgian concern.
Later, when the cooperation was extended to the Hukuang Railway Loan,
27Jordan condemned the French share as "a millstone round our necks"
When negotiations were going on simultaneously with the Chinese govern­
ment on the Soochou-Hangchou railway, a purely British concern, and
25. Jordan to Campbell, private, 6 Aug#1908, Jordan Papers, vol. 4.
26. Jordan to Campbell, private, 26 Dec. 1907, Jordan Papers, vol*5.
On this particular occasion Jordan and the Corporation were 
encountering extreme difficulties over the Soochou-Hangchou-Ningpo 
railway.
27. Jordan to Campbell, private, 11 Jun. 1908, Jordan Papers, vol»5.
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the Tientsin-Pukou Railway, an Anglo-German concern, Jordan insisted
28that the former must take precedence over the latter .
If cooperation with just one country was disagreeable to Jordan,
wholesale internationalisation in the form of the consortium was
even more repugnant. While understanding the political significance
of the consortium, Jordan attacked it for being "unnatural^,
"cumbersome and heterogeneous" and, above all, for precluding British
29concessionaires from bidding freely for Chinese industrial loans
It was a great relief to Jordan, as well as the Foreign Office, when
at the end of 1913. industrial loans were separated from political y(
ones which remained under the regulations of the consortium agreement.
It was natural that Jordan should have been especially concerned
about Britain’s railway rights in the Yangtze region. Despite the
Anglo-Chinese agreement of February 1898, on the non-alienation of
the Yangtze region it had_jnever been a British sphere, strictly speaking,
in the sense that, for instance, Shantung was a German sphere. There
were times when Jordan expressed regret that the Yangtze region had not
30been subjected to stronger B^rtish state control , In this ten
yea£ period of Jordan*s career the first encroachment on the British
railway interests in the Yangtze area was in 1909. when the Germans
succeeded in including themselyes in the Hukuang Railway Loan, This 
to
was a blow^on Jordan who found it the harder because both the British
28, Jordan to Grey, no, 238, 16 May 19.07. Ch, Corre^, yol, 220,
29_, Jordan to Langley, private, 22 Oct, & 8 Dec* 1 9 1 2 Jordan Papers,
vol. 8,
30* For example, Jordan to Langley, private.,13 Jul. 1912; 29 Dec.
19.13, Jordan Papers, vol. 8; Langley Papers (F.O, 8001 vol.31.
20
bank and the Foreign Office were resigned to the situation because
31of political considerations in Europe . The acid test was in the
months preceding World War I when Japan forced her entry into the Yangtze
region. In his resistence against Japan Jordan had the support of 
32Sir Edward Grey ,
JordanTs personal qualities
A study of how Jordan was thought of by people who were familiar 
with him throws light on his personality. His two most outstanding 
qualities were conscientiousness and righteousness,
At the end of January 1910 Jordan had "a complete breakdown
"33
owing to over-work and a conscientious devotion to duty , On his
arrival in Peking iti the summer of 1913 as charge d'affaires, Alston
34found him "almost too tired to talk" , Three years later Jordan was 
again on the point of collapse, this time partly because of the
.35additional strain caused by the death of his best friend Yiian Shih-kTai 
All this, however, partly reflects his inability to delegate less
demanding tasks to others for greater efficiency.
There were many incidents showing the sense of justice that 
was in Jordan, One example here suffices to illustrate the point.
When Jordan fell ill in early 1910 MaxMuller, first secretary of the 
legation*took charge. After several weeks Jordan discovered accidantally 
that MaxMuller had not been paid the salary of a charge d'affaires.
He was "awefully upset" and telegraphed at once to have the matter
31, Jordan to Campbell, private, 12 Aug 1909, Jordan~Papers, vol# 6 in
which Jordan attacked J.O.P, Bland whom he considered as largely
responsible for creating a situation in which the Germans could make 
a successful claitn. Also F,0. memorandum, to M, Cambon, 15 Feb, 1909;
and Addis to F.O, 23 Jan, 1909., Ch. Corres., vol. 622.
32, This aspect is dealt with at greater length in chapter 7,
33, MaxMuller to Campbell, private, 31 Jan, 1910, Alston Papers, ( F.O. 
8001vol. 245.
corrected . Jordan’s sense of justice accounted a great deal for
the respect that his subordinates had for him. Just one year after
he became minister, A. Robertson, second secretary of the legation,
wrote a private letter to M.W. Lampson of the Foreign Office which
was full of praise of Jordan and ended: "I hope it is fully realised
at home what a splendid Minister we have here. He is worth the whole
of the rest of his colleagues put together and is universally liked
37and respected. It is a genuine pleasure to work under him11 . Leech* 
another secretary of the legation,wrote: "His power, personality, and 
tact, coupled with his instinctive sense of justice, enable him to 
conquer without offending the vanquished. I have never met such a
38wonderful character during the 20 years I have been in the service."
MaxMuller told Alston that it was impossible not to be "able to work
39well and cordially with a chief like Sir John"
Within a short time Jordan gained the confidence of the British
mercantile community in China. At a China Association dinner in
40October 1907 Alston heard "nothing but praise" of Jordan. There were
rumours that Jordan would not be returning to China when he left for
leave in 1910; the English residents were so concerned that MaxMuller
41had to make repeated assurances .
34. Alston to Langley, private, 2 Jun. 1913, Alston Papers, vol#247.
35. Alston to E. Drummond, private, 16 Aug. 1916, Grey Papers,
(F.O. 800), vo!U 44.
36. MaxMuller to Campbell, private, 10 Mar. 1910, Alston Papers, vol*245.
37. Robertson to Lampson, private, 15 Oct. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol* 233.
38. Leech to Campbell, private, 2 Apr. 1908, Alston Papers, vol*244.
39. MaxMuller to Alston, private, 12 Nov. 1912, Alston Papers, vol*245.
40. Alston’s minute on Robertson to Lampson, private, 15 Oct. 1907,
Ch. Corres., vol«233. As a matter of fact Jordan was held in high 
esteem b^y the association throughout his service, China Association, 
Annual Reports 1910-1915, p.60, supp. ppa 10,14; Annual Reports 1920-1921 
pp. 17-18.
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The complimentary views above may be balanced somewhat by the
opinions of a Chinese official, Chang Ch’ien, and an Italian diplomat,
Daniele Vare. Both Chang and Vare are chosen because of their neutral
background. Important Chinese belonging either to Yuan Shih-kfaifs
or Sun Yat-sen1 s faction were bound to be prejudiced in their opinions
of Jordan. But, Chang Ch*ien had a loose attachment to both groups.
As for Vare, his neutrality was derived simply from the fact that
Italy cherished relatively less political and financial ambitions
in China. Chang said that Jordan gave him the impression of being
42proud and condescending . Perhaps Chang1s statement can be under­
stood better in the light of Vare's observation made before the War:
"I do. not profess to know what passed in Sir John!s mind, but it seemed 
to me that his world consisted of the British Empire and China, with 
Russia and Japan in the background (sometimes inconveniently near) 
and a lot of other powers fussing round and interfering in matters which 
did not really concern them and which they imperfectly understood.
Germans and French he looked upon as tiresome, and Americans as spoilt
43children. Swedes, Spaniards and Portuguese were merely Banderlog"
Vare also said that Jordan "had a personality that was worthy of study,
though he was not what you would call a superior man; only an admirable
• 44public servant"
41. MaxMuller to Alston, private, 10 May 1910, Alston Papers, vol. 245
42. Chang I-tsu, Chang Chi-chih ctiuan-chi, fu nien-pTu, nien-piao,
[ Biography of Chang Ch^ien followed by his chronological biography] , 
(Taipei, 1965), p. 256.





To Jordan there were three main elements in Chinese 
politics between 1906 and 1911. There was the weakness of 
the Manchu government; the new spirit manifested in many of the 
provinces; and above all, the power of Yuan Shih-k’ai, whether 
in or out of office, which represented the middle way between the 
governments conservatism and the province’s radicalism.
The Manchu government
The prestige of the Manchu dynasty was at its lowest 
ebb in the period. Famines, drought, and other national disasters 
were freely attributed to the belief that the mandate of the Manchu 
was at an end. Anti-dynastic outbreaks occurred with increasing 
frequency.
These years were no better in terms of government. In 
1906 China was under the nominal reign of Kuang-hsu with the 
empress dowager, Tzu-hsi, actually controlling the reins of government. 
But even the once dominating empress was fast losing her grip on the 
country. The constitutional reform policy which was officially adopted, 
explained most simply, was itself an acknowledgement of weakness by the 
government.
The death of the aged empress dowager had been long expected 
before it took place on 15 November 1908. It was preceded by the 
death of Kuang-hsii a day earlier. Uneasiness was particularly wide-
24
spread amongst Chinese officials* who feared that the disappearance
of the empress dowager might let loose the anti-Chinese sentiment of
the Manchu. The apprehension was shared by interested foreigners who
watched the situation eagerly. For example, for one week after the
deaths took place the Japanese minister in Peking sent hourly reports
to Tokyo in case of emergency.*
Jordan was further worried that the death of TzTu-hsi, leaving
Kuang-hsii in power, might endanger the position of Yuan Shih-k’ai. Yuan
was then concurrently a president of the Wai-wu Pu and a member of the
Grand Council. It was well known that Kuang-hsii hated Yuan for
betraying him in the Hundred Days’ Reform of 1898, Thus Jordan
found that the "simultaneous deaths of both Monarchs" offered "a
3
fortunate solution of the difficulty."
For a short while Jordan was optimistic. The period 
immediately after the deaths was unexpectedly peaceful. There was 
the usual sense of hopeful anticipation associated with a new 
beginning although the regency was the third minority since 1860.
*See for example, Jordan to Campbell, private, 12 Dec. 1907,
Jordan Papers, vol. 5, in which Jordan says: "Wang, [Ta-hsieiJ 
the late Minister in London, Wu Ting-fang, who is going as 
Minister to Washington, and others whom I need not mention, tell 
me that they are glad to be out of the country, not knowing what 
may happen when the Empress Dowager dies".
2
C. MacDonald, ambassador at Tokyo, to Grey, tel. 81, conf.,
19 Nov. 1908, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 183.
3
Jordan to Grey, no. 14, conf., 6 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190; 
also Jordan to Campbell, private,r26 Nov. 1908, Jordan Papers in which 
Jordan is extremely out spoken ab4uuhis relief.
^The prince regent, Prince Ch\m, headed a mission of apology to Germany 
after the Boxer fiasco, see Jordan to Grey, no. 521, 21 Nov. 1908, Ch. 
Conf. Print, vol. 183; also Jordan to Grey, no. 257, 15 Jul. 1909, Ch. 
Conf. Print,vol. 191.
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The chief "compensating advantage" of the new regency, according 
to Jordan, was : ’’For the first time in history the supreme 
direction of Chinese affairs will be in the hands of a man who has 
seen something of foreign countries, who has come freely into 
contact with the outer world."^
Disillusionment set in two months later when Yuan Shih- 
k’ai was summarily shorn of all office in early 1909. To Jordan 
no Chinese official excelled over Yuan. Take for example Jordan1 s 
criticism of the Grand Council, the body which practically did the 
work of the central government, just before Yuan Shih-k’ai became a 
member of it. Of the two Manchu members, Prince ChTing was old and 
in feeble health and the other was a useless cypher. Of the two 
Chinese members Lin Shao-nien was a "dark horse" and Chu Hung-chi, 
who dominated the council and had the trust of the empress dowager, 
was "a narrow-minded pedant"."* The Grand Council immediately after 
Yuan’s dismissal was no better. On the Manchu side, Prince Ch’ing 
remained in office, Shih Hsu was inexperienced, and Na^i’ung also 
suffered from bad health. The Chinese, Chang Chih-tung and
Jordan to Campbell, private, 21 Mar. 1907, Jordan Papers, vol. 4. 
^Jordan to Grey, no. 119, conf., 16 Mar. 1909, Ch. Corres., vol. 636. 
^Jordan to Campbell, private, 15 May 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
g
Actually Jordan rather overlooked the modern aspect of Chang.
He advocated modernisation based on western knowledge rather 
than institutions, see Chang Chih-tung, Ch1 lian-hsiieh p ’ ienJTbtWt At ion 
(Shanghai, 1898); A. J. Brown, New Forces in Old China (London 
etc. 1904), pp. 189-90. Chang was a reformer of Chinese education,
F. L. H. Pott, The Emergency in China (Indian edition, 1914), p.129;
Lu Ch'uan-lin, were aged and too conservative. When a cabinet was
for the first time instituted in May 1911 in the place of the Grand
Council Jordan regarded it as a "new stable with the old horses".^
The regency was further weakened, in terms of personnel,
by the death of Chang Chih-tung in early October 1909. To Jordan
Chang had all along been overshadowed by Yuan Shih-k'ai. Chang was
8Yuan's rival and represented the old school of Chinese officials.
It was after Yuan's dismissal that Jordan realised better that for
some years Chang and Yuan had been the two pillars which bolstered 
9
up the dynasty. Perhaps what impressed Jordan most was that Chang 
"served his country with singular disinterestedness for nearly fifty 
years and died in comparative poverty"^ - a rare virtue in Chinese 
officialdom. Jordan was also disappointed with the dismissal of Ihant- 
fang, whom Jordan regarded as the ablest of the Manchu officials, on 
trivial grounds shortly before Chang Chih-tung*s death.**
The prince regent was responsible for yet another danger. 
Shortly after the inauguration of the regency there was a marked 
revival of Manchu ascendancy in all departments of government. He 
made no attempt to give effect to the decrees promising the fusion 
of the two races and abolition of Manchu privileges. Instead he
on a smaller scale than Yuan, Chang was a reformer of the army, see 
R. L. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912 
(Princeton, 1955), pp. 60-71. It is, however, true that he was 
less of a zealous reformer than Yuan during the last years of the 
dynasty, see Shen Yun-lung (ed.), Hsien-tai cheng-chih jen-wu shu- 
p* ing t Collected articles on leading figures of Modern China Jin 
CCS t'sung-k'an, vol. 1, pp. 65-6,
%I. E. Cameron puts forward a similar view - Chang was the only 
prop of the tottering dynasty after the deaths of Tz'tl-hsi and 
Ruang-hsu, see "Public Career of Chang Chih-tung 1837-1909" in 
Pacific Historical Review, vol. 7 (1938), p.208.
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trusted his two younger brothers, whose ability was doubtful, with
heavy responsibilities in the forces. He also exposed himself
exclusively to the influences of his cousin, Duke-Tsai^ tse,, and his
kinsman, T’ieh-liang, who was Yuan Shih-k*ai*s avowed enemy. Jordan
was aware of the fact that the four Manchus were nicknamed the
12'Inner Grand Council”. Towards the end# the ascendancy of the 
Manchus in Peking was accentuated by the formation of the hand-picked 
Manchu Imperial Guards. The danger was two-fold: ManchuSon the whole 
were less skilful in matters of government, and the stability of the 
Ch*ing dynasty had hitherto been dependent on a harmonised relation 
between the Manchu and Chinese elite*
Such was Jordan1s general conception of the government to 
which he was accredited during the first five years. Yet, to him, 
the real characteristic of the Manchu government of those years was 
not so much its increasing weakness in general as its weakness in 
face of the increasing autonomy of the provinces in particular. What 
was important was Jordan*s realisation that the weakness of the 
central government was harmful to foreign interests in China. 1906—
J911 were five years of unpleasant experience in which Jordan witnessed 
how the most important British railway interests in the Yangtze area 
suffered from the central government*s weakness. The railways in
^Jordan to Campbell, private, 21 Jan. 1909, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.
Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 195.
^Annual report, ibid.
12Jordan to Grey, no. 119, conf., 16 Mar. 1909, Ch. Corres., vol.
636; E. J. Dillion, "Foreign Affairs" section, Contemporary Review, 
vol. 100 (Dec. 1911), p. 878 in which Manchu favouritism was named 
as the "cardinal error" of the regent, also L. F. Lawton and
question were the Soochou-Hangchou-Ningpo Railway and the Hukuang
Railways. Negotiation for a loan to build the latter followed
immediately that for the former, and together they covered the entire
five years1 span.
In the general scramble for concessions of 1898 the
British and Chinese Corporation Limited obtained the right to build
the Shanghai-Nanking and the Soochou-Hangchou-Ningpo Railway lines
in the lower Yangtze district. On July 9 1903 the Final Shanghai-
Nanking Railway Loan Agreement was signed with important consequences
The Chinese regarded the agreement as having the most disadvantages.
The objectionable features of the agreement included heavy commission
the purchase of the native — built Shanghai-Woosung line as a branch
of the Shanghai-Nanking line, the great power of the British chief
engineer, and the predominant British control over the construction
13and management of the line. The harsh terms stimulated indigenous 
effort at railway development, particularly in the provinces of 
Kiangsu and Chekiang.
H. Hobden, "The Fall of Yuan Shih-kai", Fortnightly Review, vol. 87 
(1 Mar, 1910), p. 432.
13For terms of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway Loan Agreement see 
MacMurray, Treaties, vol. 1, pp. 387-409. For comments see Chang 
Kia-ngau, China1s Struggle for Railroad Development (New York, 1943), 
p.30.
^See Sheng to Mr. Brenan of the corporation, 24 May 1903 in 
Satow,to Grey, no. 120, 17 Mar. 1906, Ch. Corres., Vol. 22.
^British and Chinese Corporation to F.O., 9 Jan. 1906, Ch. Corres., 
vol. 22.
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Between 1898 and 1903 the British and Chinese Corporation
C
showed no active interest in the Soochu-Ningpo acquisition and the 
Chinese wondered whether the concession would be enforced. The 
terms of the preliminary agreement of this line were more or less 
parallel to that of the Shanghai-Nanking line, and it was expected 
that the final agreement of the two lines would be identical. On 
24 May 1903 Sheng Hsiian-huai, director-general of the Imperial 
Railway administration, notified the corporation that if surveys
and estimates were not made within six months of his writing the
. . 14preliminary agreement would be considered abrogated. On receiving
no answer to his letter Sheng explicitly encouraged the Chekiang 
gentry to proceed with their railway plans. The Chekiang Railway 
Company, formally established in 1905 with imperial sanction, 
formulated a provincial railway scheme centring at Hangchou, thus 
clashing directly with the British concession.
At the end of 1905 the British and Chinese Corporation was 
informed by Sheng that he had received imperial instruction to cancel 
the preliminary agreement with the corporation.^ The imperial order 
was given, at the instigation of Sheng, in self-defence against the 
petition of the provincial gentry. For the first eight months of 
1906, until Jordan reached Peking in September, negotiations between 
the corporation, the British legation, and the Chinese government
16Acting consul Smith, Hangchou, to Satow in Satow to Landsdowne, 
no. 429, 11 Dec. 1905; Satow to Grey, tel. 10, 13 Jan. 1906;
British and Chinese Corporation to F.O., 22 Feb. and 1 Mar. 1906;
Ch. Corres., vol. 22.
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were at a standstill. On the one hand, the Chekiang gentry,
encouraged by Sheng, the imperial decree and the new governor,
strengthened their agitation against the 1898 preliminary
agreement and actually began surveys for construction by the end 
16
of February, On the other hand, the Wai-wu Pu, represented
by Prince Ch’ing and T’ang Shao-i who were willing to continue
negotiations on the basis of the preliminary agreement, was
between the grips of the British and the provincials whose opposition
the government was not able to suppress.'^ In the middle of the year
Prince Ch’ing attempted to postpone the question by suggesting it be
shelved until the Canton-Kowloon Railway Loan Agreement, being
18negotiated with the same corporation, was settled.
When Jordan reached Peking on 10 September the controversy
reached its peak. Carnegie, charge d’affaires awaiting Jordan’s
arrival, informed the Foreign Office the same day that not only had
the government not resumed negotiations but an imperial rescript of
late August had authorised two new railway companies to build a line
19from Soochou to Hangchou to Nmgpo. In the next half year negot­
iations remained stagnant while Jordan constantly received new$of the 
railway progress made by the Chekiang gentry. On 26 October the 
Chekiang Provincial Railway Company held its first shareholders’ 
meeting in which it was stated that the company had about 6,000
shareholders and the amount paid up was between 4,210,000 and 4,219,000 
20dollars. The meeting was soon followed, in mid-November, by a formal
17Satow to Grey, no. 119, 17 Mar. 1906; Satow to Grey, no. 163,
10 Apr. 1906, Ch. Corres. vol. 22.
18
Carnegie to Grey, tel. 123, 11 Jun. 1906, Ch. Corres., vol. 22.
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opening of work on a railway which was attended by important
21provincial authorities. By the end of March,1907 the ambition 
of the provincial gentry had considerably increased; the Kiangsu 
and Chekiang railway administrations avowed their intention to
22build the Soochou-Kashing and Kashing-Hangchou sections respectively.
The progress made by the provinces did not signify slackness
on the part of Jordan. On the contrary, he plunged into the question
with vigour, bombarding the Wai-wu Pu with protests against provincial
construction. However, Jordan could not do much while the Canton-
Kowloon Railway Loan Agreement remained unratified. But the half year
of stagnation was a period of profitable observation. The most
obvious observation was that provincial autonomy, asserted by the moneyed
gentry, was a real problem against the increasing weakness of the
central government. Moreover, Jordan was convinced that provincial
enterprise, however vigorous it might first appear, would end in
failure. Native railway building was yet a wasteful procedure. In early
February^  1907 Jordan reported the existence of corruption in the
Chekiang Company which squeezed contributions from the populace which
19Carnegie to Grey, tel. 166, 10 Sept. 1906. The new rescript was
again made at the memorialisation of Sheng. See also Carnegie to Grey,
no. 358, conf., 23 Aug. 1906; and no. 375, 9 Sept, 1906, Ch.Corres., 
vol. 22.
20Summary of events in Hangchou in November in Jordan to Grey, no. 507,
29 Nov. 1906, Ch. Corres., vol. 217.
^Jordan to Grey, no. 526, 12 Dec. 1906, Ch. Corres., vol. 220.
^Jordan to Grey, no. 150, 28 Mar. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220.
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23was eager for the railway to be built, Morrison confirmed Jordan’s
observation of the waste incurred by provincial construction after a
visit to the Kiangsu province.^
Jordan resolved on insisting on the validity of the 1898
preliminary agreement, despite Sheng’s argument to the contrary, and
25on maintaining an "attitude of firm and patient pressure". After 
many representations in which Jordan emphasised the importance he and 
the British government attached to the line, moves were made by the 
Chinese government at the end of May to renew negotiations with the 
corporation. The Chinese government of course also realised the 
impossibility of abrogating the preliminary agreement unilaterally. 
Negotiations would begin pending the arrival of Wang Ta-hsieh, the 
late minister to London and a member of the Chekiang gentry. On 
arriving in Peking two months later Wang attempted to further procr­
astinate by proposing that negotiations be shelved awaiting the conc­
lusion of the Anglo-German Tientsin-Pukou Railway Agreement which 
Jordan relegated to second importance to the Soochou-Ningpo line.
23Monthly summary of events in Hangchou in Jordan to Grey, no. 74,
6 Feb. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 217.
^Jordan to Grey, no. 150, 28 Mar. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220.
^Jordan to Grey, tel. 181, 4 Oct. 1906, Ch. Corres., vol. 22.
26
Memorandum to Hillier in Jordan to Grey, no. 370, 7 Aug. 1907,
Ch. Corres., vol. 220.
27
Jordan to Grey, no. 370, 7 Aug. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220. It 
is asserted that Jordan was solely responsible for moderating the 
corporation’s terms in Chen, British Loans to China 1860-1913, p.114.
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Negotiations eventually began in early August. In
the second meeting Hillier, representing the corporation, was
given three alternatives. The first two amounted to a virtual
nullification of the preliminary agreement but the third was:
"That the Corporation should furnish a loan for 
the construction of the whole line by China 
herself, the loan being secured by Chinese 
Government revenues other than those of the rail­
way, but repayable out of the surplus earnings of 
the line."26
In short, a compromise was offered in which the corporation, 
though giving the loan, was divorced from the power of construction 
and control. The decision was with Jordan. He authorised Hillier
to accept the compromise*realising its expediency in face of the
27provincial attitude. But he refused the Chinese request that since
sufficient native capital had been accumulated the loan could be used
28for another project. An imperial edict was accordingly issued
charging the governors of Kiangsu and Chekiang to persuade the gentry
to desist from their obstinacy. The edict, largely due to Yuan Shih-
kTaifs influence, was described by Jordan as "an interesting example
...of how an Imperial Decree can be cancelled when necessary, by the
29issue of an Edict indirectly annulling its conditions".
Despite the compromise, negotiations were again checkmated
during the last quarter of 1907 by a severe recrudescence of prov­
incial opposition. Embittered by the compromise, the provinces 
decided to defy both the government and the British. Angry telegrams 
were heaped on both central and local authorities. Tuan-fang, the
28Jordan to Grey, no. 405, 20 Aug. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220.
29
Jordan to Grey, no. 513, 30 Oct. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220.
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viceroy of Nanking, received a belligerent letter from the provincial
30railway companies. Jordan was fully aware of the mass meetings in
the provinces, denouncing the British loan as an 11’alienation of the
31people’s rights’", and threatening anti-British boycotts. The
Chinese press, especially in Shanghai, threatened anti-dynastic risings
32and assassinations. Jordan also knew that Wang Ta-hsieh was warned
by his provincials that if he allowed the agreement to be signed his
33ancestral tomb would be desecrated.
The central government was highly embarrassed and dared not
v/AB
conclude the agreement with the corporation. Shengucalled to Peking
and instructed to act as an intermediary between the provinces and the
government. Adopting a softer attitude, the government invited
34provincial representatives to Peking to discuss matters. In the 
capital, the representatives demonstrated the most unrelenting 
determination to block any compromise settlement.
For text of the edict see Chang Ching-lu (ed.), Tung-hua hsu-lu. 
[Documents on the Kuang-hsii reign, continued J, (Shanghai, 1909), 
ch. 210, p.5.
30E-tu Zu Sun, "The Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway Loan of 1908",
Far Eastern Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 3 (Feb. 1951), p. 143.
31
Jordan to Grey, tel. 194, 12 Nov. 1907; Jordan to Grey, no. 513,
30 Oct. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220.
32Enclosure in Jordan to Grey, no. 513, 30 Oct. 1907, Ch. Corres., 
vol. 220.
^Jordan to Grey, no. 513, 30 Oct. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220.
For contemporary records o f the agitation see for example Cheng-lun 
[Political discussion ^ (Shanghai), vol. 1, no. 2 (Nov. 1907),pp.117-8.
34Jordan to Grey, no. 553, 26 Nov.j and Jordan to Grey, no. 594,
24 Dec. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 409.
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Jordan was infuriated by the behaviour of the provinces 
and the helplessness of the central government in face of it. He 
wrote emphatically at the end of November:
"The central government is now between the Devil 
and the deep sea .... The provincials are bomb­
arding the Wai Wu Pu with furious telegrams threat­
ening open rebellion if they yield, while we go 
down once a week and tell them that they have no 
claim to be considered a government if they cannot 
bring the provincials into line. There has never 
before been such a distinct test case between 
Peking and the provinces, and the result, whatever 
way it goes, must have far-reaching effects."35
Despite Jordan’s disapproval of the provinces he had
to further compromise because of them. He gave up insistence on
the precedence of the Soochou-Ningpo line over the Tientsin-Pukou
line when the Chinese government argued that the relatively lenient
terms of the latter when published would soften the provincials
because they were to be identical with those of the compromise on
36the Soochou-Ningpo line.
Provincial vehemence began to subside at the beginning 
of 1908. The release of the Tientsin-Pukou Railway Agreement had 
a tranquilising effect. Furthermore, the central government conceded 
that the loan would not be borne by the provinces but by the Board 
of Posts and Communications. The final agreement was signed on 
6 March* 1908. It was an obvious decline from the Shanghai-Nanking
35Jordan to Campbell, private, 28 Nov. 1907, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.
The view that the issue was a test case was shared by other 
competent observers, for example, Osaka Mainichi Sinbun, 12 Dec. 1907, 
translated in Wai-chiao Pao. vol. 4, no. 2 (7 Mar. 1908), p. 17(b).
o £
Jordan to Grey, tel. 179,16 Oct.., tel. 190, 9 Nov., tel. 213,
9 Dec. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220.
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Railway Loan Agreement in terms of British advantage. Unlike the
37Shanghai-Nanking Railway the Shanghai-Ningpo line could not be
mortgaged or controlled by British creditors in the case of default
because it was secured not on its own surplus earnings but those of
the Imperial Railways of North China. There would be no British
auditor as stipulated in the preliminary agreement. On the
administrative side, the British chief engineer was to be selected by
38the Board of Posts and was to function under Chinese authorities.
39The emphasis was that the line was a Chinese property though nominally
built with a British loan. Jordan said that such reduced privileges
40were "the best we can obtain under the circumstances".
There was not a long respite after the Shanghai-Ningpo 
Railway Loan Agreement was signed before negotiations began for 
constructing the Hankow £ Hupei ]-Canton£ Kuangtung ] Railway, 
or the Hukuang Railway, to be brief. Later, negotiations were 
extended over the Hankow-Szechuan line and together with the 
Hankow-Canton line they were called the Hukaung Railways.
The concession to build the 710 miles long Hankow- 
Canton line was initially obtained by the American Chinese Devel­
opment Company in April 1898. On 6 September 1905 the Chinese gover-
41
nment redeemed the line from the Americans for £6,750,000. The
37It was arranged at the last stage that the railway would start 
from Shanghai instead of Soochou.
3 8For a comparison of the two railway agreements see Z-tu Zen 
Sun, Chinese Railways and British Interests (New York, 1954), 
pp.68-71.
39The railway was built without resort to the British loan funds. 
^Jordan to Grey, tel. 37, 10 Feb. 1908, Ch. Corres., vol. 409.
Hongkong Government gave a loan of £1,110,000 to help the 
redemption. In return for the redemption loan Chang Chih-tung, 
viceroy of Hupei and Hunan, sent a private letter to Fraser, 
then the consul-general at Hankow, giving priority to British 
nationals in railway development in the two provinces,^
During the following three years construction of the 
line was undertaken by the Hu provinces and Ruangtung. Despite 
the establishment of the Szechuan-Haukow and Cantou-Hankow 
Railroad Companies the three years were a period of stagnation 
with only a measure of success in Ruangtung. Chang Chih-tung 
realised the necessity for a foreign loan if the line was to 
be built and revenue obtained from it quickly. Nine months after
For details of the role of the American company until the 
redemption in 1903 see W. R. Briasted, "The United States and the 
American Chinese Development Company", Far Eastern Quarterly, 
vol. 11, (Feb. 1952), pp. 149- 59. For Chang*s reason of 
redemption see Yoshihiro Hatano, "The Background of the Railway 
Nationalisation Policy in the Late Chfing Period", pp. 12-13, 
P R C C  C
42In view of the connection of the Hankow-Canton line with the 
Canton-Kowloon line the Hongkong Government was eager to keep 
the former free from the control of the other powers.
/ Q
Jordan to Grey, no. 576, 23 Dec. 1908, Ch. Corres., vol. 622, 
Hatano, "The Background of the Railway Nationalisation Policy 
in the Late ChTing Period", p. 25. Chang, China*s Struggle for 
Railroad Development, pp. 39-40; Tseng K'un-hua, Chung-kuo 
tTieh-lu shih £ History of Chinese Railways ^ (Peking 1924), p.l 
and Hsu Tfung-hsin, Chang Wen-hsiang-kung nien-pfu [ Chronology of 
Chang Chih-tung (Shanghai, 1946), p.213.
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being promoted as a grand councillor, Chang was appointed as
director-general of the Hankow-Canton Railway in July 1908,
Recalling the private agreement of 1905 Chang applied in October,
through Fraser, for the help of British finance for the Hupei
section of the Canton-Hankow line, Jordan was overjoyed by Chang's
44offer and instructed Fraser to accept it.
The importance of the Canton-Hankow line in terms of
British interests was obvious. When it was completed it would be
part of the railway system which connected Peking with Canton and
Canton with,the British Colony of Hongkong. The line would be
I f
■V 4
invaluable to promoting British interests in the Yangtze and the 
West River regions. But to Jordan's disappointment the loan ended 
up as an international enterprise in which Britain, France, Germany 
and America shared the loan-equally. The history of the Hukuang 
Railways loan had two distinct phases: international rivalry, and 
provincial opposition. The second phase is more important here 
because it is a continuation, from the Shanghai-Ningpo Railway, of 
the central theme of provincial separation.
In the beginning Jordan was pleased with Chang Chih-tung's 
intention to obtain a purely British loan. In February 1909 
negotiations between the British and Chinese Corporation and the 
Chinese broke down because J. 0, P. Bland, representative of the 
corporation, insisted on the terms of the Canton-Kowloon Railway 
as affording more adequate supervision by the lending party? but
44
Jordan to Grey, no. 457, conf., 14 Oct. 1908, Ch. Corres., vol. 422.
39
Chang Chih-tung would not concede anything more than the
45Tientsm-Pukou terms. At first Jordan agreed with Bland  ^
but he soon changed his attitude when the Germans offered 
the Tientsin-Pukou terms to Chang. Despite JordanTs objection, 
the London Foreign Office and the bank agreed to sign an 
arrangement on 14 May, 1909 whereby the Hongkong and Shanghai 
Bank, the Banquecteflndo Chine which had hitherto been operating
under the British bank in the matter, and the Deutsch-Asiatiche
• 46Bank obtained equal shares of the loan. It was in the
allotment of engineering rights that Jordan fonni some 
comfort. The British group received the Hankow-Canton line 
exclusively to itself. The German group was given the Szechuan- 
Hankow line up to Ichang, thus the entire Eukuang Railway system 
was brought into question. The American insistence on particip­
ation in the loan delayed matters for another year and on 23 May^  
1910, a quadruple agreement was signed accepting American 
participation and raising the total figure of the loan to 
£6,000,000.^ On the whole, Jordan was not deeply involved in 
the period of international controversy in relation to American 
inclusion because he was taken seriously ill in early 1910 and 
soon afterwards left China until the end of the year.
^Jordan to Grey, tel. 33, 23 Jan. 1909, Ch. Corres., vol. 622. 
46For terms see memorandum of terms of agreement come to at 
meeting of 14 May in Addis to Grey, 17 May 1909, Ch. Corres., 
vol. 624, For Jordan’s displeasure see Jordan to Campbell, 
private, 4 Mar. 1909, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.
^For text of the agreement see MacMurray, Treaties, vol. 
1, pp. 886-7.
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After the inclusion of German interests Jordan became
reconciled to the internationalisation of the Hukuang Loan and
thought that "it matters not so much who builds the railways as
48that they should be built quickly in the interests of trade".
Thus he was disappointed with the delay caused by the American
action. However he knew that opposition from the provinces which
became immediately noticeable after Chang Chih-tung1s death in
October* 1909 was far more menacing. Opposition existed in Ruangtung
even before Chang’s death. When the news of a foreign loan for the
Hankow-Canton line was first heard of iri 1908 the president of the
Hankow-Canton Railway Company told Fox, acting consul-general at
Canton, that the company already had sufficient funds to complete
49the Ruangtung section of the line. Jordan notices that agitation
intensified in Ruangtung when Chang Chih-tung was appointed as
director-general of the Hankow-Canton Railway. Chang had to
convince the provinces of the government’s concern for their 
50interest. Opposition from Hupei and Hunan then was not as strong 
as Ruangtung partly because progress in the provinces was far 
behind that in Ruangtung, but mostly because Chang Chih-tung, even
after his transfer to the capital, retained a strong influence in
• 51these provinces.
^Jordan to Campbell, private, 11 Oct. 1909, Jordan Papers, vol. 6.
49Fox to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, no. 303, 7 July 1908, Ch.
Corres., vol. 422.
*^See translation of Chang’s proclamation in Jordan to Grey, no.
455, 14 Oct. 1908, Ch. Corres., Vol. 422. The declaration?was 
made in August, see Wang Shu-tung, Chang Wen-hsiang-kung chuan-chi 
£ The complete work of Chang Chih-tung ], (Peiping, 1928) , 
"Telegraphic Correspondence", ch. 80, pp. 3-6.
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With Chang’s death the provinces got out of hand. Jordan 
was informed that the Hupei Railways United Association forced 
contributions from the farming and business classes in Hupei. The 
vernacular press in the two Hu provinces quoted freely from the 
British press, notably The Times, which placed political signific­
ance on the loan negotiations, to prove that the powers had ulterior
acting W;tl|
motives in competing to build the railways. The provinces ^ era^ the
59cognisance, if not support, of the local authorities. * Consular
reports from Szechuan also indicated provincial zeal for railway
53building with native resources. Provincial pressure was so
adament that shortly before Jordan left China in early 1910 the Hupei
gentry was granted the right to issue stocks by an imperijal edict
for constructing the Hupei sections of both the Canton-Hankow and
Szechuan-Hankow lines. Jordan protested to the Wai-wu Pu with his
54French and German colleagues.
Jordan to Grey, no. 377, 13 Oct., no. 423, 16 Nov. 1909, Ch. 
Corres., vol. 626. After Chang’s death, direction of railway 
affairs was placed in the Board of Posts and Communication under 
Hsu Shih-ch’ang.
“^ Jordan to Grey, no. 468, 16 Dec., no. 478, 22 Dec. 1909, Ch. 
Corres., vol. 851. See also memorial of governor of Hunan,
Ts*en Ch’un-hsiian, 23 Nov. 1909. Ta-Ch’ing li-chao shih-lu 
[] Records of the reigns of Ch* ing Dynasty , compiled by the 
Department of State of Manchukuo (Tokyo, 1937), Hsiian-t’ung, ch. 
24, pp. 7-8. Later, Jui-Cheng, acting viceroy of Liang-Hu, also 
supported the gentry. MaxMuller to Grey, no. 165, 25 May 1910, 
Ch. Corres., vol. 851.
53For example, H. A. Little to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, no. 6,
5 Jan. 1910, Ch. Corres., vol. 851; also North China Daily News, 
23 Dec. 1909.
^Jordan to Grey, no. 51, 15 Feb. 1910, Ch. Corres., vol. 851.
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The absence of Jordan was characterised in China by
frequent anti-foreign outbursts, particularly in the provinces
affected by the Hukuang loan. There was open expulsion of
foreigners in Hangchou, tension in Nanking, and general clamouring
55against foreign encroachment in the whole of Szechuan. The most
serious outbreak was at Changsha in late spring when all foreign
56property, except the Yale Mission Hospital, Was destroyed.
When Jordan returned to China the three provinces re­
mained hostile and the loan unsigned. The loan was not to be 
signed until he had passed through what he called "never ... a
more strenuous six m o n t h s i n  which he gave the Wai-wu Pu and
58the Board of Communications "no peace". A brighter prospect 
appeared for the resumption of negotiations when Sheng Hstian-huai 
was appointed as president of the Board of Communications in the 
middle of January. Sheng had formulated the policy of nationalis­
ation of trunk lines and commercialisation of branch lines. He
entered into active negotiation with the banks between February
. 59and May with the mind to carry out his new policy . During the
60period provincial agitation continued.
^For information on the unrest see Ch. Emb. Arch. (F.O. 228),
vols. 2618-9; (F.O. 233) vol. 133.
56For a first hand account of the outbreak see M. Hewlett, then 
British consul at Changsha, Forty Years in China (London, 1943)> 
pp. 59-68; also Ch. Emb. Arch. (F.O. 228) vol.2617. The immediate
reasons for the riot appeared to be the rise of price in rice and
the discontent of the stone guilds, but the question of railway had 
already created a volcanic situation.
57Jordan to Campbell, private, 24 May 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
58Jordan to Campbell, private, 16 Mar. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
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The four months were essentially a period of
readjustment and compromise. The Chinese government feared the
provinces on the one hand and used them to extract better terms
from the banks on the other hand. The banks and the governments,
already taxed by the problem of provincial opposition, was eager
to conclude the loan especially at the later stage when they heard
61rumours of the formation of a rival international consortium.
Jordan was extremely impatient.
After the consortium made the concession whereby the
62Chingmenchou-Han^yang branch was excluded from the agreement 
a new hitch occurred in mid April. The question involved
the British particularly and Jordan played an important role in it.
59Sheng was in Japan where he inspected Japanese industry and bank­
ing between September and November, 1908. It is possible that he 
based his policy of railway nationalisation on the Japanese model 
which was put into practice about two years before he visited Japan*
A. Feuerwerker, China1s Early Industrialisation, Sheng Hsuan-huai 
and Mandarin Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass. 1958), pp.79, 81-2. For 
Japanese railway nationalisation see Japan’s Railroad Ministry, Nihon 
tetsinfeshi [History of Japan’s railways ] (Tokyo, 1922), pp. 797-830.
60At the end of January just before the negotiation resumed, for 
example, a riot broke out against the British in the British 
concession of Hankow. The alleged cause was the death of a Chinese 
coolie. But as Jordan pointed out the cause was long embedded*
Jordan to Grey, no. 43, 30 Jan. 1911, Ch. Conf. Print, vol.2064.
61According to Jordan the rumours had a considerable effect on the 
banks’- representatives and his colleagues. The chief spirit of the 
new combination appeared to be the Rufeo-Asiatic Bank, Jordan to Grey, 
no. 122, 17 Mar. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1080.
62The exclusion affected the American and German shares most. Jordan 
was not unhappy to see the Germans "obliged to forego some of their 
ill-gotten gain after all", Jordan to Campbell, private, 16 Mar. 1911, 
Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
In a meeting between the bankers and Sheng Hsuan-huai oh 12 April 
Sheng announced that in face of the increasing agitation in the 
provinces he could not accept any agreement without further concess­
ions from the groups. Sheng proposed that half of the loan funds 
should be deposited with the Ta-Chfing Government Bank and the Chiao- 
t’ung Bank because he could not accept control of loan funds by foreign 
banks at a damaging rate of interest. Hillier at first urged the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to assent to the proposal. Jordan too
63immediately telegraphed the Foreign Office advising immediate sanction.
The Hongkong and Shanghai Bank,as the chief issuing bank, was not happy
with the arrangement which cut down its control of loan funds. However,
64Addis relented partly because of Jordan’s attitude. Jordan expanded his 
views later and convinced the Foreign Office that although the 
"arrangement is not an ideal one ... such a favourable opportunity 
for a settlement is very unlikely to recur", and that "it is no time 
for mincing matters by considering the interests of any particular 
institution when the larger interests of British trade in China and 
of a British colony are at stake.
Things took a new turn when Hillier, after being told 
by Sheng Hsuan-huai of the precarious state in the provinces, wanted 
to ask the bank to revoke its consent. He was afraid that the bank 
63
Hillier to Addis in Addis to F.O., 13 Apr.> Jordan to Grey, tel. 99,
13 Apr. 1911, Ch. Corres., Vol. 1080.
^Grey to Jordan, tel. 70, 19 Apr. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1080.
^Jordan to Grey, tel. 102, 20 Apr. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1080 
on which Campbell minutes: "I dare say Sir J. Jordan is right";
Jordan to Campbell, private, 22 Apr. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
would stand to lose if a grave situation arose after large deposits
passed into the Chinese native banks, Hillier told Jordan that the
bank offices of Shanghai and Hongkong were apprehensive of the effect
on the bank, as the chief exchange bank, caused by disorganisation of
the exchange market as a result of large transfers. Jordan pointed
out that if the bank had just made several provincial loans over which
it had no effective control, it should be able to agree to the new
arrangement; and if the other groups had given up the Chingmenchou-
Hanjyang branch line the British group should be able to make the 
66sacrifice. During the rest of April the quarrel was on the portion
of the loan to be deposited with the Chinese banks. In assenting
to the principle o f deposit in the first place Addis had specified
the proportion as one-quarter; but the Chinese insisted on one-half.
Jordan again urged the Foreign Office to accede and even Hillier
regarded the question of secondary importance after the principle
67had been yielded.
Events went on smoothly afterwards between the banks 
and the Chinese government. But provincial disavowal remained strong. 
To facilitate the signature of the Final Hukuang Railways Loan Agree­
ment Sheng Hsuan-huai urged the throne to issue an edict, dated 
9 May, transferring all main railway lines to the Board of Communic­
ations. Although Jordan would have liked the branch lines to be
66Jordan to Grey, tel. 103, 21 Apr. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1080.
67
Jordan to Grey, tel. 105, 25 Apr; Hillier to Addis in Addis to
F.O., 25 Apr. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1080.
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nationalised as well, the nationalisation of the trunk lines
undoubtedly represented significantly to him a measure of government
success over the provinces. Writing to Campbell Jordan saidj "The
Government here at last determined to take their courage in both
68hands and to deal firmly with the provinces." The Hukuang Rail-
69ways Loan Agreement was signed on 20 May with other minor modific­
ations. Britain retained sole engineering rights over the Canton- 
Hankow line after a fierce international struggle. Jordan could
hardly conceal his pleasure and looked forward to the near future
70
when Peking would be directly connected with Hongkong by rail.
To Jordan the choice between the provinces and the 
central government was obvious. The provincial gentry were anti- 
foreign in the financial field. In both cases of railway loan 
negotiations concessions had to be made because of provincial agit­
ation. In the case of the Shanghai-Ningpo Railway it is arguable 
that even had there been no provincial uproar the simultaneous 
existence of the Tientsin-Pukou Railway loan negotiations made it 
inevitable for the British to soften their terms. But, whether the 
concessions would have been as drastic, had it not been for the 
provinces, is another question.
On the other hand Jordan generally found the Chinese 
government, represented by officials such as Prince Chfing, Na-T'ung,
68Jordan to Campbell, private, 15 May 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
69Terms of agreement are available in MacMurray, Treaties, vol. 1, 
pp. 866 -8 99 .
_ private,
See, for example, Jordan to Campbell,/24 May 1911, Jordan Papers, 
vol. 7.
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Yuan Shih-k’ai, Wang Ta-hsieh, T’ang Shao-i, and Liang Tun-yen,
willing to fulfill its foreign obligations,^* Even Sheng Hsuan-
huai, who posed as the greatest difficulty in the Shanghai-Ningpo
case, and in Jordan’s opinion was anti-British and an enemy of 
.72Yuan Shih-k’ai, adopted a new conciliatory attitude towards foreign
• * * •concessionaires in the Hukuang Railways loan negotiations.
Although Jordan became relatively ' optimistic about
the Manchu government after it had signed the Hukuang Railways Loan
Agreement and the Currency Reform Loan a month earlier, he continued
to be conscious of its weakness in dealing with the provinces. For
five months the provinces agitated against the government’s decision
to nationalise the trunk lines. The summit of agitation was reached
when serious revolts broke out in late August in Szechuan under the
leadership of P’u Tien-chiin, a member of the gentry, who issued the
famous "Ch’uan-jen tzu-pao sheng-chiao shuo" (A discussion on the
73Szechuanese self-preservation). Despite the professed determination
of the government to suppress the outbreak it remained unabated when
74the Hankow revolution broke out in October the same year.
The New Spirit: revolutionary and constitutional
After having been to Korea Jordan found the China to which 
he returned much different from that which he had left ten years before.
*^See, for example, Jordan to Grey, no. 334, 7 Jul. 1907, Ch.Corres., 
vol. 230.
72
Jordan to Grey, no. 594, 24 Dec. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 409.
73For details of the Szechuan revolt see H. Redtke, "The Genesis 
of the Revolution in Szechuan", P R C C C .; also Tai Chih-li 
(ed.), Ssu-ch’uan pao-lu yiin-tung shih-liao. [Documents on the 
Szechuan railroad revolt] , (Peking, 1959).
74 i-7Jordan to Admiral Winsloe, private, 15 Sept.1911, Jordan Papers, vol.7.
48
Of course no great changes were noticeable among the general mass 
of the people, but many could be found in the influential groups 
in Peking such as the court nobles, the officials, the intellectuals 
and the wealthy people. These changes were often reflected in the 
social life of the capital. Jordan was at first surprised to meet at 
dinner princes and other dignitaries who had abandoned their former 
secluded mode of life. Women of rich, respectable families were seen 
on the streets in carriages or even riding astride. While he 
regarded these changes in social life as wonderful Jordan could not 
help wondering "if things are not going too fast, and if a big react­
ion may not set in before real reform is effected". He was also 
astounded at the number of officials and intellectuals who "had
studied abroad, spoke several foreign languages, and were quite equal
75to the foreigner on his own ground".
Before long Jordan realised that changes were not con­
fined to the capital. The outlook of the articulate sector of the 
empire generally, represented by the intellectuals, the newspapermen, 
the merchants, and the moneyed-gentry of the provinces, had undergone 
a radical change. In short, the articulate China had awakened. She 
was awakened to her weakness^ more important still, she was awakened
to the advantages taken out of her weakness by foreign powers. As the
76annual report of the British legation in Peking for 1907 puts it: 
"China for the Chinese’ is not a mere temporary craze, but a settled 
conviction which has sunk deep into the minds of the people, and will 
75Jordan to Campbell, private, 29 Nov. 1906; 8 Aug. 1907, Jordan Papers, 
vol. 4; Jordan, "Some Chinese I have Known", Nineteenth Century, vol. 88 
(Dec. 1920), p. 947.
Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1907, Ch.Conf.Print, vol. 178.
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have to be reckoned with in all dealings with this Empire in the future".
Closely associated with this birth of national feeling, though not
unmarrdd by other more materialist considerations, was the "recovery
of sovereign rights movement" which grew in intensity as the years drew
77towards the 1911 revolution.
The new spirit was reflected in several characteristics 
of the time. Jordan1 s attention was particularly drawn to two of them; 
the Chinese press,^the boycotts. The former was frequently used to the 
severe detriment of both the dyn^asty and foreign interests in China, 
and the latter, although they almost always finished up in disgracing 
the central government, were primarily aimed against foreign goods.
The annual report of the legation for 1906, the first year 
of Jordan’s return to China, has a fairly large section on: the Chinese 
press. Broadly speaking, it was of two types; that^circulated in the 
interior and that in the treaty ports. As a result of severe press 
censorship the first type of paper was published merely as official 
gazettes. But the second type in the ports became increasingly anti- 
dynastic and anti-foreign in tone. The much repeated slogans were 
"China’s rights and interests", "dignity bf the state", "recovery of 
concessions", "independence" and "self-government". Press censorship 
did not affect these papers which owed their unmolested existence 
to the extra-territorial privileges of the foreigners in the foreign 
settlements. The report further points out that the brains behind
77Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 201.
78these papers were mostly returned students from Japan. The report
for 1910 reports a great increase in the number of papers and those
in the Yangtze valley in particular contributed to the feeling of
unrest by propagating warnings against the partition of China by the 
79powers. Closely associated with the Chinese press as an anti-
foreign tactic were the posting of placards and distribution of
80handbills containing similar slogans.
The first boycott by China was against American goods 
in 1905*in protest against the American immigration ban on Chinese. 
Despite the attempt of high o fficials like Viceroy Yuan Shih-k’ai 
of Chihli to stamp out the boycott and the protest of the American 
minister, the anti-American boycott lasted for several months with 
the support of merchants and newspapermen, especially those in 
Canton and Shanghai. Jordan must have heard of this unprecedented 
event in Korea. Its significance was not missed by the French and 
Russian papers in China which denounced the boycott from the start 
and warned that it would eventually effect all foreign interests 
alike.^
78Jordan tb Grey, annual report for 1906, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 171.
79Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 201.
80See, for example, Jordan to Grey, no. 53, 16 Feb. 1910, enclosing 
an intelligence report by Seeds, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 199; for a 
newspaper cutting on a placard posted in Szechuan urging national 
preparedness against foreigners, see Ch. Emb. Arch.^ F.O. 233), vol. 
133; see also L. Giles, "The Awakening of China : A street placard
from Hunan". Nineteenth Century. Vol. 60. (Oct.1906) pp. 521-32 .
81For details of the boycott see Akira Iriye, "Public Opinion in 
Late Chfing China", pp. 8-16,P R C C C , T. F. Millard, The New Far 
East (London, 1906), pp. 244-55; and C. F. Remer, A Study of Chinese 
Boycotts, (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 29-39. M. Field, "The Chinese 
Boycott of 1905", in Papers on China (Havard Univ.) vol. 11, (1907),
pp. 63-98.
In 1908 Jordan himself witnessed another boycott in China, 
this time against Japan, after the Tatsu Maru incident. Early in the 
year Tatsu Maru. a Japanese freighter, was searched and detained by 
the Chinese government for having on board arms for the revolutionar­
ies. Merchants at Canton in particular boycotted Japanese goods on 
learning Japan’s humiliating demands on the Wai-wu Pu for an apology, 
punishment of responsible officials, reparation for damage done to the
ship, and payment for the arms which were to be confiscated by the
82Chinese government.
Jordan was to some extent involved in both the negotiation 
and the boycott. Both the Chinese and Japanese governments asked for 
his good offices in arranging a settlement. Although the Admiralty 
agreed readily to arbitrate between the two governments Jordan felt 
that active intervention on the part of Britain might expose her to 
’’the charge of holding the Canton Government responsible for the acts
of pirates, while at the same time encouraging the importation of arms
83 gA.
for their use”. Grey was also reluctant to interfere. ^  Soon after
the boycott started MacDonald, on being requested by the Japanese
government, telegraphed Grey to ask if the consul-general at Canton
could be instructed to approach the Chinese authorities with a view to
8jJ*
allaying the boycott. The Foreign Office naturally referred the 
82For the course of the incident see Iriye, ’’Public Opinion in
Late Ch’ing China", pp. 16-22; and Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming
i-shih, [Materials on pre-1911 revolutionary history] , (Commercial 
Press, 1946-7), vol. 4, pp. 188-94.
83Admiralty to F.O., 7 Mar. and confidential clause of Jordan to Grey, 
tel. 47, 25 Feb. 1908, Ch. Corres., vol. 425.
8 G^rey’s minutes on Admiralty to F.O., ibid.
^MacDonald to Grey, tel. 34,30 Apr.1908, Ch.Conf.Print,vol. 182.
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matter to Jordan who was fully aware that the boycott could equally 
be directed against British goods. He therefore instructed the consul- 
general to approach the viceroy informally on the matter but no 
concrete diplomatic moves should be made "to the detriment of our
QX
trade". Jordan’s apprehension should be set against Count Hayashi’s
comment on the boycott: "The day will come when China will rise against
England. As that power has the greatest interests in China it stands 
to reason that she will suffer the heaviest losses of any of the 
powers".^
"The day" came towards the end of the same year. On 29
November a Chinese passenger died on board the British river-steamer
"Fatshan". The native press and a local political organisation,
Tzu-ch’ih Hui, asserted that the death was caused by a Portuguese 
member of the crew. On the first two days of December the acting 
British consul-general held an inquiry which gave the verdict that 
the man died of natural causes. Anti-British agitation was immed­
iately whipped up against the verdict. The viceroy succeeded in 
bringing about a fortnight’s lull on the protest of the acting consul- 
general. However, a boycott against the "Fatshan" was staged at the
83beginning of 1909 when the second inquiry produced the same result. w 
Another anti-British boycott occurred a few months later 
in the Yantgze area centred at Kuikiang. The cause was the alleged 
ill-treatment of a Chinese coolie, who died afterwards, by the 
superintendent of police in the British concession at Kiukiang. At
^Jordan to Grey, tel. 90, 2 May 1908, China Cor re s., vol. 425,
®^ A. M. Pooley, (trans.), The Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi (London/, 
1915), p.303.
the end of April the superintendent was accused ,o f murder but found 
not guilty in an inquiry held by the British consul and an officer 
deputed by the local taotai. The matter dragged on for several months 
with repeated inquiries while the population in Kiukiang was protest­
ing violently against the verdict. The question had to be taken up 
by the Wai-wu Pu and the British legation.
Oh 17 August Jordan was telegraphically informed of a 
boycott by Kiukiang against all British shipping from carrying goods 
destined for the port. The boycott hit hardest at Messrs. Jardine, 
Matheson and Company and Messrs. Butterfield and Swire Company. It 
soon had the support of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai
Qrt
and British shipping in the Yangtze generally was affected. It is
important to note that while making representations to the Wai-wu Pu
repeatedly in strong terms^Jordan did his best to pacify local
feeling by instructing the municipal council to transfer the super-
90intendent concerned and withdrawing the consul at Kiukiang. The
boycott gradually died down towards the close of the year.
During the two incidents Jordan was extremely conscious 
of the fact that the largest British firms in China were "singularly
9(
sensitive to the least dislocation of their trade". On the other 
hand, the Chinese became increasingly ready to threaten, if not 
actually stag® . , anti-British boycotts. For example, at the end of
^Jordan to Grey, tel. 1, 2 Jan. 1909; no. 4, 4 Jan. 1909, Ch. Corres., 
vol. 613.
^Details are available in Jordan to Grey, no. 336, 16 Sept., 1909,
Ch.Conf. Print, vol. 191.
9 OJordan to Grey, no. 373, 12 Oct. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, Vol. 191.
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1909 and beginning of 1910 such threats were propagated by the
oO
native press over the question of the Lanchou mine.
Leaving aside the various facets of the new spirit 
mentioned above Jordan was aware of two persistent expressions of 
the same spirit in the form of two movements running through the 
years 1906-1911. They were the revolutionary movement and the 
consitutional movement.
In 1905 Sun Yat-sen founded the Chung-kuo Tfung-meng 
Hui in Tokyo. Between 1906 and 1911 there was a series of attempts 
directly or indirectly associated with the society, aiming ultimately 
av unseatAthe Manchu government.
In December 1906 anti-dynastic risings, representing 
the first endeavour of the T’ung-meng Hui, broke out at Liuyang and 
its adjacent prefectures on the border of HunCtn and Kiangsi. Jordan
91
reported a rapid suppression and expressed not the slightest anxiety. ** 
But the risings made an impact especially on the authorities in the 
Wuhan area. In the following months there was a purge in the New Army 
at Nanking, and a close search for secret societies in the central 
Yangtze area. The consul-general at Shanghai reported this state of 
official nervousness to Jordan together with the translation of Chang 
Chih-tung’s observation on the revolutionary societies in the 
provinces bordering upon the Yangtze. Jordan considered Chang’s views 
91Jordan to Alston, private, 7 Jan. 1910, Jordan Papers, vol. 6.
9<2
Jordan to Campbell, private, 11 Nov. 1909, Jordan Papers, vol. 6.
Jordan to Grey, tel. 242, 12 Dec.; tel. 244, 15 Dec.1906, Ch. Corres. 
vol. 38. For Chinese accounts of the risings see Li, Cheng-chih shih, 
vol.1, pp.269-70; Wen Rung-chih, Chung-hua min-kuo ko-ming shih 
[ History of the Chinese Republic until the Northern ExpeditionJ ,
(Shanghai, 1927), vol. 1, p. 25.
55
a& "improbable" and would not have reported to the Foreign Office 
had it not been that similar "alarmist rumours" reached him through 
Sir Robert Hart. Sir Robert told Jordan that Yuan Shih-k*ai had
Q£*
his troops ready to go to the Yangtze region at a moment's notice.
Thus for a time the Yangtze area was closed to the
infiltration of the T'ung-meng-Hui. Moreover, after the suppression
of the Liuyang revolts the Ch'ing government discovered that the
revolutionary headquarters and leaders were in Tokyo. Japan was asked
to deport Sun Yat-sen, Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei and others who
afterwards established a new headquarters at Hanoi, Annam. Thus for
the next few years most of the revolutionary outbreaks took place in
south and south-west China. At the end of May and beginning of June
1907 the T'ung mengHui directed risings at Swatow and Huichou
respectively in Ruangtung. The consul-general at Canton telegraphed
Jordan of the disturbance on 30 May. Several days later Jordan
learned from the British admiral that at least at Swatow the rebels
had been dispersed. Despite the anxiety of the Chinese government
Jordan did not attach much significance to the risings. It was only
about two months earlier that the military attache of the legation
reported after a tour in the Yangtze that the revolutionary elements
95"were yet incapable of causing serious trouble. Jordan was further 
9&
\Jordan to Grey, no. 9, V. / conf., 7 Jan. 1907, enclosing a despatch 
from the consul-general at Shanghai, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 173. The 
state of official nervousness was confirmed in Li, Cheng-chih shih, 
vol. 1, pp. 270-7.
9$Confidential memorandum of the military attache in Jordan to Grey, 
no. 211, 2 May 1907, Ch. Corres., Vol. 220.
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convinced of the insignificance of the revolts in that for more 
than a week the consuls at Swatow and Amoy had not taken the trouble 
to report on the disturbance. On being asked by Jordan the two 
consuls said that newspaper accounts on the matter were grossly
96exaggerated.
After the failure at Swatow and Huichou, the T'ung-meng 
Hui revolutionaries staged another uprising in Ruangtung at Lienchou 
and Chinchou. Jordan did not think the incident was serious except 
that he was considerably annoyed at the destruction of British 
mission property at Lienchoufu during the disturbances preceding the 
revolt.^
On 6 July 1907 the Manchu governor of Anhui, En Hing,
was assassinated by a revolutionary Hsu Hsi-lin who acted independently
of the T'ung-meng Hui, but is much revered in the T'ung-meng Hui
literature. The assassination was followed by an abortive uprising
in Anking, the provincial capital, in which the woman revolutionary
Ch'iu Chin was involved. Hsu and Chfiu and a few others were caught,
9®severely tortured and executed. Jordan noticed that the assassin­
ation caused a great panic the Grartfl Council and high officials
Jordan to Grey, tel. 100, 7 Jun; tel. 101, 8 Jun. 1907, Ch.Corres., 
vol. 231. For details of the two risings see Feng, Ko-ming i-shih, 
vol. 5, pp. 99-116. Lo Chia-lun, Ruo-fu nien-p'u ch'u-kao. [Draft 
chronological biography of Sun Yat-senJ , (Taipei 1959), vol. 1, 
pp. 177-82. also The Times, 30 May, 1-3 Jun. 1907.
97 Jordan to Grey, no. 304, 25 Jan. 1907, Ch. Gorres., vol. 229. For 
details of the disturbances see Wen, Chung-hua min-kuo ko-ming shih, 
pp. 26-7. Feng Tzu-yu, Chung-kuo ko-ming yun-tung erh-shih-liu-nien 
tsu-chih shih, [ Organisation ;of the Chinese revolutionary movementj , 
(Shanghai, 1948), pp. 146-7.
98 For details of the entire Anking incident and its aftermath see Lo 
Chia-lun (ed.), K M W H , vol. 1, pp. 96-132; see also Kuo-fu nien-p'u
Ch'u-kao, vol. 1, pp. 182-6; and Chung-hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo wu-shih-nien
in the provinces, Chang Chih-tung was also said to have been 
threatened with assassination and TuanH?ang in Nanking was highly 
apprehensive. The Chinese press in Chekiang and Shanghai protested 
against the execution of Hsii and Ch'iu. However, Jordan himself
go
did not seem to have been much worried by the incident. There 
were other minor revolts in the next three years in which Jordan was 
almost entirely uninterested.*^®
The rising at Canton in April 1911 represented the most 
serious and well-laid attempt of the T'ung-meng Hui in its history 
before the Double Ten revolution of the same year.*^ On 10 April 
Jordan learned that the tartar-general at Canton had been assassin­
ated two days before by a member of the revolutionary party. Jamieson
the consul-general described the assassination as "merely the act of
102an isolated individual". Twenty days later Canton witnessed a 
violet uprising. But Jordan had no report from Canton and he only
wen-hsien pien-tsuan wei-yiian-hui, Chung-hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo wu-shih- 
nien wen-hsien, [ Collection of materials on the origin of the Chinese 
Republic on its 50th anniversary] , (Taipei, 1964), vol. 13, pp. 167
89.
99 Jordan to Grey, no. 332, 10 Jul; Ch. Corres., vol. 231; no. 392 
20 Aug. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 217.
*^®These attempts were: Chen-nan-kuan (1907); Ch'in-lien, Ho-k*ou, and 
Anking (1908); Canton (1910). See Lo, Kuo-fu nien-p'u chu'u-kao, 
vol. 1, pp. 193-234; Lia Tsui-chin san-shih-nien, pp. 154-8
^Details of the events are available in Tsou Lu, Ruang-chou 
san-yueh erh-shih-chiu ko-ming shih £, The rising of March, 1911 in 
Ruangchou] , (Taipei, 1953), pp. 1-77; Hsu Shih-shen, Kuo-fu ko-ming 
yiian-ch * i hsiang-chu £ Detailed commentary on texts selected to 
illustrate the revolutionary career of Sun Yat-senJ (Taipei, 1954), 
pp. 155-68.
102Jordan to Grey, no. 151, 11 Apr. 1911, Ch. Conf. Print, Vol. 204.
enquired into the matter when Grey asked him for information to 
answer parliamentary questions. Jordan answered on 3 May, one 
week after the revolt started, that Canton had calmed down and
103that accounts of the uprising had been exaggerated.
Thus Jordan was aware of the increasing strength of 
the revolutionary movement, but it was not sufficiently strong 
to seriously trouble him. This attitude of Jordan remained unchanged 
throughout the pre-revolutionary years. At the beginning of 1907 he 
said:
"There is undoubtedly a feeling of unrest and 
a good deal of noisy agitation going on in many 
parts of the Empire, but, so far as I can judge,
there is no indication of any concerted anti- 
dynastic movement with which the Government is 
likely to find it difficult to c o p e " .  104
In the annual report for 1910 it is stated that the revolutionary
1 Offsocieties "fortunately lack adequate organisation".
Since the movement was straightforwardly anti-dynastic and 
often anti-foreign, Jordan was naturally not sympathetic with it.
At the beginning of 1907 two Chinese, Chang Pao-ching and Huang Yi, 
were arrested in the Shanghai settlement for being implicated in the 
bombing of the Constitution Investigation Commission in 1905. He
instructed the consul-general at Shanghai that the political suspects
should not be handed over merely because the viceroy demanded it but 
that a prinia facie case should be established and that he should
*^^Jordan to Grey, tel. Ill, 3 May 1911, Ch. Corres., Vol. 1090.
104
Jordan to Grey, no. 9, v. conf., 7 Jan. 1907, Ch. Corres.,
vol. 223.
1 OSJordan to Grey, annual report, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 201.
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consult the British judge of the Supreme Court, Sir Havilland de 
Saumarez. To the judge, however, Jordan telegraphed: "I consider
it important, from a political point of view, that we should be very- 
careful to prevent the impression becoming current that revolution­
aries can take refuge in Shanghai in view of the many rumours of 
seditious activities in the central provinces11. In the diplomatic 
meeting Jordan strongly objected to the Italian charge d 1affaires* 
proposal that the Mixed Court should not only hold a preliminary trial 
but properly try the case itself. After the Chaochou-Huichou 
outbreak Jordan cooperated with the Wai-wu Pu in asking the Hongkong 
government to deport the instigators, notable among them Teng Tzu-yiii ^  
In early 1908, again on being requested by the Wai-wu Pu, Jordan 
telegraphed the governor of Singapore to deport Sun Yat-sen.
Sir John Anderson, however, did not comply but warned Sun against 
instigating any act inimical to the Chinese government while staying 
m  the colony.
The constitutional movement, as opposed to the revolution­
ary one, attracted much of Jordan*s attention. There are different 
ways of looking at it. In terms of content, the movement had two
1 Jordan to consul-general and Sir Havilland in Jordan to Grey, 
tel. 5, 11 Jan. 1909, Ch. Corres., vol. 213.
^^Jordan to Grey, no. 85, 18 Feb. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 213.
Jordan to Grey, no. 309, 25 Jun., tel. 100, 7 Jun. 1907, Ch.
Corres., vol. 229.
^^Jordan to Grey, no. 88, 20 Feb. 1908, Ch. Corres., Vol. 421.
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aspects: administrative and political reform. Thinking on a 
completely different level one is confronted with the conflicting 
aims of the Ch'ing government and the constitutionalists, mostly 
upper-class gentry, in supporting the movement.
Leadership of what is broadly known as the constitutional 
and reform movement passed to and fro between the government and 
the constitutionalists between 1898 and 1'910* By 1905, after the 
Russo-Japanese War, the government and the constitutionalists became 
more open in their struggle to lead the constitutional movement in 
their own ways. The aspect of administrative reform of the movement 
became increasingly overshadowed by its political significance.
However, the aspect of administrative reform was still
prominent during the first years of Jordan’s return. At the end of
1906 Jordan reported that most of the decrees passed to anticipate a
constitutional government dealt with such matters as the re-organis-
ation of the metropolitan and provincial administrations, the promotion
of education, the suppression of opium and the control of railways,
telegraphs, and postal administration.^^ In the middle of 1907 a
new series of decrees was issued on provincial administrative and 
1131judicial reform. In the last quarter of the same year it was further
lucid distinction between the two aspects of the movement and 
an explanation as to why the Ch’ing government decided to promote 
the movement to the political level are given in J. H. Fincher, 
"Perspectives on Chinese Experiments with Representative Institutions, 
1907-1916", pp. 6-17, P R C C C
111
Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1906, Ch. Corres., vol. 231; 
tel. 207, 7 Nov., tel. 211, 10 Nov., no. 476, 14 Nov. 1906, Ch.Corres., 
vol. 31. Details of the reforms intended by these decrees are seen 
in Chang Chih-pen, Hsien-fa lun f Constitutional Law} , (Shanghai, 
1946), p. 143.
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Jordan to Grey, no. 336, 11 Jul. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 224.
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decreed that the Manchu garrisons were to be disbanded and that
the Manchu were to be treated on a par with the Chinese. The
equalisation of the two races appeared to Jordan as "one of the
113few practical steps taken towards reform". Moreover, the 
codification of the laws and the improvement of the fiscal system 
was also d e c r e e d . I t  can certainly be said that Jordan was 
well inclined towards these attempts at the betterment of China 
provided they were not so drastic as to bring about the collapse 
of the socialAadministrative order. In the promotion of education, 
for instance, Jordan was not averse to replacing the traditional 
examination system with a modem one. But he was apprehensive 
of the outcome of the change because of the great role played by 
returned students from Japan. He lamented the "pity that something 
cannot be done to direct a larger portion of the student class to 
England."* ^
**^ Jordan to Grey, no. 474, 3 Oct. 1907; no. 50.1, 17 Oct. 1907, 
Ch. Corres., vol. 224.
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Jordan to Grey, No. 501, 17 Oct. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 224. 
^^Jordan to Grey, no. 28 19 Jan. 1907, Ch. Corres.» vol. 223.
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Jordan had a completely different attitude towards the 
political manifestation of the constitutional movement. In 
September 1906 the throne decreed the desirability of a constit­
utional government on the recommendation of the mission which left 
China in late 1905 to study the constitutions of countries abroad.
By August 1907 the Commission to Investigate Modern Governments 
(Kao-cha Cheng-ch’ih Kuan) had been reorganised into the Constit­
utional Government Commission (Hsien-cheng pien-ch*a Kuan), a more 
powerful and permanent agency charged with supervising reform. In 
September 1907 a national assembly (Tzu-cheng Yuan) and in October, 
provincial assembles (Tzu-i Chii) and various local assembles were 
promised. The entire process culminated in August 1908 in the 
promulgation of a programme designed to complete constitutional 
reform in nine years, at the close of which the real parliament would 
have been convened. ^  ^
Jordan’s attitude towards the nine years1 plan was one 
of scepticism. He realised that Japan was chosen as the model in 
political reform. However, he pointed out clearly that China, being 
much tess experienced politically, should have a longer period of 
preparation than nine years.
M b For text of the edict of 27 August 1908 which decreed the 
nine years* plan see Liu. Chen-k*ai, Chung-kuo hsien-cheng shih-hua 
£ History of the Chinese constitution (Taipei, I960), pp. 29-31.
"Evidently the Court and Government must reason 
that what was possible for Japan is equally 
possible for them,but it should, I think, be 
clear to them that the inarch of events in Japan 
can furnish no safe criterion for a programme 
of radical measures in a continent such as China 
is, and that in any case there is no sufficient 
number of qualified leaders and experts available 
to bring the scheme into effective execution all 
over the jSmpire in the time allotted." ^ 7
Again it is pointed out in the annual report for 1910 that
democratic institutions were not compatible with oriental life and
ideas and that western education had affected only a small minority
118while the masses were "abysmally ignorant and credulous".
Aside from the general feeling of scepticism based on
his assessment of the political ability of the Chinese5Jordan was
specifically apprehensive that the programme would further strengthen
the separatist tendency of the provinces. There is no doubt that
the Ch'ing government, under external threat and internal pressure,
recognised that political reform was indispensable and sought to
direct it in a way that would bring concentration of power in the
central government. Thus at the end of 1907 Yuan Shih-k'ai and Chang
Chih-tung, the most powerful governors-general, were promoted out of
113
their provinces. However, as Y. C. Wang puts it in retrospect:
117Jordan to Grey, no. 408, 14 Sept. 1908, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 183.
128Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 201.
113The government's motive of concentrating power in its hands is 
almost unanimously put forward in works on the movement. See, for 
example, Y. C. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West 1892-1949 
(Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1966), pp. 254-6. Fincher, 
"Perspectives in Chinese Experiments with Representative Institutions^ 
1907-1916", pp. 10-11; and Li, Tsui-chin san-shih-nien, p. 115.
"Actually, a wide discrepancy developed between intention and 
120
practice". Jordan anticipated such discrepancy from the start.
About three months after the national assembly and provincial
assemblies were promised Jordan told Sir Arthur Moore that the
Chinese government had raised "a Frankenstein by their propagation
127of constitutional theories". He told the Wai-wu Pu that
"troublesome as Foreign Representatives are, they are nothing to
what is in store for them when they will have to face a Parliamentary
122opposition composed of rabid members from Canton and the South!"
It was scheduled that the provincial councils should be
formed before the national assembly. Jordan foresaw the damaging
effect inherent in the councils upon the authority of the central
government. To him the institution of the councils^dominated by the 
123
gentry a and deliberative in function only in name, upset the 
traditional balance of local power between the government authorities 
and the gentry class. His apprehension was based on something more 
concrete than his observation of the rift between the provinces and 
the government in railway matters in particular. The self-government 
society (Tzu-ch'ih Hui) in Canton must have appeared to Jordan as the 
predecessor of the provincial assembly. The acting consul-general at 
Canton reported in early 1909 that the society was a political 
120Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West, pp. 255-6.
127Jordan to A. W. Moore, private, 16 Dec. 1907, Jordan Papers, vol. 5
122Jordan to Campbell, private, 10 Dec. 1908, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.
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^Jordan to Grey, no. 474, 20 Dec. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 199* 
enclosing a report by Campbell on the origin, governing rules, compo­
sition, franchise and powers of the assemblies. The rules governing 
election meant that only the gentry could become members.
manifestation of the reform movement in the city. It played a 
leading role in the anti-Japanese agitation and boycott in 1908 in 
protest against the Tatsu Maru incident. It also instigated the 
anti-British boycott against the "Fatshan". The society controlled 
the press and was amply financed by local influential people as well 
as Cantonese residing in the British colonies. Above all, it had 
made itself a power to be reckoned with by the Cantonese government 
and local foreign authorities. At the same time, Canton did little 
towards implementing the administrative reform which Jordan approved
- O f . 12*
The assemblies of most provinces eventually met in
mid-October 1909. /H. be expected  ^ Jordan paid serious
attention to the occasion. Consular officers in all provinces were
instructed to furnish the legation with information on the assemblies.
Apprehension was especially entertained about the assemblies at Changsha,
Hankow, and Canton which declared their steadfast intention to protect
provincial interests from foreign exploitation. The Hukuang fjailwayr
loan was the foremost question which was affected by this attitude of
the assemblies. In all, the government officials were either not
powerful enough to stamp down the gentry’s opposition or were openly
103sympathetic with the assemblies.
110-Fox to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, no. 83, 19 Feb. 1909, Ch.Corres., 
vol. 634.
lit
Jordan to Grey, no. 409, 10 Nov. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 191; 
Jordan to Grey, no. 423, 16 Nov. 441, 30 Nov. 19Q9y Ch. Corres., vol. 626 
and Jordan to Grey, no. 474, 20 Dec. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 199.
See also N C H , 16 Oct., 11 Dec. 1909; 18 Feb. 1910.
But the first sitting of the assemblies was already much
less stormy than what was to follow. In spite of his illness and
leave in 1910 Jordan knew of the three petitions (26 January, 22 June,
3 October) instigated by the Association of Provincial Councils made
up of members representing sixteen provincial assemblies to institute
a permanent parliament in one year instead of nine years as originally 
12(*
decreed. Jordan naturally disapproved of these activities and the
government exhausted all means to delay decision on this matter. When 
the second session of the provincial assembles began in late 1910, open 
rupture with the government became the dominant feature. The Ruangsi 
assembly resigned en masse because of a difference of opinion with the 
local authority over the question of opium suppression. The Chekiang 
assembly suspended its sitting because of the refusal of the governor 
to memorialise the throne for the reinstatement of Tfang Shou ch *ien, 
a prominent member of the gentry at the head of the Chekiang railway, 
who had been dismissed by an imperial decree. The assemblies of Hunan 
and Shensi pledged support for the Chekiangr- one. In Kyangtung the 
assembly insisted on a voice in the government of the province and 
demanded that the provincial budget should be submitted to it. In shorty 
the annual report for the year comments: "The most prominent feature of 
the autumn session>1910, of the various provincial assemblies has been 
the number of occasions on which recourse had been made to the 
116
For details of the petitions and the effort made by the assemblies 
to gain mass support see Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 
pp. 256-61; Chang P'eng Yuan, "Constitutionalists and the Chinese 
Revolution of 1911", pp. 17-23, P R C C C ; also MaxMuHer to Grey,
237, 22 Jul., tel. 176, 27 Oct. 1910, Ch. Corresvol. 858.
expedient of voluntary suspension of sittings by way of protest against
137various actions of the high provincial authorities...”
The national assembly of senate was formally inaugurated on 
3 October* 1910, anticipating the parliament proper. It is certain that 
the national assembly represented to Jordan less of a threat to the 
power of the central government than the provincial assemblies. Jordan 
might even have hoped that the national assembly would ex^ercise a 
moderating influence on the provincial assemblies since its duties
included intervention in the disputes between the various provincial
* . 13ftassembles and between the assemblies and the provincial authorities.
The senate was a disappointment immediately after its 
inauguration which was simultaneous with the third petition by provincial 
leaders for the immediate establishment of a parliament. The petition 
was also submitted to the senate for discussion. Towards the end of the 
month the senate decided unanimously to support the petition. It 
threatened to resign if it was rejected. On 4 November the prince 
regent yielded and made a compromise whereby parliament would be convoked 
in 1913 instead of 1917. The compromise disappointed both the petition­
ers and Jordan. The former felt that the concession fell short of their 
demand and the latter, in London, told Campbell that "the Regent could 
certainly have squashed the demand... if he had taken strong measures 
at the outset"
133Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 201.
For similar details see Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West, p. 261.
^^For details see translation of the first instalment of regulations for 
the senate in Jordan to Grey, no. 337, 22 Jul. 1908, Ch.Conf.Print, vol. 1 
and Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 201.
MaxMuller to Grey, tel. 176, 27 Oct.1910, Ch.Corres., vol. 858.
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When Jordan returned to Peking the senate was still in
session. He went to several sittings and soon discovered the reason
137for the "independent attitude" of the senate. The fact was that
the "provincial members of the Senate are carrying all before them, and,
so far, there has practically been no opposition on the part of the
133representatives of the Government". It was because though nominally
half the members of the senate were nominated by the government, most of
them were officials of the lower ranks and were more inclined to the views
of the provincial members.
Although Jordan was impressed by the seriousness of most of the 
133senators he found it difficult to accept their encouraging gestures 
towards the provincial assemblies in defying the authorities and attacking 
the central government itself. For example, on the resignation of the 
Ruangsi assembly the senate telegraphed the governor forbidding him to 
interfere with the action of the assembly whilst at the same time he was 
told to abandon the strike. The most serious attack on the central 
movement took the form of public censure on the Grand Council. The 
grand councillors were attacked for having encroached upon the legislative 
over minor economic and educational measures in Hunan, Yunnan, and Ruangsi.
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Campbellfs minute on MaxMuller to Grey, tel. 181, 5 Nov. 1910, Ch.
Corres., vol. 858.
137Jordan to Grey,annual report for 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 201.
133Jordan to Campbell, private, 6 Dec. 1910, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
133Jordan to Alston, private, 15 Dec. 1910; Jordan to Grey, private,
II Jan. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
In a meeting on 9 November the senate moved to demand explanation from
the grand councillors in person. The Grand Council retaliated by a
wholesale resignation - an unprecedented event in Chinese history. On
18 December the regent refused to accept the resignation and asserted
the councilfs supremacy over the senate. During the crisis Prince
Ch*ing and Na^t'ung, both of them grand councillors, often complained
to Jordan of "the extravagant pretensions of these inexperienced
134-representatives of the people".
Yuan Shih-k'ai
There is no way of accurately dating the beginning of the
interesting and significant friendship between Jordan and Yuan Shih-
kfai. The most common assertion is that it began when Yuan and Jordan
135were both serving m  Korea. However, available evidence does not
confirm this statement. First, Jordan1s service in Korea basically
did not coincide with that of Yiian Shih-k’ai. Jordan took up his first
position in Korea in October, 1896 and remained there until the end of
1905.^^ Yuan went to Korea in late 1882 and left in August, 1894 soon
137after war started between China and Japan. Thus there was more than
^^Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 201; 
Jordan to Grey, no. 458, conf., 20 Dec. 1910, Ch. Conf.Print, vol. 204, 
see also H H K M , vol. 4, pp. 69-71.
1 35For examjie, Hosie, "Sir Jordan, John", Dictionary of National c 
Biography, 1922-30, supp., p. 462. Speaking on Jordan on hearing of 
his death T'ang Shao-i also says that Jordan and Yuan became friends 
in Korea, N C H , 19 Sept. 1925; Wu Hsiang-hsiang, "Kai-wai hsin-chien 
Chung-kuo hsien-tai-shih shih—liao", \ New Materials abroad on Modern 
Chinese history ] , in CH tsung-kfan, vol. 1, p.62.
Sir Walter Hillier, consul-general at Seoul, applied somewhat 
unexpectedly in early July 1896 for retirement because of a serious 
eye disease which threatened him with blindness* MacDonald to Marquis 
of Salisbury, no. 50, 23 Jul. 1896, Ch. Corres.A (F.0.17) vol. 1282. At
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two years1 internal between theirtwo periods of service.
Secondly, Jordan had not once mentioned in all his writing
that he knew Yuan in Korea. The most likely occasion for him to have
done so, had it been the case, was when he wrote to Campbell shortly
after Yuan’s death. He said: "During his [Yuan’s } early life in
Korea he formed friendship with a number of Englishmen - Baker, Hillier,
1J&McLeayy Brown and others...11, but not himself. Again, neither did
he assert that he knew Yuan in Korea when he wrote the article "Some
Chinese I have known" after his retirement.
Thus Jordan might have first come across Yuan either in the
two years’ interval mentioned above or after his return to China as the
British minister there. Of these two possibilities the former was the
more likely. Yuan did not come straight back to China after having
left Korea in August^1894. He was commissioned to stay in Manchuria to
facilitate the transportation of reinforcements to the Chinese forces
fighting in Korea. He reached China in the beginning of 1895. After her
defeat by Japan China endeavoured to strengthen herself by building up a
modern national army. The responsibility fell on Yuan who took up command
the same time MacDonald recommended Jordan to fill the vacancy, MacDonald 
to Marquis of Salisbury, no. 51, 23 Jul., ibid. The Foreign Office 
appointed Jordan on 5 September, F.O. to MacDonald, draft tel., 5 Sept. 
1896, Ch. Corres. (F.O.17) vol. 1281. Jordan took up duties from Hillier 
on 26 Oct., Jordan to Marquis of Salisbury, no. 38, 26 Oct. 1896, Ch.
Corres(F.O. 17) vol. 1284. Thus presumably Jordan left China at the 
end of Sept. By then Yuan would have been back to China for about one year 
and nine months.
*^7j.Ch’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai (London, 1961), pp. 20, 44.
1 Jordan to Langley, private, 13 Jun. 1916, Jordan Papers, vol. 15.
By Hillier Jordan means Sir Walter Hillier who was consul-general at 
Seoul before him . . MacLeavy Brown had been in Korea for some time
before Jordan and was appointed by the Korean government as the adviser 
to Customs at the end of 1895.
^^The article is available in Nineteenth Century, vol.88 (Dec.1920).
over the selected force of 4,000 to 5,000 men at Hsiaochan, seventy
1 f
miles from Tientsin, in December 1895. Despite the absence of
definite evidence pointing to Jordan’s acquaintance with Yuan during
Yuan’s early days at Hsiaochan it can fairly be assumed that this was
the case as the army grew in repute. It was of course the origin of
the Pei-yang Army [ Army of the North Seas ] which owed its allegiance
the.
to Yuan and eventually becameAmilitary backing in his later bid for
ascendancy. When in Korea Jordan followed Yiian’s military career in
Hsiaochan, and later in Shantung and Chilhi, closely.
On the other hand, it is evident that Jordan and Yuan were
already acquaintances, if not friends, Soon after Jordan’s return to
China in 1906. For in the report on a visit to Yuan in Tientsin where
he occupied the post of viceroy of Chihli Jordan made no mention that
14 D.it was the first meeting.
It seems as though Jordan had already been impressed by Yuan 
before he left China iii 1896, and one is given the impression that in 
Korea he had singled out Yuan from the handful of the then prominent
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Ch’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai, pp. 44-5.
142Jordan, "Some Chinese I have known", p. 954. Other accounts of 
Yuan at Hsiaochan are: Shen Tsu-hsien and Wu K’ai-sheng, Jung-an 
ti-tztL chi [ Early life of Yuan Shih-k’ai ] in CHS ts^img-shu, pp.
73-85. Ch’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai, pp. 46-62; C. Beresford, Break up of 
China (London 1899), pp. 271-3; Powell, The Rise of China’s Military 
Power, 1895-1912, pp. 71-89.
142Jordan to Grey, no. 535, conf., 21 Dec. 1906, Ch. Corres., 
vol. 221.
143 . . . . .After going through about a dozen books written by missionaries
in China the impression is that they were almost unanimously admirers 
of Yuan. For example, G. S. Eddy, The students of Asia (London, 1916), 
pp. 113-4; J. C. Keyte, The Passing of the Dragon (London, 1913), 
pp. 1-2; A. J. Brown, New Forces in Old China, p. 345; and Rev.G.F.Fitch,
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Chinese officials and followed his career with meticulous attention.
In early December 1899 Yuan was appointed governor of Shantung in the
place of Yu Hsien. Yuan’s salutary suppression of the fanatical Boxers,
and protection of foreigners in the province won the praise of the
foreign community in China, especially the missionaries. In fact
this was the first significant impact that Yuan made on the foreigners,
something that was to have fruitful effect in his later career. Even
144-away in Seoul Jordan was aware of the happening.
In the middle of November 1901 Yuan was promoted as the
viceroy of Chihli and concurrently the commissioner for trade of ftorth
C Una. In later days Yuan often told Jordan that he regarded "his tenure
of the Viceroyship of Chihli as the most fruitful period of his career".
Yuan’s vice-royalty, especially the latter half, Coincided with the
constitutional reform movement. Yuan Shih-k’ai is known as a leader of
the progressive movement. However he was not genuinely sympathetic with
the political aspect of the movement, and his participation was more or
less confined to the aspect of social reform. One of his close associates
points out that Yuan committed himself insofar that he was able to keep
his name in the foreground in the peculiar atmosphere of the day.
From Jordan’s point of view there was no harm in Tientsin being the
"Progress of Moral Reform in China during 1907", The Chinese Recorder 
and Missionary Journal, vol. 39, no. 1 (Jan. 1908), p.9.
144Jordan, "Some Chinese I have Known", p. 954; missionaries repeatedly 
told Jordan about the incident, for example, W. McClure to Jordan in 
Jordan to Grey, no. 24, conf., 16 Jan. 1909, Ch.Conf.Print, vol. 190.
Other accounts of the event are Ch’en, Yuan-Shih-k’ai,pp.63-75; Brown,
New Forces in Old China, pp. 91, 196, 267, 341.
j  A T
Jordan, "Some Chinese I have Known", p. 955.
*^Shen Yun-lung, "Chang I-lin yii Yuan Shih-k’ai", in Hsien-tai 
Cheng-ch’ih jen-wu shu-p’ing, vol. 2, pp. 275-6.
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model municipality characterised by such blessings of modernisation
as broad streets, improved municipal arrangements, an efficient police
organisation, electric trams, sanitation and electric lighting. Jordan
was particularly impressed by Yuan’s zeal in suppressing the smoking and
growing of opium, and encouraging education, especially the technical 
\ m
aspects 6f it. In short Jordan regarded Chihli as "a model on which
14c
the reform of the country should be based11 and he trusted the
essentially conservative Yuan with his progressive policies which were
only within the framework of stability essential to British interests.
It appears that the friendship between Jordan and Yuan
matured most rapidly during the one and a half years when Yuan was in
charge of the Wai-wu Pu before his dismissal in early 1909. Yuan’s
promotion to the capital was as much good news to Jordan as it was
14£repugnant to YCian. In retrospect Jordan remarked that Yuan and 
Na—E’ung, the fairly capable Manckucounterpart of Yuan in the Wai-wu Pu, 
taken together "were probably the strongest combination the Chinese 
Foreign Office has ever produced’’. Two months after Yuan became 
president of the Wai-wu Pu the Foreign Office in London prepared a 
memorandum on the standing grievances against the Chinese to be given
147
Jordan, "Some Chinese I have Known", p. 955; Jordan to Grey, no. 535, 
conf., 21 Dec. 1906, Ch. Corres., vol. 221. For a general account of 
Yuan’s work at Tientsin see Lawton and Hobden, "The Fall of Yuan Shih-kai", 
pp.423-4; also G. S. Eddy, The Students of Asia, pp. 62-3.
140
Jordan to Grey, no. 14, conf.,6 Jan. 1909, Ch.Conf.Print, vol.190.
145The promotion was a Manchu plan to strip Yuan of his provincial 
strength, Jordan to Grey, no. 146, conf., 6 Jan. 1909, ibid.
Jordan, "Some Chinese I have Known", p. 956.
to the new Chinese minister to London. Foremost amongst the
grievances was the Soochou-Ningpo railway. It was settled in early
1908. Jordan could not forget how he was asked by Yuan to write a
strong protesting letter concerning the railway to Yuan himself so
that the latter could havetbe ground to advise the Chinese government
152on a speedy settlement. Another grievance listed in the momorandum 
was the Chinese delay in currency reform promised in the Commercial 
Treaty of 1902. Yuan tried to remedy this in late 1908 when he instru­
cted T’ang Shao-i to discuss the question with the British Foreign
Office on his way home from his mission of thanks to the United States 
for using her share of the Boxer indemnity to educate Chinese youth. 
Other questions to be discussed included Customs succession on the 
retirement of Sir Robert Hart, Sino-Japanese negotiations in Manchuria,
and British supervision of the building of the Chinese navy. But these
i . 152plans turned out to be abortive when Yuan was dismissed from office.
Throughout the one and a half years Jordan was impressed by Yuan’s 
strong hands over the provinces in forcing them into line with the 
government’s policy in relation to foreign concessions. He attributed 
the unexpected peace after the deaths of the empress dowager and 
Kuang-hsii to the presence of Yuan in the capital. But after the
* "^Memorandum, 19 Nov., in Grey to Jordan, no. 472, 20 Nov. 1907,
Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 175.
152
Jordan to Grey, no. 579, conf., 11 Dec. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 409.
153
Jordan to Grey, tel. 13, conf., 8 Jan., Jordan to Grey, no. 14, conf. 
16 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190.
15&
^Jordan to Grey, no. 521, 21 Nov. 1908, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 183.
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removal of Yuan the Wai-wu Pu "relapsed into its former state of
incapacity", and was "unable to settle any question in which provincial
#/ r 1
interests are specially ydr latgel ycoricerned. L sic*J
The edict of 2 January^1909 which dismissed Yuan Shih-k’ai
the#
from all offices was a surprise to Jordan. He thought thatAsimultan­
eous deaths of the express dowager and Kuang-hsu had removed the 
chance of the latter taking vengeance on Yuan for the 1898 coup. 
Moreover, Yuan was given the responsibility of organising the imperial
funerals, a lucrative task, and on 19 December made senior guardian
of the infant emperor. On 24 December Jordan wrote: "There is a fairly
general impression that he [ Yuan ] is degenerating both mentally and
1 &(■physically and the multitude of his wives may account for this."
Hence there was not the least apprehension of a serious political 
change.
The next morning after his dismissal Yuan took the first
train for Tientsin. However he was soon assured of his personal
safety and returned to Peking the same afternoon. Two days later he
left Peking for his home province, Honan. At Changteh, the important
railway juncture in the north of Honan Yuan built himself a retreat
1 £7which he named the "Garden for Cultivating Longevity". where he 
watched the events that were to lead to the great revolution in 1911,
1*5
Alston’s Memorandum,based on Jordan’s reports, respecting the 
Wai-wu Pu, 31 Jan. 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 196.
ISAJordan to Campbell, private, 24 Dec. 1908, Jordan Papers, 
vol.5.
^ C h ’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai, p.99.
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The removal of Yuan caused a fairly considerable storm
. . 1£8in the foreign legations, particularly in the British one. It
was a blow on Jordan and he was completely disillusioned about the 
regency. Besides its long term ill-effects on British interests 
Yuan’s removal created immediate dangers. Jordan was apprehensive 
of a disruption of the administration if Yuan’s dismissal was to 
be followed by a wholesale removal of his proteges in the government 
services. That many men owed their positions to Yuan did not escape 
Jordan. Foremost in his mind were Hsii Shih-ch’ang and T’ang Shao-i 
who, with the strong support of Yuan, were determined to checkmate 
Japanese expansion in Manchuria. Moreover, the dismissal 
represented not only "the self-willed or vindictive character of
the Prince Regent" but "the reactionary tendencies of the Manchu
* 160 . party. The drastic impeachment of the most prominent Chinese
official was keenly felt by the Chinese as an act of Manchu supp-
162ression. The schism between the Chinese and Manchu was widened.
The American and German ministers called on Jordan toi talk 
over the situation that very afternoon. They considered that the 
incident should not be passed unnoticed by the foreign representatives.
15BAccording to the representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank in 
Peking the dismissal caused the greatest commotion in the British 
legation** Wu Hsiang-hsiang, "San-Han Fu-sang so-chien Yuan Shih-k’ai 
kuan-hsi shih-liao", £ Materials relating to Yuan Shih-k’ai in Korea 
and Japan ] , in CH ts’ung-k’an, vol. 4, pp. 446-7.
1 * 0
Jordan to Grey, tel. 3, 2 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190.
160
Jordan to Grey, no, 14, 6 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190.
16 JIt is recorded that Chang Chih-tung feared that he would soon be
treated by the Manchu court as it had treated Yuan, Shen,^ T an Yuan 
Shih-k’ai", [ On Yuan Shih-k’ai ], in Hsien-tai cheng-chih jen-wu
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Jordan agreed with Count Rex and Rockhill that the foreign ministers 
should simultaneously approach the regent and each deliver a message 
from his government "strongly representing ... that China’s foreign 
relations would suffer severely by the dismissal of a statesman who
was universally considered the guarantee of his country’s political
. , . n . M162 stability.
The next day an informal diplomatic meeting was held in 
the American legation. It was decided that the diplomatic represent­
atives should ask from their respective governments authority to make 
representations against the dismissal directly to the regent rather 
than through the Wai-wu Pu. In fact a text was drafted by the French 
minister. Jordan urged the Foreign Office for immediate authorisation
and pointed out, on his own initiative, that the representation^had
__________— ~— La 63
to be effective^
This suggestion implied that Jordan hoped for the reinstatement of
Yuan as a result of the representation. The Foreign Office gave its
permission but Campbell remarked: ”1 rather doubt whether it can be
said that it is no interference, but we do interfere occasionally
134in the internal affairs of China and can hardly avoid it."
shu-p’ing, vol. 1, p.67.
162.Jordan to Grey, tel. 3, 2 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190.
Jordan to Grey, tel. 5, 3 Jan. 1909, Ch. Corres., vol. 612.
1 (A
Campbell’s minute on Jordan to Grey, tel. 5 , 3  Jan. 1909,
Ch. Corres., vol. 612.
78
However, on 9 January Jordan reported the failure of
the Diplomatic Corps at concerted action. There was a marked
divergence of opinion as to what form the representation should take
or the manner in which it should be given. Jordan was annoyed at
the "marked indifference" of the Japanese minister, Ijuin, who opposed
the mention of Yiian’s name so that the representation would not assume
a personal complexion. He indirectly deprecated the action by saying
that the representation would only be received by China as an
interference in her domestic politics. Japan further argued that
since Yiian’s personal safety was guaranteed there was no more ground
166for interference.
In order to understand Jordan’s views on the Japanese 
attitude it is necessary to know something about the Sino-Japanese 
and Anglo-Japanese relationship with regard to Manchuria. Ever since 
her victory over Russia in 1905 Japan had been expanding her influence 
in South Manchuria to the detriment of Chinese sovereignty. Almost 
immediately after Hsii Shih-chfang and T’ang Shao-i became the viceroy 
of Manchuria and the governor of Fengtien respectively in early 1907 
there was a marked tightening of Chinese policy in Manchuria. Since 
Hsii and T*ang were Yuan’s important henchmen it was believed that the 
anti-Japanese policy was adopted at Yuan’s instigation. It has also 
to be borne in mind that for several months before Yuan’s dismissal
1 65*
Jordan to Grey, tel. 17, 9 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190.
166
MacDonald to Grey, tel. 3, 10 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vo. 190.
79
negotiations had been going on between China and Japan on such 
Manchurian questions as telegraph, lumbering in the Yalu basin, and 
the construction of the Changchun-#irin Railway* British merchants 
in China had became extremely anti-Japanese because of Japanese 
commercial immorality in South Manchuria, especially the piracy of 
British trade marks. Jordan too became dissatisfied with Japan and 
was pleased with Yuan’s forward policy in Manchuria.
Thus it was commonly believed and openly suggested by 
some Chinese and foreigners, for example Morrison amongst the latter, 
that the Japanese were elated by Yuan’s ill fate and expected the 
removal of T’ang Shao-i whose attitude in Manchuria was particularly 
obnoxious. The development was taken by the Japanese as being
1 An
inducive to a successful conclusion to the Manchurian negotiations.
In his official correspondence Jordan in effect endorsed the opinion
. . 1^8by citing the view without giving any refutation. Privately to
Campbell he wrote: "There is only one opinion of the Japanese attitude 
in Peking and that is that they were perfectly satisfied with the 
recent turn of events and thought the removal of Yuan and Tong would 
facilitate their Manchurian negotiations. That appears to me a 
perfectly natural view for them to take, but unfortunately it does
169not coincide with what I conceive to be best for British interests." 
Moreover, Jordan observed a close relation between the Japanese 
legation and T’ieh-Iiang whom he regarded as the chief instrument of 
167Jordan to Campbell, private, 21 Jan. 1909, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.
1£A
Jordan to Grey, tel. 20, 11 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190.
169Jordan to Campbell, private, 19 Jan. 1909, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.
Yuan's overthrow. Some Chinese, especially Liang Tun-yen who filled 
Yuan's vacancy in the Wai-wu Pu, held firmly that the Japanese were 
actively involved in bringing about Yuan's fall by virtue of their 
influence over the Manchu faction. Officially Jordan hesitated "to 
give credence to such a statement", but he never denounced the idea 
as vehemently as the British ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Claude MacDonald. 
The concerted action of all the powers was not to take place. The 
Russian government, because of the concern of its exclusive claims in 
North Manchuria and the Russo-Japanese secret pact of March 1907, 
instructed the Russian minister to abstain from action. France, the 
ally of Russia in Europe and tied to Japan by the 1907 Franco-Japanese 
treaty, was evasive in response. Germany's instruction to her 
minister was that he was to abstain unless unanimity was achieved.
Despite the discouraging attitude of the powers Jordan and 
Rockhill still maintained the expediency of seriously drawing the atte­
ntion of the Chinese government to the matter. They agreed to request 
authorisation from their governments to make separate representations
to the Wai-wu Pu, using the French draft formula of 3 January as the 
172basis. On 11 January Jordan received his authorisation, and so did 
Rockhill. The latter did so only after the American State Department 
had ascertained the London Foreign Office's support of Jordan. In 
fact Grey said: "I was originally doubtful about the wisdom of this 
representation but suppressed my doubt owing to my confidence in 
Sir J. Jordan's knowledge of the Chinese and his judgement as to its
1 70Jordan to Grey, tel. 20, 11 Jan* MacDonald to Grey, tel. 5, 14 Jan., 
no. 11, conf., 23 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190.
Jordan to Grey, no. 24, conf., 16 Jan. 1909, Ch.Conf.Print, vol. 190
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Jordan to Grey, ibid.
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173 /s
probable effect." Thus Jordan played the most important role
in the Anglo-American action, the Americans following the British
lead because "as American interests are not large they do not desire
174-to act separately or take any leading part in such action."
Jordan and Rockhill prepared a short statement and wrote
a letter to Prince Ch'ing for an interview. At the interview the
two ministers repeated verbally the written statement. Jordan further
stressed that any violent change of the Chinese government would be
a matter of deep concern to the British because of the magnitude of
their commercial interests and the large part they played in the
development of the country. They were assured by Prince Ch'ing that
the removal of Yuan was on personal grounds and that it did not denote
1 ISa change in policy either in internal reforms or foreign relations.
Jordan had to be content with the assurance as the regent was determined
that Yuan must go.
Although the Anglo-American action did not result in the
reinstatement of Yuan it clearly reflects Jordan’s attitude towards
Yuan Shih-k’ai. It is appropriate to describe the next three years,
until Yuan was recalled at the outbreak of the 1911 revolution, as the 
176"eclipse" ' and not the absence of Yuan’s influence. Indeed, Changteh 
was in easy rail access to officials at the capital. Yuan’s son, 
K’o-ting, and henchman, Feng Kuo-chang, Yang Shih-ctii, Hsii Shih-ch'ang 
and Chao Ping-chiin, occupied important posts in the army, the police,
m
the ministry of communication and other departments. Also, Yuan had
173Grey's minute on Jordan to Grey,tel.26,15 Jan. 1909, vol. 612.
174-Bryce,British ambassador in Washington to Grey,tel.8, 10 Jan.1909,
Ch.Conf.Print, vol. 190.
supporters in the powerful Prince Ch'ing and the Manchu of £cial
Na—E'ung. Moreover, the three years were characterised by repeated
rumours of Yuan's recall. Soon after Yuan's dismissal became known,
the Chinese minister at London and Sir John MacLeavy Brown, councillor
of the Chinese legation, expressed as their views that Yuan's retirement
176was of a temporary character. Jordan likewise shared the general 
expectation of Yuan's return to official pre-eminence. The feeling was 
particularly marked from late 1910 onwards. In September^ 1910 daily 
conferences were held amongst government members with the recall of 
Yuan as the chief subject Qf discussion. No result came out because
of the alleged opposition of the express dowager, Kuang-hsu's wife.
Towards the outbreak of the revolution rumours again became rampant 
when Prince Ch'ing resigned from the premiership and recommended Yuan 
to take his place. However, his resignation was rejected by the throne.
Thus, Chinese politics between 1906 and 1911 opened up three 
possibilities. First, the central government might succeed in concent­
rating power in its hands. However, this possibility was slight despite 
various vigorous attempts of the government at imposing its will on the 
provinces towards the close of the period. Moreover, from Jordan's 
point of view, although he was sure of the government's sincerity in 
upholding her obligations towards foreign countries, it seemed that a 
175
f Jordan,to Grey, tel. 26, 15 Jan. 1909, Ch. Corres., vol. 612.
Ch'en, Yuan Shih-^k'ai, p. 101.
^^Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 110.
17%Alston's minute on Jordan to Grey, tel. 26, 15 Jan. 1909, Ch. Corres.
vol. 612 ; The Times, 11 Oct. 1909.
revival of the power of the government might not be an ideal
situation after the dismissal of Yuan Shih-kfai because of the
extreme conservative character of the officials remaining in power.
He would have liked to see more reform achieved in China along
social and administrative lines.
Secondly, there was the greater possibility of the provinces
getting the upper hand. The provinces were the places where the
revolutionary and constitutional spirit had been bred. There was no
question of Jordan ever becoming sympathetic with the revolutionary
movement. But he approved of the administrative reform provided
by the programme of the constitutional movement^despite being highly
apprehensive of its political manifestations. Therefore the importance
of Ma leader capable of controlling it [ the constitutional movement]
18 J.and guiding it along the path of moderation and safety" was something 
he felt strongly.
Thirdly, it was possible that Yuan Shih-kfai would re-enter 
public life. To Jordan this of course represented the ideal outcome of 
the situation. It would remove the shortcomings of an over-conservative 
government and provide the much needed leader for the constitutional 
movement.
179For example, Jordan to Grey, no. 458. conf., 20 Dec.1910,Ch.Conf. 
Print, vol. 204; The Times, 6 Sept., 8 Sept. 1910; 29 and 30 Sept. 1911, 
Jordan to Campbell, private, 11 Nov.1909,Jordan Papers;vol. 6 in which 
Kfo-ting told Jordan that he expected his father to return to office 
within a year.
180Jordan to Grey, no. 458, con£, 20 Dec, 1910,Ch.Conf.Print, vol. 204.
18 2
Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 201,
84
Chapter Two 
Policy of Neutrality in the 1911 Revolution
It has been established in the previous chapter that 
Jordan was not sympathetic with the revolutionary movement. But 
when the revolution broke out in October* 1911, Jordan immediately 
adopted the so-called policy of strict neutrality. That is to say, 
theoretically, no help was to be rendered either to what had hitherto 
been the legitimate government or its opponent. The reasons for 
Jordan1 s attitude are not difficult to see.
British Interests and Behaviour of the Revolutionaries Towards Foreigners 
Where the revolution first broke out^  and later centred* was 
significant. It is a common theory that there were three "centres of 
gravity"^ during the revolution, beginning with the outbreak in October 
1911 and ending with Yuan Shih-k’ai’s election as the provisional 
president of the first Chinese republic in March 1912. These "centres" 
were the Wuhan cities of Wuchang, Hankow, and Hanyang, where the 
revolution first began and which remained the field of military 
activities until negotiations began in early December; Peking, the 
stronghold of Manchu imperialism; and Shanghai, where peace conferences 
between the revolutionaries and the Manchu government took place and 
where the republican feeling became especially unrelenting. Of these 
places Jordan had to worry least about Peking in terms of British 
interests. It was a completely different matter with the other two.
The Wuhan cities occupied the central position of the Yangtse region
*P. H. Kent, The Passing of the Manchu, (London, 1912), p. 122.
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where British interests were heavily entrenched. Hankow had the
largest British concession and it was the most important railway
2centre in central China. Although the city was retrieved' by 
government troops at the end of October it remained within the 
firing range of the revolutionary cities of Haoyang and Wuchang 
until the end of November. The longstanding importance of Shanghai 
especially for British commercial interests was well-known.
Moreover, the revolution was not confined to these "centres" 
only. Within less than one and a half months after the first outbreak 
Ichang, Changsha, Hsianfu, Kiukiang, Taiyuanfu, Tengyueh,Yunnanfu, 
Mengtze, Hangchou, Ningpo, Wenchou, Chinkiang, KueichoU, Wuhu, Anking, 
Canton, Swatow, Chaochoufu, Foochou, Changchoufu, Amoy, ChefGo, Nanking, 
and Chungking were taken over by the revolutionaries. These 
revolutionary cities fell broadly into two categories: treaty ports 
where British merchants aggregated; and towns in the interior where 
many British missionaries /(stationed.
The China Station under Admiral Winsloe was responsible 
for the protection of British nationals and interests at the treaty 
ports. Soon after the Admiral arrived at the Wuhan area he was made 
senior admiral of the international squadron patrolling the Yangtze.
The British concession in Hankow could not accommodate all the 
missionaries who were collected from outside the settlement. Women
2Radiating from Hankow were: Hankow-Canton Railway, unfinished; Hankow- 
Peking Railway; Hankow-Szechuan Railway, unfinished; and Hankow- 
Shanghai Railway.
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as well as children had to sleep on board gun boats during the early
3
days of the turmoil. Moreover, the China squadron had only 29
vessels, among them ten shallow draught gunboats, one despatch
vessel and seven destroyers, more or less antiquated. With these
Admiral Winsloe had to provide security for British interests and
residents ,along the Yangtze and Canton rivers as well as the whole 
4sea coast. Besides the frequent complaints of inadequate protection
5made by British residents at some ports Jordan was made keenly aware 
of the inadequacy of the British naval strength in China by yet another 
matter. In Jordan1s opinion it was impolitic to employ British 
military force to supplement the naval man power because he was afraid 
that the presence of foreign troops in the concessions might convey 
the impression of outside interference to the revolutionaries. Thus 
the settlements at Hankow and Shanghai were guarded by bluejackets 
and volunteers. However, Admiral Winsloe found it increasingly 
difficult to provide the necessary naval manpower and repeatedly asked 
Jordan for his consent to the landing of troops to relieve the 
fatigued naval men at Shanghai and even Hankow where most of the naval 
resources concentrated.^
3
Jordan to Grey, tel. 219, 11 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
4:The Times, 24 Nov. 1911, gives the names and description of all 
British vessels irj China during the revolution.
“*For serious complaints of British residents at Hankow see Goffe to 
Jordan, no. 113, 24 Nov. 1911, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 288) vol. 1802; 
the residents of Ichang complained directly to Grey, their telegram 
Of 2 Jan., and Grey to Jordan, tel., 2 Jan. 1912, British Parliamen- 
tary Papers, LXXIII, p. 388; also NCH, 25 Nov. 1911.
g
For example, Winsloe to Admiralty to Admiralty to F.O., 3 Nov., also 
Jordan to Grey, tel. 261, 3 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.
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An equally serious problem was the protection of foreign
missionaries who were scattered throughout the interior. The
question should not be looked at from an exclusively British point
of view. If anti-foreign atrocities were to take place all foreign
missionaries would be indiscriminately involved. Thus the
instruction Jordan received was to protect British lives and those
of other foreigners whenever necessary. In retrospect, Jordan recalled
his anxiety: "Risings in China have hitherto not infrequently been
attended by anti-foreign feeling when,i/ideed, they have not been
entirely anti-foreign in character, and at the outbreak of the
revolution ... there was considerable anxiety regarding the safety
of missionaries and other residents in the interior.11^ There were
in China at the time about 40 Orthodox missionaries, 1450
8Roman Catholic priests and 5150 protestant missionaries. The last
two groups together possessed stations and out-stations in every
9prefecture in China. Most British missionaries belonged to the 
protestant church and together they represented more than twenty 
English missions. Of these the China Inland Mission was the biggest 
and had out-stations in extremely remote villages in the outlying 
provinces of Kansu, Sinkiang, and Yunnan.^
^Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1911, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 229.
8K. S. Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China, (London 
1929), pp. 566, 539, 606, which gxve sufficient information to 
produce the conjectured figures in the text; statistics in the China 
Year Book and China Mission Year Book, 1912, do not give the exact 
figures required.
9Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China, pp. 537, 571.
^China Inland Mission, annual report for 1911 entitled China and the 
Gospel, (London etc., 1912) pp. 121-37.
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Jordan was certainly concerned for British colonial 
interests. Of the British colonial possessions in South East 
Asia, Hongkong had the earliest connection with the revolutionary 
movement. A few months after establishing the Chung-hsing Hui 
headquarters at San Francisco Sun Yat-sen founded a branch of the 
society in Hongl<ong at the beginning of 1895 which was heavily 
involved in the revolutionary attempt to seize Canton in September 
1895. With the establishment of the T'ung-meng Hui in 1905 a new 
T'ung-meng Hui branch was founded in Hongkong under the leadership 
of Fung Tzu-yu. Henceforth the HongkOhg branch played an important 
role in the various T^ung-meng Hui revolutionary attempts that took 
place before 1911. Such important revolutionaries as Hu Han-min and 
Wang Ching-wei had intimate connections with the Hongtfong branch. In 
1905 too a Singapore Tfung-meng Hui was established by Sun. It soon 
flourished and its membership was enlarged especially by means of 
literary propaganda. Revolutionary cells were also founded in the 
Straits Settlement, Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, Malacca, and British Sarawak.^
The close connection between the Chinese population of the British 
colonies and revolutionary activities did not escape Jordan. Indeed3 
immediately after the revolution began important Chinese newspapers in
^For details of the revolutionary movement in British colonies see, 
for example, Ts*ao Ya-po. Wu-chang ko-ming chen-shih, £ True account 
of the Wuchang uprising ] ~ (Shanghai, 1930), pp. 260-70 in which 
Ts'ao suggests that the people in the British colonies, as opposed to 
the Dutch, contributed much more money to the cause; Li P'o-sheng, etc. 
(ed.), Hua-ch'iao chi tsung-chi, £ Record of overseas Chinese ] , 
(Taipei, 1965), pp. 459-62; and Feng, Ko-ming i-shih, vol.5, pp.206-40.
12
Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, for example the Nam Kew Eao (Straits
13Chinese Post)and the Cue Sing Mail respectively, took the revolutionary
and republican stand. Even the Nan—yang Tsung—hui Hsin—pao^  (Union Times),
another popular Chinese paper in Singapore but directed by an Englishman
A. P. Goodwin, desisted from its usual pro-Manchu line soon after the
revolution broke out. In Hongl*©ng the revolutionary success in
Kyangtung was zealously celebrated. On his way back to China from
America Sun Yat-sen was received with enthusiasm in Singapore^. When
he expressed his views in early December on the Japanese attempt to
bolster up the Manchu dynasty Jordan wrote: "If we join the Japanese
in bolstering up the dynasty, we are bound to incur much unpopularity in
the South which is red-hot republican and may possibly have some trouble
in Hongkong and Singapore where the Chinese population is intensely 
16anti-Manchu.11
On the other hand, the revolutionaries on the whole adopted a 
friendly attitude towards foreigners. The outbreak at Wuhan was 
characterised by civil treatment of the foreign concessions. Soon after 
the outbreak Jordan reported that the revolutionary commander-in-chief 
made a proclamation against injury to foreigners or concessions under
12For example, 14 Oct., 16 Oct., and 21 Oct. 1911.
13The paper appears to be a T!ung-meng Hui organ in Kuala Lumpur.
14 . . . .The Paper is m  fact an organ of the constitutionalists. Its attitude
remained anti-revolutionary until November.
^Nan-yang Tsung-hui Hsin-pao, 8 Nov., 14 Nov., 1911; and J. Cantlie and 
C. S. Jones, Sun Yat-sen and the Making of China (London, 1912) p.137.
16
Jordan to Campbell, private, 4 Dec. 1911,Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
90
pain of death. In Wuchang, where a military government of the 
revolutionaries was set up, missionaries and foreign staff members 
of schools were guarded out of the city to safer quarters by the 
revolutionary troops. The property of the churches was also protected. 
Besides, there was the explicit promise of the leader of the Wuchang 
military government, Li Yuan-hung, that foreigners would not be molested
17on the condition that they refrained from helping the Manchu government.
Protection of foreigners by the revolutionaries was reinforced
by every revolutionary success. In many places the cry was: "Protect
the foreigner, protect the Christian". In Nanking, Taiyuanfu, Kingchou
and Yachou missionaries were even able to afford protection and shelter
18to non-christian Chinese and Manchu^ Before negotiations took place 
between the government and the revolutionaries in early December 
Jordan needed only to worry for the safety of the foreigners at 
Taiyanfu and Hsianfu, the respective capitals of Shansi and Shensi, 
about whom the legations had for a long time received no news. When 
news eventually cane through apprehension for the Taiyuanfu foreigners 
was proved to be ill-founded. Hsianfu, however, "was the greatest stain 
attaching to the revolutionary cause" because eight Swedish subjects, 
six of them children, were killed in a mob violence. When Jordan 
received the news he sanctioned the formation of a rescue expedition, 
mostly manned by British men, under J. C. Keyte, which brought the
^Jordan to Grey, tel. 220, 12 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093; also 
HHKM, vol. 5, p. 175-6.
18Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China, pp. 543, 608.
remaining missionaries in Shensi out to safety. Keyte attributed
the cause of this singular act of anti-foreign violence to a split
of leadership in Shensi between the more educated sector of the
revolutionaries and the Ko-lao Hui (Society of the Elder Brethren)
which encouraged anti-foreign terrorism although it was within the
revolutionary camp.* ^
The moderate behaviour of the revolutionaries towards
foreigners was unexpected and it was natural that Jordan avoided
doing anything to change it. Jordan’s attitude towards the
revolutionaries as expressed in the policy of neutrality can perhaps
be explained in the light of W. Levi’s statement on the revolutionaries’
policy towards the foreigners: ’’The lines separating the various political
groups became nebulous. The attitudes on foreign policy which had up to
this time £ the revolution ] been the generally distinguishing mark of
these groups [ notably the government and the disaffected provinces ]
melt Altogether.There was no longer certainty as to where anyone stood.
Expediency began to rule, [ my italics ] and foreigners became objects
of political manouvres. Nobody in China wanted to expose herself to the
accusation of having surrendered to foreign powers, yet everybody was
vying for foreign sympathy in the knowledge that sooner or later he
20would need foreign help."
19Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1911, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 229.
For a first hand account of the incident and the expedition see 
J. C. Keyte, The*" %Tssing of the Dragon, (London, 1913); see also
E. F, Borst-Smith, Caught in the Chinese Revolution, (London, 1912) 
■which is a second hand account of the Shensi episode dedicated to Keyte.
20W. Levi, Modern China’s Ibreign Policy, (Minneapolis, 1953) p. 122.
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Neutrality in Action - Indemnity Postponement, Loans and Informal 
Cash Advances.
The Manchu government approached its demise in a state of 
21increasing indebtedness. According to the budget for 1911 prepared
by the Ministry of Finance at the end of 1910 China would haveA to
face a deficit of about 78,000,000 taels, or £10,000,000 without the 
22revolution. The outbreak at Wuhan heralded the danger of a lapse
of financial contribution to the government from the disaffected areas.
The anticipation of the government of this danger was later fully borne
out. In places which were affected by the revolution the machine^ of
taxation broke down partly because of administrative, confusion but
mostly because the revolutionaries abolished most of the taxes to gain
the support of the people. Then of course there was the prospect of
extra military and naval expenditure. Less than a fortnight after the
outbreak Jordan observed that "the Ministry of Finance have already
recommended the suspension of payments other than those required for
war purposes and for the service of foreign loans." By the end of
October many of the boards were left without responsible officials both
because of the general panic caused by repeated rumours of a possible
feud between the Han and Manchu communities and the fact that officials1
23salaries in most cases were long overdue.
21For a good account of the degeneration and decentralisation of 
government finance during the late Chfing period see P’eng Yii-hsin, 
"ChiVlg —mo chung-yang yii ko-sheng tsTai-cheng", [Central and 
provincial finances in the late Ch’ing period J in CCL, collection 2, 
vol. 5, pp. 3-46.
22MaxMuller to Grey, tel. 177, 28 Oct. 1910, Ch. Corres., vol. 858.
23
Jordan to Grey, no, 409, 23 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.
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A week after the revolution broke out Jordan, as the doyen,
received from the Chinese government the first suggestion of financial
assistance in a request for postponing the payment of the Boxer
indemnity. The Wai-wu Pu informed him that it would soon present him
with a memorandum, to be passed to the other ministers, applying for
the postponement. If the ministers approved, a formal application would
then be made to the powers. Jordan made no comment when reporting on 
24the matter. The Foreign Office made a calculation of the unpaid 
amount of the British share of the indemnity while waiting for the 
official application. F. A. Campbell reacted favourably and recalled 
America*s remission in 1909 of part of the indemnity which China owed 
her.25
The same day the Board of Posts and Communications applied 
to the four-powers consortium,through its agents in Peking, for a 
loan of 500,000 taels. There are two reasons for considering the 
question of this loan and that of indemnity suspension together: first, 
because the requests were made simultaneously; secondly, because Jordan 
had an identical view o* both. To clarify the discussion that follows 
a table is drawn » showing the four ministers > the four bank 
representatives in Peking, and the European banking groups concerned.
24Jordan to Grey, tel. 229, 18 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
25The total amount of the British share of the indemnity was 
£7,593,081-15s,-0d., of which £148,022-18s.Od., was paid, leaving 
still unpaid the sum of £7,44^958-l6s.2d. The remaining sum was 
being paid in monthly instalments of £28,000, see Langley*s minute 
on Jordan to Grey, tel. 229, 18 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
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When the revolution broke out Hillier, the agent of the 
British bank, was in London. The German agent, Cordes, was also absent 
from Peking. Thus the initiative of the consortium agency in Peking 
was with the American, Straight, and Frenchman, Casenave. These two 
men, Straight in particular, favoured financial aid to bolster up the 
Manchu dynasty especially after Yuan Shih-k’ai was recalled on 
14 October. Casenave recalled: "Willard Straight and I believed that... 
we have nothing to gain from the revolution. For some months the 
negotiations that we had to carry on had been placed in the hands of 
relatively capable mandarins like Tsai Tao and Sheng Kung-pao.... We 
were firmly convinced that the country was not ripe for a republic 
which would lead only to anarchy; and we believed that under these 
conditions if the Manchus would decide to entrust the government to a 
good prime minister, their maintenance was still the best solution 
possible/1^
26
H. Croly, Willard Straight, (New York, etc., 1925), pp. 417-8.
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At the same time the American, French and German ministers
were in favour of assisting the Chinese government. Jordan, however,
did not share his colleagues1 view. He wired London urging caution
since any financial assistance would mean continued support to the Manchu 
27government. Moreover, Jordan feared that China would be incapable of
repayment. The day before the outbreak he observed that flChina will wake
up some fine morning and find herself unable to meet her obligation and
28international control will be the result." Li Yuan-hungTs unilateral
warning that the revolutionary government would not recognise any loan
contracted between the powers and the Manchu government after the
29revolution began must have had an effect on Jordan. It was simply 
bad policy to lend without much hope of being repaid.
In .the China Department of the Foreign Office opinions were not 
unanimous. The relative advantages of conceding a new loan and post­
poning the indemnity payment were examined. MaxMuller preferred making 
a loan which could legally be regarded as an independent undertaking of 
the British bank to the alternative of postponing the indemnity payment, 
involving the direct sanction of the government. Campbell thought that 
for Britain’s immediate interests and convenience the dynasty should be 
preserved but at the same time he did not relish the idea of supporting an 
effete and corrupt government. He too, like Jordan, feared that China
27
Jordan to Grey, tel. 230, 18 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
28
Jordan to Campbell, private, 9 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
29
Jordan to Grey, tel. 222, 13 Oct. 1911,Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
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30
would not be able to repay her debts.
On October 19 the Board of Posts and Communications raised
its request to 2,000,000 taels. At the same time the Ministry of Finance
applied to the consortium for 10,000,000 taels. A change was then
discernable in Jordan*s attitude; in place of his previous downright
rejection he was ambiguous: "While it is no doubt desirable to render
every assistance to the Chinese government in its present difficulties,
it is equally certain that unconditional compliance with all these
requests for money must in the end entail some form of international 
31control." The Foreign Office was puzzled. MaxMuller found it
"rather difficult to gather from this telegram whether Sir J. Jordan
is in favour of the loan or not, though from his previous telegram
32he appeared to be opposed to it." The Hongkong office of the British
bank telegraphed the London office that it was imperative for the banks
to refuse all clean loans unless they were made under "the aegis" of the
governments. The London office, being torn between the attitude
of the agents in Peking who favoured the advancement of loans and that
of the Hongkong office which did not, asked the Foreign Office for
33guidance in the matter. Because of the ambiguous attitude of Jordan 
the Foreign Office could not decide on an answer. But it seemed to have
30
MaxMuller*s and Campbell*s minutes on Jordan to Grey, tel. 230, 18 Oct. 
1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
31
Jordan to Grey, tel. 231, 19 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
 ^^MaxMuller*s minute on ibid.
33
Townsend to Campbell, enclosing the telegram from Hongkong, 19 Oct.
1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
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been more inclined towards refusal than agreement. Campbell said: "Yes,
Sir J. Jordan does not like to express himself very strongly, but I
think - more from the previous tel No. 230 than from this - that he does
not approve of compliance." Grey perhaps under the same impression,
considered it wise for the powers to be financially neutral.
The other three lending powers reacted differently. The
American State Department was wary and showed reluctance to accede to
the Chinese requests. However, it was prepared to consider the matter
as purely "a legitimate business" to be dealt with by the bank groups
"acting in concert, and without any obligation on the part of their
35Governments to express an opinion, at any rate for the present."
The French government considered that since the Chinese asked for
36larger sums the matter required more consideration. But the German
government saw no objection to advancing 12,000,000 taels to the Chinese
37government by the four groups. On the whole, the attitude of the three 
powers was not favourable to making the loans. Though Willard Straight 
favoured assistance to the Manchus, the customary practice of the 
American group was inaction except when it was given the explicit support 
of the State Department. The French reply was not really an answer.
Meanwhile, the question of indemnity postponement existed on a 
par with that of loans. On 20 October the Wai-wu Pu formally proposed
34Campbell’s and Grey’s minutes on Jordan to Grey, tel. 231, 19 Oct.
1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
35
J. Bryce to Grey, tel. 150, 20 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093,
3 6
F. Bertie to Grey, tel. 176, 20 Oct. 1911, Ch.Corres., vol. 1093.
37
Lord Granville to Grey, tel. 91, 21 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
*r4
to postpone payment of the instalment of principalAinterest due on
38
1 January, 1912, and the instalment of interest due on 1 July, 1912.
So far Jordan had remained silent on the subject.
It appears that between 19 and 23 October Jordan’s attitude 
had undergone a major change. On 23 October the R>reign Office 
received a telegram from Jordan which was both a volte face in his 
attitude towards loans and a first comment on the indemnity postpone­
ment. To put it simply, Jordan advised that financial assistance be 
given to the Manchu government. The imperial cause was losing ground 
and in spite of all its faults "the government is probably no worse 
than any administration which is likely to be substituted fj^ rit." 
Moreover, Jordan considered the fact that the revolution originated 
directly from the Hukuang Railway Loan Agreement constituted "a moral 
claim" to the support of the powers without which the Manchu government 
could not survive.
But a significant qualification was attached to Jordan’s 
proposal: "such guarantees as are usual in the case of States who find 
themselves unable to meet their obligations should, I think,be insisted 
upon before we give it any such assistance, either in the way of further 
loans or in the shape of a postponement of indemnity payments." The 
safeguards that were suggested included the establishment of an audit 
department under the Ministry of Finance which was to be composed of 
foreign staff, and the employment of foreign staff members of the Customs 
as supervisors and assistants in the principal spending departments in 
the provinces as well as in Peking, these to be subject to the audit 
department.
38
Jordan to Grey, tel. 232, 20 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
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It is not too strong to say that an element of blackmail 
could be found in Jordan1s suggestion. In return for financial 
assistance, he advised that the Chinese government be asked to put 
an immediate stop to her obstruction of river conservancy measures, 
and to enforce effectively Article IX of the Mackay Treaty which 
provided for the development of China1 s mineral wealth. However, the 
"first and foremost" condition was that a reformed government should be 
placed in Peking with capable men at its head including Yuan Shih-k’ai.
In short, Jordan1s attitude towards financial help to the Manchu
government changed from objection to ambiguity and finally to conditional
. 39accession.
In view of Jordan’s sudden change of attitude, the Foreign
Office telegraphed the other three governments as to the desirability
of acceding to the Chinese requests. The telegrams, however, revealed
the Ibreign Office’s doubts about the practicability of Jordan’s
suggestion. Instead of urging the other powers to join in making the
loans and permitting a suspension of the indemnity payment, the Foreign
Office listed the dangers of taking such measures and suggested that
if eventually they were to be adopted it should be done on the conditions
40set forth by Jordan. Itaeaa Jordan himself did not seem to have really
kjL
made up his mind. Writing to Campbell the very dayksent the telegram 
supporting financial assistance to the Manchus he said: ”1 cannot see
39
Jordan to Grey, tel. 235, 23 Oct, 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
40
F. 0. telegrams to British ambassadors at Paris, 275 ; Berlin,
210; Washington, 259; and repeated to Peking, 136; 23 Oct. 1911,
Ch. Corres., Vol. 1093.
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there is much difference between a state and an individual and no
one in private life would lend money to a person who was at the end
41
of his resources and not competent to look after his affairs."
Jordan*s colleagues in Peking disagreed with the conditions
42he set down and were willing to give help without them. The other 
three governments were not sympathetic either. While Jordan treated 
the two questions of loans and indemnity postponement together, the 
three governments preferred to deal with them separately. The 
American government read Jordan* s suggestions as a scheme for the
43eventual control of China*s finances and considered it premature.
The French minister for foreign affairs feared that the position of
the Manchu government might be further compromised if it accepted
44Jordan*s conditions which were "too rigorous.*1 Even the German
government desired prudence in putting forward the conditions.
Matters were relatively simplified when on 25 October the Chinese [I
government cancelled its request for the suspension of indemnity
payments; although by then the American, German and Japanese
governments were ready to comply. The French were hesitant but
45not likely to act independently. By then the British Office too had
41Jordan to Campbell, private, 23 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
42Jordan to Campbell, private, 23 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
43Bryce to Grey, tel. 152, 24 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093; tel. 154* 
29 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.
44Carnegie, in-charge, to Grey, tel. 179, 26 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol.
1093.
45
Jordan to Grey, tel. 242, 25 Oct., Bryce to Grey, tel. 152, 24 Oct.,
Yamaza to Campbell, 25 Oct., and Carnegie to Grey, tel. 179,. 26 Oct.
1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
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a more favourable reaction to indemnity suspension than to making new
loans. In fact, China was allowed to let her indemnity payments lapse
46during the whole revolutionary upheaval.
Thus by 25 October the powers1 financial policy towards China 
remained as neutral as it had been ever since the revolution broke out 
half a month before. Jordan’s proposal of conditional aid, more than 
anything else, reinforced rather than weakened the policy of non-assistance 
to the Manchu government. This view is justified by what happened on 
24 October. That day the Peking office of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank 
telegraphed the London office urging that loans be made to the Chinese 
government or Britain and the British bank would have to be responsible 
for all the consequences of refusal since all the bank agents and 
legations of the other three powers in Peking favoured assistance. ^
Jordan immediately warned the Foreign Office against following the 
suggestion without insisting on his conditions being accepted. He 
harshly criticised the French charge d ’affaires who was particularly keen
48on lending to the Chinese government without imposing stringent conditions.
Without the consent of the governments the consortium would not 
lend to the Chinese government. The desperate Prince Ch’un, the regent, 
had to resort to a rival Anglo-Belgian-I/tench group which was represented 
by a Frenchman, Baron Cottu. This group was apparently acting under the
46
Jordan to Grey, tel. 107, 27 Apr. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1317.
47Telegram from bank representatives in Townsend to Campbell, 25 Oct.
1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
Jordan to Grey, tel. 241, 24 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
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auspices of the Russian government which was eager to frustrate the
49quadruple consortium and thereby limit American influence in China.
The French government, partly because of the obvious financial 
advantages and partly because of its need for Russian support in the 
Morrocco Crisis, was tempted to sanction this Cottu loan of 150,000,000 
francs which was to be issued in two halves.Suspecting it as a 
Russian gesture to eliminate her influence from iiorth China America
naturally reacted most strongly to the independent loan. Both the
a
American government and group declared that it would have^bad effect on
American interests in connection with the Currency Loan which was
promised to the Chinese government in the spring of 1910 by the
consortium.^ The other groups, particularly the German one, were
annoyed at the prospect of their privileged position being undermined 
52by the new loan.
In compliance with the American request for joint action the 
London Foreign Office instructed Jordan to consult his American 
colleague and to make joint representations to the Wai^wu Pu. Jordan 
personally opposed the loan mostly because it represented a departure 
from the policy of neutrality which he had by then again become resigned 
to. He persuaded the French charge d’affaires from supporting the loan
49
For the anti-Japanese and anti-Russian designs of the consortium, at 
least from Straight’s point of view, see Croly, Willard Straight, 
chapter 7.
"*^ See conditions of loan in Jordan to Grey, tel. 253, 31 Oct. 1911,
Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.
“^ American ambassador in London to Grey, 3 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol.
1094. ~
52
MaxMuller’s special minute on loans and indemnity postponement, 6 Nov. 
1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.
103
53and, according to himself, managed to win the argument. That his
advice was heeded by the French charge d'affaires might be true for
when the loan was abandoned by the French government Sir. F. Bertie,
British ambassador to Paris, was told that Jordan had helped in
54bringing about the outcome. However, the more important reasons for
the abortion of the loan appeared to have been the inability of Cottu
to issue the loan within the agreed time limit; the pressure applied
on the Rrench government by the American, British and, to a lesser
extent, German governments; and above all the Russian abandonment of
the rival loan in face of the groups1 agreement to giving up temporarily
55their efforts on the Currency loan.
Besides playing a part in bringing about the abortion of the 
Cottu loan Jordan frustrated yet other suggestions of financial aid 
to the Chinese government. On 1 November Townsend, manager of the 
British bank acting in Addis1 absence, wrote to the Foreign Office of 
the desirability of reminding the Chinese government of its right to 
claim from the consortium half of the Hukuang Loan funds to be deposited 
with the native banks. Both Townsend and Hillier urged that the policy 
was a sound one in that the money would enable the Chinese government 
53Jordan to Grey, tel. 260, 3 Nov., and tel. 265, 6 Nov. 1911, Ch.Corres., 
vol. 1094.
'^ Ber'fcte to Grey, tel. 182, 7 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.
~^ J, G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912,
(Berkely, 1935), p. 251.
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to stabilise the situation for the general benefit of commerce; and since
it was not a new loan there would be no danger of non-recognition as
56threatened by Li Yuan-hung in the case of a revolutionary victory.
Jordan objected to this suggestion and the Foeign Office declined the 
British groupfs proposal in these words which Jordan used on the Cottu 
Loan:
"the powers are likely to be in a position to excercise a 
far more salutary and abiding influence if, instead of 
lending money to prolong civil war, they reserve it for use 
under suitable guarantees whatever administration may eventually 
emerge...."57
The next dayTbwnsend urged the British Foreign Office to
agree to a new Chinese request for 5,000,000 taels to stabilise the
Shanghai money market. To strengthen his argument Townsend mentioned
58especially the expected arrival of Yuan Shih-kfai to Peking. Again 
the bankfs recommendation was declined. On 3 November Townsend 
repeated the request which was supported this time by similar requests 
from the American, French and German bank representatives in Peking.
They all urged that the loan, besides steadying the money market, would 
forestall the Cottu loan which was still a threat. Moreover, Yuan Shih- 
k!ai, who was just vested with full power, needed money for reorganisation 
purposes. Besides, the loan would be safe because it was approved by the
56Townsend to Campbell, 1 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.
^Jordan to Grey, tel. 260, 3 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.
5 8
Townsend to Campbell, 2 Nov. 1911, enclosing a telegram from Peking,
Ch. Corres., vol . 1094.
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Tzfc-cheng Yuan, the senate, which was having its second session in 
59Peking. Once more Jordan1 s words were used in the Foreign Office’s 
rejection. Jordan’s views had to be repeatedly cited because they 
carried weight when dealing with people who could either claim themselves 
as men on the spot or conversant with the situation in China. It was 
formally decided in the interbank conference of 8 November that the 
consortium would remain neutral.^
November saw the rapid spread of revolutionary success. But 
the situation had also improved on the government side. Hankow and 
Hanyang were recovered on 29 October and 27 November respectively. The 
situation in the north generally had become much more stable since Yuan 
Shih-k’ai’s arrival at Peking in mid November. Shantung, which had 
previously declared its secession from the dynasty, abandoned its 
independence. A tendency towards negotiations emerged on both sides 
when the revolutionaries lost Hanyang. The government loss of Nanking 
at the beginning of December made it seem that the score was drawing equal. 
It was at about this time that Jordan made a fresh appraisal of the policy 
of financial neutrality which he had so far adopted.
On December 5 the London Foreign Office received a letter from 
Addis enclosing a telegram the Peking office of the British bank sent three 
days before which warned the London office of the danger of the Cottu Loan
59Townsend to Campbell, 3 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.
6 0
See minutes of the inter-bank conference in Addis to Campbell,
11 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1095.
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being received. . In fact a supplementary agreement for 238,000,000
francs had been contracted. But in Peking Cottufs representative
expressed grave doubts as to his ability to meet the obligations of
the agreements and hinted that the consortium might take over the
business. The Peking office further reported that Yuan Shih-k’ai
was annoyed with the groups in blocking the Cottu Loan while not willing
to help themselves. The telegram ended with the view that "the moment
has arrived when governments should be asked to reconsider their neutral
policy and support constitutional government, thereby enabling groups to
render financial assistance," But the Foreign Office responded
unfavourably. Campbell considered that the situation in China was not
sufficiently settled and that Britain could not sanction the business
61after having intervened herself against the Cottu Loan.
Meanwhile, a truce was already arranged between the Manchu 
government and the revolutionaries. Preparations were underway for 
negotiations to take place in Shanghai and on 6 December the prince 
regent abdicated. Later the same day Jordan sent a telegram to the Foreign 
Office which represented a second volte face in his attitude towards the 
policy of financial neutrality during the revolution. He advocated that 
advances be made to Yuan Shih-k'ai who was in desperate need of funds 
to sustain his government for the impending peace negotiations at 
Shanghai. Jordan found the situation serious because Yuan Shih-k'ai, 
who had hitherto been respectful towards foreign rights, was reduced to
Addis to Campbell, enclosing telegram from Peking, 4 Dec. 1911, and 
Campbell’s minute on it, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.
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ordering Aglen, the British inspector-general of Customs, to surrender
the funds kept for pension purposes. Aglen refused and threatened to
resign. The bank agents in Peking proposed to make an advance of
30,000,000 taels on the g T~unx that unless Yuan was given money he
would not be able to control the situation and disorder would ruin the
prospect of a settlement. Jordan could no longer "withhold sanction
to the groups giving temporary accommodation" to the government
represented by Yuan. But the second volte face, like the first, was
conditional. Jordan said:
"I would propose, however, in order to obviate a possible 
boycott, that Yuan Shih— fcai should be informed that, until 
the necessity of an advance in the interest of the negotiations 
had been explained to the revolutionaries and their acquiescence 
in it secured, the money would not be handed to him."62
The other legations in Peking on the whole were favourable towards 
63lending to Yuan.
Under the circumstances the Foreign Office found Jordan1s
64suggestion "the best means out of the difficulty". It put forward 
the proposal to the other powers; it was done with some embarrassment 
because of its attitude towards the Cottu Loan a short while before.
In the telegrams to the governments, including that to Japan although 
she was not a member of the consortium, the acquiscence of the 
revolutionaries was significantly stressed.
62
Jordan to Grey, tel. 327, 6 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.
63Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, p. 261,
64
F. 0. Lindley’s minute on Jordan to Grey, tel. 337, 6 Dec. 1911,
Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.
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There were two separate questions: should the advance be made; 
and, if it should, should it be made with or without the agreement of 
the revolutionaries. On 9 December the Foreign Office learned that 
the French government was prepared to sanction the loan, but no mention 
was made about the acquiscence of the revolutionaries as a sine qua non. 
It was only nine days later that the French governmnet expressed the 
desirability of having the agreement of the revolutionaries who it
65thought could not be too obstructive if all the powers acted together.
The German government was even eager to have the advance
pushed through; besides agreeing to make the advance it did not consider
66the acquiescence of the revolutionaries a sine qua non.
The Japanese bkinister for foreign affairs at first though/;that
financial help to Yuan Shih-k'ai from the powers would exasperate the
revolutionaries and go far to wreck the negotiations. On 19 December
the Japanese government eventually agreed to advance small sums of money
to enable Yuan to continue with the administration in Peking, but not to
6 7be used for military purposes.
The American State Department was at first disinclined to 
abandon the policy of neutrality. But on 12 December it withdrew its 
objection to American nationals giving small loans"especially if loans 
are of broadly international character.
6*5
Bertie to Grey, tel, 205, 9 Dec., tel. 214, 18 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., 
vol. 1097.
66E. Goschen to Grey. tel. 113, 9 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.
6 7
MacDonald to Grey, tel. 60, 19 Dec, 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.
68
Bryce to Grey, tel. 162, 10 Dec., tel, 164, 12 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres.,
vol. 1097.
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The historian J. G. Reid would have thought the above 
paragraphs crude descriptions of the international dealings of the 
question. Wtiting on the subject he pays much attention to the anti- 
American sentiment of the Japanese and Russian governments; the anti- 
Japanese and anti-Russian feelings of the Americans in relation to 
north China; the Russian pressure on France to withdraw from the 
essentially anti-Russian quadruple consortium; and the British desire 
of avoiding friction with any party, especially Russia and Japan.
All these diplomatic cross attempts entangled international relations
69in China and made cooperation a difficult matter. Nevertheless the 
fact is that agreement was reached at one point between the powers 
that some form of financial assistance would be given to Yuan Shih-kfai.
However, Jordan’s proposal of financial aid to Yuan was 
abortive^mainly because the revolutionaries withheld their 
acquiescence^but also because Jordan himself vacillated. It was 
natural for the revolutionaries not to agree to any action beneficial 
to their enemy. Wu T’ing-fang, the revolutionary minister for foreign 
affairs, vociferously protested against any loans to Yuan. He declared 
that all loans to the government would be regarded as actions "deliberately 
directed against the rights the people are fighting for and have almost 
won",^ Although the powers were not unanimous in insisting on the
69Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, pp. 261-6 
^The Times, 11 Dec. 1911.
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agreement of the revolutionaries as an absolute condition, Grey*s
insistence on this determined the outcome. In any case, hews came
from Jordan on 16 December that at a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps
it was decided that there would be no chance of getting the
acquiescence of the revolutionaries.^*
Between 6 December, when Jordan proposed financial
accommodation for Yuan, and 16 December, when it was found that there
was no hope of getting the agreement of the revolutionaries, it was
easy for the people around Jordan to sense his vacillation. Initially
he had made the proposal to help Yuan Shih-krai to tide over the
negotiations. But he was not unaware of the risk involved to British
72interests: "The choice, briefly put, is: between chaos and boycott."
In a letter to the secretary of state of the United States urging
assent to the loanibr Yuan in order to prevent anarchy in north
China, Calhoun, the American minister pointed out: "The British
minister, who at first directed his nationals to resufie loan
negotiations, has since seemed to vacillate and I am uncertain as to his 
73policy." Reid asserts specifically that "on December 11 the British Minister
^*Jordan to Grey, tel, 348, 16 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.
72
Jordan to Campbell, private, 10 Dec. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
73 .Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, p. 265.
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again was vacillating."7  ^ That day Jordan received from the consul-
general at Shanghai the information about Wu Tfing-fangfs protest.
Wu also notified the Shanghai office of the HonglfOng and Shanghai
Bank that all loans to the Manchu government would be denounced.
The consul-general, Fraser, became nervous and feared that "if
native newspapers ventilate matter, there may be local complications."
Jordan immediately instructed Fraser to inform the revolutionary
leaders at Shanghai that advances were to be made not with the intention
of prolonging civil war but of preserving the status quo in the north
for the impending peace negotiations.7  ^ The Shanghai branch of the
76British bank became highly uneasy and objected to all advances. The
nervousness of Fraser and the Shanghai bank together with his own fear
of revolutionary boycotts forced Jordan back to the policy of financial
neutrality, not to mention the international complications involved.
Jordan1s change of mind was disapproved of by all the bank agents in
77Peking and the other three legations. Willard Straight Regarded
78Jordan as having a "wobbling" character, and the German minister
79
criticised him as a man who "did not possess great determination."
74Reid? The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, p. 265.
75Fraser to Jordan £ud Jordan to Fraser in Jordan to Grey, tel. 337,
11 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.
76Addis to Campbell, enclosing telegram from Shanghai, 12 Dec. 1911,
Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.
77Jordan to Grey, tel. 348, 16 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.
78
Croly, Willard Straight, P. 429.
79Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, p. 261.
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Neutrality in Action — Customs Collection and Deposit
The policy of neutrality was also applied to the question 
of customs. Jordan was unquestionably more involved in it than his 
other colleagues, because of his position as doyen and the British 
nationality of the inspector-general of the Customs, Aglen.
The Chinese Maritime Customs was an internationally-staffed 
institution of the Chinese government which had customs depots at the 
ports and throughout the provinces. Despite its apparent international 
character the Customs, ever since its first establishment in 1854, was 
in effect predominently controlled by Britain. W. T. Wade and 
H. N. Lay were the dominating voices in the service before Sir Robert 
Hart became chief commissioner in November 1863. During the next 
fifty years, that is until the death of Hart in 1911, British control
t
over the Customs strengthened appreciably through Hart? strong personal
influence. During the "scramble for concessions" in 1898
Sir Claude Macdonald, then British minister in Peking, had the Chinese
Wai-wu Pu confirm that the inspector-general of the Customs would
always be British as long as Britain had the largest share of Chinafs
foreign trade. It is a fact that until the 193 0fs the British formed
80the majority of the top-ranking personnel of the Customs.
Until the revolution broke out the Customs was only 
responsible for customs collection. Each depot was headed by a 
foreign commissioner and a Chinese superintendent. The revenue
80For a lucid account of British predominance in the Customs see T’ung 
Meng-cheng, Kuan-shui lun, [ Discussion on the Customs] , (Commercial 
Press, 1933), pp. 212-21; see also S. F. Wright, Hart and the Chinese 
Customs (Belfast, 1950), appendix on "Personnel of China’s Customs 
Service’ 1875, 1895, 1905, 1915", pp. 897-904.
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collected was paid into Chinese government banks at each locality*
It was afterwards paid out by the Chinese superintendent for
specified purposes, such as payments of indemnity, foreign loan
services, or current expenses of the area* But never did the Customs
have the prerogative either to directly deposit or discharge the
collected funds. Its responsibility did not go beyond verifying and
81
filling the bank receipts in proof of payment of duties.
In terms of foreign interests the customs revenues were
important in that they had been pledged as security for the Anglo-
French loans of 1858 and 1860, the Kansu Military Loan of 1867, the
loans for payment of the Sino-Japanese War indemnity, and finally the
82massive Boxer indemnity. During the revolution, after a province 
declared it independence its customs depots were open to the 
interference of the revolutionaries. Sorely pressed for funds the 
revolutionary leaders of the provinces naturally wanted to have 
access to the customs revenues. In order to prevent default of the 
debts secured by the Customs the powers were anxious to keep the 
service intact. Fortunately for them the Chinese superintendents 
of most depots of the provinces that had been taken over by the 
revolutionaries left their posts which were left to be sole 
responsibl. . the foreign commissioners.
81
Jordan to Grey, no. 458, 23 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097;
S. F. Wright (ed.), Kuan-shui chi-shih, [^Collection of documents on 
the Chinese Maritime Customs, 1912, — 1 9343 i (Inspectorate-general of 
Customs, 1936), p.l.
82T'ungf Kuan-shui lun, p. 226.
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Although at no two ports were the conditions affecting the 
83Customs the same, a precedent of neutrality with regard to customs 
funds was established jointly by Jordan and Aglen. The direct cause 
of the precedent was that the revolutionaries at Changsha and Hankow 
were the first to interfere with the customs. Both the foreign 
commissioners were British. At Changsha the revolutionary authorities 
notified the commissioner at the end of October that he might continue 
to function under their auspices. The implication of the noti £cation 
was obviously that the revenues collected were to go to the revolution­
aries, Jordan, after consulting the Customs inspector-general, sent 
a telegram to the consul at Changsha instructing him to cooperate with 
the customs commissioner to induce the revolutionaries to allow the 
customs revenues be held in deposit for the time being either by the 
inspector-general or the Consular Body at Shanghai. In arguing with 
the revolutionary government the consul was to point out that the 
revenues were "really the property of foreign bondholders and that its
appropriation by rebels may lead to serious complication with foreign 
84powers." At Hankow, the revolutionaries appointed their own Chinese
superintendent to the customs depot after the imperial authorities had
fled from the city. A similar arrangement was made with the revolution-
85aries in Hankow as in Changsha. For these places as well as those which
83See circulat no. 4, 14 Mar, 1912, in Inspectorate-general of Customs, 
The Maritime Customs (Shanghai 1938), vol. 3, p. 62.
^Jordan to Grey, tel. 244, 26 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
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Jordan to Grey, no. 458, 23 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.
were later taken over by the revolutionaries the arrangement was 
for the revenues to be deposited with the Hongkongv anc^ Shanghai Bank 
at Shanghai in the account of the inspector-general. Thus Jordan was 
much responsible for the neutrality measure in relation to customs 
funds whereby both the revolutionaries and the imperial government 
were debarred from access to the money. Moreover, this policy of 
neutrality in relation to customs funds directly opened the period 
in which the Customs gained the right of depositing and allocating 
customs revenues. Not only were the revenues in the revolutionary 
areas held in deposit with the Hongkbng and Shanghai Bank but a
86similar arrangement was made for that from the government provinces.
Soon afterwards difficulties arose over the question of 
allocation of deposit rights amongst the powers and the foreign banks. 
Jordan was at first content to use the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank 
alone for deposit purposes. However, the representatives of the other 
powers objected to the arrangement because of the exclusive British 
character of the bank. Some ministers suggested that the already 
existing Boxer Indemnity Commission of Bankers should be utilised 
instead. Jordan saw no objection to the new proposal and consulted 
Aglen on it. Aglen, however, disagreed on the ground that the 
Customs was not pledged against the Boxer indemnity alone and that there 
was a fixed order of priority by which the debts involved were to be 
redeemed. He accordingly suggested that a special commission composed 
of the banks which were involved in such loans and indemnities be
Wright, Kuan-shui chi-shih, p. 7.
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established for keeping the funds. Moreover, the commission was to
pay out of the funds the current expenses of the Customs service, to
pay as far as possible all maturing loan services, and to appoint
87
banks to deposit specific sums for specified purposes. Jordan, as
the doyen, referred the matter to the banks in Shanghai which on
23 November drew up six articles concerning the task that was entrusted 
88to them. The Diplomatic Corps approved of them and each minister
asked for the concurrence of his government. A concensus of approval
was achieved on 3 January 1912. Immediately afterwards Jordan, again
as the doyen, presented the Wai-wu Pu with eight articles proposing
the establishment of a new commission in Shanghai composed of all
banks which were connected with the debts China incurred before the
Boxer rebellion, and those connected with the Boxer indemnity. In
short, by these eight articles which the Chinese government agreed
to on 21 January 1912 the inspector-general of the Customs became
responsible for the collection of customs revenues and their remittance
to the Shanghai commission; the allocation of the funds to the specified
banks in Shanghai; and the payment of loan services. Hence, in the Chinese
view China had lost control over the use and deposit of the customs
89
revenues which were only restored duning the 193 0*s.
87Jordan to Grey, no. 458, 23 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.
88Jordan to Grey, 5 Dec. 1911, British Parliamentary Papers, LXXIII, 
pp. 373-4, they became the first six of the eight articles 
mentioned below.
89Wright, Kuan-shui chi-shih, pp. 10-1.
117
Neutrality in Action - Railways
During the period of fighting in the revolution four railways 
connected with British capital were involved* They were the Peking- 
Mukdjenand Shanghai-Nanking Railways which were mortgaged to the British 
and Chinese Corporation in return for the loans with which they were 
constructed; the Peking-Hankow Railway which was redeemed by the Chinese 
government from a Franco-Belgian concern with an Anglo-French loan; and 
the Tientsin-Pukou Railway which was only partly finished with an Anglo- 
German loan.
Both the Peking-Hankow and Tientsin-Pukow Railways do not
figure prominently in the present discussion. Each of them was a joint
enterprise concerning which Britain could not make a decision
independently. In any case, nothing could be done about the Peking-
Hankow Railway which had been used by the government since the beginning
of the revolution as the quickest means of sending troops and
reinforcements to Wuhan. The revolutionaries in Hupei, on the other
hand, destroyed part of the railway near Hankow to obstruct the
movement of the government troops which were on their way south.
Problems over the Tientsin-Pukou Railway arose when the revolutionaries,
having newly captured Nanking on 2 December, stated that they would
destroy the railroad if Chang Hsiin, the ultra-conservative general of
the Manchu government then 100 miles to the north of Nanking, attempted
to retake the city. In both cases Jordan did his best to ensure
continuous service on a purely commercial basis and prevent the earnings
90of the lines from being interfered with.
For what Jordan did about the Peking-Hankow Railway see, for example, 
Jordan to Goffe, tel. 12, 17 Jan., tel. 16, 23 Jan., tel. 20, 27 Jan.,
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Jordan played an important rSle in neutralising the
Shanghai-Nanking and the Peking-Mukden Railways. Shanghai fell to the
revolutionaries on 3 November. That day Fraser telegraphed Jordan that
about 40 revolutionaries entered the Shanghai station of the Shanghai-
Nanking Railway in the afternoon, and the line was in danger of being
interfered with. Moreover, he was apprehensive about the safety of the
International Settlement because it was near to the Shanghai station.
He had, therefore, followed the suggestion of the British general-
manager of the railway and orderedthe station to be guarded by 
91volunteers. Jordan completely approved of Fraser's action and
pointed out that the railway, though a property of the government,
was nevertheless built with British capital and mortgaged to British
bondholders whose interest would be affected by a decrease in the
earnings of the railway. He further explained that the line should
continue to run as a purely commercial undertaking and should not be
used for the conveyance of troops or munitions by either side. Although
the Foreign Office doubted the legality of Jordan1s decision it
92approved of it because it was clearly to Britain's interest.
But the revolutionaries would not accept foreign occupation 
of the Shanghai station. Negotiations took place between the 
revolutionaries and Rraser with the result that on 4 November the
tel. 20, 27 Jan., 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 228) vol. 1841;
Jordan to Grey, no. 89, 20 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1315.
As for the Tientsin-Pukou Railway see, for example, Jordan to 
Fraser, tel. 141, 15 Dec. 1911, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 671) vol. 336.
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Fraser to Jordan, tel. 91, 3 Nov. 1911, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 228) 
vol. 1806.
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Jordan to Grey, tel. 262, 4 Nov.1911, and Campbell's minute on it,
Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.
volunteers were replaced by properly uniformedAsoldiers. In fact 
Fraser was under pressure from the foreign community which objected 
strongly to the volunteers occupying the railway station because it \ 
was eager to gain the good will of the revolutionaries. In agreeing!
to the withdrawal of the volunteers, Jordan, however, continued to
. . 93insist that the railway should not be used for military purposes.
The Manchu government appeared to be particularly satisfied with
Jordan*s arrangement because, although it too was prevented from using
the railway for carrying troops and munitions, it was more important
94that the revolutionaries could not use the railway to take Nanking.
However, on 12 November Fraser suggested that it was necessary 
for Jordan to reconsider his neutral measure because the revolutionaries 
had gained indisputeA possession of the territory through which the 
entire railway ran. In fact some of the more aggressive revolutionaries 
had become restive about the restriction that Jordan had placed on them 
in using the railway. To avoid a collision with the Shanghai 
revolutionary government Jordan agreed that as long as the revolutionaries 
held indisputed possession of the territory concerned they would be 
allowed to use the railway for military transport which, nevertheless, 
would be treated on a purely commercial basis. Jordan told Eraser 
that for the benefit of the shareholders a special account had been 
opened at the Hongkong.' and Shanghai Bank into which the earnings of
93Fraser to Jordan, tel. 102, 7 Nov. 1911, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1086. 
Jordan to Grey,tel. 262, 4 Nov. 1914, Ch. corres., vol. 1094.
The satisfaction of the Manchu government is suggested in Tamura 
Kosaku, Saikin Shina gaikoshi, [ A history of Chinese diplomacy since 
the 1911 revolution J (Tokyo , 1938), vol. 1, p. 64.
120
the railway were being paid. It was also decided that for the safety
of the International Settlement neutrality of the railway would be
maintained within ten miles outside the settlement. Thus entraining
was only allowed from Naziang, a point ten miles from Shanghai. Two
days later even this restriction was removed because the British
master-general complained that Naziang was unsuitable for entraining
95on a large scale.
The Peking-Mukden Railway was neutralised under completely
different circumstances. Between the end of October and the arrival
of Yuan Shih-kfai in the middle of November, Peking was panic-stricken.
The recruitment of more than 2,000 Manchu police by the government
gave colour to the rumour that there would be a general massacre of the
Han Chinese in the capital. Just as this fear subsided rumours of an
anti-Manchu massacre gained ground. The tension increased when large
numbers of people left Peking for refuge elsewhere.
The situation deteriorated when on 29 October news reached
Peking of the mutiny of the 20th Division under General Chang Shao-tseng
at Luanchou, about 100 miles north of Tientsin on the Peking-Mukden
Railway. Soon afterwards General Wu Lu-chen of the 6th Division defected
at Shih-chia-chuang, south-west of Peking, from where he threatened
96to march on the capital. These extraordinary happenings threatened
worse confusion in Peking and because of them Jordan felt the necessity 
v
95Jordan to Grey, no. 438, 15 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096,
96The two mutinies vjtll be discussed in fuller detail in the 
next chapter.
121
of maintaining access to the sea from the capital. To achieve 
this purpose the Peking-Mukden Railway must be preserved.
On 4 November the British general-officer in command at 
Tientsin, Cooper, informed Jordan that the British chief engineer 
of the Peking-Mukden Railway was daily expecting order from the 
viceroy of Chihli to cut the line so as to forestall an advance of the 
20th Division on to Peking. At the same time there was the danger of 
the line being destroyed by the mutinous troops after their march on the 
capital, in order to prevent the government from getting reinforcements 
from Mukden, the place of origin of Manchu power.
Jordan at once made representations to the Wai-wu Pu on the 
strength of Article IX of the Final Boxer Protocol of 7 September, 1901, 
which gave the powers the right to occupy certain points to keep open 
communication between Peking and the sea, especially in times of 
emergency. At the sametime Jordan instructed the consul-general at 
Tientsin to make similar representations to the viceroy. The Chinese 
director of the railway was also warned by his British colleague against 
all interference with the running of the line.
Jordan then put forward a scheme of guarding the railway by
foreign troops first to the ministers of France and Japan because they
were the only powers, apart from Britain, who had troops at Tientsin for
the purpose. However, he took the precaution of having the ministers of
Germany, America, Russia, and Italy notified. His suggestion was readily
97approved by all the governments. The question, however, was complicated
97
Jordan to Grey, no. 434, 13 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.
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by Japan’s proposal to guard alone the part of the railway to the north 
98of Shanhaikuan. Jordan alleviated the embarrassment and apprehension
of the Rnreign Office by asserting that until the Gulf of Chihli froze
the situation only justified the guarding of the railway from Peking
to Tientsin, and that the area beyond Shanhaikuan had not been affected
99by the revolution. He stressed, above all* the precautionary nature of 
his scheme which would not entail foreign occupation of the line but
merely served "to keep the railway running without interference from
- "10° either party.
By 7 November a plan for guarding the railway between Peking 
and Tientsin was drawn up by the generals of the foreign troops at 
Tientsin, under the leadership of General Cooper. Britain was to be 
responsible for guarding the line from Peking to six kilometres'south of 
Wanchuang (71 kilometres); Japan from five kilometre*north of Langfang 
to five kilometre? south of Changchuang (35 kilometres); and France from 
six kilometre? north of Yangfsun to Tientsin east (35 kilometre^ ). Later, 
through Jordan*s influence, America was asked to cooperate when the scheme 
was extended from Tientsin to Shanhaikuan in face of the approaching winter 
when the Gulf of Chihli would be frozen. ^  However, the actual scheme 
was not put into action until early January 1912, when the Shanghai peace
98 “ ; ;
Yamaza’s, Japanese charge d’affaires in London, memorandum to F.O.,
6 Nov, 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094. The Japanese based their demand 
on the precedent created^by Russia during the Boxer incident when she 
was given the exclusivej[to guard the railway beyond Shanhaikuan, see also 
MacDonald to Grey, tdl. 43, 9 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.
99Jordan to Grey, tel. 273, 11 Nov. 1911 and Campbell’s minute on it,
Ch. Corres., vol. 1094. However, Grey agreed that iij the £ase of the 
scheme being extended beyond Shanhaikuan Japan would^grant^her request.
*^ Jordan to General Cooper, private, 10 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
101 t ^
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negotiations broke down and there were disturbances caused by the
102revolutionaries at Luanchou and Chinwangtao.
The guarding of the Peking-Mukden Railway, although
primarily for the evacuation of foreigners in an eventuality in Peking,
was nevertheless a measure of neutrality in that it prevented both the
Manchu government and the revolutionaries from destroying the railway.
Neutrality in Action - Inconsistencies
The abandonment of the neutralisation scheme with regard to the
Shanghai-Nanking Railway was not the only instance of inconsistency in
Jordan's policy of neutrality during the 1911 revolution. On the one
hand Jordan did not recognise the revolutionaries as belligerent.
Immediately after the revolution broke out Jordan instructed Goffe, acting
consul-general at Hankow, that "beyond what is absolutely indispensible for
the security of British life and property, you should not hold any
103
communication with the rebel commander." A fortnight later Jordan 
agreed with his colleagues in a diplomatic meeting that the Diplomatic 
Body would not object to the Consular Body at Hankow entering into 
relations with the revolutionary government there if this was found to be 
necessary to safeguard the tranquillity of the concessions; but the question 
of recognising the revolutionaries should not be discussed.^^
102
Jordan to Grey, tel. 4 Jan., no. 30, 16 Jan., no. 78, 15 Feb. 1912,
Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 208.
103Jordan to Goffe in Jordan to Grey, tel. 222, 13 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., 
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On the other hand, Jordan’s treatment of the questions of
contraband and the right of search of the revolutionaries did not agree
with his professed neutral attitude which, however, did not recognise
the revolutionaries as belligerents. On 22 October the senior consul
at Hankow telegraphed Jordan, as the doyen, that Li Yuan-hung had given
the Consular Body a list of goods which the Wuchang revolutionary
government would consider as contraband. The list was a long one
including such items as telegraph apparatus, materials for railway
construction, food and drink, bedding, horses, fodders, carts and
clothes for soldiers and sailors. These goods, when discovered, would
be confiscated together with the ships carrying them. Despite the
fact that the revolutionaries had not been recognised as belligerents
and therefore had no right whatsoever to impose contraband on foreign
shipping, Jordan urged his colleagues, in the diplomatic meeting of
28 October, to acquiesce to the demand of the revolutionaries. He
stated that under the circumstances he doubted the advisability of
insisting on the full enforcement of treaty rights and he himself was
prepared "to advise British shipping companies temporarily to abstain
105from this trade until the situation become clearer'.' Jordan’s attitude
was made known to the British subjects at Hankow. However, a British
steamboat was confiscated in November because the revolutionaries
106suspected that the coal on board was for the imperialists.
^^Jordan to Grey, no. 428, 8 Nov, 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.




If confiscation was rare, there were more cases of British
ships being fired on by the revolutionaries. After the outbreak of the
revolution the revolutionaries who had taken possession of the Yangtze
ports fired on any ships, including those under foreign flags, which
passed the river by night; nor were ships belonging to the British
companies spared. For example, two ships belonging to Messrs. Jardine,
Matheson and Company, the "Taising" and "Tung Ting", were fired on from
the Kiukiang forts and the two sides of the river near Hankow respectively
in November. The two steamers were suspected of carrying provisions for
the imperialists on their night cruises. Every case of this kind was
brought to Jordan1s notice. While agreeing to Goffe making
representations to the revolutionary authorities he stressed the
impossibility of adhering strictly to full treaty rights in the
abnormal situation. He approved of the willingness of the British ship-
108owners to operate along the Yangtze only during the day.
Closely connected with the question of contraband was the right 
of search by the revolutionaries. On 9 November Goffe reported that the 
general officer commanding the revolutionary troops at Kiukiang notified 
him that all vessels had to be searched at the port for munitions of war 
and supplies destined for the government forces. While saying that 
"British subjects could not, of course have been directed to obey the 
order" he approved of Goffe acknowledging the receipt of the notification
For example, a Japanese ship was fired upon because of being 
suspected of carrying imperial officials, Winsloe to Admiralty 
in Admiralty to F.C)., 6 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.
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without refuting it. By the middle of December Jordan had come 
to agree that the revolutionaries should be given the right of search 
outside treaty port limits because to refuse this, he thought, "would 
result in grave collisions tending to open conflict".^^ Thus Jordan’s 
attitude towards the questions of contraband and the right of search of 
the revolutionaries created an irregular situation in which the 
revolutionaries were not recognised as, but given the rights of, 
belligerents.
As early as 26 October the crown advocate at Shanghai, H.C. 
Wilkinson, presented Jordan with a memorandum on the claim of the 
revolutionaries to be recognised as belligerents. Wilkinson considered 
that there were three grounds on which such a claim was based: the 
revolutionares were in organised revolt against the Manchu government 
and had become the defacto rulers of more than half the country^ the 
treatment given the revolutionaries by the Consular Body at Hankow 
tacitly acknowledged them as belligerents; and, in any case, such 
recognition would not entail the recognition of their government should 
the revolutionaries eventually win their cause. It will be seen
in the following chapter that Jordan refused to consider the Blatter 
because he was reluctant to further jeopardise the already precarious
109Jordan to Grey, no. 466, 28 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.
^^Jordan to Grey, tel. 353, 19 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.
| ^*Crown advocate to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, no. 428, 8 Nov. 1911,




position of the Manchu government. The Foreign Office then agreed 
with him,^ ^
A month later even the Foreign Office became embarrassed 
by the irregular situation. Opinion in the office was not unanimous,
F.O. Lindley considered it more convenient to recognise the revolutionaries, 
but Langley held that time had not yet come to openly affront the Manchu
- n 3government.
On 19 December the crown advocate again took up the question of
recognising the revolutionaries. At that time negotiations between the
Manchu government and the revolutionaries had just begun and Jordan hoped
that by some great fortune the peace conference might decide on the
retention of a restricted Manchu monarchy. Therefore he again rejected
the crown advocate's suggestion of recognising the revolutionaries.
Grey met Jordan half way in sending a telegram to him stating that the
revolutionaries would not be recognised as belligerents unless he advised 
114so.
On 4 January, however, Jordan himself suggested that the question 
had to be reconsidered, and that the revolutionaries might have to be 
recognised after all. The main reason for the change appears to be the 
institution at Nanking on New Years Day of a united provisional republican
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government which put the revolutionaries in a stronger position than
they had been before. Moreover, the breakdown of the Shanghai peace
. 115
conference the next day threatened a renewal of fighting. However, 
no serious fighting was resumed and the revolutionaries were never 
recognised as belligerents throughout the course of the revolution.
In concluding it is justified to say that Jordan made an 
important contribution to formulating the mechanism of British neutral 
policy which was adopted during the Chinese revolution of 1911. It has 
been seen that in some cases Jordan had no time to consult the Foreign 
Office before he had to make a decision. It is obvious that in adopting 
the policy of neutrality Jordan thought primarily of the protection 
of British life and property.
By the so-called policy of neutrality the Manchu government 
was denied the support and help which she had hitherto received from 
Britain. This in itself was a blow io the prestige of the government.
The two attempts of Jordan to lend to the government proved to be abortive, 
and he was mainly responsible for withdrawing from the Manchus the surplus 
of customs revenues and railway earnings which they had hitherto enjoyed.
Moreover, Jordan’s acquiescence to the demands of the revolution­
aries in relation to contraband and the right of search was in effect an 
act of outright partiality^ which contributed significantly to the morale 
of the revolutionaries.
* ^ Jordan to Grey, no. 8, 4 Jan. 1911, Ch. Corres.. vol. 1311.
^Chapter Three 
‘ Mediation
This chapter s^j not only dealing with Jordan^s mediation between 
the revolutionaries and the imperial government at the end of November 
and beginning of December, but also the events, apart from the mechanism 
of the policy of neutrality which Britain adopted, which took place 
before it. It is hoped that by dealing with these events and the 
mediation an answer could be found to the question whether Jordan’s 
attitude towards the two contending parties was truly reflected by his 
policy of neutrality, which in effect was advantageous to the 
revolutionaries,
A brief account of the political events of the first two months 
of the revolution until Jordan’s mediation will help to make clear 
the discussion which follows. As soon as the revolution broke out in 
Wuchang the viceroy of the Hu provinces, Jui—cheng, and the commander 
of the 8th Division of the provinces, Chang Piao, fled across the 
Yangtze to Hankow. Almost immediately the Hupei revolutionaries 
gained control of the three Wuhan cities, and revolutionaries of other 
provinces also revolted. The Manchu government reacted quickly. Two 
armies were rushed to Wuhan by Generals Feng Kuo-chang and Tuan Ch’i-jui, 
under the overall command of the German-trained Manchu General Yin­
ch’ang; and the British-trained Admiral Sa Chen-ping was ordered to 
bombard Hankow, Simultaneously, Yuan Shih-k’ai was recalled, and later 
took over Yin-gh’ang’s command. In spite of these efforts of the 
government the revolution spread, and in north China too part of the 
Pei-yang Army mutinied as a result of revolutionary sedition. Generally
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speaking, the Manchn government was fast losing the country to the 
revolutionaries, but until the end of November it had not suffered a 
decisive defeat. At the beginning of December, Yttan Shih-k’ai, 
representing the Manchu government, succeeded in arranging a cease­
fire with the revolutionaries through the mediation of Jordan. Jordan 
accepted Yuan’s invitation to mediate against a Japanese attempt to 
intervene on the side of the Manchu government. On 6 December the 
prince regent abdicated, and three days later an armistice of fifteen 
days, to be followed by a peace conference, was agreed upon.
The outcome of the 1911 revolution is well-known; the Manchu
dynasty abdicated and the revolutionaries were apparently triumphant.
However, this was by no means a foregone conclusion during the first
two months of the revolution. Nearly a fortnight after the first
outbreak Jordan told Campbell that in his opinion the dynasty depended
much "upon the action of Yuan Shih-k’ai and the loyalty of the Imperial
forces"^. A week later Jordan added another source of hope for the
dynasty - the Tzfl-cheng Yiian (senate) which "may be able to dictate
the conditions on which the provinces will consent to the continuance
2
of the present dynasty" . The three hopes for the dynasty as Jordan 
saw them are convenient headings for the discussion which follows in 
that they naturally symtematise the events which occurred between the 
outbreak of the revolution and Jordan’s mediation, and reflect Jordan’s 
assessment of the relative strength of the revolutionaries and the 
government.
1. Jordan to Campbell, private, 23 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
2. Jordan to Campbell, private, 30 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
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The Reinstatement of Yuan Shih-k’ai
When the news of the Wuchang revolution reached Peking, Prince
Ch’ing suggested to the frightened court to recall Yuan Shih-k’ai to
save the situation. On 14 October, Jordan telegraphed the Foreign
Office that Yuan was appointed viceroy of Hukuang with full command
over the forces originally in Hupei and joint command over Yin-ch’ang’s
troops which were leaving for Wuhan. Admiral SaCtan-Aalso was to
cooperate with him. Jordan thought Yiian’s reappointment would
probably "ensure loyalty of the northern troops, which was doubtful,
and will materially strengthen the hands of the government in dealing
with this crisis"^. However, Yiian K ’o-ting, Yiian Shih-k’ai*s son,
told Jordan that his father would not go to Hankow unless he was given
4
full command over Yin-ch’ang’s troops .
The recall of Yiian had two somewhat contradictory effects on Jordan. 
On the one hand, that the prince regent resorted to recalling Yiian 
reflected the seriousness of the revolutionary threat and the govern­
ment’s inability to cope with it. On the other hand, with Yiian in 
control it would be more likely for the insurrection to be contained 
before assuming serious proportions. It was obvious that Jordan was 
extremely pleased with Yuan’s appointment and looked forward to his 
return to Peking "as a Dictator"^.
But Jordan was not alone in welcoming Yiian’s recall; the heads 
of the other legations viewed it with equal optimism, and urged their 
governments to consent to loans to the Manchu government. Perhaps the
3. Jordan to Grey, tel. 225, 14 Oct. 1911 Ch. Corres., vol* 1093
4. Jordan to Grey, tel. 234, conf., 21 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
5. Jordan to Campbell, private, 23 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
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illustration. Before Yiian Shih-k’ai received an imperial mandate 
to put down the revolution Ijuin was considerably interested in the 
scheme of Kawashima Nanima, the famous adventurer whose name is 
associated with the salient features of Japanese militarism and 
expansionism, whereby Japan would support a nominal Manchu regime 
in part of north China and Manchuria which would be subject to 
exclusive Japanese exploitation and a nationalist regime in south 
China under Sun Yat-sen, However, after the reinstatement of Ytian,
Ijuin became highly pro-Manchu . „ It has also been seen that the
bank agents in Peking too viewed the return favourably.
Jordan did not remain optimistic for long, though his colleagues 
did. On 29 October 1911, Yiian Shih-k’ai, in his new capacity as the 
high commissioner, left Honan for the south. The news of his movement 
undoubtedly raised the morale of the government troops fighting in 
Wuhan, and Hankow was retaken on the very day. However, the situation 
in the middle and lower Yangtze Valley had become too far out-of-hand and 
the imperial success at Hankow did little to brighten the prospect of 
the Manchu cause in Jordan’s eyes. In a letter to Campbell at the end 
of October Jordan remarked that "the areas affected are so widely apart 
and the Government is so ill prepared for a protracted struggle that the 
revolutionary cause seems to me the more hopeful of the two". He was
disturbed because a revolutionary success "would mean a long period of
confusion and disorder which would be fatal to trade"^.
6 . M. B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), 
pp. 134-5; Masaru Ikei, Japan Response to the Chinese Revolution of 
1911", Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 25. no. 2 (Feb. 1966), p. 216; 
Ijuin to Uchida, no, 348, 28 Oct. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 377-8.
7. Jordan to Campbell, private, 30 Oct., 3 Nov., 1911, Jordan Papers,
vol, 7.
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Neither did the recall of Yuan remove the financial difficulties 
of the Manchu government. It has been seen that the Manchu request for 
financial assistance had repeatedly been rejected by the powers. Even 
Yuan Shih-k’ai1s appeals for funds after his arrival in Peking were re­
buffed. On many occasions Yuan personally impressed on Jordan the urgency 
of his government’s financial needs, thinking that if Jordan was convinced 
the powers might be persuaded to lend. It has been shown that Jordan was 
of little service to Yiian in this respect.
On the other hand, Jordan knew that Yuan had access to the 
palace treasure hoarded by the late empress dowager, T?zu-hsi. Soon after 
he returned to Peking Yiian was given about £400,000 of the palace treasure 
to defray the current expenses of the government, to buy ammunition for
g
the war ministry, and to pay for troop movements . The existence of a
palace hoard was verified by the omniscient Morrison of The Times. It was
perhaps true that Yiian’s financial difficulties were at their height in
December when the revolutionaries and the government were negotiating for
a peace conference. It was then that Jordan made the suggestion that a
loan should be made to Yiian to tide over the period of negotiations.
No loan was made in the end and in the middle of December Jordan was
informed that there was enough in the imperial treasury for less than a
week. Yiian personally told Jordan that "the pot will cease boiling in
a few days". Even then Jordan remarkedJ "The loan to Yiian Shih-k’ai is
a very perplexing question in which one feels literally between the
devil and the deep sea. All his people say that he cannot go on without
money*... But one cannot be sure that things are quite as bad as
9
they are represented or that the palace hoard is exhausted".
8. Jordan to Grey, no, 444, conf., 16 Nov.1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.
9. Jordan to Campbell, private, 20 Dec. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
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Jordan was right. Again, on 2 January, he learned that Yiian had
obtained from the palace 8,000 bars of gold equivalent to about
2,000,000 taels of silver, and silver amounting to 3,000,000 taels.
Jordan also noticed the existence of the so-called "patriotic bonds"
which were forced contributions from officials and members of the
imperial family to finance the government through the crisis^.
This element of conflict in Jordan permeated other aspects
regarding the recall of Yiian. While Yiian was still engaged in
military operations in the south the_cour^ t on 1 November dismissed ^
Prince Ch’ing’s cabinet from office and appointed Yiian as the new
premier pending his return to Peking. Again Jordan’s immediate reaction
was one of pleasure. He wrote two days later:
"Yiian Shih-k’ai is the man of the hour. He has had his revenge 
for the treatment he received three years ago. We put our money 
on the right horse at that time and had the Regent only listened 
to British and American advice, he might have been spared the deep 
humiliation he is now suffering".
But with the same breath he said:
"I doubt if Yiian’s appointment as Premier will have a final 
solution". „
He envisaged Yiian would have great difficulties in forming a cabinet
of capable men and that the new cabinet, when formed, would meet great
opposition from the ministers who had been replaced. As it turned out,
there was not so much opposition from the outgoing cabinet as resistence
against joining the new one. Even T’ang Shao-i, Yiian’s henchman,
refused to be enlisted, and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, the veteran constitutiona-
11list, also rejected Yuan’s invitation to be included .
10. Jordan to Grey, no. 15, 5 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.
11, Jordan to Campbell, private, 3 Nov,, 19 Noy,, 1911, Jordan papers, 
yol. 1* Li, Cheng-ch^ih shih, vol. 1, p. 254,
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On 13 November Yuan reached Peking where he was "accorded an
almost royal reception" in which none of the Manchu princes was present.
12Presumably Jordan was in the crowd which welcomed Yuan . Not a few
people pinned their hopes on the arrival of Yuan in Peking. It was Prince
IB . 1Ch’ing’s "sole hope" . The bank agents in Peking urged that loans could
safely be advanced to the Manchu government on the grounds that the
situation would certainly improve with Yuan in the capital. Jordan was
14informed of Yiian1 s return to Peking well in advance by Yiian K’o-ting 
Again, a conflict can be discerned in his attitude. On the one hand, the 
prospect of Yiian’s return alone had an unmistakably "reassuring effect"^ 
on the panic-stricken Peking. The number of people leaving Peking decreased 
noticeably during the few previous days. Jordan was not unaffected by what 
he observed. On the other hand, he was acutely aware of the fact that 
imperial authority in most provinces had ceased to operate. The day after 
Yiian1 s return he wrote to Admiral Winsloe about the event but commented 
that "with the whole country in the hands of the rebels and no funds at 
their disposal, I do not see how the government, even with Yuan’s help, 
can manage to struggle on very much longer"^.
"The action of Yiian Shih-k’ ai"j> on which the fate of the Manchu 
dynasty much depended, relied in turn upon the attitude of Yiian Shih- 
k’ai towards the dynasty and the revolutionaries. Most histories written 
either generally on the period or specifically on Yiian Shih-k’ai cannot 
detach themselves from a judgement on Yiian’s loyalty to the Manchu court. 
Similarly it is important to understand Jordan’s conception of Yiian in 
this respect.
12. Jordan to Admiral Winsloe, private, 14 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
13. Jordan to Campbell, private, 10 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol* 7.
14. Jordan to Grey, tel. 258, 2 Nov, 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.
15. Jordan to Grey, tel. 274, 12 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1095.
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general^ before yii^ n returned to Peking, Jordan believed that
his loyalty to the Manchu dynasty was not in question^. It was only
after Yuan’s return that Jordan waa able to ascertain Yiian1 s attitude
and impress his own on him. On his arrival Yiian was immediately
engrossed in forming his cabinet, the names of which were announced on
16 November, Moreover, he was preoccupied in securing control over
all the troops in the vicinity of the capital. But he had not forgotten |f
the powers, nor had he forgotten Jordan. The next day after his
arrival Jordan received a call from Yiian K’o-tihg , t!on his father’s
behalf", informing him that though it was Yiian Shih-k’ai’s desire to
save the dynasty, circumstances had made that virtually unfeasible.
Jordan was further told that the revolutionary leaders, notably Li
Yiian-hung, had offered Yiian the presidency of a Chinese republic if he
would defect from the government. Yiian K’o-ting said that his father
asked for the advice of Jordan who gave it as his personal opinion that
the best solution lay in the retention of the Manchu dynasty as a
figure-head, accompanied by such constitutional changes as had been
promised by the court to the Tzfl-ch6ng Yiian about a fortnight before.^
Yiian K’o-ting hastened to assure Jordan that the revolutionaries
wanted "his father to be their ruler... and that the republic would
18only be a transitional stage. " Jordan was considerably surprised by 
Yuan K’o-ting’s information. He knew that since the beginning of 
November Yiian, then still in Hupei, had been trying to come to an 
understanding with the Hankow revolutionaries. But it appears that it
16. Jordan to Winsloe, private, 14 Nov.1911, Jordan Papers, vol<7,
17. For example, Jordan to Grey, no*397, 16 Oct.1911, Ch. Corres., 
vol 1094; Jordan to Campbell, 3 Nov, 1911, Jerdati Papers, vol# 7.
18. Jordan to Grey, tel* 278, 14 Nov. 1911, ‘ Ch. ' Corres, vol* 1094.
had never occurred to Jordan that Yuan might consider more than
inducing the revolutionaries to put down their arms and accept a
19 . . . .
limited Manchu monarchy . Jordan decided to clear his mind m  an
interview with YUan Shih-k’ai himself which was scheduled for the 
next day.
The Foreign Office gave immediate instruction concerning the
impending interview; Sir Edward Grey telegraphed:
"Conversations with Yuan Shih-k^ai are left entirely to 
your discretion. We have conceived very friendly feelings 
and respect for him personally from his previous record.
We should wish to see a Government sufficiently strong to 
deal impartially with foreign countries and to maintain internal 
order and favourable conditions for the progress of trade 
established in China as a consequence of the revolution.
Such a Government would receive all the diplomatic support 
which we could give it".20
However, it appears that the telegram did not arrive in time to 
prepare Jordan for his interview. In any case, YUan’s attitude towards 
the situation was substantially different from YUan K’o-ting1s descrip­
tion of it the day before. YUan Shih-k’ai told Jordan that Li Ytian- 
hung had rejected all his "overtures" which, judging from the context, 
though not specified, provided for a limited Manchu monarchy. YUan 
then stated that although Shanghai had joined Wuchang in demanding for 
a republic, he would lead the cause of the dynasty which was really the 
predominating sentiment in the north. Moreover, he thought that by 
rallying the northern provinces to his cause he might be able to form
19. Jordan to Grey, tel 258, 2 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol#1094. It is 
an established fact that on 1 November YUan wrote to Li YUan-hung, 
and on 11 November YUan’s representatives, Liu Ch’eng-en and T’sai 
Ttng-kan, reached Wuchang to negotiate with Li. Chinese historians 
usually use this as evidence to prove YUan’s disloyalty to the 
Manchus, see Wu Hsiang-hsiang, "YUan Shih-k’ai mou-ch’U lin-shih 
ta-tsung-t’ung chih ching-kuo", [The procedure by which YUan Shih- 
k’ai schemed for the provisional presidency}, in CH ts’ung-k’an, vol4 1 
p.6; ChU Cheng, Hsin-hai tsa-chi, [Notes on the 1911 revolutionj, 
(Taipei, 1956), p. 75; see also Jordan to Campbell, private, 17 Nov. 
1911, for Ts’ai Ang-kan’s version of the failure of the attempt to 
negotiate with the revolutionaries, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
20. Grey to Jordan, tel 168, 15 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1095.
138
a nucleus of government in the north which would eventually win over j
the south, either by persuasion or by force. From the tone of the
telegram on the interview to the Foreign Office it appears that Jordan
was pleased with YUan’s attitude, and he described YUan K’o-ting’s
21
interview as "a feeler".
Certainly after their meeting on 15 November Jordan was under the
impression that YUan was a faithful supporter of the Manchu cause.
However, YUan told Jordan soon afterwards that the situation was "very
hopeless" and that he had not realised the extent to which the Manchu
government had deteriorated during his three years of absence. YUan’s
private secretary, Ts’ai Ting-kin, made similar observations to Jordan
and said that many of YUan’s own followers urged him to recognise the
22
hopelessness m  upholding the dynasty . Jordan found YUan becoming
daily more despondent, and at the end of November Yuan talked of
„. 23resignation
The Imperial Forces
Jordan also held contradictory views about the imperial forces
which would, to a great extent, determine the outcome of the revolution.
Just before the revolution broke out, the bulk of the imperial forces in
North China was at Yung-p’ing, Hopei, where they were drilling for the
Grand Autumn Manoeuvres. It was planned that during the manoeuvres the
divisions which participated would be divided into two armies, marching
towards each other from opposite directions. The army which would march
from the east composed chiefly of the Pei-yang divisions under the
overall command of General Feng Kuo-chang, aided by General Chang Shao-tseng
21. Jordan to Grey, tel. 281, 15 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol, 1095.
22. Jordan to Campbell, private, 17 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol.7.
23. Jordan to Campbell, private, 27 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol, 7.
of the 20th Division of Mukden and General Wu Lu-chen of the 6th 
Division of Paoting. The army which would march from the west was 
mainly made up of units of the Imperial Guards, commanded by General 
Shu Ch’ing-o, aided by General Tfien Hsien-chang and General Ha Han-chang. 
When the revolution broke out the Ch’ing government ordered an immediate 
postponement of the manoeuvres. Yin—ch’ang, then also at Yung-p*ing, was
ordered to leave for Wuhan. His aide-de-camp, Ting Shih-yttan, immediately
• *  •set about preparing Luanchou, an important junction on the Pekmg-Mukden
Railway, as the camp for entraining purposes. Ting also asked the 
authority of the Peking-Mukden Railway to arrange with that of the 
Peking-Hankow Railway for the transport of fifty train-loads of munitions 
and troops. On 14 October the 4th Division and 1st Battalion entrained; 
Yin-Ch’ang followed two days later. Jordan hoped at the beginning that
these troops would be able to contain the Wuchang revolution as a local
-- . 24 affair
Before long Jordan became sceptical about these troops. Although
the request of the military attache of the British legation to join the
imperial army as an observer on the spot was rejected, he remained a good
source of information for Jordan on Chfing military movements. He told
Jordan that he found little enthusiasm along the Peking-Hankow line for
25the imperial cause . This observation of the military attache was
24. The details of Ch’ing military movements depicted here are found in
HHKM, vol.6, p. 339; and Wu Hsiang-hsiang, Wan-Ch*ing kung-t’ing yu
jen-wu, [The court and leading figures of the late Chfing dynast y1"7 
(Taipei, 1965), pp 100-1.
25. Jordan to Campbell, private, 23 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7; 
Jordan to Grey, no. 409, 23 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094; and 
military attache’s report in Jordan to Grey, no. 431, 10 Nov. 1911,
Ch. Corres., vol, 1095. In fact, the military attache was later 
given a special permit by the Chf ing government to go to Hankow 
himself. He arrived there on 19 October, one day after Morrison.
somewhat confirmed by Ting Shih-yiian in his diary^. Jordan commented
rather sharply that "at least 30,000 men have proceeded to the scene of
the disturbance and if China’s modern army is one-tenth as efficient as
our military experts have led us to believe, they should make short work
27of the mutineers." However, the first imperial victory at Hankow
was the result of a week’s military operation, and it has been alle ged 
that General Feng Kuo-chang was so frustrated by the resistance of the
Hankow revolutionaries that when the city was taken by his troops he
. . 28set fire to it in revenge
On the other hand, there were reasons to believe that the imperial 
troops that were sent to Wuhan were superior to the revolutionary troops 
there. Despite the obvious signs of unpreparedness, the imperial troops 
that were sent were ipart of the properly equipped and trained Pei-yang 
Army, The common phenomenon amongst the different revolutionary centres, 
however, was indiscriminate recruitment. The Wuchang military govern­
ment created a precedent for this. Thus troops belonging to the 8th 
Division which started the revolution fought side-by-side with inexperi­
enced new recruits from all classes including coolies, loafers, rickshaw 
men, and shopkeepers. Jordan was given the information which Goffe had
learned "on good authority" that there were only about 5,000 trained
29
revolutionary soldiers fighting m  Wuhan .
26.Ting’s diary was published by the Dairen library of the South Manchurian 
Railway Company and has been in rare circulation. It is entitled Mei- 
leng chang-ching pi-chi, tThe diary]. It is, however, substantially 
quoted in the section dealing with Ch’ing military movements on the 
outbreak of the revolution in Wu, Wan-Ch’ing kung-t’ing yti jen-wu,
pp. 100-1. According to Ting there was no time to prepare enough food 
and coal to entrain the soldiers from Luanchou to Hankow, and this 
caused considerable discontent amongst the soldiers.
27.Jordan to Campbell, private, 23 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
28.For example, Chii, Hsin-hai tsa-ehi, p. 68.
29.Goffe to Jordan, no. 97, 16 Oct. 1911, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1802. For 
details of rapid recruitment at Wuchang, see Lo Kang, Lo pien Kuo-fu
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That soon afterwards Jordan became sceptical even of this
superiority of the imperial troops in Wuhan is reflected in his reaction
to the imperial victory at Hanyang at the end of November. It is
important to notice that the recovery of Hanyang by government troops
is the most commonly employed evidence to argue that Ytianfs military
power was strong enough to crush the revolution, which, however, he
30 . .
preserved as a weapon to blackmail the court. The British commander-
in-chief of the China Station was considerably impressed by the equipment,
organisation, and discipline of the imperial troops in the Han^yang
31campaign which he witnessed on the spot . Later, Jordan was frequently
attacked for mediating between the revolutionaries and the government at
the time of the Han^yang success, an act which was considered to have
forestalled an eventual success of the government at Wuhan which might
32in turn have brought about the collapse of the revolutionary movement
Partly to defend himself and partly out of genuine conviction, Jordan
commented in retrospect that other than negotiations there could "be
33no doubt that at the best a long and bloody war would have ensued"
In other words, Jordan believed that the revolutionaries in Wuhan had 
every possibility of holding their own against their imperial enemies.
nien-p!u chiu-miu, [The errors in the chronological biography of Sun 
Yat-sen edited by Lo Chia-luii] , (Taipei, 1962), p. 262; and Hu Ou-kung, 
a revolutionary leader at Wuchang during the revolution, frankly 
acknowledges the incompentence of the new recruits in his Hsin-hai 
ko-ming pei-fang shih-lu, [The 1911 revolution in north ChinaJ,
(Shanghai, 1948), p .ij1. Also Chung-kuo jen-min cheng-chrih hsieh- 
shang hui-i Hu-pei-sheng wei-yuan-hui, Hsin-hai hui-i lu, £Collections 
of memoirs on the 1911 revolutionj, (Wuhan, 1957), vol. 1, pp. 179-80.
30,For example, Ch'en, Yuan Shih-kfai, pp. 116-7; E.P. Young, "Yuan Shih- 
kfaifs Rise to the Presidency, 1911-1912'/ p. 33, note 14 in PRCCC which 
gives reference to the remarks of contemporary American diplomatic and 
consular officials; and Sih-Gung Cheng, Modern China, (Clarenden Press, 
1919), pp, 15-6,
31.Admiral Winsloe to Admiralty in Admiralty to F.O., 13 Jan. 1912,
Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.
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Leaving aside the strength of the imperial troops in Wuhan,
Jordan found it difficult to make a definite assessment of the imperial
troops in north China which would determine Yuan Shih-k’ai’s action.
Jordan was particularly struck by the unreliability of the Pei-yang army.
Three days after the revolution broke out he telegraphed the Foreign
34
Office that the loyalty of the northern troops was "doubtful" . The
British military attache was convinced that many of the officers on the
. 3 5general staff were in secret communication with the revolutionaries .
Yuan k ’o-ting was one amongst those who informed Jordan of the unrelia-
36
ble state of the Pei-yang Army.
Jordan’s apprehension seemed for a time to be justified when on*’
29 October the 20th Division of Mukden, then at Luanchou because of the 
postponed Autumn Maneouvres, mutinied and refused to entrain for the front. 
Immediately afterwards Chang Shao-tseng, the commander, and several of 
his colleagues presented the court with a petition of 12 articles which, 
if enforced, would provide a national parliament before the end of the 
year, a constitution to be drawn up by the parliament, a cabinet 
responsible to the parliament, and the exclusion of members of the 
imperial household from all offices of state. In short, they demanded 
of a highly limited constitutional monarchy. The Manchu government 
was alarmed by such an event taking place on its doorstep, especially 
as Luanchou was a strategic point on the Peking-Mukden line, on which
32. The severest criticism came from the Peking correspondent of the New 
York Herald, a Mr. Ohl, who entertained a personal grudge against 
Jordan and a general anti-British attitude.
33. Jordan to Grey, tel. 97, 24 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1315.
34. Jordan to Grey, tel. 225, 14 Oct.1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
35. Jordan to Campbell, private, 23 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
36. Jordan to Grey, tel. 234, 21 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093,
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the Manchus depended both for reinforcements from, and retreat to,
37Manchuria . It can, however, be argued that the Luanchou mutiny
did not make Jordan feel completely hopeless about the loyalty of the
Pei-yang troops. On 2 November, Yiian K*o-ting assured him that the
38mutinous troops were "acting under Yiian Shih-kai's inspirations".
The reason for Jordan's acceptance of Yiian K*o-ting's statement can
be seen in the next section in relation to the Tzti-chfeng Yiian.
However, the disloyalty of part of the Pei-yang Army was undoubtedly
reflected in the mutiny of the 6th Division, one of the original divisions
of the Pei-yang Army then under the command of Wu Lu-chen, at Shih-chia-
chuang. That Jordan was conversant with the situation during
the revolution was shown by the fact that as early as 14 October he
expressed his knowledge that the 6th Division was "honey-combed with
39revolutionary ideas"
Wu Lu-chen succeeded to the command of the 6th Division only in 
the winter of 1910 through the influence of his good friend, Liang-pi, 
a Manchu noble. He was, however, a revolutionary. Yin-ch!ang distrusted 
him and rejected his request after the outbreak of the revolution to lead 
his division to the front. After Chang Shao-tseng's actions at Luanchou,
Wu attempted to contact Chang and Lan T’ien-wei, the assistant commander 
of the 20th Division, both his old friends, to start a revolution in the 
north. The Manchu government heard of the plot and was alarmed. It 
appointed Wu as the new governor of Shansi, the capital of which had 
just been taken over by the revolutionaries, to quench the revolution there,
37. For details of the Luanchou mutiny see HHKM, vol. 6, pp. 331-9; 
for the twelve demands see Li, Cheng-ch*lh shih, pp. 251-2.
38. Jordan to Grey, tel. 259, 2 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.
39. Jordan to Campbell, private, 14 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7,
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The idea of the appointment was to separate Wu, Chang and Lan so that 
it would be difficult for them to join forces. Wu accepted the appoint­
ment but met the Shansi revolutionaries at Niang-tzu-kuan where they were 
persuaded to pretend surrendering to him to allay the Manchus* suspicion. 
He then stationed his troops at Shih-chia-chuang, awaiting an opportunity 
in which lis division and the 20th Division might meet and march on Peking. 
At Shih-chia-chuang too, Wu disrupted the transport of munitions to the 
imperial troops fighting in Wuhan. That the Manchu government was 
alarmed was natural; apart from the fact that the Peking-Mukden and 
Peking-Hankow Railways were being endangered, Luanchou, Shih-chia-chuang, 
and Niang-tzu-kuan were within striking distance from Peking. Jordan 
did not fail to appreciate the gravity of the situation. It was at 
this point that he arranged for the guarding of the Peking-Mukden
Railway by foreign troops to keep the sea accessible to Peking in case
40of an eventuality there
Later, however, Jordan must have been considerably relieved that the 
Luanchou and Shih-chia-chuang crises did not assume the magnitude which 
they at first threatened to. Chang Shao-tseng's resignation ended the 
first incident and Wu Lu-chen1s assassination the second. Most commenta­
tors agree that the net outcome of the disappearence of the influence of 
Chang and Wu, particularly the latter, was that YUan Shih-kVai became
$ . 4i
the indisputable power in north China.
It has been seen so far that Jordan had been unable to assess the 
extent to which the Pei-yang Army was unreliable in terms of its sub­
jection to revolutionary infiltration. He seemed to be equally, if not
40. For details of the Shih-chia-chuang mutiny, see HHKM. vol. 6, pp. 
329-31, 361-2, 371.
41# For example, HHKM, vol. 6, p. 279; Wen Kung-chih, Tsui-chin san-shih-
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more, uncertain of Yiian Shih-k'ai's control over the Pei-yang Army
which was an important factor in assessing the reliability of it.
Jordan again had contradictory views on the matter. When YUan was
recalled in the middle of October Jordan certainly had high hopes
mainly because of his belief in YUan's influence with the army. The
belief was short-lived. The Shih-chia-chuang mutiny in particular made
him realise that YUan's control over the Pei-yang Army was not as
absolute as he at first thought it to be:
"although Yuan's prestige with it [the army] was very great, ^
it does not follow that he may be able to control it permanently".
Knowing China as he did, he must have realised soon afterwards that
YUan's loss of direct administrative control over the Pei-yang divisions
between 1907 and 1911 must have attenuated his claim to personal loyalty
from the soldiers in spite of the close link that he had maintained with
the top-ranking officers during the period. Commenting on this Jordan
regretfully wrote:
"The whole arrangement has the defect which has characterised 
all recent Chinese policies - the one man rule".4^
Apart from the Pei-yang Army, the imperial forces included the
44Imperial Guards and the old-style troops which antedated the New Army.
They were, however, of extremely marginal significance. The Imperial
Guards came under YUan's influence only after his return to Peking, and
Jordan noticed that such out-moded forces as the Hsun-fung Tui, HuaiChUn,
45and Wu-wel-so Chun could hardly be depended on in a serious combat.
nien chUn-shih shih in CHS ts1ung-shu, vol. 2, p.5; and Li, Cheng- 
ch'ih shih, vol. 1, p. 313.
42. Jordan to Campbell, 3 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
43. Ibid.
44t The term "New Army", or Hsin Chun, is used to include both the Pei- 
yang Army and the Nan-yang Army which was in the south.
45# Military attache's report in Jordan to Grey, no. 492, 4 Dec. 1911,
*flh. Corres.. vol. 1098.
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Thus, speaking generally on the imperial forces, Jordan realised 
that in terms of military prowess in the Wuhan area the revolutionary 
forces were stronger and more confident, the government troops weaker 
and less cohesive than is generally supposed. And, in terms of the 
overall military strength of the Manchu government which depended on 
YUan Shih-kfai, Jordan realised that Yuan was confronted by such 
unpleasant facts as the revolutionary sedition in, and his loss of 
absolute control of, the Pei-yang Army.
The Tzu-cheng YUan.
The Tzu-cheng YUan, or national assembly, began its second session 
in Peking on 22 October, but it only struck Jordan as a possible influence 
in retaining the Manchu dynasty as a limited monarchy at the end of 
October and beginning of November in connection with the Luanchou mutiny.
Two days before the Luanchou generals made their demands the Tzu-cheng 
YUan had presented four demands: the abolition of the imperial cabinet, 
so called because the majority of its members were from the imperial 
family; an amnesty for political offenders; the participation of the 
people in drawing up the constitution; and the immediate convocation of 
parliament. The close similarity between the Luanchou generals and the 
Tzu-cheng Yuan in their demands immediately caused Jordan to suspect that
46
the Luanchou demands were drawn up in consultation with the Tzu-cheng Yuan.
Jordan1s suspicion was confirmed when an 2 November YUan K’o-ting
told him that the Luanchou demands were made under the inspiration of
u 47his father who was also in direct communication with the Tzu-cheng YUan.
46. Jordan to Grey, tel. 256, 30 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
47. Jordan to Grey, tel. 258, 2 Nov, 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
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Having been given the information by YHan K’o-ting, and being convinced
of Yiian’s sincerity in upholding a limited Manchu monarchy, Jordan
therefore thought of the Luanchou mutiny more as a constitutionalist
than revolutionary plot, and his attention was accordingly diverted to
the Tzu-cheng Yiian.
The frightened Manchu court immediately conceded r Chang’s demands,
and the Tzu-cheng YUan was ordered, on 2 November, to draw up a
constitution. The next day it produced a constitution of nineteen articles
which was practically an endorsement of the Luanchou demands. The regent
accepted the constitution and promised to promulgate it at the end of
the month in the Imperial Ancestral Temple, To further show its sincerity
in accepting constitutional limitations, the Manchu court requested the
Tzu-cheng YUan to pass its decision, which it did on 7 November, to appoint
48YUan Shih-k’ai as the new premier.
It has been seen that for the past few years Jordan had been a 
close observer of the constitutional movement and was fully conversant with 
the relationship between the Tzu-cheng Yuan and the Tzu-i ChU, the 
provincial assemblies. As early as the day after the Luanchou demands 
were made, Jordan hopefully telegraphed the Foreign Office that the Tzu- 
cheng Yuan might succeed in persuading the provinces, through their i
assemblies^to accept under adequate guarantees the concessions made by the i
49 . .government . Immediately after the court had accepted the constitution
Jordan wrote to Campbell that delegates would be sent out by the Tzu-cheng 
Yuan to the provinces to gain their acceptance of a constitutional monarchy
48. For details of these sessions in the Tzu-cheng Yuan, see Peking Daily 
News, 3, 8, 9 Nov. 1911.
49. Jordan to Grey, tel. 256, 30 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.
50. Jordan to Campbell, private, 3 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7. It 
is said that later the assembly was surrounded by a "languid"
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On 6 November he reiterated to the Foreign Office his opinion that the
hopes of the Manchus ITrest upon Yuan and the National Assembly being
able to convince the country that it is better to keep the Manchu
dynasty in position, shorn of all powers, than to the prospect of
probabl<9 confusion and disorder
However, the hope raised by the Tzu-cheng Yttan in Jordan that the
Manchu dynasty might after all be retained was short-lived. About the
middle of November Jordan already observed that the delegates who had
been despatched by the Tzu-cheng Ytlan to indoctrinate the provicial
assemblies with the idea of a limited Manchu monarchy did not have "a
very cordial reception” at Hankow, Shanghai, and other strong revolution- 
52ary centres . When the prince regent took the oath on 26 November,
binding the dynasty to the constitution, Jordan knew that the Tzu-cheng
Yttan had already lost its cause.
Before looking at Jordan’s mediation between the revolutionaries and
the government, several conclusions have to be drawn from what has so
far been said in this chapter. First, it is clearly underwritten that
Jordan, although adopting the policy of neutrality, still adhered firmly
to the ideal which he had held during the pre-revolutionary years, - a
figure-head Manchu dynasty with YCtan Shih-k’ai in actual power. He
distrusted the revolutionaries and their idea of a Chinese republic. At
this point it is interesting to contrast Jordan’s consistent attitude to
the attitude of Goffe, acting consul-general at Hankow, Fraser, consul-
general at Shanghai and Wilkinson, consul at Nanking. In this it is
assumed that as British representatives at the ports concerned, they had
been supporters of the Manchu government as opposed to the revolutionaries.
atmosphere because the best speakers had been sent to the provinces, 
Peking Daily News, 14 Nov. 1911.
51.Jordan to Grey, no. 427, 6 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1095.
Throughout the revolution Goffe was most ingratiating towards Li Yiian- 
hung, and became extremely friendly with him. In a despatch which dealt 
with the revolution in retrospect, Goffe said: "The future could be faced
with less anxiety if China possessed more men of the stamp of the leader
53 . . .of the revolutionaries at Wuchang" . It has been seen in connection with
the policy of neutrality that Jordan was often affected by Fraserfs
anxiety to be on good terms with the Shanghai revolutionaries. It will
be seen that towards the end of the revolution Wilkinson openly
sympathised with Sun Yat-sen, who had by then become the provisional
president of the Nanking republican government, as opposed to Yiian Shih- 
.54k*ai , Secondly, Jordan had been unable to come to a definite conclusion 
as to the relative strength of the revolutionaries and the government.
This is reflected in the conflicting views which he held towards the 
reinstatement of Ytian Shih-k!ai, the imperial forces, and the Tzu-cheng 
Yiian, the three remaining props of the Manchu dynasty during the first 
two months of the revolution. Thirdly, however, it became increasingly 
clear towards the end of November that the revolutionary cause was 
getting the upper hand.
Mediation
The suggestion that Britain should mediate between the revolutionaries 
and the Manchus was not first made by Jordan, On 26 October Townsend of 
the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, acting in the absence of Addis, and 
Hillier, the bank1s representative in Peking, who was in London at the 
time, called on the.Foreign.Office.to whom.they communicated a telegram
52. Jordan to Grey, tel, 274, 12 Nov. 1911,- Ch. .Corres., vol. 1095.
53. Goffe to Jordan, no, 17, 20 Feb. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1841.
54. Wilkinson to Jordan, no. 6, 24 Jan. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 228), 
vol. 1836.
150
of the Hongkong Office of the bank suggesting that the powers might
offer to mediate for the Chinese. Hillier especially tried to convince
Campbell that mediation was particularly suited to the Chinese mentality"^.
The Foreign Office was sceptical and asked for Jordan’s opinion. Jordan
replied that mediation at that moment was both unlikely to be successful
and impracticable. It was not likely to be successful because the Manchus
and the revolutionaries were fighting for two directly opposing causes and
that there was as yet no organised revolutionary centre or body to deal
with. It was impracticable in that it would involve Britain deeply and
56prematurely and compromise the Manchu cause before it was fully tested
Fighting between the revolutionary and government forces continued
in Wuhan until the end of November. On 25 November, Goffe telegraphed
Jordan that stray shells from Hanyang were falling on the British
concession in Hankow. The next day Jordan expressed to Yflan Shih-k’ai
his anxiety for the safety of the British community at Hankow. Yttan
stated that the■imperial forces were only acting on the defensive and
he was willing to suspend hostilities if an armistice could be arranged
on mutually satisfactory terms. Jordan was then asked by YHan to convey
his desire to Li YUan-hung through the British acting consul-general at
Hankow. Jordan made the decision in accepting Yuan’s request to him to
mediate and instructed Goffe to send a verbal and unofficial message to Li.
He took care to explain that his object of mediation was to ’’avert
useless bloodshed and to prevent prolongation of dangerous situation in
. 5 7which the British community has now been placed* for some six weeks.”
55. Campbell’s minute addressed to Grey, 26 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol.1093
56. Jordan to Grey, tel, 249, 29 Oct. 1911, Ch. Carres., vol. 1094.
57. Jordan to Grey, tel. 302, 26 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.
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On 27 November the imperial troops retook Hanyang. According to
Goffe the revolutionaries were demoralised and fled to Wuchang where the
situation became untenable. Jordan was further informed that Li Ytian-
hung had come to accept a constitutional monarchy. Goffe said that he
would try hard to obtain Li’s terms for an armistice which would then
58be sent to Jordan to be communicated to Yiian Shih-k’ai.
The promptness and decision with which Jordan reacted to YUan’s
invitation to mediate between the imperial and the revolutionary sides
was quite unlike his usual way of lengthy contemplation. The apparently
prompt decision was, however, the result of vigilent observation and
experienced calculation. The four objections which he listed a month
before to Hillier’s suggestion of mediation no longer existed.
The first objection was that there was no basis for negotiation in
that the revolutionaries asked for a republic and the imperialists, of
course, the retention of the dynasty. This objection seemed to have
been removed with Li Ytian-hung agreeing to a constitutional monarchy.
The second objection was that there was as yet no central machinery
through which the revolutionaries could be dealt with collectively in
a negotiation. But, by the end of November there was a clear attempt at
cohesion amongst revolutionaries of different provinces. In fact, earlier
in the middle of November Goffe reported to Jordan that he had received
from Li Yuan-hung a despatch stating that he had been elected by various
republican generals as the representative of the republican government
59with Wuchang as the temporary centre. When Hanyang fell representatives
58. Goffe to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, tel. 307, 27 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., 
vol. 1096.
59. Goffe to Jordan, tel. 76, 15 Nov. 1911. Ch. Emb. Arch, vol. 1802.
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from the revolutionary provinces were arriving at Wuchang for consulta­
tion in forming a united provisional government•^
The third objection a month before was that the strength of the 
Manchu government had not yet been fully tested. Hence premature 
mediation of a third party tended to compromise the position of the 
government. By the end of November, however, as it has just been 
asserted, the inability of the Manchu government to claim a decisive 
military superiority over the revolutionaries was obvious to Jordan,
The fourth objection to mediation a month before was that it 
involved Britain. But events had developed to a point at which Jordan 
realised that Britain had of necessity to become involved. Apart from 
the severe disruption of trade, the exposure of the Hankow concession 
to continued warfare, Jordan foresaw the danger of troops, both revolu­
tionary and imperial, degenerating into bandits mostly as a result of the 
shortage of pay. There was the additional danger that the original 
bandits in the provinces might take advantage of the chaotic political 
situation to carry on pillage on an enlarged scale. Under such circum­
stances, British missionaries still remaining in the interior were 
likely to be endangered. At about the fall of Hanyang Jordan wrote to 
Admiral Winsloe urging him to defer his annual visit to Hongkong and
remain in the north during the winter which he expected to be filled with
61general lawlessness, misery and distress in the central provinces.
Finally, there was an obvious difference between the situation at
the time of Hillierfs proposal for mediation and that which prevailed
at the end of November. Had Hillier’s proposal been approved,hthe British
60: Goffe to Jordan, tel. 88, 29 Nov. 1911. Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1802.
61. Jordan to Admiral Winsloe in Jordan to Grey, no. 480, 5 Dec. 1911,
Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.
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government would have appeared to have interfer ed of her own accord.
But at the end of November Jordan was accepting an invitation to mediate
from Yilan Shih-kfai, with the tacit agreement of Li Ytian-hung.
On 27 November Goffe telegraphed Jordan the terms which Li proposed
for a fifteen day armistice in which each side would keep to the
territory they occupied. The terms were: representatives from all
the revolutionary provinces to meet and elect plenipotentiaries to
negotiate with Yiian’s representatives; and the armistice to extend for
another fifteen days, if necessary. Jordan transmitted the terms to
Yuan who asked Feng Kuo-chang for a detailed account of the disposition
6 2of the imperial troops at Wuhan before stating his terms.
On 1 December Yuan gave his terms which Jordan telegraphed Goffe 
to transmit to the revolutionaries. They provided for continued posse­
ssion by both sides of territories which.each already occupied; a three- 
day truce; and prohibition on both sides to obtain reinforcements or 
increase military strength in general during the truce and subsequent 
armistice. The wording of the last condition was: "In order that any 
infringement of the conditions may be obviated, British consul-general 
to sign armistice agreement as witness". Before consulting the Foreign 
Office Jordan authorised Goffe to sign the agreement accordingly. Later
he explained to Grey: "I trust that the last condition meets with your
63approval: I had no time to consult you in regard to it"
The Foreign Office was not unanimous in reacting to Jordan1s initia­
tive. Some fear was felt that the situation could be embarrassing for
62. Goffe to Jordan, tel. 87, 27 Nov. 1911, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1802; 
Jordan to Grey, tel. 308, 28 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.
63. Jordan to Grey, tel. 314, 1 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.
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Britain if either side infringed an armistice agreement witnessed by the
British acting consul-general. As it turned out, the British consulate-
general at Hankow received numerous complaints of infringement especially
. . 6 4from the revolutionaries . The permanent under-secretary, Sir Arthur
Nicolson, was doubtful as to the effect of British mediation on the
other powers, especially Japan who had just made overtures to London to
65intervene actively on the side of the Manchus . Campbell, nevertheless
warmly seconded Jordan’s action for he considered that, in being the
witness, Goffe had no obligation to guarantee that the agreement would be
kept intact but would only make it less likely for either side to
66infringe the conditions. Sir Edward Grey was perhaps the most out­
spoken in approving Jordan’s action. He minuted: "I approve: it is
not an occasion when we should be punctilious and Sir J. Jordan acted 
67quite rightly.”
On 2 December the imperial troops at Nanking were defeated by the
revolutionaries who took over the city. Through Ts’ai T’ing-kan Jordan
conveyed to YUan his desire that no attempt would be made to retake Nanking
by force which would "irretrievably compromise the cause of a peaceful 
68settlement" . Through Goffe a truce for three days was at last arranged
on 3 December. No terms were made specifically in relation to the truce
but the conditions existing were practically those demanded by YUan 
.69Shih-k’ai . On 4 December Jordan, YUan, and T’ang Shao-i had a meeting 
in which an arrangement for an armistice was drawn up. YUan issued the
64. For example, Goffe to Jordan, tel.103, 11 Dec., tel. Ill, 15 Dec. 1911, 
Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1802.
65. Nicolson’s minute on Jordan to Grey, tel, 314, 1 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., 
vol* 1096.
66. Campbell’s minute on ibid.
67. Grey’s minute on ibid.
68. Jordan to Grey, no. 495, 12 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol*1310.
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terms to Feng Kuo-chang while Jordan telegraphed them to Goffe who 
was instructed to exert his good offices in securing their acceptance 
by the revolutionaries. The terms stipulated for an extension of the 
truce and the prohibition of further military movements anywhere 
including Wuchang and Nanking, and negotiations between the revolutiona­
ries and government in which T’ang Shao-i, to be expected at Wuchang 
within five days, would represent Yuan Shih-kfai in discussing the 
situation with Li YUan-hung or his representatives^. On 6 December 
a second three day truce was agreed upon which expired on 9 December 
when a fifteen day armistice was put into force^.
Jordan’s mediation between the revolutionaries and the Manchu court 
has to be seen in relation to the Japanese proposals for active interven­
tion in favour of the Manchu dynasty. When talking of Japanese response 
to the Chinese revolution there is a distinction between the policy and 
attitude of the Japanese government and that of the shishi. or national­
ists, notable amongst them was Miyazaki Torazo who was closely connected 
72with Sun Yat-sen . The nationalists, however, represented the unofficial 
Japanese policy.
Official Japanese policy was shaped by various personalities in the 
Japanese government who were not unanimous in their attitude towards the 
Chinese revolution. The Japanese administration which met this Chinese
69. Goffe to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, tel. 317, 3 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., 
vol* 1096.
70. Jordan to Grey, tel 319, conf,, 4 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.
71. Jordan to Grey, tel 334, 10 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.
72. The intimate relationship between Miyazaki Torazo and Sun Yat-sen 
until the 1911 revolution can be seen in Miyazaki’s reminiscence, 
SanjuSan-nen no yume, [Thirty-three years’ dream], (Tokyo 1926, 1943), 
which has been translated into the Chinese version of San-shih-san-nUn’ 
lo-huameng, (Shanghai, 1934) ; also Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen 
pp. 49-51, 64-153.
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crisis was the Saionji cabinet, the foreign minister of which,
. 73
Uchida Yasuvja. i * was inexperienced in Chinese affairs . During
the first week of the revolution the Saionji cabinet, under the
influence of the army, seemed to have followed the policy of supporting
the Manchu government. On 16 October the Japanese government decided
to supply the Manchu government with arms and ammunition through
74 .private merchants in compliance with a request made by the Manchus 
three days earlier through the military attache of the Japanese legation, 
Aoki Nobuzumi.^^
The general staff of the army, on the other hand, advocated supply­
ing troops to the revolutionaries. Saionji end Uchida objected but the 
home minister, Hara Kei, advised the cabinet to consider the situation 
carefully, and not just be content with supporting the Manchus, because 
the influence of the revolutionaries was fast expanding. The cabinet 
meeting of. 24 October decided on a policy of exploiting the situation 
in China to consolidate Japanese influence in Manchuria on the one hand, 
and cooperating with the other powers on the other. The second part 
of the decision was made because the Japanese government wanted to
avoid offending both the Manchus and the revolutionaries whilst the
76situation remained unclear .
The Japanese government policy changed with the emergence of Yuan 
Shih-k’ai as the premier in the middle of November. It has been seen 
that this had largely to do with Ijuin, Japan’s minister in Peking.
73. Uchida was the former ambassador to the United States. The Chinese 
revolution broke out whilst he was on his way to Japan from America 
to take up the post of foreign minister.
74. Ikei, ’’Japan’s Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911”, p. 214.
75. Ijuin to Hayashi, no, 261, secret, 13 Oct. 1911, NGB,vols.44-5, pp 134-5
76. Ikei, ’’Japan’s Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911,” pp. 214-5.
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Knowing the extent to which the Manchus relied on Yuan Shih-k’ai,
Ijuin too became increasingly interested in YUan with whom he became
friendly when he was a consul at Tientsin. Being inexperienced in
Chinese affairs, Uchida depended on Ijuin’s judgement.
Before YUan’s return to Peking Ijuin had already established a
secret tie with YUan’s confidant, Chao Ping-chUn^. On 16 November
Ijuin was instructed by the Gaimusho to ascertain Yuan’s intentions
but avoid committing Japan definitely. But if YUan signified his
intention to save the situation by relying on Japan, Ijuin should
78promise some help . After talking with YUan on 18 November, Ijuin
was convinced that YUan intended to preserve the dynasty. Accordingly
he strongly advised his government to adopt a positive policy in support
79of YUan and the dynasty
Based on some fragmentary evidence in the biography of Yamagata
Aritomo, the historian Masaru Ikei points out that concurrently there
might have been pressure from the Genro on the cabinet to adopt a similar 
80policy . The outcome was an invitation to the British government to 
intervene in the Chinese situation on behalf of the Manchus.
On 28 November Yamaza Enjiro, Japanese charge d’affaires in London, 
was instructed by Uchida to present two memoranda to Sir Edward Grey.
The first gave a fair description of the current Chinese situation and 
pointed out the danger entailed in the prolonged continuance of it,
77. Ijuin to Uchida, nos. 398, 401, 1 Nov. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 54-6#
78. Uchida to Ijuin, no. 299, 17 Nov. 1911, NGB, vols 44-5, pp. 164-6.
79. Ijuin to Uchida, no 548, v. conf. 18 Nov. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp# 380-
80. Ikei,"Japan’s Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911", p. 219.
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It also gave an analysis of the relative strength of the Manchus and 
the revolutionaries and concluded that "the time has come for the powers 
largely interested in China that they should not maintain any longer an 
attitude of mere onlookers, but that it is essential for them to take 
proper measures as soon as possible with a view to safeguarding their 
interests". Japan desired to know Britain’s views and she would not 
approach the other interested powers before an agreement was reached 
between them.
The second memorandum, as a natural sequence to the first, embodied 
the "proper measures" which the Japanese government was contemplating.
The Japanese government regarded a republic as most unsuitable for 
China, but since the Manchus were incapable of regaining power it 
suggested that Britain, and the other powers, should agree actively to
intervene in favour of a constitutional government with nominal Manchu
• -  81 sovereignty
The outstanding feature of these memoranda was that the views 
expressed in them, except the operative arrangement, were exactly 
synonymous with those of Jordan. As Lindley of the Foreign Office 
remarked: "The Japse communication describes accurately the present
situation in China as far as we know it; [from Sir John Jordan] and the 
views of the Japse govt as to the best solution, viz a reformed
82
Manchu monarchy, are identical with those held by Sir John Jordan...."
Grey wanted to obtain confidentially Jordan’s opinion on the operative 
part of the Japanese proposal^,
81. Memoranda communicated by Yamaza in Grey to MacDonald, no, 244,
1 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.
82. Lindley’s minute on memoranda.
83. Grey to Jordan, tel. 188, conf., 1 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.
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Two days later Jordan gave his views. At the end of a telegram
which was primarily a report on the three day truce arranged through
Goffe, Jordan expressed his anxiety that nothing should be done to
thwart the arrangements which Yuan was making to negotiate with the
revolutionaries’ representatives at Wuchang. Campbell grasped Jordan’s
meaning and remarked: "To wait and see what happens is the policy
84
that appears indicated"
In the telegram to the Foreign Office which was a direct reply 
to Grey’s question on Japan’s proposals, Jordan expressed his views 
in a more explicit and constructive manner. He stated that he agreed 
completely with the Japanese that a constitutional monarchy would be 
the best solution for China. However, he objected to Japan’s proposal 
of active intervention on behalf of the Manchus on three grounds.
First, he thought that "the cause of constitutional 'monarchy will be 
prejudiced rather than advanced by foreign intervention at present". 
Secondly, intervention on the part of the powers would create an 
immediate threat to the security and interests of foreigners in China. 
Thirdly, by championing an effete Manchu regime the powers were in effect 
making themselves responsible in fu* ture for the observation of the 
constitution by the Manchu throne. The last point would give rise to 
the danger of Japan and Russia gaining an undesirable measure of
85
tutelage over the court "in virtue of their military proximity."
In place of the proposed action of Japan Jordan had two suggestions: 
the prolongation of the armistice into a period long enough for 
negotiation to take place in which the Chinese themselves would compose
84. Jordan to Grey, tel. 317, 3 Dec. 1911, and Campbell’s minute on it, 
Ch. Corres., vol 1096.
85. Jordan to Grey, tel. 318, 3 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol 1096.
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their own differences; and the exertion of pressure by the powers 
to assist Yiian Shih-k’ai in obtaining the abdication of the prince 
regent as "an essential preliminary to a settlement". The Foreign 
Office expected these views from Jordan. A memorandum containing the 
salient features of his telegram was drawn up and sent to the Japanese 
on 5 December as an answer to their proposals. In informing him of 
the communication to Japan Grey assured Jordan that his suggestions 
were "most helpful". Jordan was to cooperate with the Japanese minister 
to give Yuan Shih-k’ai such assistance as they deemed advisable to
86prolong the armistice and secure the abdication of the prince regent
As early as the middle of November, there were demands for the
removal of the regent. T’ang Shao-i told Jordan then that he had
suggested the regent’s abdication to both Yiian and Prince Ch’ing as a
necessary prelude to any negotiation. T’ang further stated that a
Chinese imperial guardian for the boy emperor would have to be appointed
pending the convocation of a representative assembly at Shanghai to
decide on the future form of government. It was also known to Jordan
that Yiian readily accepted T’ang’s suggestion while Prince Ch’ing,
8 7
despite his well-known reliance on Yuan, was reluctant . The prince 
regent himself was most unwilling to abdicate. From then on Yiian worked 
hard on the removal of the regent. It is certain that Yiian had the 
support of Jordan in the matter from the beginning. On 27 November 
Jordan told Campbell that the regent still refused to resign and "Yiian
86. Grey to Jordan, tel. 195, 5 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol-1096.
87. Jordan to Grey, tel. 287, 19 Nov. 1911, tel 294, 23 Nov, 1911 
Ch. Corres., vol. 1095.
161
88said that there was no way of putting sense into his stupid head."
Jordan was convinced by Yuan that by removing the unpopular prince regent
89
"constitutional government might be more palatable to the south".
The regent eventually abdicated on 6 December.
The Japanese government did not answer Britain’s reply to her 
proposals until 9 December, endorsing the British policy of non­
intervention. Judging from the virulent attacks on the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance in the Japanese press which favoured its government’s policy 
90of intervention , it is obvious that Britain’s restraint was largely 
responsible for the eventual decision of the Japanese government.
Jordan was instrumental in deciding on the policy of mediation and 
non-intervention. The reasons for Jordan’s mediation from the view­
point of British interests are obvious. However, it appears that he 
also thought that by bringing about negotiations before the government 
became too weakened to be worthy of any consideration, the retention 
of the dynasty might still not be an impossible outcome.
88. Jordan to Campbell, private, 27 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
89. Jordan to Grey, tel. 319, conf., 4 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol.1096.
90. Ikei, "Japan’s Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911", p. 224, 
referring to Osaka Mainichi, 18 Jan., and Kokumin Shinbun, 5 Feb. 1912.
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Chapter Four 
YUan Shih-k’ ai*s Rise to the Presidency
The truce which took place on 3 December marked the end of 
hostilities between the revolutionaries and the Manchu government, 
although the threat of a renewal of fighting was always present. 
Immediately after the truce preparations were made for negotiations.
During this period of preparation Jordan was primarily concerned with 
the maintenance of the armistice. In the course of the Shanghai peace 
conference which began on 18 December an important change occurred in 
Jordan1s attitude. He realised then, as a result of the interaction 
of several factors, that the Manchu dynasty had to go. His policy 
became one of obvious support for a republic, conditional upon YUan 
Shih-k!ai being the president. Unfortunately the peace conference 
broke down at the beginning of January, 1912 and the situation developed 
in such a way as to threaten YUan Shih-k’ai1s position in the revolution. 
The period between the breakdown of the Shanghai peace conference and 
the eventual abdication of the Ch’ing dynasty on 12 February, 1912 was 
a time of uncertainty for Yuan Shih-k’ai. Likewise, it was a time of 
anxiety for Jordan because of his changed policy of supporting YUan 
Shih-k’ai as the president of the Chinese republic.
The Shanghai Peace Conference
On 9 December T’ang Shao-i, Yang Shih-ch’i, T’ang’s aide in the 
conference, and nine other delegates, alle gedly representing the northern 
provinces, left Peking for the conference which was to have taken place 
in Wuchang. Two days later T’ang’s retinue reached Hankow where the 
revolutionaries, however, demanded that Shanghai be the venue of the
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negotiation instead^. Before leaving Hankow for Shanghai T’ang Shao-i 
had an interview with Li Yuan-hung in which he urged Li to accompany 
him to Shanghai; Li, however, expressed his inability to do so. That 
the conference took place in Shanghai instead of Wuchang and that Li 
Yuan-hung was not present at the conference had repercussions of 
considerable importance both in terms of the outcome of the conference 
and Jordan*s attitude to the revolutionaries’ demand for a republic in 
the conference.
Jordan did his best to facilitate negotiations between the two
2sides. T’ang was received at Hankow by Goffe , and when Shanghai was
later preferred as the place of negotiation Fraser was instructed to
3 .offer his good offices . Incidentally, Admiral Winsloe, who was asked
by Jordan to defer his annual visit to Hongkong and stay north, chose
Shanghai as his base for the winter. His squadron was a forceful reminder
to the participants of the conference that they were under foreign 
. 4
observation .
Realising the interest and fast expanding influence of Japan in 
China, Jordan knew that he could not ignore her in his attempt to 
facilitate the negotiation. It appears that one of the reasons which 
made the Japanese government agree to Britain’s policy of non-intervention 
on 9 December was that it suspected duplicity in Yuan’s simultaneous 
requests to Jordan to mediate between the revolutionaries and his govern­
ment and to Japan for help to.preserve.the dynasty. .Japan.appeared.to
^The reason for the change has never been clear. It might have been that 
revolutionaries of other provinces were not willing to trust the negotia­
tion with Li Yttan-hung whom they feared would compromise their position 
too much, see Goffe to Jordan, tel. 88, 29 Nov. 1911, Ch. Emb. Arch., 
vol.1802.
^Goffe to Jordan, tel. 104, 11 Dec. 1911, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1802. 
•^Jordan to Grey, no. 502, 17 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol, 1310.
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have also viewed Britain’s policy with suspicion in that while 
rejecting her invitation to intervene on behalf of the Ch’ing govern­
ment, Jordan, with the approval of his government, was actively engaged 
in bringing the opponents together, in arranging for an armistice, and 
in helping to prepare for the peace conference.
Ijuin Hikokichi, who was largely responsible for the Japanese memo­
randa of 28 November, was especially displeased with Jordan’s actions.
On 6 December Ijuin telegraphed the Gaimusho that in view of the 
"ambiguous attitude" of the British minister the Japanese government 
should ask the British government to have Jordan instructed to maintain 
a close contact with himself"*. It is interesting to note that two days 
before Ijuin received a telegram from Uchida stating the necessity of 
ascertaining again the motives of YUan Shih-k’ai because of the ambiguity 
of his policy**. Instead of answering this instruction Ijuin criticised 
Jordan’s actions as being not only "ambiguous", but deliberately so.
On 8 December Uchida again instructed Ijuin to ascertain the motives 
7of Yuan . The second instruction was only natural, for Uchida was 
baffled by YUan’s actions of signing a second three day truce on 
6 December, appointing T’ang Shao-i to negotiate with the revolutionaries^ 
and securing the abdication of the regent. But it was apparent that 
Ijuin had more faith in the sincerity of YUan Shih-k’ai than Jordan.
Jordan was not unaware of Ijuin’s suspicions. In an interview on 
5 December he explained carefully to Ijuin the impracticability of Japan* s
4 . .
Admiral Winsloe to Admiralty, 18 Dec. 1911, in Admiralty to F.O.,
13 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.
5Ijuin to Uchida, no. 640, 6 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, supp., p. 397.
6
Uchida to Ijuin, no.347, 4 Dec. 1911. NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 391-3.
^Uchida to Ijuin, no. 648, 8 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 401-3.
proposal for intervention and his own steps to bring the two parties 
together. In reporting on the interview immediately afterwards Jordan
chance of peaceful settlement might be, every opportunity should be
given to Chinese of composing their differences themselves before
8
resorting to foreign intervention" . He was soon disillusioned about
the acquiescence of Ijuin and had to explain again "our situation
9 . .
throughout to Japanese minister" on 8 December . Ijuin then expressed 
as his personal opinion that the independent action of Britain was 
liable to rouse the suspicions of other powers; and he himself had 
avoided having any contact with Yiian Shih-kfai since he knew of Jordan’s 
mediation^. As a result of this interview Jordan suggested that to 
avoid further misunderstanding the Japanese government should be 
officially invited to help in asisting the negotiation, but with 
himself remaining as sole intermediary. He stated that his hands would 
undoubtedly be strengthened if it could be made known that the other 
powers agreed with his policy, but "concerted action of more than two 
or three legations is too unwieldy to betworkable". He further stated 
that concerted action of all the legations should be considered only
as a last resort to avert a complete state of anarchy should a deadlock
• • 11in the negotiation occur
The Foreign Office approved of the suggestion as "an excellent 
move" to allay Japan’s suspicions and prove Britain’s sincerity to 
her ally in relation to Chinese politics, while.retaining the essential
"o-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jordan to Grey, tel. 323, 5 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.
9
Jordan to Grey, tel. 329, 8 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.
^Ijuin to Uchida, no,648, 8 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols#44-5, pp. 403-4.
stated that "we [ Ijuin however slightly the
11
Jordan to Grey, tel. 329, 8 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.
166
initiative in Jordan’s hands. The invitation was sent to the Japanese
. 12government through MacDonald who keenly supported it . MacDonald
pointed out that Britain was obliged to invite Japan in the matter on
the strength of Article I of the alliance agreement, but he was sure
that Japan would accept Jordan as an intermediary because she was fully
aware of the "special position he L Jordan] holds with Yuan Shih-k’ai"^.
A change of attitude also took place in the Gaimusho. It has been
seen that on 9 December it agreed in principle to Britain’s policy of
non-intervention. Apparently Uchida began to suspect that Ijuin had
14misjudged the situation by concentrating entirely on YUan Shih-k’ai 
This change of attitude of the Japanese foreign ministry was reflected 
clearly in its reaction to Ijuin’s conversation with YUan Shih-k’ai on
12 December. The day before Jordan suggested to Ijuin that Ijuin might 
further the cause of negotiation by entering into direct relations with 
YUan Shih-k’ai. This suggestion shows that Jordan was ignorant of the 
transaction that had been going on between Ijuin and YUan since YUan’s 
return to Peking. Jordan learned from YUan Shih-k’ai that Ijuin called 
on him that very day. In the interview, Jordan was told, Ijuin reminded 
Yuan of the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and expressed his 
wish that in future he would be fully informed of all which passed between 
Yuan and Jordan. YUan asked Jordan if he would object to his taking 
Ijuin into his confidence'*'^ . , However, . it appears that YUan had not
12
Grey to MacDonald, tel. 58, 8 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.
13
MacDonald to Grey, tel. 56, 9 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097, also 
Uchida to Ijuin, no. 372, 13 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, p. 410.
14
Uchida decided to try out the alternatives by sending two envoys:
Matsui Keishiro to Peking to help Ijuin in supporting the dynasty; 
and H.W. Denison, legal adviser to the Gaimusho, to Shanghai to talk
with the revolutionaries > see Uchida to Ijuin, ao, 384, 16 Dec. 1911 
NGB, vols. 44-5, p. 415; and Ikei, "Japan’s Response to the Chinese 
Revolution of 1911", p. 222.
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informed Jordan of the interview of 12 December in which, according
to the telegram which Ijuin sent to the Gaimusho that day, Yuan again
denounced the idea of a republic in China. Ijuin stated as his personal
view that Yuan could depend on the Japanese government in his last
attempt to retain the dynasty, and assured Uchida that he would be
16in as close a contact with Ytian as possible . However, Ijuin*s advice 
was obviously received sceptically. In Uchida*s reply to Ijuin which 
was sent on 15 December, it was stated that although Japan agreed with 
Yuan*s preference for a constitutional monarchy in China she found it 
difficult to offer material aid for the purpose and that she must act 
in coordination with Britain^. In fact, earlier that day Uchida had 
instructed Ijuin and the Japanese consul-general in Shanghai to cooperate
18with their respective British counterparts in facilitating the negotiations.
Attention became focussed on the peace conference in Shanghai. The
day before the conference began Jordan instructed Fraser to have Wu T*ing-
fang, the commissioner representing the revolutionaries at the peace
conference, verbally informed that the Japanese government was in
complete unison with the British government, and that he and the Japanese
19
consul-general were acting in concert . YUan Shih-k*ai also spoke
to T*ang Shao-i in the same terms.
Before negotiations started the Diplomatic Body at Peking, with
Jordan as the head, decided that permission should be obtained from the
governments to present identical communications to the commissioners of
the peace.conference through.the Consular.Body at Shanghai.. The notes
■^Jordan to Grey, tel. 340, 13 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097. 
l^Ijuin to Uchida, no 668, 12 Dec. 1911. v. conf., and urgent, NGB, vols, 
44-5, pp. 405-9.
17Uchida to Ijuin, no. 380, 15 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 410-2.
■^Uchida to Ijuin, no. 379, 15 Dec. 1911, and Uchida to Ariyoshi, no. 146,
v. conf., 15 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 410, 413.
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were to emphasise the necessity of reaching an understanding as soon 
as possible, and were eventually presented on 20 December.
The first meeting of the conference was held on 18 December in 
the International Settlement at Shanghai. After the usual exchange 
of credentials, each side accused the other of infringement of the 
armistice arrangement. The atmosphere became tense already after 
the first meeting. On the second day of the conference Fraser was 
visited by T’ang Shao-i who intimated that in the second conference 
meeting the revolutionaries would demand the acceptance of a republic 
as a condition for further negotiations. T’ang asked Fraser to see
Wu T* ing-fang and reason with him. Fraser did as asked but found
20 . .Wu most truculent . In this connection it has to be recalled that
before T’ang Shao-i left Wuhan for the Shanghai conference he was given
by the Hupei revolutionary government four proposals: the overthrow
of the Manchu dynasty; liberal treatment of the imperial family; good
treatment of the Manchus generally; and a united China. Jordan learned
. 21
that Yiian would accept all proposals except the first one;
The second conference meeting on 20 December was significant in 
that in confirming the communication of T’ang Shao-i to Fraser it marked 
a turning point in the attitude of Jordan. In the meeting the revolution­
aries declared that a republic would be the future form of Chinese 
government and flno compromise whatever could be discussed". Failing 
an agreement, the revolutionaries would take "all civilised measures" to
19Jordan to Fraser in Jordan to Grey, tel. 350, 17 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., 
vol. 1097.
20Fraser to Jordan m  Jordan to Grey, tel. 352, 20 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., 
vol. 1097.
21
Jordan to Grey, tel. 345, 15 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.
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materialise their ideal. Simultaneously, T’ang Shao-i asked Jordan,
through Fraser, to convey to Yiian the observation that a "republic
became the only solution". T’ang also sent a separate telegram to
22
Yiian to the same effect
Until the revolutionaries’ categorical demand for a republic on 
20 December, Jordan had been torn between the expediency of enforcing 
a neutral policy which was basically beneficial to the revolutionaries 
and his ideal of a limited Manchu monarchy as being most suitable for 
China. However, circumstances increasingly convinced him that the 
retention of the Manchu dynasty was impossible and the uncompromising 
attitude of the revolutionaries on 20 December was the last straw in 
causing him to discard his ideal. Three factors were involved at this 
stage in finally convincing Jordan of the inevitability of a republic: 
the fact that the peace conference was held in Shanghai; his anxiety 
to prevent the renewal of hostilities; and, above all, what appeared as 
Yuan Shih-k’ai*s acceptance of a republic.
That the conference took place in Shanghai, instead of Wuchang, 
was significant. It was not surprising that an adamant demand for a 
republic was made by the revolutionary leaders in Shanghai, such as 
Wu T’ing-fang, Wen Tsung-yao, and Wang Ch’ung-wei, who, though not 
being left-wing revolutionaries like Sun Yat-sen, Huang Hsing and Ch’en 
Ch’i-mei, were sincere believers in republicanism. They were, moreover, 
different from Li Yuan-hung who was basically neither a revolutionary 
nor a republican, and had agreed to a constitutional monarchy when 
the revolutionaries were defeated at Hanyang.
22
Fraser to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, tel. 357, 21 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres.,
vol. 1097.
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The fact that the peace conference took place In the International
Settlement at Shanghai also meant that Jordan was more subject to the
opinions of the British mercantile community there which was extremely
anxious to be on good terms with the revolutionaries because of their
business. Despite his own silence on the matter it was obvious to
outside observers that Jordan was extremely susceptible to the British
.23opinion at Shanghai
It was the revolutionaries1 good fortune that Morrison of The Times
was at Shanghai during the negotiation. Morrison was a great sympathiser
of the revolution. On the outbreak of the uprising he rode up and
down the legation street declaring enthusiastically that "the end of
24
the Manchu dynasty was at hand" . Later, he tried to persuade Yuan
25Shih-k’ai to give up the cause of the Manchus . It was natural that 
Jordan was considerably influenced by the attitude of Morrison who had 
not only recommended his appointment in 1905, but was largely responsible 
for the formation of public opinion on Chinese affairs in Britain.
The second factor which accounted for Jordan’s support of a 
republic was his fear of the renewal of hostilities. This fear stemmed 
mostly from his belief in Yuan’s sincerity in insisting on a Manchu 
constitutional monarchy which would clash with the revolutionaries* demand 
for a republic. Jordan knew that on knowing the absolute demand of the 
revolutionaries^Yftan telegraphed T’ang to continue negotiations on the
23 . . . . .  . . . .For British opinion m  Shanghai on the revolution and its influence on
Jordan, see Chung-hua min-kuo k’ai-kuo wu-shih-nien wen-hsien pien- 
tsuan wei-yuan-hui, Chung-hua min-kuo k’ai-kuo Wu-shih-nien wen hsien, 
vol. 1 p.380; HHKM, vol. 8, p. 439; and Bland, Recent Events, p. 267.
24
Croly, Willard Straight, p. 412.
25 . . . .
Report on an interview between Yuan Shih-k’ai and Morrison, in North
China Daily News, 9 Dec. 1911.
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basis of a limited monarchy until the peace conference reached a
. . 26 . . . . .
decisive crisis . Did Jordan still believe m  Yiian* s sincerity
as much as he did when Yuan returned to Peking about a month before?
The question is not without ambiguity. First, Jordan knew that
since the middle of November Yuan had been repeatedly offered the
presidency of the republic by the revolutionaries. The last offer,
27as far as he knew, was made at the beginning of December . There must
have been enough ambiguity on YUan’s part to have prompted Jordan to
write to Campbell at the end of November, in connection with Yiian*s
threat to resign because of the regent’s refusal to abdicate, that
Yiian had no "real intention of effacing himself, and in the end he
will probably keep to the winning side if he does not fall between the
28stools in the meantime" . Secondly, Jordan was informed that the
imperial defeat at Nanking on 2 December, almost unanimously considered
by historians as an event which rehabilitated the morale of the
revolutionaries after their defeat at Hanyang five days before, was
brought about by some arrangement between the generals of the two sides.
Jordan told the Foreign Office that Tuan Ch’i-jui, the imperial general
in charge of the campaign and one of Yuan’s henchmen, was instructed by
29Peking to abandon the city . Thirdly, there was the strange behaviour of 
T’ang Shao-i in accepting a republic readily at the Shanghai peace 
conference. Later, Jordan remarked that T’ang’s "doings at Shanghai are
26
Jordan to Grey, tel. 359, 21 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.
27For example, Jordan to Grey, no. 502, 17 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 
1310. The offer was formally decided on by the representatives of the 
revolutionary province on 2 December at a meeting at Wuchang, see for 
example, Wu, "YUan Shih-k’ai mou-ch’U lin-shih ta-tsung-t*ung chih 
ching-kuo", p. 8.
2®Jordan to Campbell, private, 27 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
J o r d a n  to Grey, no. 495, 12 Dec, 1911. Ch. Corres., vol. 1310.
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a bit of a mystery to everybody and why Yuan ever sent him there
if he knew Tong’s sentiments is only explicable on the theory that
Yuan, in spite of all his protestations, would in the end accept the
30presidency of a republic11
At the same time, however, what has just been cited was insufficient 
proof for Jordan of Yiian*s insincerity in supporting the Manchu dynasty. 
As far as the revolutionaries* offers of the presidency were concerned 
Jordan had not learned that Yiian had accepted any of them. In the case 
of the battle of Nanking Jordan could have easily thought that Yiian 
might have ordered Tuan Ch’i-jui to &andon the city to appease the 
revolutionaries in preparation for the peace conference. After all, the 
abandonment of Nanking which brought an end to serious fighting between 
the revolutionaries and the Manchu government was only in line with 
Yiian* s proposal for a cease-fire a week before. On the surface, Yiian’s 
appointment of Tang Shao-i as his representative to the Shanghai peace 
conference was the most suspicious act. But Jordan himself was aware 
of T’ang’s sentiments, and he was present in the special meeting of 
4 December which decided on T’ang’s appointment. One wonders why he 
did not raise the question of suitability of the choice at the time, at 
least privately, to Yiian. Thus, taken as a whole, despite a certain 
amount of discrepancy, Jordan still regarded Yiian as sincere in his 
opposition to a republic. And because of this he was seriously appre­
hensive of a renewal of hostilities.
The third, and perhaps most important reason for Jordan’s support 
of a republic was Yiian Shih-k’ai* s acceptance of the revolutionaries’ 
demand. Before elucidating this point it is necessary to recapitulate
Jordan to Campbell, private, 4 Jan. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.
what has been said so far about Yiian1 s attitude to the Manchu dynasty. 
Whether Yiian was loyal or disloyal to the Manchu dynasty is, in my 
opinion, one of the hopeless cases in history, the truth of which, I 
doubt, could ever be found. In terms of recent historical works only, 
Jerome Ch’en’s Yuan Shih-k’ai and Wu Hsiang-hsiang1 s "Yiian Shih-kTai 
mou-ch’u lin-shih ta-tsung-t*ung chih ching-kuo" hold the view that 
Yiian was guilty of duplicity from the beginning of the revolution; he 
preserved the dynasty as long as it could be used in bargaining with the 
revolutionaries for his own position. However, Ernest P. Young’s 
"Yuan Shih-k’ai1s Rise to the Presidency, 1911-1912" argues with equal 
conviction that Yuan was forced to give up the dynasty by forces which 
were beyond his control. The most important of these forces were what 
Young terms the "unpleasant military facts" which YUan faced, which 
roughly coincide with Jordan’s observations on the unreliability of the 
imperial forces, and the neutrality of the powers. It is not the purpose 
of this study at all to find an answer to this historical riddle. The 
important matter is that until the Shanghai conference Jordan believed 
in YUan’s sincerity in his support of the dynasty and had good reasons 
for doing so. Moreover, until then YUan appeared to have taken Jordan 
into his confidence, consulting him on every major decision.
A change in YUan’s attitude towards Jordan seemed to have taken place 
soon after 20 December, It has to be recalled that on 17 December, one 
day before the peace conference began, Ijuin with Jordan’s knowledge 
saw Yuan. Yuan told Jordan afterwards that in the interview he reiterated 
his preference for a limited monarchy and stated that his aim was to 
retain the child emperor and to institute a council of regency. When
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questioned as to his policy in case of the Shanghai conference
failing to come to an agreement, Yiian expressed his readiness to ask
for the good offices of "friendly powers." The Japanese minister
persued the matter and suggested that should such a failure occur
only Japan and Britain would first be approached. Yiian replied
significantly that "he would of course have to inform Great Britain
in view of assistance he had already received from usTBritain}...
fand] that he was willing to inform Japan also if the two governments
wished that he should do so." Ijuin then pointed out the objections
to approaching a number of powers, and pressed Yiian to leave the question
of friendly mediation to Britain and Japan alone. To this Yiian replied
"emphatically that if Great Britain and Japan were agreed on the point,
he would be quite prepared ... to approach British and Japanese govern-fl
31ments alone and to follow advice and decision of the two powers" .
Yiian was obviously anxious to emphasise Britain's lead in any Anglo- 
Japanese action.
Jordan felt that the proposal of Ijuin was "a step slightly in
32advance of my instructions which only covered negotiation at Shanghai"
Grey also became uneasy and instructed Jordan that although he did not
object to Yiian Shih-k'ai consulting him and Ijuin, he had to be careful
not to let Ijuin push him into actions which would be regarded as active
33intervention or would arouse the hostility of the powers , MacDonald
in Tokyo also warned both the Japanese vice-minister for foreign affairs
and Grey of the dubious effect that would be produced by any such
. 34independentAnglo-Japanese.attion,a$.proposed by Ijuin .. The day the
31 “
Jordan to Grey, tel. 351, secret, 17 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097. 
^^Ibid.
-^Grey to Jordan, tel. 223, 18 Dec. 1911. Ch. Corres., vol. 1097. 
^4MacDonald to Grey, tel. 62, 20 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.
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revolutionaries declared absolutely for a republic at the Shanghai
conference Jordan told Ijuin that the proposal of Anglo-Japanese
intervention in the event of the failure of the Shanghai conference
was impracticable and liable to arouse the jealousy of the other 
35powers
On 20 December, too, Morrison called on the Japanese consul-general
Ariyoshi, praised Yuan Shih-kfai and expressed his belief that a republic
36with Ytian as president was the only solution to the Chinese situation 
The next day Jordan called on Ijuin who made use of the chance to test 
Jordan’s attitude towards Morrison’s opinion. After the interview Ijuin 
telegraphed Uchida that Jordan ’’had given him the impression that he 
personally considered that a republic with Yuan Shih-* kai as president
37might be a possible solution of the question, failing a limited monarchy". 
Ijuin, obviously still clinging to the idea of supporting Yttan Shih-k’ai 
in retaining the dynasty, suggested that the Japanese government should 
instruct Yamaza to express to the London Foreign Office Japan’s objection 
to the course. On 24 December Yamaza communicated a confidential memo­
randum to Grey to ascertain if "the opinion expressed by Sir J. Jordan...
38is shared by the British government." Grey asked Jordan if what the
. 3 9Japanese minister spoke of him was true . Jordan replied: "I am not
in favour and never have been in favour of supporting Yuan Shih-k'ai as
40president of Republic" . Jordan could not have told an untruth here.
His statement, taken on the surface, was fully justified. Indeed, if he 
had not been, and was not in favour of a republic in China, how could
he have been in favour of Yuen as.the.president? At the same time Ijuin
35ijuin to Uchida, no. 711, 20 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, p. 432.
36Ariyoshi to Uchida, no. 429, 20 Dec. 1911, NGB. vols. 44-5, p.435-6.
^ M a c D o n a l d  to Grey, tel. 64, 26 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098; also 
Ijuin to Uchida, no. 715, urgent, 22 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp.437-9.
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had not made a mistake because of his deficiency in English, though
41Uchida later tried to explain the misunderstanding in this way 
Jordan did say in the interview that Britain, with vital interests in 
central and south China, could not afford to disregard the demands of 
the revolutionaries. Moreover, he told Ijuin that Morrison’s proposal 
of installing Ytian as the president had already been relayed to the 
newspapers in England. The incident reflects that Jordan began to ?
realise the inevitability of a republic in China. However, it was 
Yuan’s dubious behaviour which eventually made him deny openly his 
support for the retention of the monarchy.
On 22 December Yuan Shih-k’ai asked to see Jordan and Ijuin 
separately about the telegrams which he had been receiving from T’ang Shao- 
i since 20 December. The most important of these was the Dne in which 
T’ang suggested that the question of the form of government should be 
decided in a representative national assembly. Yuan Shih-k’ai saw 
Jordan first, stressed his adherence to a constitutional monarchy and 
asked him if "he could look to foreign intervention for support". Jordan 
replied that it was a serious task to coerce half of the country and 
that Britain "wanted a strong and united China, under whatever form of 
government the Chinese people wished". It was the first time since 
the revolution broke out when Jordan made no mention of his preference 
for a constitutional monarchy. Yuan then asserted that the Shanghai 
republicans were not.entitled.to represent the view of the masses whose 
38Memorandum communicated to F.O., 24 Dec. 1911. Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.
^Grey to Jordan,tel. 235, 24 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.
^Jordan to Grey, tel. 366, 25 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.
41
Confidential clause of MacDonald to Grey, tel. 64, 26 Dec. 1911,
Ch. Corres., vol. 1098,
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sentiments were intensely conservative and monarchical. To remedy
this Jordan suggested that T*ang Shao-i!s proposal of a representative
assembley could be adopted. It could not but be obvious to Yiian that
. 42Jordan would not object to a republic.
The interview between Yttan Shih-k’ai and Ijuin took place in the 
afternoon, Yuan repeated what he had said in the morning to Ijuin 
who again gave Yiian Shih-k'ai the assurance that the Japanese govern­
ment favoured a constitutional monarchy in China, and promised to
43telegraph Yiian1 s appeal for aid to Tokyo.
The next day the following words appeared in The Times;
"The present issue is complicated by the openly expressed 
fears of Yuan Shih-kai that England and Japan, acting in 
unison, are determined to maintain a monarchical govern­
ment in China, if necessary by force. Absurd though the 
story is, it is believed by Yuan Shih-kai and is having 
a baneful effect that the British Foreign Office might 
wisely dispel" ^
Both Jordan and the Foreign Office were baffled. Jordan was warned
by Tfang Shao-i from Shanghai that any attempt to intervene on the
45part of the powers would unite all classes and parties against foreigners
Grey on 24 December instructed Jordan to "strongly deprecate statement
46
by Yuan Shih-kai which is mischievous and... quite untrue." Jordan then
told Yuan, in the words of Morrison, that "Great Britain had done her
best to bring the contending factions together, but cared not a damn
47whether there was a republic or a monarchy." At the same time, Jordan 
instructed Fraser to refute statements in the nature of that in The Times
42
Jordan to Grey, tel. 360, 22 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098,
43Ijuin to Uchida, no. 720, 23 Dec. 1911, v. urgent, NGB, vols. 44-5,
■ pp. 449-52.
The Times, 23 Dec. 1911.
^Jordan to Grey, tel. 364, 23 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.
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which appeared in. the press in Shanghai.
Morrison, The Times correspondent then at Shanghai, testified 
that he got the message from T’ang Shao-i who said that he was given
I
I it by telegraph from Yiian Shih-k’ai. Morrison later attempted to
i
explain the misunderstanding to Willard Straight:
"Sir John Jordan, the British Minister, and Ijuin, the Jap­
anese Minister, acted under explicit instruction from their 
chiefs to cooperate. They both separately so informed Yuan.
Ijuin, however, without telling Jordan, advised Yuan that 
Japan would never recognise a republic and would interfere 
with force, if necessary, to prevent its establishment. In 
view of what both Jordan and Ijuin had said about coopera­
tion Yuan took this as meaning that Great Britain agreed 
with this attitude".49
But Ytlan could not possibly have misunderstood Jordan’s opinion expressed
in the interview on the morning of 22 December. There was a deliberate
want of faith on Yilan’s part. If he had really assumed that Jordan and
Ijuin were so closely in unison, why did he always give them separate
interviews?
The entire incident strongly supports the theory that at least from 
20 December Yttan, regardless of his attitude before, had come to accept 
the republic and its presidency. This theory has to be seen in the 
light of two pieces of evidence which Jordan was ignorant of. The first 
was that simultaneous with the peace conference there was a secret con­
ference in the Wen-ming book-shop in Kansu Road, Shanghai"*^  between the
46
Grey to Jordan, tel. 236, 24 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.
47Croly, Willard Straight, p. 431.
48Jordan to Grey, tel. 367, 26 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.
49Croly, Willard Straight, p. 431.
~*^ It is a mistake in Ch’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai, p. 121 where it is stated 
that the negotiation took place in Nanking. At that time Huang Hsing 
was in Shanghai, having left Wuhan after the revolutionary
defeat at Han^yang in November, see Li, "Huang Kfo-chiang hsien-sheng
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representative of Tuan Ch^i-jui, Liao Yu-chfun, and that of Huang Hsing,
Ku Chung-shen. There can be no doubt that this secret meeting had the 
sanction of Huang Hsing and Yiian Shih-k1 ai who was Tuan Chfi—juifs 
superior. On 20 December, the very day the revolutionaries demanded 
a republic in the peace conference, an agreement was reached in this secret 
conference, consisting of five articles: "1. A republican government 
will be established as the only government of China; 2. the Imperial 
House will be treated with generosity and courtesy; 3. he who overthrows 
the Manchu regime shall be President of the republic; 4. the soldiers 
of the north and south, including both Hans and Manchus, will be treated 
with due consideration and they will not be held responsible for the 
destruction during the revolutionary war; 5. temporary administrative 
councils will be created in the provinces to maintain peace and order.
The agreement explicitly stated that the Manchu dynasty was to be sacri­
ficed, and Jerome Chfen even suggests that it was the basis of the 
formal discussion at the peace conference"^.
The second piece of evidence was that Wang Chirg-wei, a noted member 
of the Tfung-meng Hui and on the delegation of the revolutionaries at 
the Shanghai conference, had been included by Yuan in the delegation 
representing the government. It appears that Yuan became anxious for his 
own position on learning of the impending return of Sun Yat-sen soon
after 20 December and asked Wang Ching-wei to do his best in negotiating
53with the revolutionaries . It is also alleged that soon after the
unilateral declaration of the revolutionaries on 20 December Yiian Shih-k1 aif
nien-p!u kao", pp. 276-7; and HHKM, vol. 8, p.103. The negotiation took 
place in the Wen-ming book-shop because it belonged to a revolutionary,
Yii Fu, who took part in the negotiation.
“^ Translation of terms taken from CVen, Yuan Shih-k1 ai, p. 121.
52Ibid.
53Hu Ou-kung, Hsin-hai ko-ming pei-fang shih-lu, pp, 103-4, and Chfen, Yuan 
Shih-kfai, p. 121. In fact Yiian Shih-kfai made Wang his sworn son.
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urged on by Wang Ching-wei, Yiian K'o-ting, T’ang Shaa-i, Yang 
Shih-ch’i, and Liang Shih-i, sent a telegram to the imperial delega­
tion at Shanghai, agreeing to the abdication of the Manchus. However, 
he emphasised that it was inappropropriate for him to abandon the 
Manchu cause immediately."*^
Two reasons for Yiian* s treatment of his interview with Jordan on 
22 December are therefore not impossible. First, Yiian might have thought 
of using Jordan’s public denial of support of the dynasty to justify 
his abandonment of its cause to the court which, of course, realised 
the influence of Britain in China. Secondly, knowing Japan’s opposition 
to the republic, Yiian might also have thought a public denunciation of 
the dynasty by Britain a forceful frustration of Japan’s desire. What­
ever the reasons might have been it is true that Yiian forged the threat 
of Anglo-Japanese intervention on behalf of the dynasty and had it 
relayed through T’ang Shao-i to Morrison whose pro-revolutionary sentiments 
were well-known to him.
There is no evidence bearing on Jordan’s views on Yiian’s dubious
action. But the truth is that he remained friendly and in close contact
with Yiian. On 24 December Jordan and Ijuin were again asked separately
to see Yiian and Prince Ch’ing. In the meeting with Jordan, Yiian produced
a draft telegram which he was about to send to T’ang accepting his
proposal of a national assembly to decide the future form of government.
Jordan approved of the proposal as a "fair one" which would make the
revolutionaries morally responsible for continuing the civil war if they 
.55
rejected it . Ijuin, however, asked Yiian to defer despatch of the telegram
HHKM, vol. 8, pp. 117-8.
Jordan to Grey, tel. 365, 24 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.
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56for material aid two days before
In Japan, mostly because of the insistence of the Genro, the govern­
ment made a last attempt at maintaining a constitutional monarchy in 
China^. However, Yiian Shih-k!ai, having ascertained Britain’s attitude, 
could openly defy Japan’s intention. He sent the telegram, approving
the national assembly, to T’ang on 26 December without waiting for Japan
58as Ijum requested . An edict approving the assembly appeared on
28 December which J.O.P. Bland described as ’’the death warrant of the 
dynasty
To Jordan’s relief the Japanese government at last reckoned its
intervention as a complete failure, and decided to take no further
step pending the outcome of the assembly. For a few days after the decree 
was issued events appeared to Jordan to be developing satisfactorily. On
29 December he learned that the peace conference had decided to extend
the armistice to 5 January, before then questions concerning the election
60and composition of the national assembly would be raised , Meetings
on 30 and 31 December were indeed devoted to the consideration of the
61assembly and 8 January was fixed as the date of the first sitting . All
of a sudden, however, Yiian Shih-k’ai’s attitude changed and T’ang Shao-i
was allowed to resign from the post of imperial commissioner at the
C.C.
Ijuin to Uchida, no. 726, 25 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols, 44-5, p.459.
^The Japanese cabinet was unanimously in favour of abandoning demands 
for a constitutional government on 22 December. The Genro, notably 
Yamagata Aritomo, however, put pressure on the cabinet on 24 December 
to have further talks with Britain and Yiian on the line of a constitution^, 
monarchy, see Ikei, ’’Japan’s Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911”, 
p. 223; and Uchida to Ijuin, no. 405, 24 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, 
pp. 454-5.
58in fact, Yiian blamed Ijuin and Japan instead for being forced to abandon 
the dynasty because Japanese aid was not forthcoming, Ijuin to Uchida, 
no. 738, 27 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 472-7 .
59]3land, Recent Events, p. 167, It was a "death warrant" of the dynasty 
because only Kansu, the New Dominions, Manchuria, Shantung, Chihli, and 
Honan were nominally under imperial rule.
182
Shanghai conference on 2 January.
Yiian Shih-k1 ai negotiations with the Revolutionaries fot the Abdication 
of the Manchus.
According to Jordan, Yiian Shih-k1ai was "unwell and very depressed"
on 1 January. He talked of resignation to escape from an intractable
situation: in the north he became extremely unpopular because of his
concession to the revolutionaries in agreeing to the national assembly;
and in the south the peace conference broke down because of the "most
uncompromising" attitude of the revolutionaries in insisting on the national
assembly sitting in Shanghai where the atmosphere was too republican.
Jordan was puzzled by the change because if Yiian had in the first place
conceded to the assembly, the outocme of which was a foregone conclusion,
the questions of its location and composition were not of first importance.
He therefore told Grey: "The whole manner and language of Yuan Shih-kai
were so tantalisingly puzzling and so different from what they have been
hitherto, that I could not resist enquiring whether any outside influence
62was being brought to bear."
It has been generally agreed by Chinese historians that what happened 
in Nanking between 29 December, 1911 and 1 January^1912 was the reason 
why Yiian changed his attitude. Sun Yat-sen arrived in Shanghai on Christ­
mas Day. On 29 December the revolutionaries who had established a united 
provisional government at Nanking elected Sun as the provisional president.
60
Fraser to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, tel. 372, 30 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., 
vol. 1310.
61For minutes of the meetings see HHKM, vol. 8, pp. 85-95.
6 2
Jordan to Grey, tel. 1, secret, 1 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1310.
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On 1 January he was duly inaugurated at Nanking. Despite Sunfs
assurances the day before his inauguration and in his inauguration
speech that he would vacate the presidency immediately on the abdica-
63
tion of the Manchus , Yuan felt that he had been cheated by the 
revolutionaries who had repeatedly offered him the presidency and he 
refused to be pacified by mere promises. Yiian telegraphed T’ang 
accusing him of having exceeded his authority in the conference sessions 
of 30 and 31 December, and on 1 January T’ang resigned. Yuan accepted 
the resignation the next day and informed Wu T’ing-fang that henceforth 
he would negotiate directly with the revolutionaries by telegraph. Wu 
objected to the inconvenience and urged Yiian to go personally to Shanghai. 
Yiian in turn asked Wu to go to Peking and the conference was suspended 
in the midst of the arguments.
However, it appears that Sun Yat-sen’s and Wu T’ing-fang*s assurances
• • • 64on 2 and 5 Tannery respectively allayed much of Yiian* s suspicion.
Moreoever, the difference between Yiian and the revolutionaries was 
further bridged by such ambiguous characters as T’ang Shao-i, Wang Ching- 
wei, Liang Shih-i, and Yang Shih-ch’i who engaged themselves actively 
in pulling strings between the two sides. On the surface negotiations 
between Yuan Shih-k’ai and the revolutionaries had been discontinued, 
but in fact secret negotiations were going on. However, they were no 
longer negotiations between the revolutionaries and the imperial govern­
ment represented by Yiian Shih-k’ai, but between Yiian, as an individual,
63Li, Cheng-ch’ih shih, vol. 1, pp. 334-5; Lo, Lo pien Kuo-fu nien-p’u 
chiu-miu, pp. 282-4; for translation of the oath see H.F. MacNair,
Modern Chinese History, (Shanghai, 1927), p. 719.
64 . .Lo, Lo pien Kuo-fu nlen-p’u chiu-Htiiu, pp. 285-8,
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and the revolutionaries concerning the treatment of the imperial 
dynasty. The exit of the Manchus became a foregone conclusion, 
but both Yiian and the revolutionaries wanted to secure the best 
terms for themselves in preparation for the impending transitional 
period.
Jordan was not unaware of these secret dealings. In the middle of
January the Foreign Office was told that "a Mr Hsiang, who is said
to be in confidence of Sun Yat-sen, is known to have paid several visits
to the premier, and it is believed that Tong Shao-yi, although no longer
the accredited agent of Yuan, still keeps up a secret correspondence
with him through Liang Shih-yi, another Cantonese, who is playing a
65leading part in this strange drama." Ten days later Jordan wrote
of the difficulty he had in following events because there were "two
66sets of negotiations going on."
Jordan was right in his observations. To ordinary readers of news­
papers it would have appeared that a lukewarm attempt was still being made 
by Yiian and Wu to find a solution to the question of the form of govern­
ment to be adopted. This was because some of the telegrams which went 
between Yiian and Wu were released to the press, but they were mere decora­
tive fljtftrishes. The rest of the telegrams were kept secret. It is 
asserted that the unreleased telegrams from Yiian to Wu T’ing-fang were 
largely phrased by Liang Shih-i; from Wu to Yiian by Wang Ching-wei; 
from Tfang Shao-i and Yang Shih-ch'i mostly by Yang himself; and from 
Yiian to T’ang and Yang by Liang Shih-i and Yiian Chung-shu. The most 
striking fact was that all these underlings were in close communication
65Jordan to Grey, no. 29, 16 Jan., 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1312.
66 — — — —
Jordan to Grey, no. 47, 27 Jan., 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1312.
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6 7with each other. By the end of the first “ten days of January 
an agreement was near, The terms were roughly that the Manchu emperor 
was to abdicate, the imperial court to be well treated, Sun Yat-sen 
to resign as soon as the abdication took place, and Yuan Shih-k1ai to 
be president.
It was therefore no surprise to Jordan when on 11 January Liang
Shih-i informed him that "all parties had come to the conclusion that
the abdication of the emperor and the retirement of the Court formed
an indispensible preliminary to any settlement." Liang expressed as
his own opinion that the court would either abdicate in favour of Yuan
or authorise him to establish a provisional government. Jordan was
asked if Yiian would be recognised in either case. Jordan was sounded
iC
on a situation which, if^materialised, would be at complete variance with
the agreement which had supposedly been reached between Yiian and the
revolutionaries, . Instead of Yiian receiving power from the Nanking
provisional government Jordan was asked if he and Britain would recognise
a new provisional government in the north, to be exclusively under Yiian1 s
control. Despite the "attitude of reserve" which he claimed to have
assumed, Jordan pointed out that "the Powers had shown confidence in 
68
Yuan Shih-kai." . Three days later Yiian1 s secretary, Tsfai T’ing-kan,
told Jordan that the express dowager, Lung-yii, would soon issue an
abdication edict which would place Yiian Shih-k’ai in temporary charge of
69
the government pending the election of a president . However, events 
were not to develop thus smoothly. It is also interesting to note that
6 7
HHKM, vol. 8, p. 118; and Li, Chen-ch’ih shih, vol. 1, p. 337.
68Jordan to Grey, tel, 13, conf., 12 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1310.
69
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Yuan Shih-k’ai did not send Liang and Ts’ai to Ijuin^.
Yuan Shih-k’ai Falling between Two Stools?
Immediately after Liang’s and Ts’ai’s communications to Jordan 
Ytian was put in an extremely critical situation for a fortnight during 
which his position was uncertain. He was pressed into a tight corner 
by both the Manchu fanatics and revolutionary die-hards. Jordan, because 
of his alignment with Yiian, also suffered from the uncertain situation.
When the secret negotiations between Yiian Shih-k’ai and the revolu­
tionaries concerning the abdication of the Manchus reached an advanced 
stage, Ytfan asked Prince Ch’ing to raise the matter at court. On 12 
January a secret meeting of the imperial kinsmen was held in which Prince 
Ch’ing presented the case for abdication. The majority of the young 
kinsmen refused to consider the question. The meeting was responsible for 
the origin of what was to be known as the Tsung-she Tang, or imperial 
clan party, whose members were those imperial kinsmen and Manchu nobles 
who insisted on the retention of the dynasty. Amongst them were Prince 
Kung, Prince Su, Prince Ch’un (the ex-regent), Duke Tsai-tse, Liang-pi, 
T’ieh-liang, and Yli-lang. A few of these imperial clansmen, in particu­
lar, Prince Kung, had their antiques and valuable paintings sold to
71raise funds for a final show-down with the revolutionaries . Although 
Yiian avoided giving a direct answer to the ex-regent who visited him on 
13 January to sound .him on the topic of abdication, the news of abdica-
72"tion spread and was, Jordan reported, "freely discussed in official circles:
^Ijuin only learned of Liang’s visit to Jordan from Jordan himself, see 
Ijuin to Uchida, urgent, no. 28, 12 Jan. 1912, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp.543-4. 
It appears that Ijuin was completely ignorant of Ts’ai’s visit.
^For these details see Li, Cheng-ch’ih shih, p. 337; HHKM, vol. 8, p.Ill; 
and Kao Yin-tsu, Chung-hua min-kuo ta-shih chi, [.Chronology of important 
events of the republican periodj , Ol’aipei, 1957), p. 2.
^Jordan to Grey, no. 29, conf., 16 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1312.
187
On 16 January Yiian was nearly assassinated on the way home from 
an audience with the empress dowager from whom he wanted a decisive 
answer on the question of abdication. The plot was launched by an 
underground revolutionary organisation in Peking under the leadership 
of Chang Hsien-pei and Yang Yu-chfang who, being in the north, were 
apparently ignorant of the fact that negotiations were still going on 
between Yiian and the revolutionaries. They therefore decided to remove 
Yiian whom they regarded as the sole obstruction to the revolutionary 
success. Yiian narrowly escaped while some men and horses in his retinue
73were killed. Jordan called personally to congratulate him on his escape ,
After the incident Yiian never appeared in court again although he
continued to urge the court to abdicate. His trusted adherents Wu Wei-
te, then minister for foreign affairs, Chao Ping-chiin, minister of the
74interior, and Liang Shih-i were entrusted with the task of persuasion 
The first imperial conference was held in front of the throne the 
next day after the attempted assassination of Yiian, but no conclusion was 
reached; Prince Chfing' and Pfu-lun stood for voluntary abdication of 
the emperor and court, and a Mongolian prince and Prince Kung spoke for
the opposition. The rest of the clansmen present were silent.
On 18 January the second imperial conference was summoned in which 
the difference between the two views became more obvious. It was after 
this meeting that the Tsung-she Tang decided to act. Early in the morning 
of 19 January the Tsung-she Tang members issued a strong statement of 
their views and vowed to take stringent actions to maintain the Manchu
j * 75dynasty .
73Jordan to Grey, tel. 18, conf., 19 Jan. 1912 Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.
7^Details of the role played by Liang, Wu, and Chao at court before the
abdication is recorded in biography of Liang, Ts'en, Liang, nien-p'u
vol.l pp. 105-111.
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A new situation developed when in the imperial conference of
19 January Liang Shih-i and Chao Ping-chiin, speaking for Yiian Shih-k’ai^
suggested that the current problem be decided by the cabinet and that
both the Peking and Nanking governments be simultaneously dissolved
and replaced by a new integrated government at Tientsin. The same day
Jordan saw Yiian and was consulted on the current situation as usual.
Yiian disclosed his intention of setting up a government in Tientsin.
He assured Jordan that "arrangements had been completed with the
southern leaders". The arrangements that had been reached were, of
course, nothing to do with the proposed Tientsin government. Jordan
was then asked to telegraph the Foreign Office to recognise YiianTs
position in the new government. It appears that Jordan was the only
foreign minister who was taken into Yuan’s confidence in this matter.
Jordan informed the Foreign Office and advised firmly that "recognition
of Yiian Shih-kai affords only hope of securing anything like a stable
76Government in China." Grey, upon Jordan’s advice, agreed that Yiian’s 
proposal which was made "in arrangement with southern leaders" should be 
supported^.
Conference on the question of abdication continued to take place in 
the palace on 20, 21 and 22 January. The empress dowager, whose trust in 
Yiian Shih-k’ai had much increased after his escape- from the assassination 
was weak-kneed and wanted to succumb. The Tsung-she Tang members, however, 
were adamant in their objection. The empress dowager was embarrassed 
and particularly annoyed with Prince Kung whose attitude was especially
^Li, Cheng-chf’iih shih, vol. 1, pp 338-9,76 — — — — — — — — —
Jordan to Grey, tel, 18, conf., 19 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.
^Grey to Jordan, tel. 14, 21 Jan., 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.
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uncompromising. The spirit of the imperial clique appeared to
have been bolstered up by Feng Kuo-chang who told Duke Tsai-tse,
obviously without Yiian’s knowledge, that if he could only have three
months1 expenses he would be able to quench the revolution. The princes,
although unwilling to part with their personal wealth, maintained a
78
militant attitude
The position became increasingly impossible for Yiian who on 
23 January sent Tsfai T’ing-kan to inform Jordan of his difficulty 
in dealing with the Tsung-she Tang. Yiian again threatened to resign. 
Jordan was extremely perturbed by Ts’ai’s intimation. He immediately 
called on Ijuin and stated emphatically that some measures had to be 
taken to prevent Yiian’s resignation which would certainly lead to confu­
sion in the north. On reporting the interview to the Foreign Office
Jordan said that Ijuin did not attach serious importance to Ts’ai’s
. 7 9statement and was "disinclined to take any action" . The Foreign Office
sensed from the remark that Jordan was in favour of some action which
would "perhaps take the form of a joint warning from the Powers to the
Manchu Princes of the risks which they would run if they depart from
80the policy hitherto adopted on Yuan Shih-kai’s advice." However,
both Grey and Nicolson were cautious and advised adherence to the policy
of impartiality. Langley wrote privately and stressed: "At present
81the watfhcword here is, as ever, strict non-intervention." The Foreign 
Office, unlike Jordan, was unwilling to give its support exclusively to 
Yiian because it felt that it knew "too little of the Chinese forces at 
78
Such details are available in HHKM, vol.112-3; Ch’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai 
p.128; and Aisin Gioro P*u-i, Wo-ti ch’ien pan-sheng,fAutobiography 
of the last Ch’ing emperor], (Peking, 1964), p. 43.
^Jordan to Grey, tel. 21, 23 Jan, 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.
^ L a n g l e y ’s minute on ibid.
81-Langley to Jordan, private, 25 Jan. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 1.
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work to be sure of our ground" and the situation was ever-changing
82and "confused by various unknown factors".
Re liitions between Yiian Shih-k’ai and the "reactionary party",
Jordan’s label for the Tsung-she Tang continued to deteriorate, and
Jordan feared that fighting might break out in that the princes succeeded
fn inducing the indecisive empress dowager to postpone abdication and
obliging Yiian Shih-k’ai to retake the original decision of having the
83question settled by a national convention . A decree embodying the
above decision appeared on 25 January. If Yiian’s proposed resignation
was repugnant to Jordan, it was welcomed by the Tsung-she Tang which
immediately arranged that once Yiian resigned its members would form a
new cabinet with T’ieh-liang as the commander of the Manchu troops.
Meanwhile, Yiian was under extreme pressure from the revolutionaries
who found his Tientsin scheme both surprising and objectionable.
Wilkinson, consul at Nanking, reported to Jordan that on knowing Yiian’s
plan of a Tientsin government, Sun Yat-sen immediately withdrew his
offer of the presidency and instructed Wu T’ing-fang to telegraph Yiian
the following conditions: the emperor should abdicate; the emperor was
to abstain from the organisation of a provisional amalgamated government;
Nanking would be the seat of the new provisional government; and Sun Yat-
sen would resign when, and only when, the provisional government was
recognised by the powers; finally, Yiian was not to concern himself with
. 8 4the provisional government until after Sun’s resignation . Two days 
later, Sun again telegraphed five points to Yuan through Wu and had them 
82Grey’s and Nicolson’s minutes on Jordan to Grey, tel.21, 23 Jan., 1913, 
Ch. Corres., vol. 1311,
83--------
Jordan to Grey, no. 47, 27 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1312.
^Wilkinson to Jordan, no. 73, 20 Jan. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1836; 
for terms see Li, Cheng-ch’ih,; shih, vol. 1, 339-40.
published in the press: the abdication of the emperor which Yiian was
to officially announce to the foreign ministers; a public declaration
by Yiian of his support of republicanism; the resignation of Sun Yat-sen
when informed of the abdication by either the Diplomatic Body or the
Consular Body at Shanghai; and an oath by Yiian after his election as
president to be faithful to the constitution promulgated by the Nanking 
85
senate. The attempt of Sun to detach Yiian from the Manchu government
and to put him under the control of Nanking was obvious and fully
justified from the revolutionaries1 point of view, Wilkinson therefore
told Jordan that the "conditions laid down by Dr. Sun Wen...are by no
means impossible ones for Yuan Shih-kai to accept, especially if, as
is no doubt intended, pressure is brought upon him to do so by the
86foreign Ministers at Peking." Jordan, however, disliked Sun’s actions. 
The same day Sun raised his five points Jordan telegraphed the Foreign 
Office that the situation had changed and there seemed to be "great 
difficulties in forming an amalgamated Government of the north and 
south". Jordan was, of course, biased. The revolutionaries were not 
withholding their approval for an amalgamated government but a govern­
ment which would be totally irresponsible to them and exclusively under 
Yuan. Jordan made no effort to conceal his distaste when he saw that 
while almost all the ministers favoured a temporary government under
Yiian Shih-k’ai, it was being "expressly debarred by the uncompromising
87attitude of Sun and the Nanking leaders."
Yiian Shih-k’ai’s position remained most intractable until 26 January
when several important events occurred. It looks as though his fortune 
85Jordan to Grey, no. 40, conf., 22 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1312. 
^Wilkinson to Jordan, no. 6, 24 Jan. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1836. 
^Jordan to Grey, tel. 20, 22 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.
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improved with his being made a marquis of the first order by the
empress dowager that day. That same day the Manchu noble Liang-pi,
the leader of the Tsung-she Tang, was assassinated by a revolutionary,
Peng Chia-chen. The death of Liang-pi was a fatal blow to the Tsung-
she Tang and before long it was dispersed: Prince Su fled to Port Arthur;
88Prince Kung to Tsingtao; and some others to Tientsin . Jordan was
undoubtedly relieved although he described the incident as inaugurating
89a "reign of terrorism"
The same day as Liang-pifs assassination too, another spectacular
event took place. Over forty generals of the Pei-yang Army, led by Tuan
Ch’i-jui, memorialised the throne to abdicate. Jordan realised, as has
been confirmed by numerous historians since then, that the authors of
the memorial "had acted under the inspiration of Yuan Shih-kai". However,
instead of accusing Yiian of disloyalty as many do, Jordan followed the
above statement with an eulogy, praising Yiian as "the astute politician,
whose masterly brain has been directing all the moves in this long drawn-
90out game of Chinese statecraft". „ The memorialisation of the Pei-yang 
generals was important in that the dynasty was stripped of all military 
support.
In the final imperial conference on 30 January the decision of abdi­
cation was taken by the empress dowager. On 1 February Jordan was in­
formed by Wu Wei-te that Yiian had been formally authorised to negotiate
91terms with the revolutionaries for the treatment of the court . On 12
February three edicts were promulgated. The first one fixed a republic 
88
P!u-i, Wo-ti ch’ien pan-sheng. p. 45; Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat- 
sen, p.139; and Kao, Chung-hua min-kuo ta-shih chi, p.2; and HHKM, p.115.
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Jordan to Grey, no. 47, 27 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1312.
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Jordan to Grey, no. 71, 10 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1314; also 
Tsou, Shih-kao, p. 953; Ch’en, Yuan Shih-k1ai, p. 127; and Li, Cheng- 
ch’ih shih, vol. 1, pp. 341-2.
91Jordan to Grey, tel, 30, 1 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.
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as the form of government and invested Yiian Shih-k’ai with full power
to organise a provisional republic with the cooperation of the southern
republican party. The second dealt with the terms of the treatment of
the imperial family. And the third exhorted the people and officials
to serve the new government.
Thus between 26 Januaty and 12 February, when the Manchu? abdicated,
Yuan had only to deal with the revolutionaries. During this period
relations between Yiian and the revolutionaries were extremely tense.
Many revolutionaries regarded Yuan’s machination as the sole cause of
the postponement of the Manchu abdication. Jordan learned from Wilkinson
that within the Nanking government there was a strong extremist and
military section which favoured the continuance of war not so much
against the Manchus, whom it regarded as worthy of no consideration,
as Yiian Shih-k’ai whom it suspected of trying to outmaneouvre the
92revolutionaries and aspire to imperial honours for himself . Indeed, 
the cry for a northern expedition amongst the southern revolutionary 
leaders resounded with increasing ferocity. This militant spirit was 
fully reflected in the telegrams which were published in the Lin-shih 
Cheng-fu Kung-pao, an official publication of the Nanking provisional 
government. For example, the Wuchang military government telegraphed 
the Nanking government on 26"January that if abdication failed to take
place by the expiration of the armistice on 29 January, it would resume
93 . . .fighting . Other revolutionaries urged the Nanking government that a
northern expedition was a necessary prelude to forestalling the cunning
. 94devices of Ytfan and, thus, a general settlement of the situation
92
Wilkinson to Jordan, no 6, 24 Jan. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1836. 
93Lin-shih Cheng-fu Kung-pao, 29 Jan. 1912.
94 .
Lin-shih Cheng-fu Kung-pao, 31 Jan. 1912
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Jordan was aware that 3,500 revolutionaries had already been transported
to Shantung and, on 27 January, two days before the armistice expired,
fighting resumed on the Tientsin-Pukou Railway. Moreover, there was
a circulation of leaflets and pamphlets which urged the necessity of
leaving the national problem to the arbitration of force. Thus on 30
January, in spite of the empress dowager’s decision to abdicate, Jordan
. 95told the Foreign Office that the situation was far from certain . But 
it also appears that Jordan somehow believed that Yuan would be able 
eventually to reach an agreement with the revolutionaries whose financial 
difficulties removed much sharpness from their threat of a general 
northern expedition^.
It has been seen that on 30 January the empress dowager entrusted 
Yiian with full authority to negotiate with the revolutionaries for the 
terms and manner of abdication. All negotiations between Yiian and the 
revolutionaries before that date were, legally speaking, unauthorised. 
Between 1 and 12 February Yiian’s two preoccupations were, according to 
Jordan, the final settlement of conditions upon which the Manchu court 
was to retire, and the ensurance of as short an interval as possible 
between abdication and the establishment of a coalition government.
In order to bring about a short interval Yiian proposed that the announce­
ment of abdication, Sun Yat-sen’s resignation, YUan’s own election as 
president, and the inauguration of the.amalgamated cabinet should take
95Jordan to Grey, no. 47, 27 Jan., no. 50, 29 Jan, 1912, Ch. Corres., 
vols. 1312, 1313.
96Jordan to Grey, no. 50, 29 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1313, Jordan 
learned from Fraser who was told by Wu T* ing-fang that the revolution­
aries had no means to pay troops; also Wilkinson to Jordan, no. 11,
3 Feb. 1911, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1836, Wilkinson reports that troops 
in Nanking were paid partly by military notes which were printed by 
the Nanking government as a result of financial exigencies. For an 
enlightening account of revolutionary finance in this period, see G. 
Lanning, Old Forces in New China, (Shanghai, 1912). pp 359-61.
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place on the same day. Jordan, of course, understood that YUan’s
motive was to consolidate his control over the situation by quick
. 97actions, leaving little room for counteraction . Sun Yat-sen realised this 
point also and insisted that Yiian should allow events to proceed without 
undue haste and go to Nanking to be elected as president. Sun regarded 
it as crucial that Yiian should be elected by the Nanking senate, an 
acknowledgement that the republic to be inaugurated was the fruit of 
the revolution. YUan Shih-k’ai wanted precisely to avoid this because 
he had no desire to derive his authority from the revolutionaries.
The abdication edict of 12 February was a blow on Sun Yat-sen and 
his close followers, such as Hu Han-min, Ch’en ChV-mei, and Ma Chiin-wu, 
who represented the left-wing of the revolutionaries. It was in effect 
a replica of the Tientsin provisional government scheme which Yiian first 
proposed about a month before. The new provisional amalgamated govern­
ment, though not at Tientsin, would be exclusively controlled by YUan 
Shih-k’ai whose status was legalised not by the revolutionaries but 
by the Manchu edict. However, Sun Yat-sen resigned soon after the 
abdication as he had promised and YUan Shih-k’ai was elected on 15 February 
as the new provisional] president by the Nanking senate.
However, disagreement between YUan and Sun Yat-sen continued and 
was reflected in the question of the capital. Three days before the 
abdication edict was promulgated Wilkinson told Jordan that the situation
had improved, in view of the impending abdication, except for a possible
98
hitch over the location of the republican government . It was because
97Jordan to Grey, no. 71, 10 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1314. This is 
an important document which portrays not only the events which took 
place during the 12 days or so before abdication, but is also a summary 
of Jordan’s attitude since his definite abandonment of the monarchic, al 
cause on 20 December 1911.
98 . .
Wilkinson to Jordan, no. 12, 9 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1836.
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Sun Yat-sen insisted that Nanking instead of Peking should be the seat
of the government for three ostensible reasons: to remind Yiian that
he owed his position to the revolutionaries; to remove him from the
base of his military strength; and to detach him from the traditional
. . 99seat of despotic monarchicism. Jordan was further told that there
was a decided rift within the Nanking government because a strong
moderate group objected to the insistence of Sunfs extremist section
also on three grounds: it would certainly be objected by YUan Shih-k’ai
for personal reasons; it would incur an enormous expense which China
could ill afford at that time; and it would certainly mean that all
the palaces in Peking would be l o o t e d A s  a result of the influence
of the moderate group, the senate on 14 February passed by 20 to 8
votes a resolution making Peking the capital"^. The decision, however,
was reversed by 19 to 8 votes the next day under threat from Sun Yat-sen 
102and Huang Hsing . Jordan, as expected, was sympathetic towards YUan
who "did not naturally feel inclined to separate himself from his army
and trust himself as a private citizen to the tender mercies of the new
republic". Moreover, YUan was needed in the north to preserve order
103where sentiments were essentially monarchical ,
99 rChang Ch’i-ytln, Tang-shih kai-yao, L Outline of the history of the
kuomin-tang and the Chinese revolution in the last sixty yearsj,
(Taipei, 1951), pp. 139-40.
^^Wilkinson to Jordan, no. 12, 9 Feb. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch.%vol. 1836,
"the summarised content of which was telegraphed to Jordan. The moderate 
revolutionaries were mindful of Yuan’s feelings because they had decided 
to give him a free hand to settle the confusion, see, for example, Chung 
-kuo jen-min cheng-ch’ih hsieh-shang hui-i ch’iian-kuo wei-yUan-hui wen- 
shih tzu-liao yen-chiu wei-yuan-hui, Hsin-hai ko-ming hui-i lu,£ Col­
lection of recollections of the revolution of 1911], (Taipei, 1916), 
vol. 1, p. 488; for general reasons see Lanning, Old Forces in New 
China, pp. 338-9.
101-The moderate group included such important revolutionaries as Sung
Chiao-jen and Chang Ping-lin, and the representatives from the northern 
revolutionary provinces. They thought that the change would facilitate 
Russia’s and Japan’s encroachment on north China, Wu, "Yuan Shih-k’ai
Largely because of Sun Yat-sen1s influence, a delegation, including
Ts’ai Ytian-p’ei, Wang Ching-wei, and Sung Chiao-jen, was despatched to
"welcome11 YUan to Nanking. The event aroused the keen interest of the
British Foreign Office. On 19 February the Foreign Office listed its
objections to Nanking as the capital in a memorandum which largely based
its argument on the Boxer protocol of 7 September 1901. The Foreign Office
argued that the allocation of the legations and the provision for open
communication between the capital and the sea had the basic assumption
that Peking would remain as the capital. Besides, an enormous amount
of British capital had been invested in the railway system in north China
which was built with Peking as the capital. Moreover, large expenses
would have to be incurred if the legations were to be moved to Nanking.
In short, the British government was tempted to intervene with the other 
104
powers
Jordan, when asked his views by Grey, deprecated intervention as 
unnecessary because he had just been told by T’ang Shao-i and Liang Shih- 
i that most political leaders in both north and south favoured Peking 
which would most likely be retained as the capital of the country.
Moreover, Jordan pointed out that it would be most unsuitable for Britain^
mou-ch’u lin-shih ta-tsung-t*ung chih ching-kuo," p. 12, I Kuo-Kan (ed.), 
Li fu-tsung-t’ung cheng-shu, C Official Writings of Vice-president Li 
YUan-hungJ, in CHS t’sung-shu, pp. 98-9.
102 .Wilkinson to Jordan, tel. 17, 15 Feb. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1836. 
Huang Hsing threatened the assemblymen with military arrest if they 
would not rescind the decision. A close associate of Sun threatened 
suicide on the floor if they would not do the same, Young "Yuan Shih 
k’ai’s Rise to the Presidency, 1911-12", p. 24.
103Jordan to Grey, no. 71, 10 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1314.
104
MaxMuller’s minute to Langley, 19 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1313.
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of all the powers, to take the initiative to intervene in the matter.
Such an action would not only be resented by the southern extremists
but, more significantly, by the British merchants in Shanghai and the
southern ports who were plainly in favour of a move of the capital to
the south whereby the political centre of the country would be brought
into closer relations with its commercial area^ "^ .^
The welcoming delegation reached Peking on 25 February. Four days
later two regiments of what was known as YUan Shih-k’ai’s most trusted
3rd Division, under the command of one of his most dependable officers,
Ts’ao K’un, mutinied in the western section of the city and looted
several thousand firms and homes in the heart of the capital. The
mutinous troops also staged a siege of the residence which housed the
welcoming delegation. During the next few days mutinies occurred in
Tientsin and Paoting where troops not only looted but set fire to the 
106
cities
Events connected with the choice of the capital moved quickly to­
wards a solution after the mutiny in Peking. Ts’ai YUan-p’ei, as the leader 
of the welcoming delegation, telegraphed the Nanking government on 
2 March urging that YUan should be allowed to remain in Peking both
to restore order and forestall intervention by Japan who was sending
107
troops to the disaffected areas from Manchuria. . Four days later 
the Nanking government agreed to Yuan assuming the. presidency in Peking, 
but he had to telegraph. his oath to the Nanking senate which was also
■^Jordan to Grey, tel. 63, 28 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1313.
106For details of the mutinies see, for example, HHKM, vol. 8, p. 122; 
Chung-kuo jen-min cheng-ch’ih hsieh-shang hui-i ch’uan-kuo wei-yuan- 
hui wen-shih tzu-liao yen-chiu wei-yUan-hui, Hsin-hai ko^ming hui-i lu, 
vol. 1, p. 487; and Pei-ching ping-pien shih-mo chi, in CHS ts’ung-shu.
^^Uchida to Ijuin, no. 65, 4 Mar. 1912, NGB, vols. 44-5, p. 593.
to confirm the names of the premier and cabinet ministers whom he
nominated. The cabinet, however, would have to assume duty in Nanking
and then proceed to Peking. YUan Shih-k1ai was duly sworn in as the
second provisional president of the Chinese republic on 10 March, 1912.
Because of the close connection between the Peking mutiny and the
settlement of the question of the capital, it has been commonly asserted
that the mutiny was instigated by YUan Shih-k*ai to dramatise to the
Nanking government the unstable north where his presence was indis- 
108pensible , However, this theory becomes doubtful when one looks at
the mutiny from Jordan’s point of view. Jordan was shocked by the mutiny
which he could observe clearly because it took place near the legation
quarters. On 3 March he convened a meeting of the Diplomatic Body to
decide on the role of the powers in the crisis. It was decided in the
meeting that during the day-time foreign soldiers were not only to
patrol the legation quarters, but the city of Peking in general to help
109to maintain order . He knew that it was believed amongst some 
extremists in Nanking that YUan inspired the mutiny^^; however, it 
appears that he considered it too impolitic to have been designed 
by YUan. In the first place, it was only the day before the mutiny that 
YUan’s men, T’ang Shao-i and Liang Shih-i>told him that in the Nanking 
government only a minority insisted on Nanking and in the end Peking 
would most likely be preferred under pressure from the majority. It 
seemed unnecessary for YUan to stage a mutiny which he should have known,
with his knowledge of.soldiers, to b e .infectious....................
108For example, Wen, Chung-hua min-kuo ko-^ ming shih, vol. 1, pp. 81-2; 
T’ao, Shih-hua, vol. 1, pp. 124-5; Chang, Tang-shih kai-yao, pp. 130-1 
and KMWH, vol. 3, p. 434.
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Ijuin to Uchida, no. 164, 3 Mar. 1912, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 588-9. 
^^Wilkinson, to Jordan, no. 17, 7 Mar. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1836.
More important still, Jordan considered the mutinies as severely 
detrimental to Yiian* s prestige. He told Grey rather sorrowfully:
"There can be no doubt that Yuan Shih-kai’s prestige has suffered a 
severe blow from which it may not recover. His name, recently so 
honoured as the saviour of his country, is now execrated as the cause 
of the recent disorder.11 Was Yiian likely to have instigated the 
Peking mutiny, which seemed unnecessary, at the expense of his reputation 
not only amongst the moderate elements in the south but, more significantly^ 
the foreign powers^whose trust he had always valued, especially under 
the extraordinary circumstances of the time? Thus Jordan’s reaction 
helps in supporting the theory that Yiian did not instigate the Peking 
mutiny although it served his political purposes in the question of the 
capital; a theory which is gaining credence in recent historical research 
on the incident^^.
By way of concluding the chapter, it can be said that Jordan did not 
abandon the Manchu cause until 20 December 1911, when the revolutionaries 
declared unilaterally for a republic. However, his final despair of the 
Manchu dynasty was not of great practical significance in that in order 
to protect British interests he had already improvised the mechanism of 
British neutral policy which was beneficial to the revolutionaries.
The entire matter had more to do with his idealistic hopes for the future 
of China for whom, he believed, a republic would be most unsuitable.
Jordan’s attention became even more focussed on Yiian Shih-k’ai after 
20 December. The republic could only be accepted on condition of Yiian
^^Jordan to Grey, no. 104, 3 Mar. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1315.
112 . . .For example, Wu, "Yiian Shih-k’ai mou-ch’ii lin-shih ta-tsung-t’ung
chih ching-kuo", pp. 11-16; and Young, "Yuan Shih-k’ai*s Rise to the
Presidency, 1911-1912," pp. 27-8.
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becoming the president. To him institutions and what is known as 
the "one man rule" policy were the essential ingredients of Chinese 
politics. By institutions was meant, of course, the dynasty or 
monarchy which had hitherto been the established form of government 
in China. Now that there had to be a drastic change in terms of 
institutions, the "one man", in this case, Yiian Shih-k’ai, had to 
be more heavily depended upon to tide over the greatest crisis in 
Chinese history. In this connection, it is seen that although the 
Foreign Office too, largely through Jordan’s influence, cherished 
a good opinion of Yiian Shih-k’ai, it had never reached the degree 
of pinning all its hopes on him. It may be arguable that by reason 
of its relative detachment, the Foreign Office had a more balanced 
view than Jordan on the much interwoven issues of YUan Shih-k’ai, 
Chinese politics in general, and British interests in China during 
the latter half of the revolution.
It has been asserted that until the end of December Jordan in general 
believed in Yiian’s sincerity in his support of the dynasty. Yiian* s 
subsequent acceptance of the presidency did not change Jordan’s view 
of his integrity. Indeed, Jordan himself was forced by sheer circum­
stances to abandon his ideal. Thus Langley was told that "Yuan Shih- 
kai has played the only part open to him - that of an opportunist 
prepared to accept the solution which the country wanted, or at all 
events, the portion of it which is in a position to make known and 
enforce its wishes at present"^^.
Yiian* s attitude towards Jordan is also much reflected in this 
chapter. He was definitely much more attached to Jordan than Ijuin.
Jordan to Langley, private, 17 Jan, 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.
202
After Japan had definitely abandoned her insistence on a constitutional 
monarchy, Yiian assumed a much more aloof attitude towards Ijuin than 
before. This, of course, is a direct manifestation of Yiian1 s belief 
in Britain’s rather than Japan’s friendship. But Yuan did not hesitate 
to make use of Jordan to suit his own political purposes, and Jordan 
was seen to have suffered in Yiian’s game of playing one barbarian 
against another.
Since negotiations started between the north and south there had 
been little scope for Jordan’s action. Neither Jordan nor Britain, nor 
any powers, had a decisive influence on the course of events during the 
months of negotiations leading to Yiian Shih-k’ai*s rise to the 
presidency. The outcome of the revolution was essentially the result 
of the reshuffling of power balance between the revolutionaries, the 
Manchus, and Yiian Shih-k’ai. A sidelight is thrown on the fact that 
by 1911-1912, although foreign influence in her was still considerable, 
China had reached the transitional stage at which her politics could 
no longer be lightly interfered by the powers. In short, Yiian emerged 
as the strong man not only over the Manchus and the revolutionaries, but 
the powers and their representatives, including Jordan, althoughat the 
same time he had to ingratiate himself with the foreigners.
Although the dynasty had to go, the revolution undoubtedly yielded 
a satisfactory outcome from Jordan’s vantage point. With Yiian in control 
British interests would be guaranteed, and the excesses of the revolution­
aries restrained. He was certainly justified in saying, soon after his 
abandonment of the Manchu cause, that the "truth, of course, is that
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China is not suited and will not for many years to come be suited,
either for constitutional government or a republic, and that it matters
little what £orm of government is adopted, provided she can obtain some
114capable men to govern the country." The most capable man, no doubt,
was Yiian Shih-k’ai; and this point stands more prominently against another
statement made by Jordan: "It is strange the whole upheaval has not yet
thrown up a single new man of any capacity or marked ability above his
fellows. Wu [t ting-fang], Wen [isung-yao] and the whole Shanghai lot
are not the sort of men to whom one would care to entrust the fortunes of
a new r e g i m e . S u n  Yat-sen, above all, was an "armchair politician",
116"a coward", and "a wild visionary who knows nothing of China".
114Jordan to Grey, no. 13, 6 Jan. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.
115Jordan to Campbell, private, 4 Jan. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.
116Jordan to Campbell, private, 27 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7; 
Jordan to Grey, tel. 278, 14 Nov. the confidential clause in Jordan 
to Grey, tel. 289, 20 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1095; and Jordan 




It has been seen that the lack of funds on both sides of the 
imperialists and the revolutionaries had materially hastened their 
abandonment of force and adoption of peaceful negootiations. It was, 
therefore, not surprising that the immediate problem of the newly esta­
blished republic was finance. The Reorganisation Loan cliscujfsed here 
was the loan of £25,000,000 which China secured from the consortium 
in 1913 with which she was chiefly to pay off her maturing foreign 
liabilities and the series of provisional loans which she had been 
receiving sporadically from the consortium since the republic was 
established. Jordan*s part in the negotiations for the Reorganisation 
Loan has to be discussed here at length because without the provisional 
loans, given on the understanding that they would be redeemed by a large 
reorganisation loan, Yiian*s government^had little chance to tide over 
its first year of existence. Moreover, it will be seen in the following 
chapter that the timely access to the Reorganisation Loan money in the 
summer of 1913 enabled Yiian Shih-k*ai to crush the Kuo-min Tang opposition 
against him with ease, thus establishing a mile-stone on his road to 
autocracy.
Premier T*ang Shao-i Jld not have exaggerate when, in
addressing the Nanking assembly on 29 March, he described China as "the
most poverty-stricken country in the world".^ Once he was in control of
the situation, even before the formal inauguration of the republic,
2Yiian Shih-k’ai knew that he needed external financial help . Unlike
"^Bland, Recent Events, p. 381 
2 — — — — — — —
Yiian* s attempt to float an internal loan in January ended in failure, 
Ch*en, Yuan Shih-k’ai, p. 147.
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before the revolution, foreign loans were no longer being contracted
for extraordinary and constructive purposes, but for ordinary, political,
and recurring administrative purposes. In applying for help to the
quadruple consortium in the middle of February 1912 the Chinese based
their request on the need to meet the current administrative expenses
3and to pay the stipulated pensions to the Manchu court.
There were immediate military expenses for Yuan to see to.
On the one hand money was urgently needed to disband about 500,000 
irregular soldiers^ mainly as a result of the indiscriminate recruitment 
of the revolutionaries during the period of fighting. Agitation for 
money by soldiers awaiting disbandment was strongest at Shanghai and 
Nanking, Aside from being anxious to prevent the unpaid soldiers from 
degenerating into brigands or staging mutinies, Yiian Shih-kfai was 
naturally eager to rid the revolutionary leaders of their following.
On the other hand Yiian needed to maintain and build up his own forces, 
Unlike Japan, loyalty in China had to^bought. While pushing on the 
programme of disbandment in the south, Yiian recruited for himself thirty 
new corps of soldiers on the ground of security after the mutinies in 
February and March, refusing Huang Hsing's suggestion that he should 
take over his Nanking soldiers who could not be disbanded because of the
3 . .Hillier to Addis in Addis to Langley, 17 Feb. 1912, Cfo. Corres., 
vol. 1313,
4Jordan was informed of the figure by Yuan, Confidential clause 
in Jordan to Grey, tel, 88, 19 Mar. 1912, Ch. Corres,, vol. 1315,
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lack of funds.
At the same time many outstanding foreign debts were 
awaiting liquidation. It has been seen that the payment of the Boxer 
indemnity fell completely into abeyance during the revolution. A 
number of maturing provincial loans would have to be redeemed. In some 
cases Britain, Brance and Germany had themselves since the beginning of 
the revolution been paying for Chinafs interest charges on the Chinese 
loans which they had issued in order to safeguard China’s credit in 
the European money market.^ With the re—emergence of a semblance of 
government in China the powers began to press for payment. The only 
way out of the difficulty for Yuan was to liquidate old debts by making 
new ones.
So much for the needs of expenditure. But what were the 
prospects of income? It would be some time before the provinces would 
make contributions to the central government. The government would 
be fortunate if the provinces did not clamour for financial assistance 
for the disbandment of excessive troops and general rehabilitation 
purposes. In fact for two years after the revolution Peking was seldom 
in receipt of anything from the provinces, except from those nearby.
5 • •Ch’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai, p. 145; Li, "Huang K’o-ch’ian& hsien-sheng
nien-p’uj’, pp. 307-8.
6 kao
For a list of outstanding liabilities due by the Chinese government 
at the end of 1911, see The China Year Book, 1912, p. 298.
7 . .Willard Straight, "China’s Loan Neogitations" in G, E, Blakeslee, 
(ed.), Recent Developments in China, (New York, 1913), p. 140.
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Even the small sums that the government did receive were irregular
g
in nature and often took the form of patriotic pledges . Moreover,
in some cases provincial authorities neededWhatever money they could
grab to maintain a certain amount of military strength and hence
political security. Chang Hstin and Huang Hsing were outstanding
9examples  ^ . In any case Yuan Shih-k’ai did not insist
on contributions at this early stage to ingratiate himself with the 
provinces.
Customs surplus had been a source of income to the Manchu 
government. With the tightening of foreign oontrol over the Customs 
Service during the revolution and China’s deplorable state of indebted­
ness, surplus would not be reaching the republican government for some 
time to come. At the same time both the likin excise and especially 
the salt gabelle were so chaotic and governed by monopolies that they
were far beyond the reach of the new government.
It has been seen in relation to the Hukuang Railway Loan
negotiations that Jordan disliked the consortium in dealing with China’s
finances. His dislike of it increased when at the end of June^1912 
Russia and Japan were included in it. It took nearly half a year for the 
negotiations for the establishment of a sextuple consortium to complete
because of Russia’s and Japan’s insistence on reserving to themselves
.
8 ; ;  1 
See table showing the budgets of China for 1913-1915 in Chia Te-huai,
Min-kuo ts’ai-cheng chien-shih, [Brief history of the finances of the
Chinese Republic^ (Commercial Press, 1941,) pp. 667-72; Yang Ju-mei,
Min-kuo ts’ai cheng lun (Shanghai, 1932) p.12; and H.G.W. Woodhead,
The Truth about the Chinese Republic, (London, 1925), pp. 124-5.
9 . . . .Chang Hsttn continued with his recruitment when the general call was i
for disbandment of troops, Jordan to Grey, no, 198, 29 Apr. 1912, Ch. j
Corres., vol. 1318. Huang Hsing disbanded as far as he could thesoldiers who
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Mongolia and Manchuria respectively. Between the two Jordan viewed
Russia*s cooperation with greater apprehension because of Russia’s
explicit aversion to a strong China which would be a setback to her
ambitious activities inUrga.*^ He was further conscious that the
Russian and Japanese elements of the consortium would hinder its
dealings with the Chinese, bearing in mind the anti-Japanese and anti-
Russian sentiments of YCCan Shih-k’ai^. However, Grey insisted on the
inclusion of the two powers. Knowing Jordan’s feelings Langley wrote
after the signature of the sextuple agreement with an apologetic
undertone: "we have, I hope, not given away too much upon the question
of Manchuria and Mongolia which our other concession really implies
though the names do not appear," He further asked Jordan to understand
the difficviLt position which the Foreign Office was in because Russia’s
12entrance had the backing of France.
Apart from his intolerance of the consortium policy there are 
strong indications that Jordan was uneasy about giving loans to China 
in her then existing financial state. If China’s credit in the 
European money market before the revolution had been fairly satisfactory 
it had certainly been impaired during the course of the chaos when she
were hastily recruited during the revolution but retained those who 
were truly revolutionary in sentiment, Li, "Huang K’o-ch’iang hsien- 
sheng nien-p’u", pp.316-7.
^For example, Jordan to Langley, private, 16 Apr.1912, Jordan Papers, 
vol. 8.
^For example, Jordan to Grey, tel. 188, 15 Sept 1912, Ch. Corres., 
vol. 1322.
12
Langley to Jordan, private, 21 Jun. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 1.
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was actually in default. Jordan expressed this worry readily:
"Lending money to China in her present condition is a mild 
form of gambling. The lenders trust to her great natural 
resources and to political pressure or intervention for 
repayment in the long run. Unless the process of regeneration 
is more effective than any one would care to predict at 
present, it is morally certain that the recovery of all this 
money will be an unpleasant task for our successors."13
Knowing his support for Yttan Shih-kfai one would expect 
Jordan to have taken the initiative to assist his administration 
financially. However, it appeared that personal approval to 
renewing financial help to China was forced from him at the end of 
February when Japan offered a series of independent loans to the still 
existing Nanking government. With the stark necessity for funds Sun Yat- 
sen and the Nanking government approached Japan for various amounts of 
money pledged separately against the Han Yeh Ping Mines, the China Mer­
chants1 Steam Navigation Company Limited, and the Shanghai-Ningpo Railway.
All these loans were partly paid over despite protests from different
14 . . . .quarters. Even the Okura Loan, which had as its security the Shanghai-
Ningpo Railway, was half paid over in face of Britain*s and more
especially Jordan’s objection on the ground that it was a direct
violation of the 1908 railway agreement. Jordan viewed these small
13Jordan to Langley, private, 25 Mar. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.
14Protests from the United States, Britain, and Jordan against the 
loans as gross violation of neutrality are abundantly available 
in Ch. Corres., vol. 1312.
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advances to the Chinese under the guise of loans to private
companies as Japan1s ostentatious attempt at "utilising the abnormal
situation in the south to acquire predominance in the shipping and
15industrial interests in Yang-tsze".
On 17 February the London Foreign Office was iufdrmed that 
the consortium’s agents in Peking had proposed to finance the Chinese 
provisional government by means of treasury bills in view of Yuan 
Shih-k’ai1s pressing need for funds to establish a coalition government. 
The bank representatives anticipated that China would negotiate for a 
large and comprehensive loan for reorganisation purposes. The
16consortium sought the concurrence of the governments concerned. To
Sir Edward Grey’s question as to whether "time has come for advancing
money to the Provisional Government"^ Jordan replied:
"Under the circumstances I see no alternative to advancing 
money to the ProvisionalgGovernment, in view of the active 
competition o f others."
Thus initially it was the fear of uncontrolled competition
and Japanese intrusion into the Yangtze that prompted Jordan to approve
of the consortium financing China. But this did not rule out his
awareness of Yuan Shih-k’ai’s financial difficulties. In the same
telegram he said that Yuan needed 2,000,000 taels for the Nanking
^For Jordan’s protest against the Okura Loan see Jordan to Grey, 
tel. 35, 5 Feb, 1912; for his comment on the loans see Jordan to 
Grey, tel. 41 , 9;Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1312.
16Addis to Langley, enclosing telegram from Hillier, 17 Feb. 1912,
Ch. Corres., vol. 1313.
^Grey to Jordan, tel. 36, 21 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1313.
18
Jordan to Grey, tel. 60, 23 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres.. vol. 1313.
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government to disband troops and liquidate its outstanding liabilities*
Yet the fear of Japan's competition reigned more predominently in his
mind for he pointed out that Japan had promised to furnish Yuan with
the money as part of a larger loan to be secured on the China Merchants1
flefet. On 2g Hhbruary the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, on behalf of
the consortium, paid the 2,000,000 taels to the Nanking minister of 
19finance.
In the annual report on China for 1912 which was drawn up
under Jordan's supervision, the history of the Reorganisation Loan
negotiations amongst the Chinese government, the consortium, and the
powers between 22: E&bruary and the end of 1912 is divided into six
periods, each possessing its own characteristics. Since the pEriodisation
in the report is in itself a reflection of Jordan’s attitude towards the
loan and since it can be extended to apply to the entire length of the
loan negotiation until its conclusion in April* 1913, it deserves to
20be adopted in the present analysis. In studying Jordan’s attitude 
towards the loan it is also hoped that light will be thrown on the
21
British side of the matter, an aspect which has yet been little studied.
1 9 ..The British bank made the advance in view of China’s immediate need 
on behalf of the other groups which had not sufficiently recovered 
from the policy of neutrality.
20Jordan to Grey, annual report, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320. Words quoted 
at the beginning of each period are from the report.
21 . .Of the works which are consulted for this study of the Reorganisation
Loan the following are written from the American point of view:
A.G.Coons, TheiFftreign Public Debt of China, (Phil.,1930), pp.54-61; 
T.W.Lamont, Henry P. Davison: The Record of a Useful Life. (New York,
1933 ) pp. 160-5; (Davison was the head of the American bank) , ■, K.V .yield 
American Participation in' the China Consortium^ (Chicago, 1930)* hereafter 
Consortiums, pp.67-97; Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson’s China Policy 1913-17,
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Period I (22 February to 15 March.): ’’optimism on the part of the
groups, and the commencement of advances.11
The 2,000,000 taels of 28 February was of course insufficient
to meet China’s needs. Nanking was clamouring for more money. On 29
T’ang Shao-i again asked the consortium for 3,000,000 taels for
relieving the Peking government for the month of Marche Also,
64,000,000 taels would be needed each month for April, May and June 9
half for Peking and the other half for Nanking. To repay these advances
China expected to conclude in June the same year a comprehensive
reorganisation loan of £60,000,000f namely £12,000,000 for each of five
years, the first instalment to be floated in July. Besides repaying
the preliminary advances the loan was to cover all matured provincial
loans and arrears of indemnity. The balance of the proceeds was to be
used for reorganisation: 80% for productive undertakings and 20% for the
army, navy, and education. The loan was to be secured as a second
22charge on a reorganised salt gabelle. On 2 March Yuan Shih-k’ai made
an urgent request for 1,015,000 taels, less than half of T’ang’s made
23two days before. Jordan agreed to make the advance partly because 
the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank was willing to do so and partly the
f\
(New York, 1952), pp. 23-55; C, Vevier, The United States and China, 
1906-1913, (New Jersey, 1955), pp. 196-213; S. R. Wagel, Finance in 
China, ^Shanghai, 1914), pp. 57-77; and A. M. Overlach, Foreign Financial 
Control in China, (New York 1919), pp. 239-69.
22
Hillier to Addis in Addis to Langley, 1 Mar. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol.1314.
23
Chang, Chung-hua min-kuo wai-chiao shih, p. 58.
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situation was serious for Yiian after the series of mutinies which
24
had broken out in Peking, Paoting, and Tientsin,
On 9 March the consortium handed over 1,100,000 taels to 
Peking and stipulated that an option on further monthly provisions and 
the reorganisation loan must be obtained. The option was given the same 
day by Yiian Shih-kfai in his letter to the bank representatives stating:
"3. That the banks hold a firm option for the provision 
of the further monthly requirements of the Chinese 
government for the months of March, April, May, June 
and possibly July and August, which the four groups have 
already been requested to finance, against the delivery 
of additional sterling Treasury Bills or terms to be 
arranged,
4. That in consideration of the assistance rendered by the 
groups to China in the present emergency and of their 
services in supplying her credit on the foreign markets, 
the Chinese government assures to the groups (provided 
their terms are equally advantageous with those other­
wise obtainable) the firm option of undertaking the 
comprehensive loan for general reorganisation purposes 
already proposed to them. . ..,r25
The British group, finding the Chinese request for a loan of
£60,000,000 of great importance, suggested an inter-bank conference
to set down definitely the future policy towards lending to China. In
a meeting of the conference on 12 March, the bankers decided to supply
Yiianfs monthly requirements until August, inclusive, and to meet a
further request from Yuan for 2,000,000 taels made oh 11 March for
24
The advance was also by the British bank on behalf of the others, 
Addis to Langley, 6 Mar. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1314,
25 .Field? Consortiums, pp. 74-5.
214
the payment of troops at Wuchang and the protection of the Hupei
26provincial notes. However, this amount of money was not paid over
on account of the independent Anglo-Belgian Loan which was to suspend
negotiations between China and the consortium for one and a half
months. The "optimism11, the total lack of expectation that obstructions
might arise, with which the banks had thus far dealt with the financial
needs can be deduced from the bankers1 terms, stipulated in the meeting
of 12 March, upon which they would meet the monthly requirements. The
terms were: payment was to be made against Chinese treasury bills;
China was to receive95iX for nine months* bills; the groups were to
have preference on a loan not exceeding £60,000,000 to be spread over
5 years secured by the salt gabelle; China was to take immediate
action to reorganise the gabelle through foreign experts to be
recommended by the inspector-general of the Customs. Moreover, China
was to give adequate guarantees for proper control of the expenditure
of the loan proceeds; and, while the monthly requirements were being
made and until all the issues of the treasury bills would have been
redeemed and the loan successfully issued, the Chinese government
was to "bind themselves and their successors not to negotiate or
contract any loan or advance whatsoever except through the medium of
27
the four groups.fT
Because of the reckless printing of such military notes by the 
revolutionaries to solve temporarily their financial difficulty, 
the redemption of these notes was a big problem after the revolution, 
for example, Wagel, Finance in China, p.76.
27 .Field, Consortiums, pp. 75-6.
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Little can be said about Jordan in this period. He was
extremely, perhaps unusually, silent on the matter. Perhaps, being
torn between the feelings of "should not" and "have to" he found it
difficult to voice his opinion. But one fact was apparent: he wanted
China to employ extensive foreign expert aid in the productive processes.
This would be particularly expedient in the reorganisation of the salt
gabelle which Jordan thought "should be administered under foreign expert 
28supervision." Judging more from his attitude towards railway loans 
before the revolution and from the next two periods of the Reorganisation 
Loan negotiations Jordan appeared to have been in favour of strict 
supervision of both expenditure and security of loan funds. Apart from 
this inference his attitude during this period was on the whole unsettled. 
This unsettled state of mind was to be modified with more events taking 
place which enabled him better to choose a course of the lesser evil. In 
the annual report it is said that "the optimism which characterised the 
attitude of four groups during the first period was hardly shared by 
their governments". Despite the general nature of the statement it can be 
accepted as the reflection of the uneasiness with which Jordan, as a 
part of the British government, viewed the matter.
28
Jordan to Grey, tel. 60, 23iFfeb. 1912, in reply to Grey to Jordan 
tel. 36, 21 Feb. 1912, with regard to conditions put forward in 
Hillier to Addis, 15 Feb. in Addis to Langley, 17 Feb. 1912, Ch.Corres., 
vol. 1313.
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Period II (15 March, to 29 April): "strained relations resulting from 
Chinese breach of faith".
On 14 March the Peking bank representatives learned that
Tang Shao-i had concluded an independent agreement with a Belgian
syndicate for a loan of £1,000,000. The loan agreement gave as security
the net income and property of the Peking-Kalgan Railway, as well as
the general revenue bf the government. The interest rate was sealed
at 5%, The consortium and the powers broke into loud protests which
were echoed by the foreign press both inside and outside China. All
advances were instantly suspended. The loan was considered as Chinafs
29
"breach of faith".
What was Jordan* s reaction to the Anglo-Belgian Loan? The 
crux of the question is whether China had broken her promise. Strictly 
speaking China could argue that the Anglo-Belgian Loan was not a breach 
of her contract of 9 March although it ran counter to the policy set 
down in the consortium meeting of 12 March. Yiian Shih-fc’ai's letter 
gave a firm option to the consortium to advance the monthly requirements 
and a future reorganisation loan. But with regard to the reorganisation 
loan the condition was that the terms of the consortium had to be uequally 
advantageous with those otherwise obtainable.11 The Anglo-Belgian Loan 
was obviously too big a sum to be relegated to the status of a monthly 
advance. As a loan its terms were much more lenient than even the
29
MacMurray, Treaties, Vol. 2, pp. 947-50. The British firms that 
participated in the Anglo-Belgian Loan included the Eastern Bank,
Messrs. Sassoons and Company, and Messrs. J. Henry ShrSder and 
Company,
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monthly advances given by the consortium, not to mention the big
30loan which was to be negotiated. The most significant advantage
of the new loan to the Chinese was that it did not involve any form of
foreign control. It can perhaps be contended on behalf of the
consortium that the Chinese should have given it some warning.
Jordan protested against the Anglo-Belgian Loan with his
three colleagues on 25 March. In making the protest he endorsed the
view that China had broken her promise and had helped in creating a
precedent of monopoly by the consortium. This was important as he
himself later said, though in a different context* that "a precedent
31is everything in China.” It cannot be denied, however, that-Jordan
in that
had an additional ground forprotest^in taking the Peking-Kalgan
Railway as its security the Anglo-Belgian Loan was a violation of
both the Sino-British Peking-Kalgan Railway Loan Agreement of 1902,
which expressly forbad the railway to be pledged for foreign loans,
32and the Anglo-French Peking-Kalgan Railway Loan Agreement of 1908.
By the end of March Yiian Shih-k’ai became anxious for the
deadlock to be removed. A few hours before the ministers presented
the joint representation on 25 March Yiian went to Jordan personally
32and asked him to “extricate him from the ’impasse1". The Chinese 
wanted to renew relations with the consortium as if the Anglo-Belgian 
Loan were non-existent. The ministers in Peking backed up the
3 0The legality of the Chinese in signing the loan is clearly and 
convincingly set out in Chu Hsieh, Chung-kuo ts ’ai—cheng wen-t’ i,
£ Problems of Chinese finances 1865—1933J[ » (Shanghai, 1933) ,pp. 133-4.
^Jordan to Langley, private, 21 May, 191.2, Jordan Papers, vol. 8. 
^Jordan to Grey, tel. 98, 4 Apr. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1316.
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consortium^ refusal. Three weeks later Jordan was approached by
the minister of finance, Hsnjng Hsi-ling to induce the groups to
resume negotiations. Jordan gave Hsiung TTa frigid reception11 and told
34him to approach all the four ministers. A Chinese memorandum was
consequently presented to the Diplomatic Body which Jordan regarded as
showing"a very inadequate appreciation o f the part China must play if
35she is to have foreign money." Moreover, he considered that the 
loan was "a blessing in disguise" since it made China more conscious
36than befdreflher role as "a suiter for foreign financial assistance"^
Thus towards the end of the short second period Jordan1 s 
attitude became.fdrmalised. He realised that consortium monopoly was 
necessary as opposed to free competition; and supervision of the 
Chinese expenditure of loan funds was necessary as opposed to free 
spending. The Belgian loan produced a sizeable impact on Jordan in 
relation to his insistence on strict supervision, particularly that of 
expenditure. Ofjficial records on the expenditure of the Belgian loan 
are unavailable. Writings touching on the subject are generally 
confusing and contradictory. However, it is certain that Jordan objected
33Jordan to Langley, private, 25 Mar, 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.
34Jordan to Langley, private, 16 Apr. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.
35Jordan to Langley, ibid; Jordan to Grey, tel. 103, 18 Apr. 1912,
Ch. Corres., vol. 1317.
36
Jordan to Langley, ibid.
219
vigorously to the manner in which the money was spent. He asserted
that a great part of the loan, amounting to £1,250,000 (by including
a subsequent issue of £250,000), was "frittered away" in political
selling and buying. He pointed out that the whole matter was so
unaccountable that Tlang Shao-i hadf never been able to produce a full
account of the expenditure to the public although it was demanded that 
37he do so.- Jordan1 s observation was not unsupported. According to a
renowned contemporary journalist in Peking, Huang Yiian-yung, T*ang
brought with him two-thirds of the loan money to Nanking for cabinet-
making, disbandment of troops, and general stabilisation in the south.
38The remaining one-third was totally unaccountable. Such leaders of
the time as Huang Hsing, Ch'en Ch'i-mei, and even TTang Shao-i were
suspected of having lined their pockets. Jordan seemed to have
39accepted the accusation against Huang Hsing readily.
In the middle of April the attitude of the consortium softened 
after an apology from T'ang Shao-i. It was willing to resume negotiations
if China acknowledged formally that the loan was an act of faithlessness
40 . .on her part. Compliance to the condition came from China on 27 April
41and the Anglo-Belgian Loan was officially cancelled on 2 May 1912.
37Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1620.
3 8Huang Yiin-sheng i-chu, Yffan-sheng irehtu- in CHS tsfungj-shuT vol. 1, 
pp.131 -3.
39Section on Huang Hsing, Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1912,
Ch. Corres., vol. 1620.
40Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to Peking in Hongkong and Shanghai Bank 
to F .0. ,19 Apr. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1317.
41 _
The China Year Booi^ 1913, p» 354.
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Negotiations between China and the consortium were resumed on 29 April.^
Period III (29 April to 9 July): "desperate appeals for funds,
hesitation of the groups and growing agitation in China against
conditions of control."
It has seldom been mentioned in books touching on the
Reorganisation Loan that the Belgian loan did produce a softening
e ffect on Addis who was the head of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank.
In a letter to the Foreign Office in early April he pointed out that
international financial tutelage w$uld not be acceptable to republican
China. Yuan would suffer a severe loss of prestige if his government
accepted a system of strict foreign financial control. He thought
that the interests of the shareholders could be safeguarded by a
"negative form of control" conveyed by the right of veto on expenditure
and the appointment of foreign auditors, accountants and collectors of/
43revenues pledged as security by the Chinese government. These
proposals were at first not accepted by the other groups and
governments and were regarded by the British Foreign Office as "too 
44moderate."
In China, the bank representatives were displeased with Addis1 
proposal and considered that the supervision of expenditure must be 
stricter than what Addis suggested. To them foreign control should be 
strict and applied to the period "deemed to be sufficient for complete 
work of establishing efficient government", and not just to the loan off 
£60,000,000. Moreover, foreign advice should be sought not only for
42Jordan to Grey, tel. 108, 29 Apr. 1912, Ch. Corres., Vol. 1317.
43Addis to Langley, 2 Apr. 1912, Ch. Corres., Vol. 1316. 




the collection of those revenues pledged for the loan but on all
revenues in general. They went as far as suggesting that £60,000,000
would barely be enough to include the funds needed to reform the salt
gabelle into a respectable security for the financial assistance that
had been and was to be given to China.^
Jordan appeared uncertain. While agreeing to the suggestions
of the bank representatives as the best solution to Chinafs insolvency
with fruitful results in the long term, he felt too that Addis* fear 
not
was^unjustified. And over and above these arguments was the pressing
fact that Yuan was desparate for money. Jordan summed up the situation
46to Langley saying: "The difficulty is a very real one."
Immediately after the resumption of negotiations the groups
received repeated appeals for funds from China. T’ang Shao-i announced
that his government would require a larger sum of money than previously
specified. The requirements would amount to 35,000,000 taels during
the next five weeks and 10,000,000 taels per month between 15 June and
15 October. Jordan’s view was that these requirements should be
satisfied under conditions of control to be arranged by the group
representatives in consultation with the ministers. He asked Hillier
and Mayers, representative of the British and Chinese Corporation, to
draw up a scheme to control the Chinese expenditure of the provisional 
47advances. He regarded the control of expenditure as "the crux of the
45Hillier to Addis in Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to F.O., 25 Apr. 1912, 
Ch. Corres., vol. 1317.
46
Jordan to Langley, private, 4 May, 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.
47
Jordan to Grey, tel. 109, 1 May, 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1317.
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whole problem, as upon its successful solution the pacification of 
the country entirely depends." The scheme that was drawn up was 
subsequently revised by the other bank representatives. It 
stipulated that the Chinese minister of finance was to attach to his 
department an experienced foreign auditor selected by the consortium.
His post was to be retained under the direction of a foreign controller- 
general of foreign debts to be appointed later in connection with the 
reorganisation loan. His function was to sign all requisitions upon 
the monthly advances. Expenditure control was dealt with under two 
headings: the payment and disbandment of troops; and the payment of 
civil officials1 salaries and administrative expenses.
Regarding the first heading the auditor was to sign 
requisitions on being informed of the number of soldiers to be disbanded 
and the amount of funds needed by a commission to be formed by the 
ministry of war with the cooperation of the military attaches of the 
legations concerned. The commission would detach one or more Chinese 
and one or more foreign military officers as deputies to each of the 
important military centres, for example, Nanking, Wuchang and Canton, 
to witness the procedure of either payment or disbandment. The soldiers 
to be disbanded would receive an order of pay in return for which they 
would be disarmed under the observation of the deputies.
As for the salaries of civil officials and administrative 
expenses, general statements of:monthly requirements should be 
published in advance in the government gazette and detailed pay sheets 
furnished by the minister of finance f or the auditor’s approval. 
Realising the difficulty in directly tracing the application of these
223
funds, it was stipulated that sheets of payment were also to be 
distributed amongst consular officers who were to ascertain by 
private enquiry how far the funds were reaching their destinations.
It was further clearly stipulated that all expenditure 
for purposes not covered by the above clauses had to have its regulations 
arranged separately between the minister of finance and the consortium.
It was also specified that the scheme applied only to the provisional 
advances and not to the eventual big loan, hinting that regulations for 
the latter would assume an even stricter nature.
Jordan approved of the scheme which was then presented to the 
banks and the governments. In explaining his agreement to the scheme 
to the Foreign Office Jordan said that it_was a"choice of evils11 because 
even knowing that foreign control of expenditure "in the present temper 
of the country may raise a storm of opposition which will sweep away 
all semblance of government" it still had to be insisted on in that if 
China was allowed indiscriminate borrowing and spending she would "work 
her ruin in a measurable distance of time,"^ Jordan was not surprised 
that T'ang Shao-i should catagorically reject the scheme when it was 
presented to him on 3 May, Tfang declared that rather than subscribing 
to the scheme he would resort to forcing loans from the Chinese 
themselves. Jordan remarked that "there seems nothing to be done but to
48
Jordan to Grey, no. 198, 29 Apr. 1912, enclosing the scheme,
Ch. Corres., vol. 1318.
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49
wait till the Chinese come to their senses."
Nine days later the Chinese presented a set of counter 
proposals for supervising the expenditure of the provisional advances.
It suggested that in relation tn the disbandment and payment of 
troops, instead of the military attaches of the legations, the foreign 
commissioners of the Customs should be employed. They would be assured 
of all facilities to ensure the effectiveness of the scheme and, jointly 
with the Chinese military deputies from Peking, would sign all pay sheets. 
The minister of finance pointed out that the new arrangement would make 
the scheme less obnoxious to the Chinese in that the commissioners of 
the Customs were themselves employees of the Chinese government and it 
could be suggested to the public that their employment was necessary 
because the Customs revenues were to be used to disband and pay the 
troops while in fact the money would be released beforehand to the 
inspector-general of the Customs in Peking from the provisional advances.^ 
The consortium accepted the counter proposal and on 17 May paid 
over 3,000,000 taels to the Chinese government: 1,500,000 taels for 
the payment of troops in Peking; and 1,500,000 taels for the redemption 
of military notes at Shanghai. The total sum of the advances made thus 
far was 6,100,000 taels. Jordan was fairly satisfied and pronounced that
49Jordan to Langley, private, 4 May 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8; 
also Hillier to Addis in Hongkong andyBank to F.O., 3 May 1912,
Ch. Corres., vol. 1317. Shanghai
■^Hillier to Addis in Addis to F. 0., 13 May 1912, Ch. Corres.,
vol. 1318.
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even the counter proposals guaranteed "a stricter measure of
supervision than has ever been excercised over the expenditure
of foreign money in the past, but this is justified not only by
the anomaly of the political situation, but still more by the fact
that the expenditure in this instance is of an entirely unproductive 
»51nature.
After the advance of 17 May two more advances of 3,000,000
taels each were made on 12 and 18 June respectively. Between 17 May
and 18 June two incidents occurred which, though minor in significance,
were indicative of Jordan’s attitude towards the question of control
over the expenditure of the provisional advances. It has been said
that the banks had conceded the substitution of the commissioners of
the Customs for foreign military attahces in supervising the payment
and disbandment of troops. In early June the Chinese attempted to
associate the Chinese superintendents of the Customs, who had been
deprived of their function during the revolution when the foreign
commissioners became directly responsible to’the International Bankers’
Commission at Shanghai, with the scheme in order to further reduce its
objectionable foreign element. The bank representatives acceded to the
Chinese proposal. On receipt of the news Jordan objected strongly,
because
fearing that the accession would make supervision unreal^of the corrupt
nature of the Chinese superintendants. Jordan won the support of the
other ministers and together they made the bank representatives rescind
52their accession to the Chinese.
51,
Jordan to Grey, no. 231, 18 May 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1319.
52
Jordan to Grey, no. 257, 15 Jun. 1912, Ch. Corres., Vol. 1320.
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Soon afterwards Jordan was greatly displeased by an 
independent action of Hillier which he considered as having the effect 
of rendering supervision illusory. Without consulting Jordan, Hillier 
agreed to a document which was intended to be handed to the Chinese 
minister of finance as an exposition of the bank representatives’ 
interpretation of the duties of the Customs commissioner under the 
regulations governing the expenditure of the advances. The document 
stated that the commissioner did not need to supervise all cases of 
payment and disbandment of troops in his area in person. He was 
free to delegate one or more members of his Chinese staff to represent 
him in such operations. A further provision even limited personal in­
vestigation of the commissioner to cases in which he was refused facilities 
for verification or had grave grounds for suggesting that irregularities 
had taken place. Despite his extreme displeasure Jordan refrained from 
taking any action because the document had already been approved by the
other ministers and he would not like to bear alone the censure of the 
53Chinese. He reflected his displeasure about the matter when writing on
the advance that was to be paid over on 18 June: ” The Chinese have made
convey a
a peremptory demand for a further advance.. .and ^ covert hint that there will 
be trouble if there is any delay in producing the money. I am not 
altogether surprised at this after the way the Bankers relaxed the 
provisions for superintending the expenditure of the advances.
53
Jordan to Grey, jio. 257, 15 Jun. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320.
54
Jordan to MaxMuller, private, 17 Jun. 1912, Jordan Papers,
vol. 8.
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On the other hand internal opposition to foreign financial 
control in connection with the provisional advances was increasing. Since 
the resumption of negotiations at the end of April Jordan had been making 
scattered references to the opposition of the provinces which, however, 
did not become obviously noticeable until May and June. Jordan reported 
that the Chinese minister of finance had to address a public letter at 
the end of May to Huang Hsing, Li Yttan-hung, and the southern leaders, 
defending his acceptance of foreign supervision of expenditure. Tension 
was increased when the so-called National Subscription Movement (Kuo-min- 
chiian) , which ended in failure, came into vogue especially in the 
southern provinces with the aim of obviating the necessity of foreign 
borrowing. In connection with the movement there was a general recrude­
scence of anti-foreign feeling. Moreover, foreign finance in China was 
again being used as a weapon to attack the government by its enemies. 
Jordan described the mounting agitation as bearing "a sinister resemblance 
to the similar movement against the Hukuang Railway loan, which proved 
the precursor of the revolution". He also noticed that the agitation 
had the support of Tfang Shao-i who wanted to use it as a lever to obtain 
more favourable conditions from the consortium. ^
Details of the National Subscription Movement, the National Rescue 
Association, and translation of finance minister*s letter in Jordan 
to Grey, no. 241, 31 May 1912, Ch. Corres., Vol. 1319. Details of
anti-foreign feeling especially in Szechuan see Jordan to Grey, no.
248, 6 Jun. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1319; Jordan to Grey, no. 254, 
12 Jun. 1912, Ch. Corres., Vol. 1320, See also, Wu Yen-yun (ed.), 
Huang liu-shou stxu-tu [ Correspondence of Huang*s Nanking Period ] , 
in CHS tsfung-shu, pp. 10-5, 20—1, 25—7, and Li, "Huang K’o-ch'iang
hsien-sheng men-p'u'y, pp. 319-26.
kao
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By the end of June Jordan made a new observation about the
supervision of expenditure which had something to do with his later
change of attitude. He found that with the central government unable
to excercise authority over the provinces, the foreign advisers,
auditors, and accountants in Peking as provided by the regulations of
supervision could excercise no more than paper control. He observed
that in many cases in this period supervision was merely nominal. Jordan
began to doubt if superivison of expenditure was really as important
56as he had first thought it to be.
At the same time the consortium busied itself with the 
formulation of conditions governing the eventual comprehensive loan 
and the admission of Russia and Japan, In the inter-bank meeting in 
London of 14 and 15 May a tentative list of conditions was drawn up without 
which the consortium would decline to undertake the reorganisation loan. 
These conditions were not'finally decided on until the consortium heads 
met again in Paris between 18 and 20 June. To be brief Willard Straightfs 
summary of the most important terms is cited below:
111. That the government should have the right to satisfy
themselves as to purposes for which funds are required.
2. That China should herself create a system of audit in
which foreigners should be employed with powers not merely 
advisory but also executive so as to ensure the effective 
expenditure of loan funds borrowed for the purposes 
specified,
For example, the supervision of the disbandment of troops at 
Nanking was a complete failure, Jordan to Grey, no, 323, 5 Aug. 
1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1321,
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3. That the salt taxes to be hypothecated for the service
of this loan should be administered either by the existing 
Maritime Customs organisation or by a separate Chinese 
service like the Customs, however, under foreign direction, 
thus safeguarding the proper administration of the security 
despite the possible continuance or recurrence of unsettled 
conditions in China,
4. That the groups should take the first series of the loan 
of £60,000,000 at a fixed price, and be assured an option 
in the subsequent series at a price to be based on the 
market quotation of the first issue, thus giving China the 
benefit of any improvement in her credit.
5. That to protect the quotation of bonds issued and to assure 
a successful marketing of subsequent series, China should 
not borrow through other groups until the entire loan of 
£60,000,000 had been issued.
6. That for a period of five years China should appoint the 
groups1 financial agents to assist the administration in 
its work of reorganisation.7
When these conditions were presented by the bank representatives
on 24 June the Chinese rejected them, especially the ones concerning the
control of the salt gabelle, foreign auditors and foreign supervision of
expenditure. In short the Chinese government objected to the two basic
principles of supervision of expenditure and control of security. Grey
instructed Jordan to inform the Chinese government with his colleagues
that "the six powers cannot approve of any loan being made by their
nationals except 'upon the general lines of the conditions laid down in
the groups’ telegram of 15ftMay, to which the provisional assent of His
Majesty’s Government has been given."' However, Grey would not insist on
58the last provision of a foreign financial agency in China.
Straight, "China’s Loan Neogitations", pp. 143-4; for a brief but 
lucid analysis of the psychology of the consortium bankers while 
they were drawing up the terms see Field, Consortiums, p; 83. It 
has to be noted that these conditions are often referred to in the 
British Foreign Office materials as"the groups’ telegram of ISftMay."
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On 29 June the Chinese minister of finance reduced the
amount of the loan from £60,000,000 to £10,000,000 with the hope of
having the conditions relaxed. The attitude of the British Foreign
Office was to insist on "an assurance of adequate security properly
administered and a wise and effective control of the proceeds of any
59loan, be it for 10 or for 60 millions." The French government
suggested that the best way to soften the Chinese government was to
suspend all payments. On 6 July Grey instructed Jordan to associate
60himself with his French colleague. On 9 July Jordan and the other 
five ministers made a joint declaration to China that the powers would 
not allow the consortium to make further advances without the conditions 
which were presented to China at the end of June. The minister of 
finance of China stated in reply that he could not accept the conditions 
which were so stringent that internal trouble would be the only result.
The important matter was that in following the Foreign Office*s 
instruction to make the joint declaration of 9 July, Jordan showed little 
enthusiasm.^
Period IV (9 July to 22 September): "a period of a misunderstanding.11
The two months after 9 July were almost wholly preoccupied 
with discussions of the terms of supervision between the bank& and 
the Chinese government; between the banks and their respective governments; 
and among the banks and governments themselves. During the period Addis,
59MaxMuller*s minute on Addis to F.O., 29 Jun. 1912, Ch. Corres., 
vol. 1320.
60
Grey to Jordan, tel. 108, 6 Jul. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320,
61
Jordan to Grey, tels. 151, 152, 9 Jul. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320.
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speaking for the British bank, again suggested that the consortium
should be satisfied with less stringent supervision and control to
ensure the successful conclusion of a reorganisation loan. He thought
that instead of insisting on a firm option for future loans a preference
on equal terms would be sufficient. Also, rather than the hypothecation
of the entire salt gabelle a scheme could be evolved whereby the area
of the gabelle under reorganisation would increase proportionately with
62the amount of the loan issued. However, some groups insisted that
terms should not be relaxed while others took the view that even if terms
were to be eventually relaxed the Chinese government had to take the
first step to renew negotiations. But all agreed that China should
6 ^
contract a loan of at least £20,000,000 and not £10,000,000. While 
the British group adopted a lenient attitude, the British government not 
only insisted on the conditions of 15 May but, together with the German 
government, turned down the suggestion of the United States that China 
should be allowed to borrow elsewhere during the deadlock.
The British Foreign OfficeTs policy continued to be the same 
until the end of August when the Crisp Loan challenged it about the 
legality of giving exclusive support to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank 
in loan negotiations with China. The question, though being successfully 
62
Addis1 tel. to groups, 17 Jul. in Addis to F.O. 17 Jul. 1912, Ch.Corres., 
vol. 1320.
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The consortium considered that £10 million could hardly cover the sum 
which China owed it. For list of China's debts see Urbig (head of 
German group) to Addis in Addis to F.O., 17 Jul. 1912, Ch. Corres., 
vol. 1320.
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Langley to Jordan, private, 4 Aug. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 1;
U.S. ambassador to E.O., 19 Jul. 1912; and MaxMuller's minute on 
ibid., Ch. Corres., vol. 1321.
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repressed by the Foreign Office thus far, had been present from the
beginning. It has to be recalled that at the beginning of March the
Foreign Office sanctioned the request of the Hongkong and Shanghai
Bank for exclusive government support until the conclusion of a reorgan-
65isation loan with China. In giving the sanction the Foreign Office
had in mind its own convenience and the fact that the bank had made the
66first advances without proper security. This action of the Foreign
Office roused the antagonism of the other big banking houses in London,
notably the Eastern Bank which participated in advancing the Anglo-
67Belgian Loan half a year before. After 9 July the Chinese government
made numerous appeals for funds to sources other than the consortium
68including such British concerns as the Chartered Bank and the Chinese
69Engineering and Mining Company. In each of these cases the Foreign 
Office succeeded in staving off the participation of outside British 
groups.
On 23 August Mr. Birch Crisp called at the Foreign Office 
and was received by J. D. Gregory who was in charge of Chinese loans. 
Crisp informed Gregory of the loan which his syndicate had been 
negotiating with China since 30 May. Gregory explained that it was
65Addis to Langley, 6 Mar. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1315.
66Langley to Addis, 14 Mar. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1315.
67MaxMullerfs minute on his interview with the chairman of the 
Eastern Bank on 7 Mar., 9 Mar. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1314.
68
Jordan to Grey, tel. 153, 10 Jul., tel. 156, conf., 16 Jul. 1912,
Ch. Corres., vol. 1320.
69
Chinese Engineering and Mining Company to F.O., 29 Aug; Grey to
Jordan, tel. 135, 30 Aug. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1321.
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the government's policya to "support a loan concluded without adequate
guarantees for the control of the expenditure of the proceeds and
without proper security.However, Crisp was serious about the loan
and the Foreign Office was aware that it was encouraged by Morrison
who was then in London.^  *
The knowledge that Crisp was about to conclude a loan with
China and that he had the support of the Lloyd’s Bank, the London County
and West Bank, and the Capital and Counties Bank caused the Foreign
Office to resurvey its loan policy. The Foreign Office felt that
increased pressure was coming from the British banks on the one hand
while there was a prolonged delay in arriving at a conclusion by the
consortium as to the minimum control to be demanded from China, The
Foreign Office considered abandoning the consortium policy as a final
72solution to the dilemma. On 30 August Grey telegraphed Jordan for 
his views on a possible withdrawal of the government’s exclusive support 
which had hitherto been given the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, although 
it was stated that the final abandonment of the consortium would be 
conditional on a further definite refusal of the Chinese to accept the 
scheme that was drawn up by the groups. In the event of the consortium 
being abandoned the British government "would be free to consider, purely 
on its merits, any application from respectable British groups for 
support in carrying through any financial operations in China", and it
^Gregory's minute on the interview, 27 Aug. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1321.
^Not only was Morrison implicated, MacLeavy Brown, councillor of 
the Chinese legation in London^acted as witness of the contract, 
see, for example, Gregory's minute on principles to guide-loan, 27 Aug. 
1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1321.
'Gregory's minute on the question of the right of loan negotiation by 
other groups, 27 Aug.1912, Ch.Corres., vol. 1321.
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would, if necessary, oppose "any loan agreement not fulfilling
substantially the same conditions as they have insisted upon in the
case of the abortive reorganisation loan as regards proper security
and control of expenditure and also repayment of the advances to the
73six Power consortium."
Jordan advised against the discontinuance of the consortium
which he had by then accepted as an expedient. He did so despite the
fact that in the meantime he was finding the consortium policy increasingly
disadvantageous to British interests because Britain had never,like Japan,
Russia, Germany, or France, converted her railway concessions* in China
into national concerns. In the middle of July Jordan opposed strenuously
the Chinese government’s offer of the Northern Railway, a Chinese
government property built with British capital, as an alternative
74security to the salt gabelle. In reply to Grey’s telegram Jordan 
pointed out that the Chinese government had not yet made a definite 
rejection of the consortium. As a matter of fact a fresh overture for 
£20,000,000 had just been made to the consortium providing that the 
terms would not be such as to impair the administrative authority of the 
Chinese government or to excite popular opposition. He reiterated that 
if the consortium was abandoned the result would be ruthless competition 
resulting in the loss of all semblance of control which in turn would 
cause worse financial confusion in China. He was convinced that given 
equal terms the Chinese would prefer the consortium, because of its 
greater resources, to other groups whose chance of a success lay in "their
73Grey to Jordan, tel. 134, 30 Aug. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1321.
74
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agreeing to relax t e r m s . I t  appears that Jordan was unaware that in
saying so he was actually pointing out indirectly the necessity of
relaxing the terms drawn up by the consortium. Gregory regarded Jordan
76as "rather begging the question".
On 4 September the Foreign Office was officially informed by 
the Chinese minister in London that the Chinese government had 
definitely signed the Crisp Loan Agreement for £1(^ 000,000. On 
10 September the Foreign Office warned Crisp that pressure would be 
put on the Chinese government to abandon the loan. Apparently China 
was still willing to cancel the Crisp Loan if the consortium relaxed 
its conditions. However, the groups generally were not prepared to
A 77do so.
Despite the Crisp Loan Grey decided to abide with the
consortium for the time being. There were two other reasons for the
decision besides Jordan1s advice. First, the Chinese government was
still having talks with the bankers in Peking and negotiations could
not be considered as broken down definitely. Secondly, the Hongkong
and Shanghai Bank put pressure on the Foreign Office not to recede from
its pledge of support to the bank pending the issue of a reorganisation 
78loan. Thus the Foreign Office saw in the speedy conclusion of the
^Jordan to Grey, tel. 175, 3 Sept. 1912, Ch. Corres. , vol. 1322.
76Gregory’s minute in ibid.
^Correspondence between groups in Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to 
F.O., 13 Sept. 1912, vol. 1322.
78
Gregory’s minute on Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to F.O., 11
Sept. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.
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loan the only means to free itself from the pressure exerted on it 
simultaneously by the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and the other 
independent houses. A quick conclusion of the loan could only be 
achieved by the relaxation of the consortium terms. Gregory came 
to think that pressure should be put on the British group to coerce 
its partners into relaxing the terms "all under the threat of with­
drawal of our support, if the next negotiations are a failure." Grey 
approved and telegraphed Jordan of this change of policy on 16 September. 
He was willing to relax the conditions governing foreign administration 
of the salt gabelle though not that of the expenditure of loan funds.
He also stated that the British group had agreed to the modification 
suggested, and he believed that the position of the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Bank "who have always hitherto taken the lead in the 
negotiations, should... be sufficiently strong fco enable them to carry 
the: consortium with them if they are supported by His Majesty* s 
Government." But it was also decided that the consortium would not make 
any move until the Chinese government would be induced to present a
statement as to the extent it would agree to foreign control of the 
79salt gabelle.
Simultaneously in China Jordan came to the same conclusion 
that relaxation of the consortium terms was a necessity. On 13 September 
Yiian Shih-k*ai privately informed Jordan that he was prepared to cancel 
the Crisp Loan if the consortium would agree to more reasonable terms. 
Jordan assured the Foreign Office that the Crisp Loan was "a lever for
79
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moderating the demands of the groups." Being thus encouraged Jordan 
called on Yuan the next day and urged him to cancel the Crisp Loan.
Without being given any guarantee of a relaxation of terms Yuan declined.
He told Jordan that he must have money immail lately, but acceptance of 
the conditions imposed by the consortium would mean "his own political 
extinction". He assured Jordan that despite the hostile protest against 
foreign control over the salt gabelle by the national council and the 
provinces he was willing to employ foreigners extensively in the 
gabelle. At the end of the interview Yuan stated categorically that with 
money he could guarantee order and stability, without it he would resign. 
Jordan regarded the interview as Yuan’s personal appeal to himself to 
obtain an abatement of the groups1 demands. At the end of the telegram 
in which he reported on the meeting he stated explicitly for the first
81time that abatement of the consortium terms was the"only feasible solution. 
His telegram crossed that of the Foreign Office which was to inform him of
the same conclusion. On receipt of Jordan’s telegram Greywas ready to
inform the other five powers of Britain’s decision.
Jordan went a step further than the Foreign Office in the
relaxation of terms. While the Foreign Office only agreed to lessen 
the control over the salt gabelle and not expenditure of loan funds 
Jordan agreed to both. Writing privately to Langley on 21 September he 
expressed fully his opinion on the loan negotiations which had so far
80
Jordan to Grey, tel. 185, 13 Sept* 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.
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developed. He regarded it a mistake of Britain to have made the joint
declaration of 9 July which bound China to terms which she could not
accept in their entity. He reiterated the necessity of retaining the
consortium to prevent harmful competition and thought it unnecessary to
attach more significance to controlling the expenditure of a loan which
was more designed for China to repay her debts than to reorganise the
country. Moreover, the past two months proved that supervision over
82the disbandment of troops had been a complete failure.
The willingness of Britain to relax conditions was not to 
produce an immediate effect. On 21 September the Peking bank 
representatives were presented with a set of counter proposals by the 
Chinese minister of finance for the resumption of loan negotiations.
They were:
Ma. The reorganisation of the salt gabelle;
b. The employment of foreigners in the administration;
c. The deposit of revenue collections in an approved bank;
d. The counter-signature by a foreigner of requisitions in
loan funds;
e. A joint foreign and Chinese audit;
f. The employment of foreign experts in industrial enter­
prises;
g. A preference on equal terms for further advances."
Both Jordan and Grey found the counter proposals a suitable basis
84for the resumption of negotiations. However, without having consulted 
Jordan, Hillier jained the other five bank representatives in rejecting 
the counter proposals and declaring a categorical adhesion to the 
ministers1 joint representation of 9 July.
82Jordan to Langley, private, 21 Sept.1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.
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Enclosed in Addis to F.O., 30 Sept.1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.
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Jordan to Grey, tel. 192, 20 Sept.1912; Grey to Jordan, tel. 154,
21 Sept.1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.
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Period V (22 September to 5 November); "readjustment of ideas."
On 24 September, the day after the bank representatives
rejected China’s counter proposals, the Crisp Syndicate paid China
£5,000,000 of its loan. Yuan Shih-k’ai sent word to Jordan that he
was forced to accept the money because of the uncompromising attitude 
85of the groups. The following day Jordan "exhausted every effect
to induce President to cancel or suspend London Loan", but failed.
Yuan repeated his need for immediate financial assistance and his reasons
86against the consortium loan terms. Moreover, Jordan considered that
the protest of the consortium against the Crisp Loan rested on no solid
87
basis since it was the consortium who suspended payment after July.
There is no doubt that the firm attitude of Yuan made an impression on
' Jordan. Two days later the Crisp Loan became an accomplished fact when, 
in spite of the efforts of the British government to block it, half of 
it was floated in the London market.
Meanwhile talks were^amongst the groups as to whether the 
Chinese counter proposals of 21 September, should be accepted as the 
basis for resumption of negotiations. The correspondence between the 
groups on the question was fast becoming bulky, yet no conclusion 
could be achieved. The French and the American groups in particular 
were most insistent on adherence to the conditions of the groups’
85
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88telegram of 15 May. The other governments too were not yet prepared
to relax the conditions.
Jordan became extremely impatient at the speed with which
events were moving. On 1 October he again reminded the Foreign Office
firmly that no settlement could be possible without relaxation of terms.
He further suggested that instead of the consortium principals in
Europe drawing hard and fast terms without sufficient regard for the
conditions in China, the bank representatives in Peking should be given
89more freedom to negotiate with China. An increase in the freedom of 
action of the bank representatives would naturally mean a simultaneous 
increase ,in the freedom of action of the ministers in Peking. Jordan 
pointed out privately to Langley that the situation then was one of 
delicacy and difficulty for Yuan Shih-kfai. Yuan was trying to win 
votes for his presidential election and was naturally unwilling to
90antagonise the southern provinces who were against foreign control.
It has to be borne in mind that until then Yuan had still succeeded 
in maintaining, rapprochement,superficial though it might have been, 
with the revolutionary, later Kuo-min Tang, leaders which culminated 
in the visits of Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing to Peking in August and 
September.
88Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to F.O., 2 Oct. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol.1322.
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The signature of an agreement between a Belgian firm and
the Chinese government for a loan of 250,000,000 franees to build a
91railway from Lanchou to Haichou on 24 September intensified the
impatience of Jordan at the stubbornass of the consortium and the other
governments in refusing to relax terms, thus preventing the loan from
being pushed through. Jordan, with his usual jealousy for British
railway interests in China, Was upset that Belgium, because she was
outside the consortium, should be free to conclude the railway loan.
The British and Chinese Corporation also found the Belgian railway loan
most unpleasant. After consulting each other^ Jordan and Mayer sent ;
separate telegrams to the Foreign Office and the corporation respectively
stating that it was intolerable that the consortium arrangement should
continue to fetter the participating powers in purely industrial
enterprises and leave the field open for non-consortium interests. They
suggested that in future there should be a distinction between financial
and industrial loans. The former should continue to be undertaken
internationally through the consortium while the powers should be free to
92compete m  the latter. The Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, however, held 
the view that the continental powers of the consortium regarded industrial 
loans as much a political instrument as financial ones and would resist 
any attempt to discriminate between them. The Foreign Office agreed with 
the bank that the time had not yet come for such a separation to take 
place.^
91For text of agreement see MacMurray, Treaties,vol. 2, pp. 976-99.
9 ?Jordan to Grey, tel. 206, 5 Oct.; and Hillier's telegram on Mayer s 
telegram in Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to F.O.,8 Oct.1912,Ch.Corres., 
vol. 1322.
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Meanwhile, the other five groups and governments were as 
undecided as before. The bankers met in Paris on 5 October but failed 
to come to a unanimous agreement. The Foreign Office in London felt 
increasingly suffocated by the pressure coming from Jordan and the public 
whose questions directed at Grey in parliament showed a mounting opposition 
to the governments monopolistic support of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank. 
The Foreign Office had to make the British group press the other groups to 
come to a decision.
After the middle of October the groups eventually decided, as 
Jordan earlier suggested, that the bank representatives in Peking would 
be given the power to decide, with the six ministers, on what were the 
absolutely indispensible and practicable aonditions to be obtained from 
China in giving the reorganisation loan. It has to be recognised, however, 
that the consortium came to the decision not only under the pressure 
exerted by the British group and government but also with the awareness 
that China was making overtures for funds in different directions. The
success of the Crisp Syndicate to float half of its loan demonstrated the
. . . .  . . . 9 4possibility of independent transaction despite the consortium bloc. In
accordance with the inter-bank decision in Europe a conference of the 
bank representatives in China was held in Shanghai. It was decided on 
24 October that in future the representatives would be given "full power"
93Addis to Hongkong office of bank, 11 Oct. 1912, approved by the F.O.,
Ch. Corres., Vol. 1322.
94There were constant rumours of Chinese overtures to different concerns: 
Jordan to Grey, tel. 215, 19 Oct. 1912, on alleged negotiation between 
the Chinese minister in London and British Syndicates; and F.O. minute,
23 Oct. 1912, on yet two more Chinese overtures to foreign concerns,
Ch. Corres., vol. 1323.
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in consultation with their ministers in negotiating with China.
Thus for the time being initiative of the consortium was
moved from Europe to Peking. Jordan was of course in favour of relaxation.)
The American minister, Calhoun, had been uneasy about the stringent terms
96of the consortium and would cooperate with Jordan. Jordan claimed
himself to have been successful in persuading the Japanese minister to
agree to the necessity of leniency. He persuaded the other three ministers
97on the point and all, except the Russian, were "reasonable." Thus, it 
is not surprising that on 5 November negotiations reopened officially 
between the consortium and the Chinese government on the basis of the 
Chinese counter proposals of 21 September. But it is also true that the
knowledge of the possible inability of the Crisp Syndicate to pay over the
second half of the Crisp Loan made the Chinese even more willing to reopen 
talks with the consortium
Period VI (5 November 1912 to 26 April 1913): "continuous labour in 
negotiating and drafting the agreement for the reorganisation loan."
The months between 5 November, the resumption of negotiations, 
and 26 April* 1913, the conclusion of the Reorganisation Loan Agreement, 
were taken up with revision of terms between the Chinese government and 
the consortium. From the end of January 1913 onwards the period was 
also characterised by the scramble amongst the governments for the
95 . .Hillier to Addis m  Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to F.O., 25 Oct. Ch.
Corres., vol. 1323. In the meeting too a first step was taken towards 
the separation of financial and industrial loans which, however, is no 
longer relevant to this study.
96Field, Consortiums, p.84.
Jordan to Langley, private, 4 Nov. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.
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adviserships provided by the loan agreement.
British attitudes towards the loan negotiation during the 
fourth and fifth periods had been quite unlike those of other powers 
of the consortium. Perhaps the difference was not as marked in this 
last period when loan negotiations in China were tinted by the 
considerations of alliances in Europe which affected Britain as much as 
France, Russia,and Germany. Because of the increased political 
element in the negotiations, Jordan’s part in the matter became much 
overshadowed.
During the last period Jordan wanted a speedy conclusion of
the big loan as before. He still maintained that the consortium had to:
be retained to preclude damaging competition which would result in a complete
loss of control over the security and expenditure of loan funds; Yuan Shih-
k’ai had to be given immediate financial assistance; and British interests
had to be liberated from the consortium arrangement to enjoy freedom of
competition in the industrial field. Jordan’s desire to restore to
British firms the freedom of industrial competition in China had not only
98strengthened m  himself but had infected the Foreign Office. Grey, in 
particular shared his zeal and pressed the British group to induce the
98This can well be seen in Jordan to Langley, 8 Dec. 1912  ^ "I wish 
heartily that we were safely rid of all these groups and again free 
to go in for industrial undertakings. Nothing good has come out of 
these unnatural combines. During the first three of four years of 
my tenure of this post we did some really good work of which we have 
-reason to be proud.” Jordan Papers, vol. 8.
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consortium to make arrangements for the eventual, separation of financial
and industrial loans pending the complete issue of the big loan and its
* * 99 associate ones.
To Jordan’s utter annoyance, negotiations dragged on during 
the last stage. For the first two months after negotiations reopened 
the chief obstacle to rapid progress was the Crisp Loan. Jordan held the 
difficult view that while it was impossible for the consortium to 
negotiate with the Chinese as though the Crisp Loan did not exist,
Britain should not be a party to help or coerce China to break the Crisp 
c o n t r a c t . I n  fact, Jordan was resigned to half close his eyes to the 
existence of the Crisp Loan and allow negotiations to proceed as much as 
possible. Fortunately the problem never materialised because Crisp found 
it increasingly difficult to pay the remaining half of his loan to China. 
On 23 December Crisp agreed to have his loan cancelled on condition that 
China should pay him a considerable compensation (about £150,000).
The powers, themselves raised several obstacles. The French, 
supported by the Russians, insisted on the inclusion in the expenditure 
of the loan of the payment of claims due to the governments arising from 
the revolution. Jordan preferred to make the payment of these claims a
99Grey to Jordan, private, 30 Oct. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 1. The 
question came to be greatly discussed in the inter-bank conferences 
of the period, see minutes of meetings in Ch. Corres., vol. 1324-5,
1590 and 1594.
^^For example, Jordan to Grey, tel. 238, 21 Nov. 1912, Ch. Corres.,
vol. 1324.
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condition precedent to the powers1 recognition of the republic.
In the general discussions of the employment of foreign
advisers under the loan terms at the end of 1912, the French and
Russian ministers insisted on the provision of satisfactory contracts
for the foreigners concerned. Jordan thought it sufficient if the
102groups approved the appointments. It was only near the end of 1912 
that a rough agreement was arrived at amongst the groups and governments 
on the different points raised including that of the issue price. The 
fact was clearly that Jordan took a more lenient stand towards almost 
every question connected with the last stage of the loan negotiation than 
his colleagues and the consortium and he carried the Foreign Office with 
him.
A general agreement between the consortium and Chinese 
government soon followed that between the governments and groups. The 
amount of the loan was to be £25,000,000 pledged on the salt gabelle.
The supervision of expenditure and security was secured by the 
establishment of a central salt administration, a national debts 
department, (for all foreign loans) a loan department, (for the 
reorganisation loan only) and an audit bureau. Despite the fact that 
foreign element was to be heavy in these departments the terms of 
supervision had already been relaxed. Taking the salt department as the 
most outstanding example, instead of insisting that it be exclusively run 
by foreigners at the top levels the consortium agreed that a Chinese
Jordan to Grey, tel. 254, 11 Dec. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1325.
102
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co-inspector-general would be appointed on a par with the foreign
103inspector-general. The banks also agreed that because of China*s
urgent demand for money provisional advances would be made before the
issue of treasury bills of the loan which would take at least two 
104months. That on 27 December Chao Pmg-chun, the premier, and Chou 
Jlsueh-hsi, the minister of finance, presented the outline of the loan 
agreement to the provisional senate confirmed the idea that the loan 
could have been concluded soon afterwards had it not been that a new 
question arose.
The new question was the scramble for adviserships amongst 
the powers. Early in January the Chinese government notified the six 
governments that in the near future the latter would be informed of 
the names, duties, and powers of the foreigners to be employed as 
advisers. There would probably be three of them; one each for the 
salt administration, the public debts, and audit departments. The 
French objected to the Chinese proposal. Jordan was sorely tried by 
the aggrefiive attitude of the French minister who asserted that his 
government desired that China would appoint six advisers, one of each 
nationality of the consortium. The Russian minister naturally took 
up the same line. Most of the other powers and their ministers disagreed 
with the French suggestion. Jordan maintained firmly that the French 
proposal would entail a foreign commission of control which the Chinese 
would never accept.
103
See article 5 of the Reorganisation Loan Agreement, MacMurray,
Treaties, vol. 2, pp. 1009-10.
104
Huang, Yuan-sheng l-chu, vol. 2, pp. 26-8.
3ordan to Grey, tel. 23, 26 Jan. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1590.
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Because of the want of accord among the consortium powers
no advances were made to the Chinese by the end of January as promised.
The Chinese declared that they would break off negotiations and seek
for funds elsewhere. In theory, Jordan thought that the Chinese were
justified in borrowing elsewhere because the consortium had failed to
make the promised advances. In practice, however, he and the German
minister held that their countries1 interests would be too severely
106jeopardised by an abortion of the loan at this stage. Grey agreed
and was prepared to instruct Addis to make the advances independently
with the Germans if France and Russia continued to obstruct, out of,
he suspected, political reasons in Europe and M o n g o l i a . B u t  Jordan
was also afraid that this independent Anglo -German action, if effected,
108would precipitate a rupture of the consortium.
For the next one and a half months negotiations revolved
round the question of the number of advisers and its allotment amongst
the powers. Details of this stage of negotiations are not of direct
109relevance to the study of Jordan. It suffices to say that Jordan 
endeavoured to ensure a speedy conclusion of the loan but with little 
success. Grey had become more susceptible to considerations of 
European politics in his dealings with China. Rather than asking Germany 
to join in making advances to China Grey came to insist that she could
106Field, Consortiums, p. 90.
^^Grey to Jordan, tel. 19, 24 Jan. and confidential clause in Grey 
to Jordan, tel. 25, 1 Feb. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1590.
108
Jordan to Grey, tel. 22, 24 Jan. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1590.
109
Details are available in Field, Consortiums, pp. 89-93.
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never be given the post of the inspector-general of the salt
administration. It was no surprise that on 2 February the American
minister reported: "Everything indicates a readjustment of relations
of England, France) and Russia on lines of triple e n t e n t e . O n
9 March the Chinese minister of finance sent a letter to the powers
censuring them, and not the groups, for delaying the progress of 
111negotiations»
At the same time Grey was much depressed by the stalemate
in the negotiations. Just before 17 February when all the governments,
except the American, agreed on the French proposal of four advisers
Jordan was told by Langley that Grey decided that "if the proposal made
by the Legations fails and the other powers then refused to revert to
the Chinese proposal he must give up the job as impossible." Langley
added: "I should be very sorry if he takes that line and hope that with
your advice he will not do so as it seems a thousand pities that the
negotiations so nearly brought to a successful conclusion should be
112wrecked on the distribution of these appointments. By the end of 
February the accord between the governments had again disappeared, this 
time largely because the Germans objected to Britain having both the 
Customs and the salt administration. To remove the deadlock Jordan 
suggested that there should be one British inspector-general of salt at 
Peking, one German deputy inspector-general at Shanghai, one French and 
one Russian advise is to the audits department, and one German director of
^^Field, Consortiums, p. 93.
^^Coons, The Foreign Public Debt of China, pp. 59-60.
112
Langley to Jordan, private, 13 Feb.1913, Jordan Papers, vol. 11.
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the national loan bureau. In this way Jordan hoped that the Germans
would be appeased and that the Chinese might accept the scheme in that
although the number of advisers was increased to five their presence
113would still be confined to three departments. The Chinese cabinet .
rejected the proposal about the middle of March because it feared
that its acceptance would lead to complications in parliament which
was on the eve of being convened.
The situation was given a new turn after the middle of March.
The American Department of State, under the new administration of
Woodrow Wilson, refused to renew its request to the American group to
further connect itself with the China consortium. The secession of
the American group had a demoralising effect on the rest of the
consortium groups. It was feared that America would make independent
115loans to China without insisting on control because the new American
government considered the consortium terms as "touching very nearly the
administrative independence of China" and "might conceivably go to the
length in some unhappy contingency of forcible interference in the
financial, and even in the political, affairs of that great Oriental 
116
State." It was also feared that China would be encouraged by the
113
Jordan to Grey, no.109,conf., draft , 10 Mar.1912, Ch.Emb.Arch,
(F.0.228) vol. 2354.
114 .
Ibid., and Jordan to Grey,tel.68,13 Mar.1913,Ch.Emb.Arch,vol.2354.
It appears that America did later propose to make loans of U.S. 
$25,000,000 and $125,000,000 respectively, Hongkong and Shanghai 
Bank to F.O., 6Apr. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1593* Details of the 
American secession are found in, for example, W. J. Bryan, The 
Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan, (American secretary of state,
5 Mar. 1913-8 Jun.1913), (Chicago, 1925), pp.361-3; Lamont,
Henry P. Davison, pp. 160-5.
116S.F.Bemis (ed.), The American Secretaries of State and Their 
Dimplomacy Series,vol. 10, chapter 2, p. 10.
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American action to free herself from the consortium,^^ j
A deluge of questions was directed at the British government ;
i
in parliament, because of the American secession, on its consortium 
policy. Grey, who had all along been criticised in the matter, was
discouraged by the new turn of events and considered abandoning the
consortium quite seriously. Jordan immediately assured him that the '■
\
withdrawal of the American group would not in itself weaken the
consortium but it was essential for the five remaining groups to be ]
118 ■]maintained. Jordan1s advice certainly had a salutary influence on
i
119Greyfs decision again to abide with the consortium. •
At the same time the change in the political situation in ■
China forced Yuan to accept financial assistance from the quintuple 
consortium almost on any terms. Two days after the American group 
seceded from the consortium Sung Chiao-jen, the founder and actual leader 
of the Kuo-min Tangfwas assassinated in Shanghai. Yuan was accused by 
the Kuo-min Tang for having instigated the crime, and relationship between 
the two was fast deteriorating. On 27 March the Chinese minister in 
London told Grey that a salt expert in India, Sir Richard Dane, was
120
offered the position of foreign inspector-general of the salt administration.
At the end of April the Chinese government voluntarily agreed to appoint
. . 121 five advisers.
**^For example, there was the rumour that China asked for a loan of 
£30,000,000 from Addstein and Reuter, Langley to Jordan, 2 Apr. 1913, 
Jordan Papers, vol. 11.
118
Jordan to Grey, tel. 74, 21 Mar. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1592.
119Langley to Jordan, private, 26 Mar. 1913, Jordan Papers, vol. 11.
120
Grey to Jordan, tel. 90, conf., 28 Mar., also Jordan to Grey, tel. 78,
29 Mar. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1592.
121
Jordan to Grey, v. conf., tel. 81, 4 Apr. 1912, Ch.Corres., vol. 1593.
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A new question arose during the last half month before the
eventual conclusion of the loan in late April in which Jordan played
a prominent part. On 10 April the representatives in Peking were
notified that if the consortium agreed to a reduction of interest from
5\% to 5% the Chinese government would be ready to sign the contract "at
122once and without reference to New Parliament." The consortium soon
agreed to the reduced interest rate but was doubtful about ignoring the
new parliament which had a Kuo-min Tang majority. Grey shared the doubt
123and telegraphed for Jordan’s opinion. Jordan stated firmly that
whether parliament was consulted or not was a domestic question of China
and the loan agreement properly communicated to the legations by the
Wai-chiao Pu would satisfy all requirements to make it a binding engagement
124on the Chinese government and its successors. Hillier telegraphed Addis
125 . at the same time putting forward the same view. The same day Addis info­
rmed Hillier of his agreement to sign the loan contract without the
126ratification of the Chinese parliament.
On 25 April Sun Yat-sen made a public denunciation of the loan
in Shanghai. Jordan asked Grey not to regard the declaration as "too 
127important." The Reorganisation Loan Agreement was eventually signed
on 26 April, after midnight, in the office of the Hongkong and Shanghai
• • • fear .Bank while until the last minute^was entertained that a Kuo-min Tang plot
122
Hillier to Addis in Addis to F.O., 10 Apr. 1913, Ch. Corres.,vol. 1593.
123
Grey to Jordan, tel. 108, 11 Apr. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1593.
124
Jordan to Grey, tel. 92, 14 Apr. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1593.
125
Hillier to Addis, 18 Apr. 1913, (F.0.228) Ch.Emb.Arch., vol. 2355. 
126Addis to Hillier, 18 Apr. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2355.
Jordan to Grey, tel. 103, 28 Apr. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1593.
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might upset the plan.
In signing the loan agreement Jordan urged that the Chinese
parliament, which was opened on 8 April, should be ignored. He was fully
aware of the confusion inside the parliament since it was first convened 
that
and thought^ it was in no suitable state to debate on the loan. On the
one hand Britain could not indefinitely be prevented from recovering her
128"freedom for economic enterprises", and on the other hand Yiian Shih-k'ai
could not be let down on the eve of his struggle with the Kuo-min Tang or
"his disappearance from public life would mean political and commercial 
129chaos." Jordan*s reasoning incidentally explained why Yiian would not
submit the loan agreement to be approved by the new parliament as at the
end of 1912 when he submitted the outline of the agreement to the
provisional parliament which in effect had a more substantial Kuo-min Tang 
130majority. In fact he was assured by some of the Kuo-min Tang members,
soon after the lean agreement was signed., that they would not block the
131agreement if he submitted it to parliament. The question was not whether 
the loan agreement would be approved or not but when it would] be approved, 
and Yiian needed money immediately in preparing for a show-down with the 
Kuo-min Tang.
128Jordan to Langley, private, 21 Apr. 1913, Alston Papers, (F.O. 800), 
vol. 246.
129Jordan to Grey, tel. 103, 28 Apr. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1593.
130
Numerically the Kuo-min Tang held a majority in both the provisional 
and the first parliaments. In the new parliament, however, some Kuo- 
min Tang members held more than one party card and were susceptible to 
bribes from Yiian Shih-kfai. The position of the party became more 
vulnerable when Liang Ch'i-ch'ao organised the Chin-pu Tang by combining 
the other three most important parties other than the Kuo-min Tang in the 
the provisional pariiament^ soon after parliament opened^under the 
auspices of Yuan, see for example, Ch*en, Yuan Shih k ai, p. 143; Wen,
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By way of summary, it is without question true that the
Reorganisation Loan negotiations were an international matter in which
the role of Jordan was often overshadowed. Bearing this point in mind,
it is remarkable that Jordan’s part in the negotiations is still clearly
traceable. Instead of the usual way of looking at the loan negotiations
from the American angle, the British side of the matter is emphasised here.
This emphasis is justified not only on the subjective basis that this
study is on Jordan but also on the objectii/e one that despite the
international character of the question Britain remained the corner-stone
of the politico-financial edifice which dealt with Chinese finance both
because of her residual influence in the Far East and the leading role of
her bank in the consortium. Regardless of motives, Britain1s lead is most
clearly reflected in the fact that she, and not America as is usually 
132suggested , was the first consortium power which suggested the relaxation 
of terms in giving the Reorganisation Loan to China.
Jordan1s role becomes distinct once the loan negotiations are
looked at from the purely British angle. Generally speaking, the role
of the British bank can be relegated to secondary importance on the grounds 
that it operated largely in accordance with the wishes of the Foreign 
Office. Thus the views of the Foreign Office and Jordan are the important 
matter.
Tsui-chin san-shih nien Chung-kuo chun-shih shih, vol. 2, p. 24;
Tsou Lu, Hui-ku lu [reminiscences] , (Shanghai,1943), pp. 54, 57; and
Li Tsung-huang, Chung-kuo Kuo-min Tang tang-shih, [History of the
Kuo-min Tang] ,(Shanghai 1935), pp. 149-50, 152-3•
13U
For example, Tsou, Shih-kao, vol. 2, pp. 978-9; Li, Cheng-ch1ih shih, 
vol. 2, pp. 390-1. “--------------
132
Most of the books which are listed in note 21 have the implication that 
the American secession from the consortium was the major cause of the 
relaxation of terms.
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Despite Jordan’s dislike of the consortium and initial scepticism
as to China’s ability to repay her debts there was general accord between
Jordan and the Foreign Office in relation to loan negotiations until the
deadlock of 9 July. This accord was expressed in the upholding of the
consortium as the channel of financing China and insistence on strict
supervision of both expenditure and security of loan funds. The fact that
both the Foreign Office and Jordan professed that in insisting on strict
supervision they thought of China’s good as well as their own, suggests
that the consortium governments were not just exploitative in their
133motives as is almost unanimously put forward in Chinese writing.
From 9 July onwards Jordan’s influence on the Foreign Office, 
expecially on Grey, in dealing with the negotiation increased. Grey’s 
first reaction towards the Crisp Loan was to consider withdrawing from the 
cpnsortium. This Jordan firmly discouraged. Soon after this the Foreign 
Office and Jordan reached simultaneously, though for different reasons, the 
conclusion that a relaxation of the consortium terms was the only way to the 
speedy conclusion of a reorganisation loan which in turn was the only way 
out of the difficult situation for both Britain and China. Once the 
conclusion was reached, Jordan was far more consistent than Grey in 
acting on it. Jordan firmly maintained the necessity of rr^ Q^feLng the 
consortium pending the conclusion of the big loan every time Grey suggested 
its abandonment under strong pressure at home. It is of course arguable 
that since Britain had been so much involved in the loan that unless the
133For example, Ch’ien I-shih, Chin-tai Chung-kuo ching-chi shih,
L Economic history of modern Chinaj, (Life Press, 1939), pp. 85-7;
Chang I-fan etc. (ed.), Ts’ai-cheng chin-jung ta-tzu-tien, \Dictionary 
of terms used in public finance and currency] (Shanghai, 1937), p.1236.
256
situation became absolutely impossible Grey would not rescind his
support to the consortium. Yet it cannot be denied that Jordan1s firm
adherence to the consortium principle and his effort in China to
facilitate a conclusion of the loan question was a constant moral
support to Grey in abiding with the consortium. Grey meant it when he
attributed the successful conclusion of the Reorganisation Loan entirely
134to Jordan’s untiring efforts.
That the consortium was preserved was important because it 
was important for Yuan to receive money from the powers represented d 
in the consortium. It goes without saying that the material aspect of 
the Reorganisation Loan was important in the spring and summer of 1913.
But it can still be argued that Yuan could have obtained money somew^e^e^™’ 
had the consortium failed him. Thus the more important point, as Jordan 
pointed out, was that "in making the loan we £ the powers] are 
virtually backing him [Yuan] against the rest of the field 
especially recalling the effect of the powers1 neutrality on the Manchus 
during the revolution less than two years before. The Reorganisation 
Loan was the token of recognition given by the powers to Yuan of his 
position in China.
During the course of the negotiation for the Reorganisation 
Loan Jordan was unique in being closely related with Yiian Shih-k’ai. It 
has been seen that Yuan had several times personally appealed to Jordan 
who in turn gave Yuan his personal advice on the loan question, although 
this did not refute the fact that Jordan viewed the question with other
134
Grey to Jordan, tel. 132, 10 May, Ch. Corres., vol, 1594.
135-
Jordan to Langley, private, 21 Apr. 1913, Alston Papers, vol. 246.
considerations as well as Yuan’s position in mind. Writing to Langley
about a month before the Crisp Loan Jordan said: "Yuan looks ...upon me
as a sort of renegade. At our last interview he pictured the six
ministers as trying hard to strangle him but said he knew I kept the
136knot from being tied too tightly." This point seems to be justified
by Jordan’s action later in relation to the so-called Austrian Contracts.
It was originally arranged that advances would be paid over to the Chinese
government in a few days after the signature of the Reorganisation Loan
Agreement. Two days after the signature great misgiving was caused
amongst the groups when they discovered the Austrian Contracts whereby
the Austrian firm, Arnold, Karberg and Company, gave the Chinese marine
a total loan of £3,200,000. The contracts were signed on 10 April, the
exact date after which the Reorganisation Loan Agreement (Article 17)
stipulated that no loan could be concluded by China without consulting 
137the consortium. Jordan immediately held up the loan for more than
a week. However, on being given the discretion to act by the Foreign
Office^  he changed his mind and authorised Hillier to pay Yuan the
advances. This was done just one day before the French minister was
informed by his government of a French hitch and was instructed to defer
all actions. Jordan congratulated himself for making "a miraculously
narrow escape" from "an awful mess". When Jordan was holding up the
loan Yiian sent a private message that his last hope was gone. Later when
Yiian heard from Jordan that he was to have money after all he said that
138"old friends were the best.
136Jordan to Langley, private, 4 Aug. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.
137p0r terms of the contracts see MacMurray,Treaties,vol.2,pp.1004-7.
^Jordan to Grey, tel. 111,8 May; tel. 112,9 May 1913,Ch.Corres. ,vol. 1594; 




Yiian Shih-k’ai’s ambitions had clearly been underwritten by 
the Reorganisation Loan. With access to these funds the path of 
autocracy was more readily open to him, and in this chapter we must 
trace the growth of Yiian’s power in the years between the so-called 
second Kuo-min Tang revolution of 1913 and the outbreak of World War I. 
Since, however, Jordan took little note of the post-1913 aspects of 
Yiian1 s power play - most likely because they appeared as natural 
consequences of his victory rather than inherent crises in their own 
right - stress must be placed on the dramatic events which led up to 
the revolution of 1913 and the consequences of them. Two matters 
particularly held Jordan’s attention: the resignation of T’ang Shao-i
from the premiership; and the assassination of Sung Chiao-jen.
The Resignation of T’ang Shao-i
T’ang’s resignation deserves attention because it is almost 
unanimously interpreted as YUan’s first blow at a responsible cabinet 
system which was designed by the provisional parliament at Nanking to 
curb his ambitions.'*' Immediately after Yuan Shih-k’ai’s investiture 
as the provisional president on 10 March, 1912 the next urgent step 
towards establishing an amalgamated republican government was the 
formation of a cabinet. On 13 March Yiian appointed T’ang Shao-i as 
the first premier of the first Chinese republic, a step which had 
previously been approved by the Nanking parliament. By the end of March
,^ For example, Li, Tsui-chin san-shih-nien, pp. 257-8; and Chang 
Hsiao-chien, Chung-kuo chin-tal cheng-ch’ih shih, [Political history 
of modern China], (Taipei, 1959), p. 103.
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T’ang completed the task of cabinet-making. On the surface, the
cabinet represented a conciliation between the north and south. T’ang
himself had a dual affiliation: as a henchman of Yiian and as a member
of the revolutionary party. Lu Cheng-hsiang and Hsiung Hsi-ling, both
men of neutral political standing, were recruited respectively as
ministers of foreign affairs and finance. The revolutionaries Ts’ai
Yuan-p’ei, Sung Chiao-jen, Ch’en Ch’i-mei, Wang Ch’ung-wei, and
Liu Kuan-hsiung were appointed, respectively, ministers of education,
agriculture and forestry, industry and commerce, justice, and the navy.
But the important army and interior ministries were given to Tuan
Ch’i-jui and Chao Ping-chiin who were Yiian* s devoted subordinates. Thus,
Wilkinson told Jordan that it was unanimously agreed in the Nanking
2government that "the new cabinet was a triumph for President Ydan” .
Perhaps no one amongst the foreigners knew better than Jordan the 
relationship between Yiian and T’ang - essentially between master and 
subordinate. Yiian was the Chinese commissioner for military affairs 
in Korea when he first met T’ang who was then a customs official.
During the next ten years T’ang deputised for Yiian whenever Yiian was 
absent from Korea. When Yiian was training soldiers at Hsiaochen, T’ang 
was his secretary. As the governor of Shantung Yiian entrusted T’ang 
with the handling of diplomatic and commercial affairs. On becoming 
the viceroy of Chihli, YUan commissioned T’ang to the customs office
at Tientsin to help collect provincial revenues with which to pay off
Chihli’s share of the Boxer indemnity. After the Russo-Japanese War
the viceroy of Chihli was for the first time made responsible for the
^Wilkinson to Jordan, no#21, 1 Apr. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol*1836.
For more detailed analysis of the cabinet members and their political 
affiliation see Ch’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai, p. 141; Ku Chung-hsiu, Chung 
hua min-kuo k’ai-kuo shih,[History of the establishment of the Chinese 
Republic] in CHS tsyung-shu, p. 101.
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defence of Manchuria. It was through Yiian* s influence that Tfang 
was appointed the governor of Fengtien in the spring of 1907. Two 
months after his recall to office in the revolution of 1911 Yiian sent 
T’ang as his personal representative to negotiate with the revolution­
aries at Shanghai.^
Thus, while acknowledging Tfangfs capability, Jordan considered
that he could not achieve much without Yuan Shih-kfai!s influence 
4behind him. This is most clearly reflected in his change of attitude 
towards T’ang*s mission to Britain in early 1909 after his visit to 
the United States, ostensibly to thank her for relinquishing part of 
her share of the Boxer indemnity^. Being the senior vice-president of 
the Wai-wu Pu Yiian Shih-kfai had unofficially given the mission the 
additional task of seeking expert aid from Britain for a number of 
schemes concerned chiefly with the Chinese navy. Jordan had regarded 
T’ang*s visit to England seriously and had asked Campbell to "secure 
a good reception" for him , After Yiian* s dismissal from office, 
however, Jordan had told Campbell that T’ang*s mission no longer had 
"any practical importance*1 because the materialisation of its unauthorised 
commission "depended entirely on Yiian*s presence** in Peking^. When
3
According to the description of T*ang given in Jordan to Grey, annual 
report for 1919, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 229.
4 . . . .T*ang after all had had seven years of education in America. For Jordan*s
appreciation of T’ang’s relative ability as compared with most Chinese 
see, for example, Jordan to Langley, private, 7 Feb. 1907, Jordan Papers, 
vol» 4.
^Some historians regarded the mission to America as a manifestation of 
Yiian’s pro-American policy and his attempt to oust Japan from Manchuria 
with American help, see, for example, J.A. Miller "The United States 
and Chinese Territorial Integrity, 1908", in D.L. Lee etc. (ed.), Essays 
in History and International Relations in Honour of George Hubbard 
Blakeslee, (Mass., 1949), pp# 243-56.
6
Jordan to Campbell, private, 24 Dec., also 17 Sept. 1908, Jordan Papers 
vol. 5.
^Jordan to Campbell, private, 21 Jan. 1909, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.
at the beginning of 1911 T’ang resigned from the post of acting 
minister of the Board of Communications, Jordan had regarded his 
decision as a wise one, for without "Yuan Shih-k’ai, [who was still
i 8in enforced retirementj he would have no power" .
Yiian must have felt particularly confident in nominating T’ang
as the premier. It was natural for him to assume that the new
president/premier relationship would resemble the old master/protege
one. Yiian was, however, quickly disillusioned. T’ang insisted from
the beginning on adhering to the provisional constitution which was
promulgated by the Nanking senate and announced by Yiian Shih-k’ai on
11 March. Writing to Jordan the consul at Nanking, Wilkinson, commented
"The powers of the President, the Ministry and the Constitution are
all very loosely defined in the constitution, and will probably be a
9
source of frequent dispute in the future" . However vague the 
provisional constitution might have been it was impossible to bypass 
its chief stipulation - the institution of a responsible cabinet.
From the beginning T’ang was determined that the cabinet, and not 
Yiian, would exercise executive powers in government administration.
He would not allow the president’s office to issue any statement 
without his approval and co-signature. He even edited Yiian* s first 
inaugural speech before it could be published. Yiian retaliated by 
exhausting every means to inconvenience the cabinet. Chao Ping-Chiin
8Jordan to Campbell, private, 19 Jan. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
9Wilkinson to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, no. 163, 3 Apr. 1912, Ch. Conf. 
Print, vo1*208, enclosed in it is a copy of the English text of the 
constitution. For the original text see Ku Tun-jou, Chung-kuo i-hui 
shih, [History of the Chinese parliament], (Taichung, 1962), pp. 63-8. 
For an analysis of the shortcomings of the constitution see Huang 
Kung-chiieh etc., Chung-kuo chih-hsien shih, [History of the constitu­
tion in China], (Commercial Press, 1937), vol. 1, pp. 41-4.
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never once participated in cabinet meetings, and Tfang was hated in the 
president’s office. Difference of opinion also arose over Huang Hsing’s 
appointment and the treatment of Chang Rsiin whose troops were feared 
by Nanking
It has commonly been held that the eventual break-up of the
friendship in June was precipitated by two questions: the Anglo-Belgian
Loan of March 1913 and the appointment of a governor-general of Chihli.
It has already been seen that the Belgian loan was denounced by the
consortium and the powers as a breach of China’s faith. Part of the
inner history of the loan is still shrouded in mystery. So far there
have been two views on the relative part played by YHan and T’ang in
the matter. One view maintains that having given preference to the
consortium on 9 March Yiian had every intention adhermg to his
promisej the Belgian loan entirely an independent action of T'ang.
It is a fact that Hsiung Hsi-ling, the minister of finance who was close
to Yiian, strongly opposed this transaction of T’ang’s with an outside 
11group . Thus Yiian was extremely displeased with T’ang when the 
consortium suspended all advances on knowing about the new loan. This 
was certainly the view which Yiian wanted the consortium and the powers 
to hold. It is, howeverjcontrived, for if Hsiung Hsi-ling had complained 
about the Belgian loan in advance, it was unlikely that Yiian would have 
been completely ignorant of the matter; and if he had really objected 
strongly to the loan he could have warned T’ang off.
^For such details see Li, Cheng-ch’ih shih, vol. 2, pp. 374-5; Ao, 
Shih-hua, vol. 1, pp. 132-3; and a contemporary newspaper account 
in Cue Sing Mail, 29 Jul. 1912.
H-For example, Chuang Chiin-chang, Chung-hua min-kuo chien-kuo shih, 
[History of the establishment of the Chinese Republicj (Taipei, 1957)
p. 108.
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The more convincing view holds that while agreeing to the pre­
ference demanded by the consortium Yiian was fully aware of the stringency 
of the consortium terms which, if accepted, would be detrimental to his 
political position. He was not therefore unwilling that T’ang should 
be successful in pushing through the independent loan which, besides 
easing his financial embarrassment could be used as a lever to extract 
better terms from the consortium. Opposition from the groups turned 
out to be unexpectedly strong and Yiian resorted to denying completely
his part in the matter. T’ang, the scape-goat, was thus made to
12apologise to the legations
Jordan chose to assume that Yiian was innocent. Writing on the
impasse created by the Belgian loan he said: "Tong Shao-yi has been at
his old tricks again and has got the President and his party into a 
13mess" . It is an open question whether Jordan really did believe 
in Yiian*s innocence or, knowing his financial difficulty and precarious 
political position, helped him in softening the ire of the consortium 
by putting the blame entirely on T’ang.
Most historians agree that the dispute over the governor-general- 
ship of Chihli was the immediate cause of T’ang*s resignation* In the 
middle of March the provisional government of Nanking stipulated that 
governors-general and governors of provinces would henceforth be given 
the title of tu-tu and were to be elected by the provincial parliaments. 
Wang Chih-hsiang, a military officer who sided with the revolutionary 
party, was elected tu-tu by the Chihli parliament. The intention of the
^ C h ’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai, p. 148.
13Jordan to Langley, private, 25 Mar. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.
Jordan was obviously alluding to T’ang*s support for a republic at the 
Shanghai peace conference of 1911-2 as one of his "tricks".
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revolutionary members of the Chihli parliament was to keep Yiian under 
the close observation of Wang. Tfang at the time was still organising 
the cabinet in Nanking where the revolutionaries insisted on the 
government endorsing the Chihli election. On returning to Peking Tfang 
obtained a personal guarantee from Yiian for Wang’s appointment. Wang 
was told to go to Peking to be officially appointed. On Wang’s 
arrival the government received a circular telegram from the leaders 
of five Chihli divisions objecting to his appointment. Because of this 
Yiian decided to send Wang to Nanking to assist in the disbandment of 
troops instead. T’ang, eager to adhere to his promise to Nanking and 
W<wfttjain the faith of the government, refused to co-sign Wang’s new 
commission. It was, however, released on 15 June without T’ang’s signa­
ture. The next day T’ang left for Tientsin, leaving behind a letter of
. 14resignation
Jordan attributed the cause of T’ang’s resignation mainly to the
Belgian loan^. In fact he hardly mentioned the dispute over Wang.
This reflects that much of Jordan’s attention at this time was taken
jup by loans and finance rather than China’s internal politics. During
the deadlock created by the Belgian loan Jordan already predicted that
16T’ang Shao-i *frill probably not last" , anticipating his dismissal rather 
than resignation. Thus later he described Twang’s resignation as his 
"bolt to Tientsin"^. Despite his awareness of the sensation caused 
amongst the "Southern men" by T’ang’s action there is no evidence of
18Jordan reading it as the first step by Yuan towards destroying the republic.
^For details see T’ao, Shih-hua, vol. 1, pp. 134-5; and Ts’en, Liang, 
nien-p’u, vol. 1, p.121, Both assert with certainty that the telegram 
from the Chihli military leaders was Yiian* s idea.
■^Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1912, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 229.
16Jordan to Langley, private, 16 Apr. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.
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However, the incident serves to show the difference in Jordan*s
attitude towards Y(ian Shih-k’ai and TTang Shao-i.
In spite of Jordan*s profession that he regarded both YUan
and T*ang as his "old friends" and was sorry to see the split between 
19them , Jordan was not in the least disturbed by T*ang*s resignation.
This reaction of Jordan was in great contrast to his attitude towards 
the dismissal of YUan Shih-k*ai in 1909. In reporting the departure 
of T*ang Jordan commented: "Tong*s emotional nature and general 
unsteadiness of purpose do not fit him to be a political leader.11 He 
further regarded T’ang as being presumptuous in tendering the resignation!
ti
As negotiator between the north and south at the Shanghai conference 
Tong claimed to be the founder of the republic, and was inclined to
arrogate to himself a largershare of authority than the President was
. 2 0  disposed to yield"
Lu Cheng-hsiang, a well-meaning diplomat who could easily be
influenced by YUan, succeeded T’ang Shao-i as premier for less than
four months. And when, at the end of September, Chao Ping-chUn acceeded
to the post, the cabinet came to be a truly pliant tool in the hands of
YUan Shih-k’ai.
The Assassination Cf Sung Chiao-jen.
Until the assassination of Sung Chiao-jen on 20 March, 1913, rela­
tions between YUan Shih-k’ai and the revolutionary party were apparently 
harmonious. For example, the revolutionaries had protested only mildly
against YUan* s unlawful execution of.the two revolutionary generals,
17Jordan to Langley, private, 25 Jun. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.
•^Ibid., and Jordan to Grey, no,276, 28 Jun. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320.
■^Jordan to Langley, private, 21 May 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.
20
Jordan to Grey, no*276, 28 Jun. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320.
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.21Chang Chen-wu and Fang Wei » and had supported the visits paid to
22Yuan by Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsmg m  August and September* 1912 .
Chinese internal politics during the first year of the republic was
characterised by constant cabinet changes on the part of the government
and the formation, disintegration, and allying of new political parties.
The apparent harmonious relations between YUan and the revolutionaries
stemmed largely from the instability of the government on the one hand
and the weakened position of the revolutionary party as it broke apart
on the other. The internal split in the revolutionary movement marked
by the formation of the Kung-ho Tang (Republican Party) by such
prominent revolutionary leaders as Chang Ping-1in, Sun Wu, and Lan
Tfien-wei with some former constitutionalists and members of the Manchu
bureaucracy under the leadership of Li Yuan-hung. Other revolutionaries
such as Ku Chung-hsiu and Wu Ching-lien formed the Tfung-iKung-ho Tang
(United Republican Party). The position of the revolutionary party
was somewhat retrieved when Sung Chiao-jen organised the Kuo-min Tang
23
in August 1912, using the Tfung-meng Hui as a nucleus
It has already been mentioned that Jordan1s preoccupation with the 
Reorganisation Loan negotiations resulted in his paying scant attention 
to most of these internal changes. It was the assassination of Sung Chiao- 
jen and the subsequent uproar which brought his attention back to the
21It has been asserted that Yiian executed Chang, a bitter personal enemy 
of Li Yuan-hung, and Fang, Chang’s subordinate, to further secure the 
loyalty of Li Yiianrhung who was then a popular public figure, Farjenel, 
Through the Chinese Revolution, p. 231; T’ao, Shih-hua, vol. 1, pp.138-41, 
Jordan, however, thought that the government’s argument that Chang and 
Fang were guilty of sedition "can scarcely be disputed", Jordan to Grey, 
no. 358, 28 Aug. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.
22Details of the meetings amongst Yiian, Sun, Huang, and Li Yiian-hung are
available in, for example, Ts’en, Liang, nien-p’u, vol. 1, pp4 122-4; 
and T’ao, Shih-hua, vol. 1, pp. 14/-Oi.
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Chinese political scene.
After founding the Kuo-min Tang%Sung Chiao-jen remained as its
24actual leader with Sun Yat-sen as nominal chairman . Sung was a staunch
advocate of the responsible cabinet system and local self-government.
These two political ideals of the Kuo-min Tang were heresy to Yuan 
.25Shih-k’ai . Sung toured round Hunan, Hupei, Anhuei, and Kiangsuj
propagating his political ideals with the aim of winning more Kuo-min
Tang seats in the provincial assemblies and the parliament which were to
be convened in early 1913. In his speeches Sung did not hesitate to
26
attack Yiian*s government. Recalling his attitude towards the
constitutional movement during the last years of the Manchu dynasty it
is to be expected that Jordan disagreed with Sung. He asserted that it
was by "a gross display of corruption and intimidation” that the Kuo-min
Tang achieved its success in the elections for the provincial assemblies
27
which were completed by the end of January .
By March,1913 elections for the national parliament clearly indicated 
that there would be a Kuo-min Tang majority. It was naturally expected
23 . . .  . . . .
Good analyses of party formation, affiliation, and their significance
are found in T’ao, Shih-hua, vol. 1, pp 142-5; and Yu Jun-t?ang etc., 
Chung-kuo tang-tai cheng-tang .lun,[Political parties in present-day 
ChinaJ (Canton, 19485","" pp. 29-31.
24
Sun felt that the Three People’s Principles were especially neglected 
by Sung, Tsou, Shih-kao, vol. 1, pp. 143-5; Chang, Tang-shih kai-yao, 
vol. 1, pp,144-5; for a defence of Sung, see Chang Chi, Chang PTu ctfaan 
hsien-sheng chuan-chi, [works of Chang Chi], (Taipei, 1951), vol. 1, 
pp. 31-2,
23 tSee political principles of the Kuo-min Tang in Yu Jun-tang, Chung-kuo
tang-tai cheng-tang lun, p.30.
2 5--------------------
For example in a large party meeting held in Peking on 21 July 1912 
Sung declared the government to be useless and expounded on the 
necessity of a government by the t’ung-meng Hui, S.K. Hornbeck, Contempo­
rary Politics in the Far East, (London 1916), p. 73. About half a month
before his death, Sung gave a speech in Nanking criticising the govern­
ment as degenerating and unpopular, Li, "Huang K’o—ch’iang hsien—sheng
nien-p’u kao", p. 359.
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that Sung would be the new premier as a result of his party’s position 
in the parliament. But on 20 March, just before leaving for Peking to 
consult Yuan Shih-k’ai on political matters in preparation for the 
opening of the parliament in early April, Sung Chiao-jen was shot in 
the back at the North Station in Shanghai. Two days later he died from 
his wounds^.
Sung’s death quickly evolved into a serious political crisis.
Soon after the murder the assassin, Wu Shih-ying, and the alleged insti­
gator, Ying Kuei-hsing, were arrested and held in custody by the authori­
ties of the French and the International Settlements respectively. On
28 March, Jordan received from the Wai-chiao Pu a notification requesting 
him, as the doyen, to remit Wu, Ying, and all the witnesses to the 
Chinese authorities on the grounds that the crime was committed in 
Chinese territory. Before consulting the other ministers Jordan tenta­
tively approved Fraser’s suggestion that they should insist on the accused 
being tried by the Mixed Court to ascertain if the crime had truly been
committed in the settlements and if so whether a prima facie case could 
29be established .
Soon afterwards Jordan learned from Fraser that the Municipal Police
of the International Settlement had in their possession documentary
30 . . .evidence indicating that Ying had instigated the crime under orders
27Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1912, Ch. Conf. Print, vol.229.
28Details of the assassination are available in Li, "Huang K’o-ch’iang 
hsien-sheng nien-p’u kao", pp. 359-60.
29Jordan to Grey, tel. 77, 29 Mar. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1623; Jordan 
to Fraser, tel. 6, 29 Mar. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch.,(F.O. 228), vol. 1875. 
Later the British authority asserted that claim of jurisdiction over 
Ying was mainly established on the fact that the arrest was made in the 
settlement, Fraser to Jordan, tel. 14, 31 Mar. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., 
30vo1 . 1875.
Later in a telegram to Grey, Jordan explained that the evidence consisted
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from Hung Shu-tsu, the private secretary of premier Chao-Ping-chun.
Jordan was further told that the Kuo-min Tang members were aware of
such evidence and that Ying Ruei-hsing had telegraphed Peking urging
that Jordan and the French minister should be moved to intervene.
Knowing Jordan’s sympathy for YUan^Fraser, however, said:
"I do not see any advantage in trying to have evidence 
withheld or holding sitting in camera and I think men 
and papers must be handed over if there is reasonable 
evidence of guilt"^!.
Fraser expanded his view in a despatch written the same day:
11 The best thing for every body seems to be to let the 
counsel on each side... have a free hand; after all, there 
is no real evidence against Yuan and no direct evidence 
against Chao, so far as I know, though Ying may implicate 
them in his despair .
Fraser's suggestion reflected his certainty that Jordan would be on the
side of Ytlan in any internal strife in which he was involved.
33Jordan agreed with Fraser’s view . Evidence of Yttan’s implication 
was too strong to be overlooked. It would be unsound policy to involve 
Britain in a Chinese political scandal. He was further convinced of 
Yiian’s guilt when he learned that the French consul-general at Shanghai 
had been asked by the commissioner of foreign affairs of Tientsin to 
delay the trial proceedings against Wu as long as possible until he had 
seen all evidence compromising the government. At the same time Colonel 
Bruce of the Municipal Police was asked to keep Ying in his custody also 
as long as possible.^
of a special private code sent to Ying by Hung and telegrams in the 
same code between them. Amongst the telegrams was one from Ying to 
Hung after the assassination reporting that the "arch criminal had 
been removed". There was also a letter from Hung to Ying promising 
a large reward if the "great object" was fulfilled, Jordan to Grey, 
no. 143, conf., 3 Apr., see also no. 182, 3 May 1913, Ch.„Corres., 
vol. 1623.
31
Fraser to Jordan, tel. 13, conf., 28 Mar, 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol.1875.
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The Mixed Court had its first hearing of the Sung case on 12 April
when it reported to the senior consul that a prima facie case could be
established against Ying Kuei-hsing. Three days later the Consular
Body agreed to the rendition of Ying under a written guarantee from
the Chinese authority that the accused would be given a fair trial
.35before a regular court. The rendition took place on 22 April
Later developments of the assassination confirmed Jordan that 
he had acted correctly in not interfering for Yiian showed himself 
capable of controlling the situation. In spite of the news from 
Fraser at the beginning of April that the Kuo-min Tang leaders in
3 6Shanghai had decided on the political elimination of Yiian by force
Jordan observed that on 8 April the parliament opened "smoothly and
37everything is quiet," at least on the surface . As for the undercurrent 
of tension Jordan thought that there could only be two ways of removing 
it: a compromise or a showdown between Yiian and the Kuo-min Tang.
In early April Jordan was optimistic about a compromise: "the present 
struggle between the north and south, like any street brawl, will 
probably terminate in both sides eventually adjusting their differences 
in deferance to the counsels of peace makers". Failing a compromise, on
32Fraser to Jordan, despatch, conf., 28 Mar.1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol.1875.
33Jordan to Fraser, tel. 6, 29 Mar. Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1875.
34 . . .  .The Tientsin commissioner was used to dilute the taint of government's
implication, Fraser to Jordan, tel. 14, 31 Mar. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., 
vol. 1875.
35Fraser to Jordan, tel. 14, 31 Mar., tel. 19, 12 Apr., tel. 20,
15 Apr., no451, 22 Apr. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch,, vol. 1875.
3 6 —— — — — — —
Fraser to Jordan, tel. 15, v. conf., 2 Apr. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch.,
vol. 1875.
37
Jordan to Grey, no*149, 9 Apr. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1624.
See also Huang, Yiian-sheng i-chu, vol. 2, p. 84 on the uneasy peace 
after Sung's death.
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the other hand, Jordan was confident that Yifan would come out of an
armed struggle successfully with his troops of about 100,000strong
s' . . 38who were immeasurably superior to any forces which the south can command.11
Yiian1 s position was further strengthened by the conclusion of the 
Reorganisation Loan four days after the rendition of Ying Kuei-hsing 
to the Chinese court.
The Second Revolution j
A compromise between the Kuo-min Tang and Yiian Shih-k*ai was not 
to take place. Events moved fast after the conclusion of the Reorgani­
sation Loan towards what is commonly known as the "second revolution".
On learning of the death of Sung Chiao-jen, Sun Yat-sen hurried 
back to Shanghai from Japan on 25 March. There he met with other 
Kuo-min Tang leaders at Huang Hsing’s house to consider steps to be 
taken against Yiian. Sun Yat-sen favoured the immediate use of force 
to expel Yiian from office. Huang Hsing and Huang Fu deprecated the use 
of arms on two grounds: first, it did not appear to be right to resort 
to force when it might be possible to punish Yiian through legal and 
constitutional means; secondly, the party was simply not ready for an 
armed clash with Yiian. They realised that the Kuo-min Tang provinces of 
Hunan, Kuangsi, Anhuei, and Kuangtung had still to grapple with problems 
of internal order and military discipline. Their argument gained the 
support of most Kuo-min Tang leaders then at Shanghai and, rather than 
arming themselves, they set about organising a special court to ensure 
a fair trial of the Sung case. The special court was, of course, rejected 
by Yiian1 s government which insisted that the case be tried by the tu-tu
38
Jordan to Grey, no. 143, conf., 3 Apr. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1623.
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and the civil commissioner of Kiangsu in a regular court. The Kuo-min
Tang continued to adhere to a policy of constitutional opposition even
after the conclusion of the Reorganisation Loan and after Yifan1 s refusal
to allow Chao Ping-chun to appear as a witness in the Sung case as
decided on by the Shanghai court and as demanded by the Kuo-min Tang.
Chao, who had been on "sick leave" for a period after Sung’s death, finally
39resigned on 1 May.
The Kuo-min Tang, it should be noted, was not even then a united
party. Two factions were discernable in the Peking assembly. One stood
for a legal solution to the political problem. The other preferred to
use force and many of this group left for Shanghai with the intention of
initiating hostilities. Many other nominal Kuo-min Tang members succumbed
easily to Yiian’s bribery and gave up their party membership. The conclusion
of the Reorganisation Loan not only enabled Yiian to bribe more Kuo-min Tang
members but furnish Liang Ch’i-ch’ao with ample funds to organise the Chin-
pu Tang (Progressive Party), an amalgam of the T’ung-i Tang, (United
Party), Min-chu Tang (Democratic Party), and Kung-ho Tang, which, with
the Kuo-min Tang, were the chief parties in the Peking assembly. The
Chin-pu Tang soon became something of a government organ in the new
40parliament in opposition to the Kuo-min Tang.
Details of the dissension, weakness of the Kuo-min Tang in Shanghai 
and the provinces, the special court, and Chao are found in Shen,
"Pu-hsin ti erh-t’zu ko-ming", pp. 17-20; Li, "Huang K’o-ch’iang hsien 
sheng nien-p’u kao", pp. 362-3, 365, 369-70; P’an Kung-chan, Ch’en Ch’i- 
mei, [Biography of Ch’en Ch*i-me£], (Taipei, 1954), pp. 57-8 and Chin 
Wen-ssu etc. (ed.), Huang Ying-po (Fu) hsien-sheng ku-chiu kan-i lu, 
Memorial volume for Huang , in CHS ts’ung-shu, pp. 1^4-5. Chao Ping-chun 
was poisoned in early spring the next year in his position as tu-tu of 
Chihli. Almost all Chinese historians agree that he was poisoned by 
YUan to prevent him from betraying his guilt in Sung’s death, but Jordan 
thought that his death was caused by Kuo-min Tang members, Jordan to 
Grey, no. 88, 2 Mar. 1914, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 214 
40Tsou, then a member of parliament representing Kuangtung, Hui-ku lu 
pp. 53-4; and Tsou Lu wen-ts’un, [Collections of Tsou], (Peking,1930), 
pt. 5, p.10; YUan-sheng i-chu, vol. 2, p. 101.
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On 29 April YUan asked for a confidential interview with Jordan.
After thanking Britain for her role in the Reorganisation Loan and 
commenting on the Sung case, YUan sounded out Jordan on the political 
situation. YUan told Jordan that Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing wanted 
to reduce him to a figurehead if not eliminate him entirely. He said 
that he had received reports saying that Kuangtung and Kiangsi were 
contemplating an independent movement. He then asked Jordan if the powers 
would be satisfied with the rise of Sun and Huang to power and, if not, 
would they adopt an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards him if 
he should find it necessary to use force against the recalcitrant 
provinces.
Jordan stated in reply that it was well-known that Greyfs policy
had always been for a strong and united China. Although deprecating
the idea of a civil war, he assured YUan that "the feeling among
the foreign representatives at Peking were practically unanimous in
favour of his own continuance in office". His personal opinion was
that "his retirement would be a great misfortune". He further rid Yuan
of his fear of Japan’s help to the Kuo-min Tang by assuring YUan that
41the Japanese minister shared his view . Grey, however, was not as
42outspoken in supporting Yuan
Jordan came out of the interview knowing that another civil war 
was unavoidable. He realised that although the Kuo-min Tang might be 
trying to avoid an armed collision yet its insistence on YUan being 
bound by constitutional regulations was in effect tantamount to insistence 
on a showdown. This he regarded as the "root cause" of the struggle between
41Jordan to Grey, tel. 104 v. conf., 29 Apr. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1624.
42
Grey to Jordan, tel. 122, 1 May 1913, Ch. Corres, vol. 1624.
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43Yiian and the Kuo-min Tang.
The repeated overtures of the Kuo-min Tang during May to remove
the tension by constitutional means appeared futile to Jordan. Early
in May Jordan learned that Colonel Bruce, who was on intimate terms
with the Shanghai Kuo-min Tang leaders, was told by Sun that force would
44not be used against Yiian . On 6 May Fraser told Jordan that the Kuo-min
Tang leaders were perturbed by the movement of government troops into
45Hupei and reiterated their desire to avoid fighting . In the middle of 
May the Kuo-min Tang asked the missionary Timothy Richard to enquire 
whether Jordan would mediate between Yiian and the party. It had decided 
to agree on the retention of Yiian as president on condition that he would 
apportion offices equally among the parties, establish an audit of public 
expenditure, give the Sung case a fair trial, and be controlled by
constitutional laws. In return the party would abandon its attack on
46 .the government . On 20 May Jordan learned that E.S. Little of Messrs.
Brunner, Mond, and Company in Shanghai, who was closely related with
the Kuo-min Tang was about to go to Peking to lay before Yiian the
47Kuo-min Tang*s proposal for removing the strain . To these suggestions
of mediation, unlike the revolution of 1911, Jordan firmly replied that
he feared "no foreigners could hope to do any good by intefering in 
^  "48such a question..........................
43Jordan deals with the "root cause" of the second revolution at length 
in Jordan to Grey, no. 211, 19 May 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1624.
44Fraser to Jordan, tel. 27, 1 May 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1875.
45Fraser to Jordan, tel. 29, 6 May 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol 1875.
46Fraser to Jordan, tel. 33, 16 May 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1875. Fraser
however, thought that this application for mediation was a test of the
attitude of the powers whom the Kuo-min Tang suspected for having promised 
Yiian their unqualified support.
^Fraser to Jordan, tel, 34. conf., 20 May 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1875.
^Jordan to Fraser, tel, 20, 17 May 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1875.
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By the end of May both sides were preparing for an armed conflict.
/
The Kuo-min Tang realised that Yuan would not accept their peace offers. 
Jordan learned that in a dinner given in his honour Baron Kato, who was 
then visiting China, was asked pointedly by Sun Yat-sen how far the
Kuo-min Tang could rely on Japan’s support in its coming struggle against
49 . .
the government . By then Huang Hsing had already been stripped of his
military rank and denounced by the government. Large bodies of govern­
ment troops were moving into the Yangtze area. And Yuan publicly 
rejected Ts’en Chfun-hsiian1 s offer of mediation by saying that the
question was not the difference between the north and south but the
50submission of provinces to the central authority.
Before going on leave Jordan, in a farewell interview on 4 June, 
gave Yuan his blessings on crushing the Kuo-min Tang. In the meeting 
Yiian assured Jordan that the position of the Kuo-min Tang provinces was 
far from being formidable and that he had the situation of the Yangtze 
area firmly under control. To give more security to the government
position in the Yangtze he had only to remove the Kuo-min Tang tu-tu
of Kiangsi, Li Lieh-chiin. He would then turn his attention to Canton.
Yiian stated firmly that he v/as "determined at all costs to secure the
unification of the provinces under the central government".
As for the situation in Peking, Yiian was then mainly concerned with 
his election to the presidency^ He was certain that he would be the 
first president because even the Kuo-min Tang could not decide on an 
alternative candidate. However, he refused to be a figurehead president 
whose powers were to be limited by party cabinets and other regulations.
49
Jordan to Grey, no. 217, conf., 23 May 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1624.
50For example, Ch’en Po-ta, Ctiieh-kuo ta-tao Yiian Shih-k1 ai, [ Yiian Shih-k’ai, 
the destroyer of the republief, (Peking, iyo4/ p. 21, quoting Shih Pao,
24 May 1913.
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He would set about to educate members of parliament in the true 
requirements of the country.
Jordan replied that a strong centralised government was absolutely 
essential to bring about a unification of China’s finances. Instead of 
deprecating civil war as he did in the interview of 29 April he "hoped 
that no more force than was necessary would be used to bring the provinces 
into line". He then expressed appreciation on behalf of the Diplomatic 
Body of the ability with which Yiian had kept China together in face of 
overwhelming difficulties during the eighteen months before. He 
regretted that he could not witness Yttan’s inauguration as the president 
and assured him that Britain would recognise the republic as soon as 
the president was elected.
Once Jordan’s support was gained on the principal point Yiian 
turned to the practical details. He asked for Jordan’s assistance in 
preventing the import of arms into Canton from Hongkong, the sanction 
of loans to the provinces, and the using of the Shanghai International 
Settlement as a shelter by political agitators.
Jordan stated that he had already arranged with the Wai-chiao Pu 
that the Hongkong government would not issue an export permit of arms 
unless against a permit issued by the Chinese Ministry of War and after 
notifying the British legation. By this arrangement one large consign­
ment of arms for Canton had already been held up. He would, however, 
remind the governor of Hongkong again on the point. As far as provincial 
loans were concerned, they would certainly not be sanctioned without 
the approval of the central government. The problem of the Shanghai 
settlement was more complicated because of the international character
277
of that port. But the Diplomatic Body under his doyenship had.always 
objected to the use of the settlement as a basis for agitators1 activities,
and it would certainly continue to do so. Jordan’s support for Yiian
could not have been more explicit than this"*'*’.
On 9 June, three days after Jordan’s departure, Yiian dismissed Li 
Lieh-chiin from his post as tu-tu of Kiangsi. On 14 and 30 June the 
Kuo-min Tang tu-tus, Hu Han-min and Po Wen-wei were respectively dismissed 
from Kuangtung and Anhuei. The second revolution began on 12 July with 
Li Lieh-chiin’s declaration of independence at Hukou. Huang Hsing took 
up military command at Nanking on 14 July. Two days later Ch’en Ch’i-raei
became independent at Shanghai. With the flight of Huang Hsing from
Nanking on 29 July the revolution ended as a quick defeat of the Kuo-min 
Tang.
Despite Jordan’s absence it is essential to view the second revolu­
tion in relation to the Reorganisation Loan in which he had played a clear 
role. Out of £21,000,000 realised by the Reorganisation Loan over 
£10,500,000 was assigned to the payment of matured or maturing liabilities 
of the Chinese government, £3,000,000 to disbandment of troops, £5,500,000
to "current expenses of administration", and £2,000,000 to reorganisation 
. . 52of the Salt administration . Immediately after the problem over the 
Austrian Contracts was settled regular advances of loan funds were paid 
over to the Chinese government. According to the British legation it 
was impossible to state the exact amount of loan funds that was expended 
on the second revolution. However, it is estimated that during the summer
51
Barton’s record of the interview in Jordan to Grey, no. 234, 5 Jun. 1913, 
Ch. Corres., vol. 1624.
52
MacMurray, Treaties, vol. 2, p.1013. Only £21,000,000 was realised because 
the loan was made at the issue price of 84% and the interest rate of 5%.
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and autumn months of 1913 Yuan’s government received about £8,000,000
of loan money over which supervision as required by the loan agreement 
53had no effect . It is obvious that the £8,000,000 was originally
earmarked for current administrative expenses and the disbandment of
troops. In fact Chou Hsiieh-hsi, the minister of finance who signed the
Reorganisation Loan Agreement, resigned and wentto Tsing-tao in opposition
to Yiian’s violation of the loan agreement in using the money which was
54meant for the disbandment of troops to crush the Kuo-min Tang , It
appears that part of the funds assigned to the reorganisation of the
55
salt gabelle was also used by YUan to ensure his success
The importance of the Reorganisation Loan is significantly shown 
in the fact that the loyalty of the Chinese navy was at the last minute 
bought by YUan with the loan money. The loyalty of the navy under 
Admiral Li Ting-sing was vital to the government’s position in the 
Yaqgzze especially considering that the navy had its base at Shanghai 
where most of the Kuo-min Tang leaders aggregated, A detailed eye­
witness account, by W.F. Tyler, a self-proclaimed "strong partisan of 
YUan" who had had an intimate relationship with the Chinese navy during 
the Sino-Japanese Var and was working in the Customs at Shanghai in 
1913, describes how an imminent mutiny of the navy was narrowly averted 
by the admiral’s timely access to loan funds,
53Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1913, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 229,
54 . . .Chou Shu-chen, grand-daughter of Chou HsUeh-hsr, Chou Chih-an hsien
sheng pieh-ch’uan, [^Biography of Chou Hsiieh-hsiJ , (Shanghai, 1947),
p.81.
“*“*Chiang Ching-i, Chung-kuo yen-cheng wen-t’ i, £ The salt problem in China] 
(Shanghai, 1936), pp. 134-5. Here the author asserts that part of the 
money assigned to the reorganisation of the salt gabelle was illegally 
used by Yiian to crush the revolution in opposition to his monarchical 
movement in 1916. This is untrue because the Reorganisation Loan was 
completely spent by April 1914. If there had been any irregularities
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On 17 July, Tyler decided to visit Admiral Li because he was 
puzzled by the fact that the fleet was still anchored opposite the 
arsenal when there was definite news that the Kuo-min Tang was about 
to attack the arsenal. Admiral Li told Tyler that in a meeting on board 
the day before two captains threatened with their mauser rifles to carry 
the rest of the crew with them to the side of the Kuo-min Tang. This
was serious news to Tyler who feared that the immediate outcome would
be a joint attack on the arsenal by the Kuo-min Tang and the navy. 
Admiral Li then suggested that an immediate supply of about a million
taels might save the situation in that the fleet had not been paid for
two months and the Kuo-min Tang promised to pay it if it would defect 
from the government.
After having left Admiral Li, Tyler immediately called on 
A. G. Stephen, manager of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, about the 
possibility of using the considerable reserve of Chinese government 
money which the group banks held against Chinese liabilities. Stephen 
gave no immediate answer.
On 18 July Tyler was introduced to Admiral Tseng 'Ju-cheng, a 
faithful partisan of Yiian Shih-kfai. Admiral Tseng told Tyler that 
money must be obtained by noon the next day as he; expected the attack 
on the arsenal to take place the next night. The same day Tyler met 
Admiral Jerram of the "Newcastle", just arrived in Shanghai, and the 
British acting consul-general, Fulford. Jerram was encouraging towards 
Tyler’s efforts in saving the navy for the government, but Fulford was 
cautious. Tyler himself admitted that his intervention was not correct 
but it was the lesser evil compared with the downfall of YUan Shih-k’ai.
in this aspect it was most likely to be in connection with the 
revolution of 1913.
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On 19 July Tyler received a cheque of a quarter-of-a-million 
taels together with the guarantee of further advances on condition 
that he would administer the funds. A telegram from the chief secretary 
of the Customs Inspectorate-general, C.A.V. Brown, giving him freedom 
to act at his discretion,removed all uneasiness that Tyler had about 
implicating the Customs in internal politics.
Tyler immediately rented a flat as a naval office in which he acted 
as the treasurer. He told Admirals Li and Tseng to call another meeting 
of the captains and assure them of pay. The admirals were immediately 
furnished with fudns in return for which they had to provide a summary 
of expenditure for each vessel. The Kuo-min Tang attack on the arsenal 
took place on 23 July, the government troops were assisted in their
56defence of the arsenal by the Chinese men-of-war anchored off Shanghai .
Tyler’s account was supplemented by the Foreign Office archives 
which explained what had taken place in the Shanghai office of the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, the Shanghai consulate-general, the British 
legation and theconsortium which led to the release of the funds admini­
stered by Tyler. Having known from Tyler the situation of the navy, 
Stephen called on Fulford and asked if a British naval man could act as 
the paymaster-general to guarantee the loyalty of the navy. Fulford 
deprecated the suggestion and proposed that Stephen should wire Hillier 
in Peking to see if funds could be drawn from the Reorganisation Loan 
and if a man of the bank could carry out the scheme privately with the 
navy^. Stephen telegraphed Hillier accordingly and stressed that unless 
the fleet helped Peking actively the conflagration would be prolonged
56
W. F. Tyler, Pulling Strings in China, (London, 1929), pp. 230-7.
■^Fulford to Alston, no. 93, conf., 19 Jul. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch.,
(F.O. 671) vol. 357.
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with serious consequences, especially with Nanking having just declared
58its independence. Hillier consulted Alston, acting minister in
Jordan1s absence,, who in turn consulted the other four ministers of the
consortium powers and together they sanctioned the immediate advance of
.59funds to the Chinese admirals through the banks in Shanghai
The Reorganisation Loan funds were also used to secure the loyalty
of the government troops guarding the Shanghai arsenal under the command
of Tseng Ju-cheng and the allegiance of Chang Hstin who, it is alleged,
had previously encouraged the governor of Mukden to declare independence
60in return for a bribe from Japan , The use of the Reorganisation Loan 
money as bribery can be summed up with the words of Alston1s report on 
the revolution: "It must, in the first place, be conceded that the 
principal weapon used by the Central Government and its supporters has 
been bribery. No decisive success in the field was gained by the 
northern generals nor anything in the nature of a ’lesson1 inflicted 
on the rebel forces. Desultory fighting ... was followed, in almost 
every case, by protracted negotiations, resulting in the fixing of a 
definite price at which the leaders were prepared to be 'bought off1 
and the men to disperse after laying down their arms and receiving a 
bonus in cash."^
When Jordan resumed duties in late November Yuan Shih-k'ai had not 
only crushed the second revolution but had been formally elected president. 
Four days after the election, on 10 October, Yuan's government was
58
Text of Stephen's telegram, 17 Jul. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 228), 
vol. 2498.
59Alston to Fulford, tel. 20 Jul. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2498; and 
Alston to Grey, tel. 164, 20 Jul. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1624.
gQ — — — — — —
Tyler, Pulling Strings in China, pp. 240-1; and Alston to Grey, no. 320, 
draft, ~15 Aug. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch.,(F.O. 228), vol. 2500.
GlAlston to Grey, no.367, 22 Sept. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1625,
282
recognised by the powers with the exception of America who had given 
her recognition half a year before. To prevent the heavily Kuo-min Tang 
inspired Draft Constitution of the Altar of Heaven (T’ien-t’an hsien-fa 
ts1 ao-an) from passing YUan Shih-kfai, on 4 November, rid the parliament 
of a quorum by simply expelling from it all Kuo-min Tang members. Soon 
after Jordan1s return an advisory body known as the Administrative Council 
(Cheng-ch’ih Hui-i) was organised for Yuan by the prime minister, Hsiung 
Hsi-ling, in the place of the disabled parliament. Jordan later made an
II
interesting remark on the organ: Yuan Shih-k’ai has thrown off the mask
and is attempting to govern China very much on the British Crown Colony
system. He has an Administrative Council which is a much more pliant
instrument of his will than the ordinary Legislative Council is in the
6 2hands of a British Colonial Governor11 . On 10 January 1914 YUan 
dissolved the parliament and less than two months later he ordered the 
dissolution of all the provincial assemblies and self-governing bodies 
throughout the country.
Having removed most of the obvious obstacles to power Yuan set 
about positively to establish his autocracy over China. The Administra­
tive Council, in deference to his wish,appointed a select committee to 
amend and revise the Nanking Provisional Constitution into what was 
officially designated as the Constitutional Compact of the Chinese 
Republic (Chung-hua min-kuo yo-fa), but more aptly Yuan’s constitution, 
promulgated on 1 May 1914. The compact greatly increased the power of 
the president, thus limiting that of the legislature in proportion.
The president was to appoint all cabinet ministers and other officials;
Jordan to Langley, private, 8 Feb. 1914, Jordan Papers, vol. 12.
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to conduct foreign affairs independently and declare war; -to draft,
together with the new Council of State, and promulgate the constitution;
and to issue emergency decrees and financial measures. The Council of
State, (Ts’an-cheug Yuan) provided by the compact and composed of members
selected on a highly conservative basis, was established in late June
in the place of the Administrative Council as an advisory organ to the
president. At the end of December the Council of State drew up a
revised Law for the Presidential Election which significantly provided
that the president was to be in office for ten years, and eligible for
re-election. Moreover, he was to nominate three candidates from whom
the new president would be elected. Besides taking quasi-constitutional
steps to confirm his autocracy, YUan Shih-k’ai consolidated his military
hold over the provinces by appointing as high provincial authorities only
63those who were committed to his cause .
Needless to say, Jordan was satisfied with these developments. For
the first time since 1906 there was some semblance of a strong central
government in China, something which he had been obsessed about. When
World War I broke out he had become much more optimistic about the
situation in China. This optimism stemmed largely from what he considered^
a marked improvement in China’s finances as a result of centralisation.
Jordan noticed that the central government was receiving an increasing
64
amount of revenue from the provinces . The centralisation of salt
For details of Yiian’s autocratic measures between July 1913 and 
December 1914, see Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East,- 
pp. 48-58; F.W. Houn, Central Government of China 1912-1928, (Wisconsin, 
1959), pp. 86-92; Liu, Chung-kuo hsien-cheng shih-hua, pp. 48-51;
Ch*ien Tuan-sheng etc.»Mln-kuo cheng-chih shih, Chistory of the Admini­
strative system of the republieJ, (Shanghai, 1946), vol. 1, pp. 66-103,
64Jordan to Langley, private, 20 Apr. 1914, Jordan Papers, vol. 12.
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adminstration began to show its effect by 1914 when there was a
65marked increase in the monthly yield of revenue . Salt continued
66to do well during the early months of the War . Between the Customs
and the Salt Jordan knew that China could repay her foreign liabilities
with confidence. This accounted for his accommodating attitude towards
6 7the talks for a fresh reorganisation loan for China in April 1914 
About three months after the War began Jordan was still sanguine about 
China,although a shadow had already been cast by Japan1s action in 
Shangtung:
"China is going along quietly, keeping her head above 
water and just managing to pay her way financially. Unless 
there are some unexpected complications, I see no reason 
to be apprehensive about the immediate future.
65Jordan to Langley, private, 30 Nov. 1913; 4 May 1914, Jordan Papers, 
vol. 12. Also W.R.S., "The Chinese Salt Administration", in Remer 
(ed.), Readings in Economics for China, (Shanghai, 1922), p. 289.
66Jordan to Langley, private, 25 Oct., 24 Nov., 1914, Jordan Papers, 
vol. 12.
67Jordan to Langley, private, 6 Apr. 1914, Jordan Papers, vol. 12.
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The monarchical movement which was formally inaugurated with the
founding of the Cliou-an Hui ( Society for the planning of peace) in
August,1915 was the most important domestic question in China between
August,1914, the outbreak of World War I, and June, 1916, the death
of Yiian Shih-k'ai. It has been current before the War started that
Yiian entertained imperialist ambitions. The saying seemed to have
been borne out by his increasingly autocratic policies after the 1913
revolution; his worship, in late 1913 and early 1914, of Heaven and
Confucius which was a traditional imperial prerogative; and his
obvious connivance at the seditious expressions of such advocates of
imperialist restoration under the former Ch*ing dynasty as Sung Yu-
jen and Tung Nai-hsUan in 1914^, During the crisis of the 21
demands it was alleged that Yuan had accepted Japan1s offer to
2support him as emperor if he would concede her demands . But it
1. Huang I, YUan-shih tao-kuo chi in CHS ts'unp-shu p. 21: l^ ao,
Shih-hua, vol. 2, pp. 90-4. Jordan also refers to this agitation 
for Manchu restoration in Jordan to Langley, private, 2 Dec.,
1914, Jordan Papers, vol. 12.
2. The allegation has both been supported and repudiated. For 
support see, for example, Putnam Weale, The Fight, pp.123-4,
146; Jiiu Yen, Chung-kuo wai-chiao shih, {^ History of Foreign 
relations of Chinaj (Taipei, 1962) p.446; Liu Yen, Ti-kuo chu-i 
ya-pTo Chung-kuo shih, [China under the oppression of imperialism^
(Shanghai, 1927), p .66; and Pai Chiao, YUan Shih-kfai yU Chung-hua 
min-kuo, p.139. For repudiation see, Chang, Chung-hua min-kuo wai- 
chiao shih, p.180; and Wang YUn-sheng, Liu-shih-iiien-lai Chung-kuo 
yU Jih-pen, [Documents on Sino-Japanese relations for the past sixty 
years](Tientsin, 1932-4), vol. 7, pp. 1-2.
In my opinion it was not likely that Yuan had accepted the bribe; 
had it been offered at all. YUan was extremely careful in 
negotiating with the Japanese. The negotiation lasted four months
in which there were over twenty conferences. YUan released the 
long censored press to agitate against Japan, see Chow Ts’e-tsung,
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is a fact that in early 1915 Yuan Shih-kai attempted by brib<ery 
to obtain Liang Cbfi-ct^ ao’s support for his monarchical scheme . 
Active preparations were temporarily abandoned in the following 
months as negotiations with Japan on the twenty-one (Jemands were 
under way. Immediately after negotiations drew to a close, YUan 
Shih-kai redirected his full attention to the monarchy question.
The three months between the signing of the Sino-Japanese conven­
tion and the establishment of the Ch1 ou-an Hui were characterised 
by rumours in Peking that a Yiian dynasty was at hand, Feng Kuo- 
chang went personally to Peking at the end of June to find out the 
truth from Yiian, To Feng, whose objection to YUan taking the crown 
was obvious, YUan emphatically denied his imperialist intention,^ 
But soon afterwards the governors-general of Shantung, Kiangsi, 
Shansi, Mukden and Hupei, together with Chang Tso-lin, were called 
to Peking, ostensibly to report on their posts. There their 
allegiance to the monarchy was won,^ The monarchy was still under 
cover,
The May Fourth Movement, (Cambridge, Mass,, 1960) p.21. The 
revolutionary Huang Hsing telegraphed from abroad giving YUan 
his support, ChUn-tu HsUeh, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolu­
tion, (Stanford, 1961), p. 53, After the Sino-Japanese treaty 
was signed YUan expressed to Jordan his pride in successfully 
rejecting the fifth group of Japan’s demands, see Jordan to 
Langley, private, 10 Jun., 1915, Jordan Papers vol. 13, It 
was obvious that Japan’s hatred of YUan increased after the 
twenty-one demands incident and she determined to oust YUan 
from the Chinese scene, Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, 
p, 194. However, the allegation of YUan being bribed, true or 
otherwise, gained currency,
3 Liang refused YUan his support. Soon after the appearance of 
the Ch’ ou-an Hui Liang publicly denounced the monarchy by 
releasing an article entitled "I-tsai so-wei Kuo-ti wen-t*L che". 
Jwhat strangeness, the so-called question of the form of 
government,] Liang refused to withhold the publication under
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The Ch1ou-an Hui was the first step towards publicising the
monarchy. Its aim was to study (yen-chiu) the question as to which
was the most suitable form of government (kuo-t*i) for China .
However, the fact that its manifesto took up the argument of
7
Professor F. J. Goodnow made the result of the study a foregone 
conclusion. It was only at this stage that the seriousness of 
Yuan’s monarchical desire began to dawn on Jordan. Until then, 
Jordan had assumed that YUan was content with the autocratic powers
g
that he had, which equalled that of any emperor in old China .
The monarchical movement was the first and only important 
domestic crisis in the regime of YUan Shih-k’ai during World War I. 
The power balance in China underwent important changes during the 
War. Concentrating on her struggle against Germany, Britain 
withdrew her squadron from the Far East, leaving her established 
interests mainly to the protection of Japan, Japan inherited the 
dominant role in China which had hitherto been Britain’s. She also
a bribe of 20,000 dollars, Liang Clfi-ch’ao, Tun-pi Chi, 
[Collected cables, documents, articles etc. in support of 
the Yunnan declaration of independence against the regime of 
YUan Shih-k’ai in 1916] in CCS ts’ung-k’an, pt, 4, p.80, 
and J.R. Levonson, Liang Ch’i-Ch’ao and the Mind of Modern 
China, (London, 1965), p.179. For an English translation 
of Liang’s article, see Putnam Weale, The Fight, pp. 142-58.
4. Liang Clii-ch’ ao, Yin-ping-shih wen-chi, [Collected works and 
essays of the Ice-Drinker’s Studio) (Shanghai, 1925), Vol.56, 
p. 14(b); T’ao, Shlh-hua, vol.2, p. 99; and Putnam Weale,
The Fight, p.137, Note 1.
5. T’ao Shih-hua,voI.2jpp. 103-4; T’ao,Liu-ChUn-tzu ctiuan, 
[Biography of the six gentlemen], (Shanghai, 1948), pp.264-5 . 
An analysis of Chang Tso-lin’s intention in supporting YUan’s 
monarchy is given in Sonoda Ikki, Kaiketsu cho saku-rin.
[Biography of Chang Tso-lin] (Tokyo 1923), pp. 88-90, and of
Yen Fu in B. Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power, Yen Fu
and the West, (Harvard Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 223-8.
288
saw to it that her new gain would be fully exploited to her advantage. 
Britain and her allies could do nothing, for Japan’s help was badly 
needed in tracking German cruisers in the China Seas, the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans, in conveying troops from India and Australia to 
European fronts and above all, in supplying munitions and war materials 
especially to Russia. Yiian’s monarchical movement synchronised with 
the most bitter losses of the Allies on the two fronts. Thus Japan’s 
war contribution was most urgently needed and her influence in China 
increased in proportion to the need of her allies. Hence, a study 
of Jordan’s attitude towards Japan is a prerequisite for understanding 
his attitude towards the monarchical movement in which Japan played a 
predominant role.
Jordan and Japan
. 9Throughout the second part of his consular and diplomatic service , 
Jordan had many opportunities to come into contact with Japan. He 
was the Consul-general at Seoul during the decade between the Sino- 
Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars; a period when Russia and Japan 
rivalled each other for predominance in Korea, Jordan was then clearly 
pro-Japanese. He found Russian influence over the corrupt Korean court
6. The society was formally established on 23 August under Yang Tu, 
Yuan’s trusted henchman, and five others who were henceforth 
known as the "six gentlemen". For manifesto embodying its aim, 
see Huang»Yilan-stiih tao-kuo chi, p.28. For details of the "six 
gentlemen" see T£o, Ifu-Chiin-tzit ctiuan, pp. 23 8-40.
7. Professor Goodnow had been at one time adviser to Yiian. He was 
invited to spend his 1915 summer vacation in Peking. In June he 
presented his famous memorandum advocating monarchy as the most 
suitable form of government for China, For text, see Pai Chiao,
Yiian Shih-K’ai yu chung-hua min-kuo, pp. 162-174. For full original 
text, see Peking Gazette, 17 Aug. 1915, in Jordan to Grey, no. 214, 
25 Aug, 1915, Ch. Corres. Vol. 2338.
extremely distasteful especially during the three or four years
before the Russo-Japanese War^. Japan was Britain’s ally and
Russia’s activities in Manchuria resembled robbery* He was even
annoyed with Japan in behaving towards Russia with such moderation
that was "interpreted as a sign of weakness"^. Japan stood for
progress and Jordan could not understand why the Koreans should prefer
12a Russian absorption to a Japanese one . Immediately after the
Russo-Japanese War began Jordan wrote:
"It will be a terrible struggle, the East against the worst 
part of the West, with the best part of the West’s sympathies 
enlisted on the East’s side,"13
Military operations occurred mainly in Korea until the late spring 
of 1904 when they were transferred to Manchuria, Jordan’s descrip­
tion of Japanese actions in Korea was full of admiration. The Jap­
anese soldiers behaved well, acted with precision and foresight.
This was in great contrast to the ignorance and excesses shown by 
14the Russians, During the war Jordan expressed the desire that Japan
should soon be rid of military concern and initiate a large-scale
15reform programme m  Korea , He was not in the least averse to the
16possibility of a Japanese protectorate over Korea ,
8, Jordan to Langley, private, 8 Feb, 1914, Jordan Papers, vol.12.
9, Jordan was promoted to the diplomatic service early in 1912,
10, For example, Jordan to Campbell, private, 11 Jan, 1904, Jordan 
Papers, vol,3,
11, Jordan to Satow, then minister at Peking, private, 16 Dec. 1903, 
Jordan Papers, Vol. 3.
12, Jordan to Satow, private, 17 Jan*1904, Jordan Papers, Vol. 3
13, Jordan to Campbell, private, 9 Feb. 1904, Jordan Papers, Vol.3.
14, For example, Jordan to Campbell, private 15 Feb., 22 Feb.,
16 Mar., and 7 Jun., 1904, Jordan Papers, Vol. 3.
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Soon after the war Jordan went to Peking. Gradually he discov­
ered that Japan was not as dove-like as he had thought. Before long
a fairly intense anti-Japanese sentiment became prevalent amongst
17 . .the British communities at the treaty ports • British merchants, 
especially those in Shanghai, were outraged by the dishonest commer­
cial dealings of Japan. For the first two years after the war the
greatest crime of Japan in commerce appeared to Jordan and the British
18merchants to be the piracy of British trademarks . From 1907 onwards 
it was apparent that Japan had stepped into Russia’s shoes in South 
Manchuria where she discriminated against goods other than her own. 
Between the beginning of 1907 and that of 1909 Japan’s policy 
suffered obstruction in Manchuria from Hsii Shih-ch’ang and T*ang Shao- 
i,who were the viceroy of Mukden and the governor of Fengtien respective­
ly, through the influence of Yttan Shih-k’ai. Thus when Yiian was
dismissed in early 1909, Jordan sensed Japan’s relief as much as his
19own disappointment . Almost simultaneously the United States applied 
herself vigorously to arresting the Japanisation of Manchuria. Her 
efforts were personified by Willard Straight, the American cpnsul- 
general at Mukden, who aspired to the building of the Chingchou-Aigun 
Railway and the internationalisation of all Manchurian railways.
15. Jordan to Campbell, private, 15 Feb. and 17 Jun. 1904, Jordan 
Papers, vol. 3.
16. Jordan sided with the Japanese in preventing the Korean court 
from appointing a new minister to London as a first step towards 
converting Korea into a Japanese protectorate, Jordan to Campbell, 
private, 23 Nov. and 2 Dec. 1904, Jordan Papars, vol. 3.
17. Annual reports from British legation, Tokyo, for 1909 and 1910 in 
Ch. Conf. Print, Vols, 195, 201; the Rt. Hon. Earl Stanhope,
"Great Britain and Japan in the Far East", Nineteenth Century,
Vol. 67 (1910), p. 534; and F. Coleman, The Far East Unveiled, 
(London etc. 1918), p.12.
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On account of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Grey refused
America Britainfs support in the schemes. Jordan was unhappy about
the Anglo-American grudge and commented:
"This is one of the penalties which we have to pay for the 
political advantages which we reap from our alliance with 
Japan".^
However, Jordan was still influenced by the good impression of Japan
which he had built up during his Korean sojourn. Later, he grew to
accept Japan*s special position in Manchuria for which she did pay
21a price, as long as British treaty rights were not impinged .
During the revolution of 1911-1912 sharp differences of opinion
arose between the British and Japanese governments and between Jordan
and Ijuin. However, the outcome of the revolution was satisfactory
22to Jordan as YUan Shih-k’ai re-emerged with full powers . During 
the revolution in 1913 both the Japanese nationalists and the 
Japanese government were engaged in activities against YUan Shih-k’ai.
The event certainly made Jordan more suspicious of Japan. But, his 
absence from China during the revolution and the ultimate success of 
YUan tended to soften resentment.
The first real conflict between Jordan and the Japanese came 
soon after he returned from his leave to Peking at the end of 1913.
18. Jordan to A. Hosie, private, 20 Nov* 1906, Jordan Papers, vol.4. 
and Jordan to Campbell, private, 30 Apr. 1908, Jordan Papers,
Vol. 5.
19. Refer Chapter 1, pp. 79-80.
20. Jordan to Grey, no. 2, Conf., 2 Jan. 1911, Ch. Conf. Print, Vol. 204.
21. For example, Jordan to Campbell, private 18 Feb, 1909, Jordan 
papers, vol. 5.
22. See Chapter 4.
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Jordan himself told the Japanese Minister, Yamaza:
,!I had been closely associated with the Japanese for over 
seventeen years in Korea and here, and that this was the ^  
first time 1 had found myself in acute conflict with them11 .
The struggle can be summed up in two comments of Jordan:
"the Japanese government are determined to make every 
effort to obtain a firm railway footing in the Yagtze 
Valley"**.
and,
"We jjSritainj are determined to defend it"^.
Grey and Jordan supported each other in firmly maintaining the Yang-
26
tze as a British sphere . Jordan maintained a most uncompromising
attitude in making representations both to the Chinese government and
the Japanese legation against Japan’s claim to build the Nanchang-
Hankow and the Nanking-Rsiangtan lines. Efforts were also made to
block Japan’s plan of a railway from Fukien to a point on the Canton- 
27
Hankow line . Apart from railways, Jordan complained of the Japanese
loans to the Chapei Water Works, the Tung Kuan-shan mines in Anhui,
28 29
the Hupei Cement Works , the China Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company,
30
and above all, the Han Yeh Ping Iron Works as bearing political 
31purposes , Jordan was further agitated by the founding of the 
Japanese and Chinese Development Company in March 1914 which had as its 
directors and advisers, leading Japanese bankers and businessmen whose
23, Jordan to Langley, private, 23 Feb, 1914, Jordan Papers, Vol, 12,
24, Jordan to Grey, no 269, 27 Jul, 1914, Ch. Cortes., Vol, 1942,
25, Jordan to Grey, Tel. 31, 19 Feb. ,1914 Ch. Corres^, Vol. 1941.
26, For example, Jordan to Grey, ho 63, conf., 10 Feb 1914, Ch.
Cotres., Vol. 194©; Jordan to Grey, tel, 31, 19 Feb#1914 in which 
Jordan urged a definite and firm policy; Grey to Greene, no. 22,
2 Fel\, Jordan to Grey, no, 77, 21 Feb, and Grey to Jordan, tel. 32, 
25 Feb#1914, Ch. Corres., Vol. 1941. See also J.O.P. Bland, "The 
Future of China", Edinburgh Review, Vol. 220, (Oct 1914), p.443.
293
aim was to lead industrial development in China, especially in the
32 . .
Yangtze . Most of the Japanese claims on the Yangtze derived from
promises given by Sun Yat-sen and Li Lieh-chun in return for JapanTs
aid during the revolution in 1913, However, Yuan Shih-kTai played
along with Japan because of the financial needs of his government;
the Reorganisation Loan having been spent by April 1914, Jordan did
not only resent Japan’s policy, he also became aloof towards Yuan 
.33
Shih-k’ai . Despite the marked increase of Japanese prestige and
influence in China Jordan, until the outbreak of war, was confident
3 Athat Britain’s prestige still surpassed that of Japan . The Anglo- 
Japanese strife for the Yangtze was temporarily shelved by the out­
break of World War I, only to emerge again in 1915 when Japan 
presented the 21 demands.
With the War started, Britain’s relations with Japan immediately 
overshadowed those with China. Grey initially asked Japan to help 
only in protecting Hongkong and Wei-hai-wei, As far as Britain was 
concerned, there was no question of Japan declaring war. Japan planned
27. Materials relating to these railway negotiations are found in 
abundance in Ch. Corres., Vols. 1941-2; also Kajima Morinosuke, 
Nihon Gaiko seisaku no shiteki kosatsu, [a historical study of 
Japan’s foreign policyj (Tokyo, 1958)7" PP. 454-6.
28. Jordan to Grey, tel. 38, 25 Feb. 1914, Ch. Corre^, Vol. 1941.
29. Jordan to Grey, tel. 47, 5 Mar, 1914, Ch. Corre^, Vol. 1941.
30. Jordan to Grey, no. 89, 28 Feb, 1914 also no. 96, 7 Mar. 1914,
Ch, Corre^, vol. 1941.
31. Such accusations can be found in, for example, Jordan to Langley, 
private, 23 Feb.1914, Jordan Papers, Vol. 12; Jordan to Grey, 
tel.38, 25 Feb. 1914, Ch. Corres., Vol. 1941.
32. For details of programme considered by Company see, Greene to 
Grey, tel. 17, 13 Mar. and no, 79, conf., 19 Mar, 1914, Ch. Corres,, 
vols. 1941, 1942.
33. Jordan to Langley, private, 23 Feb,1914, Jordan Papers, Vol. 12.
294otherwise. On 7th and 8th August cabinet meetings were held in Japan
which decided her entry into the War on Britain’s side. By 9th August
it seemed to Jordan that Japan gave a much wider interpretation to
Grey’s request for Japanese help and he feared that a declaration of
war by Japan on Germany was imminent. He told Grey categorically that
there was no urgent need for Japan’s help in China. A declaration of
war by Japan would "endanger the stability of the existing regime in
China, to say nothing of the inevitable effect it would have upon our
future political influence in this country and our prestige in Asia 
35generally" . At the same time Jordan received a telegram from the 
governor of Hongkong, Sir F. May, saying that intervention by Japan
would involve serious complications as a result of loss of British
36prestige
Later the same day Greene telegraphed Jordan that the French 
ambassador informed him of an interview in London between Sir A. Nicolson, 
permanent under-secretary for foreign affairs, and M. Cambon, the French
ambassador in England, on joint Anglo-French-Japanese action against
37Tsmgtao . In fact, no such interview had ever taken place in 
38London . Acting upon the false information Greene had, on the 
previous day, advised the Foreign Office to accept the scheme of
34. Jordan to Grey, no, 135, conf., 30 Mar 1914, Ch. Corres., vol. 1942.
35. Jordan to Grey, tel. 146, secret, 9 Aug. 1914. Japan Corres.. vol.
2016. The Japanese somehow learned of Jordan’s attitude and 
objected to it, see Greene to Grey, tel. 71, 10 Aug. 1914, Japan 
Corres., vol. 2016.
36. May to Jordan, tel. 9 Aug. 1914, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 228), vol.2306.
37. Greene to Grey, tel. 67, secret, 8 Aug. 1914, Japan Corres., vol.2016,
it was repeated to Jordan in Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 228), vol. 2306.
38. Grey to Greene, tel. 44, secret, 9 Aug, 1914, Japan Corres., vol. 2016.
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co-operation for future purposes in China, Unlike Greene,
Jordan did not give a gentle advice for joint action but strongly 
believed that the co-operation of the British navy with Japan in any 
action against Tsingtao was the only alternative to "a lasting blow" 
to Britain1s prestige in the Far East, Jordan, however, did not
+o
reiterate his objection to Japan’s entry in^the war. The decision to
subordinate Britain’s interests in China, not to mention China’s own
39interests, to Britain’s interests in Europe was clearly at work ,
On 10 August the British Foreign Office was officially informed
40of the Japanese cabinet’s decision to declare war , Grey gave way
the next day though laying down a geographical limitation for Japanese 
41actions , On 10 August too, Greene telegraphed Grey concerning
Japan’s proposed action against Tsingtao, America was not to be
invited. The allies would act together and would restore Tsingtao
to China After the War. If Britain would not consent, Japan would
42still proceed on her own ,
Jordan immediately expressed the view that a public declaration 
as to the eventual restoration of Kiaochou was absolutely essential,
and that Russia and France would have to be invited in operating
43against Tsingtao . At least twice afterwards, before Japan delivered
her ultimatum on 15 August, Jordan repeated his insistence on a
44public statement , Jordan hoped that Japan’s actions would be
39. Jordan to Grey, tel. 148, secret and urgent, 9 Aug, 1914, Japan
Corres^ , vol. 2016.
40. Japanese memorandum to F.O., 10 Aug, 1914, Japan Correa» vol. 2016.
41. Grey to Greene, tel. 47, 11 Aug, 1914, Japan Corres,, Vol, 2016.
42. Greene to Grey, tel. 72, 10 Aug, 1914, Japan Cbrres0 Vol, 2016,
43. Jordan to Grey, tel. 153, secret, 11 Aug, 1914, Japan Corres,, Vol. 2016
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neutralised by Britain participating in them. To his suggestion
45
of mvrting the Allies Grey responded positively , Japan, however,
46
had now come to object to French and Russian inclusion ,
Jordan’s desire to have Britain associated with Japan persisted 
throughout the history of taking Tsingtao, On 2 September, Japanese 
troops landed on Lungkou on the northern Shantung coast, about 150 
miles outside the leased territory. To attack Tsingtao the troops 
had to trespass on Chinese territory over which no German right had 
previously existed. The question of territorial neutrality had been
contemplated by both Japan and Britain before the ultimatum was
47delivered , however, the Chinese declaration on 3 September of a 
war zone of the adjacent territory of Kiaochou Bay, including Lungkou,
Laichou, and Kiaochou was essentially the result of Sino-Japanese
48 «diplomacy , The British expeditionary force under General Barnardiston
did not take the overland route and landed on 23 September at Lao-shan
Wan, a place inside the German leased territory; thus avoiding the
49violation of neutrality , Jordan knew of the plan at an early stage
and despite Britain1s avoidance of any breach of Chinese neutrality, he
advised that no distinction should be made between Japan and Britain 
50
in this respect.
44. Jordan to Grey, tel, 162, 13 Aug. 1914, in this Jordan remarks 
that without a public statement "we should be making a false 
start". Also, Jordan to Grey, tel. 163, 14 Aug. 1914, Japan 
Co£res.,Vol. 2016.
45. Grey to Jordan, tel 139, 12 Aug, 1914, Japan Corres^, vol 2016.
46. Greene to Grey, tel 94, 19 Aug, 1914, Japan Corre^, Vol 2017.
47. Greene to Grey, tel 83, 14 Aug, 1914, Japan Cotres,, vol 2016.
48. For telegrams between the Chinese and Japanese foreign offices,
see Wang, Liu-shih-*nien-lai Chung-kuo yti Jjhrq)en, Vol. 6, pp, 53-8.
Some sources state that Jordan did help to persuade the Chinese 
to concede to a war zone, for example Chao Yttn, "Chi Chung-Jih
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Jordan did his utmost to smooth relations between Japan and
China and to allay Chinese suspicions of Japan in the Tsingtau
affair. On 12 AugustJ YUan sent an emissary to inform Jordan that
the Chinese government was inclined to accept a German offer of
returning Kiaochou direct to China because China feared that Japan
would attack and occupy the place single-handed. Jordan said frankly
that China was not likely to be allowed to do so. By then Jordan,
of course, had already learned of Japan’s decision to enter the war
and act against Tsingtao^. Before the emissary left, Jordan told him
to assure Yiian that Chinese interests would be seriously considered
and that no apprehension need be entertained on any possible joint
52Anglo-Japanese action on Kiaochou .
53Later, in express defiance of Grey’s wish , Jordan was not 
associated by the Japanese Charge d’affaires in communicating to 
China the terms of the Japanese ultimatum to Germany. Yiian was uneasy 
about the independent Japanese action. Jordan, as baffled by Japan
Chiao-she", in Chia-yin tsa-chih, (The Tiger Magazine), vol. 1,
ho. 7 (Jul.1915), p.4
49. For details of Anglo-Japanese action against Tsingtao, see
Gezay Wood, The Shantung Question, (New York, etc. 1922) pp 48-50; 
and T.E. La Fargue, China and the WorId War, (Stanford etc. 1937), 
pp. 21-6, and T&tt T’ ien-k’ai, Shan-tung Wen-t’ i shih-mo [The 
Shantung question], (Sfanglta*, 13$5 ^  3/-3 ,
50. Jordan to Grey, tel. 189, 4 Sept. 1914 Japan Corres., vol 2017.
51. There appears, however, to be another reason for Jordan’s objection 
to direct restoration of Kiaochou by the Germans. The fact that 
Tsingtao had been used since the War began as the base of German 
anti-Ally activities was an extreme irritation to Jordan. German 
influence at Tsingtau would not be eradicated in the case of a 
direct restoration, see T’ao, Shih-hua, Vol. 2, pp. 46-7.
T’an T*ien-k’ai in his work suggested that Yuan Shih~k’ai thought 
of taking back Tsingtao by his own military strength. He is 
inaccurate in asserting that this plan had the support of Jordan, 
Shan-tung wan-t’i Shih-mo p,31.
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as the London foreign Office, however, assured Yftan that there was
fla complete understanding between the two governments”"*^ . When
Japanese troops were about to land at Lungkou Jordan told Yuan that
China’s best policy was to have complete confidence in Japan'*'*. Japan
then launched a military occupation of the Kiao-tsi Railway, running
between Kiaochou and Tsinan, when she took over the Wei-hsien terminus
of the line at the end of September. The Wai-chiao Pu protested that
56
territory to the west of Wei-hsien was not within the war zone . 
Chinese public sentiment was also roused by the incident. Japan, on 
the other hand, was bent on occupation and argued that the railway 
was the property of the German government. Although Jordan disappr­
oved of the Japanese action he involved himself in running between
57
the Chinese and Japanese in an attempt to find a compromise . The 
persistent effort of Jordan to bring China and Japan smoothly along 
can be explained by his desire to avoid the emergence of embarrassing 
situations in which Britain’s weakness would be further revealed.
52. Jordan to Grey, tel. 156, secret, tel. 158, secret, 12 Aug*1914, 
Japan Corres., Vol* 2016.
53. Grey to Jordan, tel. 140; and Grey to Greene, tel. 50, 12 Aug.1914, 
Japan Corres., vol.2016,
54. Jordan to Grey, tel.165, 17 Aug.1914, Japan Corres, vol 2016; 
for explanation of Japanese action, see Greene to Grey, tel. 100, 
con£j 20 Aug.1914, Japan Corres, Vol. 2017,
55. Jordan to Grey, tel. 179. 1 Sept.1914, Japan Corres., vol,2017.
56. For Chinese protests, see Wunsz King, (ed.) V.K. Wellington Koo’s 
Foreign Policy, Some Selected Documents, (Shanghai, 1931) pp.76-81.
57. For example, Jordan to Grey, tel. 205, 29 Sept. and tel. 208,
30 Sept.1914, Japan Corres^ Vol. 2017,
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Following closely the capture of Tsingtau, Japan made the 
21 Aemands on China, The incident is interesting in that it confirmed 
the characteristics of Jordan’s war-time policy in relation to Japan, 
Generally speaking, Britain was given even less scope in which 
to assert her rights as an ally in the new crisis than in the occupa­
tion of Tsingtau, The European War at this point was going badly on 
the Western Front, Japan made it explicit from the beginning that
58
the British Foreign Office would not be welcome to make observations ,
Despite the fact that she found the Japanese demands highly obnoxious,
Britain’s policy in the crisis was essentially one of accommodation of
59
Japan’s wishes on the principles of expediency and reward ,
The beginning of the incident was characterised by Japanese
distrust of Jordan, There was no doubt that Kato, fearing Jordan’s
pro-Chinese attitude might create complications, attempted to conceal
the terms of the demands from Jordan for over three weeks, during which
60
time he hoped to make Chinese acceptance a ’fait accompli’ , The
58, Greene to Grey, tel, 64, secret, 10 Feb. 1915, Ch, Corres., Vol.2322,
59, In terms of expediency, Alston wrote a memorandum in March laying 
down officially a policy of effacement in the Far East, the damage 
of which to be repaired by the result of the War. Alston’s 
confidential memorandum, 14 Mar# 1915, Ch. Corres.» vol. 2323. In 
terms of reward, it has to be remembered that Grey promised Kato
in Dec. 1914 that Japan would be entitled, after the War to rewards 
proportionate to her war efforts, F.O, memorandum , 29 Jan#^on 
Japanese demands communicated by Japanese ambassador, 22 Jan,1915, 
Ch. Corres,, vol. 2322.
60, According to the usual practice, a document, bearing on China, 
that was passed between Tokyo and London, would be passed almost 
simultaneously between the Japanese and British legations in 
Peking. On urgent matters communication was also made between 
the Tokyo British embassy and Peking British legation. The 
Foreign Office in London was given the released version on
22 Jan. Perhaps the terms were too long, or thinking that he 
would be informed by the Japanese legation anyway, both the London
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apprehension of Kato was a direct outcome of his knowledge of
Jordanfs suspicion of Japan,
As in the case of Tsingtau, Jordan decided that Britain had
temporarily to efface herself before Japan, Although Rioki had not
"felt justified by his instructions11 to furnish Jordan a copy of the
demands, he translated orally to Jordan at the end of January the
principal points of what has come to be known as the released version
of the demands. Commenting on the oral statement, Jordan said that
the demands did not seriously affect British interests in China and were
61a natural outcome of the current political situation , On 8 February
Jordan saw for the first time the released version of the demands on
paper. He telegraphed to Grey his two main concerns. First, that
Britain’s established interests in China would not be affected;
secondly, that the stability of the existing Yttan regime would not be 
6 2upset • Grey adopted Jordan’s views. On 22 February he instructed
Greene to inform Japan that Britain, in accordance with Japan’s wish,
would not comment on the demands. But, Japan was to respect British
commercial interests and China’s independence and integrity. This
63in effect was Britain’s tacit approval of Japan’s action .
Foreign Office and Greene did not send a copy of the demands to 
Jordan, It turned out that Hioki refused Jordan a copy also on 
the grounds that he was instructed not to. The result was that 
Jordan did not have a copy of any version of the demands until 
8 February. Alston was convinced that Kato was deliberate in 
concealing the terms from Jordan; Alston's minute on Greene to 
Grey, tel. 78, 22 Feb. 1915,, Ch. Corres., vol 2322. Alston’s 
theory might be true because even Jordan himself knew that Kato
considered him ’’very pro-Chinese", Jordan to Langley, private,
2 Oct, 1914. Jordan Papers, vol. 12.
61. Jordan to Grey, tel. 19, 29 Jan, 1915, Ch. Corres. vol.2322.
62. Jordan to Grey, tel. 27, 8 Feb, 1915, Ch. Corres., vol, 2322.
63. Grey to Greene, tel. 47, 22 Feb. 1915, Ch. Corres, vol. 2322.
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After a visit paid hy Wellington Koo, then a councillor in 
the Wai-chiao Pu, on 9 February, Jordan suspected that there were 
discrepancies between the version of the demands to the Chinese and 
that to the powers* A week afterwards Jordan still wrote that
the Japanese action was inevitable and "weak States must pay the
6 A • » •penalty of weakness" . In a memorandum in March the Foreign Office
laid down the policy of temporary effacement in China. Because of
its trust in Jordan1 s caution the content of the memorandum was sent
to him by post in a private letter which reached him just before the
65entire incident closed • Jordan replied, with justice:
"Had the above £policyJ been sent to me as official
instructions months ago, I could not have carried
them out more carefully than I have d o n e ."66
As in the case of Tsingtau, Jordan urged on the Chinese govern­
ment tolerance with regard to the Japanese demands. This policy of 
Jordan was particularly marked at the final stage of the Sino-Japanese 
negotiations. Japan had been considerably irritated by the stubborn 
resistance of the Chinese during the course of the negotiation. By 
the end of April China was given a revised version of the demands of
which her acceptance was demanded under threat. The Chinese govern-
6 7ment expressed to Jordan that the revision was unsatisfactory. 
Negotiations broke off on 1 May after China had returned what she 
considered the most that she could accept. China was prepared to 
accept war if forced. Liang Shih- i was sent to Jordan to ascertain
64. Jordan to Langley, private, 15 Feb.1915, Jordan Papers, Vol. 13.
65. Alston to Jordan, private, 19 Mar. 1915, Jordan Papers, Vol. 14.
66. Jordan to Alston, private, 6 May 1915, Jordan Papers, Vol. 13.
67. Jordan to Grey, tel. 102, 29 Apr. 1915, Ch. Corresj., Vol.2323.
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British policy if Japan declared war on China. Jordan categorically
denounced the thought of war:
"I earnestly urged him to weigh the consequences of war 
against results of compliance with modified demands. The 
former must mean immediate disaster^while the latter would 
give China time to await issue of Europe war, which might 
afford her a last opportunity to set her house in order1
When Japan finally delivered an ultimatum on 7 May51915 demanding
a categorical reply, with the exception of Group V, Jordan advised
the Chinese government to give in with good grace. Anxious to make
sure that no loophole was left for Japan to create further troubles
Jordan sent an urgent and private message to Yttan on 8 May urging
69the "necessity of giving an absolutely unconditional acceptance"
On the same day China accepted the revised demands. According to 
Lu Cheng-hsiang, Jordanfs advice had a weighty influence on the 
cabinet members during the meeting which decided the final outcome^.
There was, however, one great change in Jordan during the 21 
demands incident. He no longer identified himself and Britain with 
Japan. He firmly objected to the suggestion of the China Association 
to the Foreign Office of co-existing with Japan in China by active 
cooperation.^ Moreover, while urging tolerance and temperance on 
China on the one hand, Jordan made it plain to Yuan Shih-kfai and
other cabinet members that his sympathy was with the Chinese on the
^  72other .
68. Jordan to Grey, tel. 110, 5 May 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2324.
69. Jordan to Grey, tel. 119, conf., 8 May 1915 Ch. Corte^, vol. 2324.
70. Jordan to Grey, tel. 122, 8 May 1915, Ch. Corre^, Vol. 2324.
71. Jordan to Alston, tel.^private and conf., 25 Mar; 1915, Ch.
Corres., vol. 2323.
72* Wang, Liu-shih-nien-lai Chung-kuo yu Jih-pen, vol, 6, pp,310-1 
T^ ao, Shih-hua, vol. 2, p. 61.
There can be no denying that Jordan1s resentment of Japan was 
greatly strengthened by the 21 demands. Especially towards the latter 
part of the event his private correspondence was strewn with denun­
ciation. On 1 May, for instance, Jordan wrote to Langley that 
Denison1s death had produced a marked deterioration in Japanese
73
diplomacy which was so unlike that before the Russo-Japanese War
Before the Japanese ultimatum was delivered Jordan remarked that
there was "no reasoning with a highwayman well-armed and Japan’s action
7 4towards China is worse than that of Germany in the case of Belgium" .
Yet the confinement of these critical remarks to his private letters
only was perhaps not merely accidental. All through the crisis Jordan
exercised restraint not to act in any way which would be detrimental
to Anglo-Japanese co-operation outside China^. In fact, Jordan
did so well that Japan, anxious for China to accept her ultimatum,
76
asked for Jordan’s good offices in persuading the Chinese . The
Foreign Office highly appreciated the way he handled the situation 
77in Peking
In short, Jordan’s resentment against Japan did not reach its 
breaking point during the crisis over the 21 demands. There were 
several reasons for this. First, his two primary concerns were met,
7 3 Jordan to Langley, private, 1 May 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13.
74. Jordan to Alston, private, 6 May 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13,
75. For example, Jordan to Langley, private, 15 Feb, 1915, Jordan 
Papers, vol. 13,
76. Greene to Grey, tel. 175, 8 May, on which Alston sarcastically 
minutes?"Contrast Baron Kato’s desire for Sir John Jordan’s 
good offices at the eleventh hour, with his mistrust of him at 
the first 1" Ch. Corres., vol. 2324. Also, The Times, 24 May 1915,
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at least half-way. Railway concessions in the Yangtze was the 
greatest concern caused by the demands in terms of British interests. 
Later, Jordan realised, and thus enlightened the Foreign Office, 
that consideration of the matter was really purely academic in that
capital for construction would not be forthcoming for a long time
78 /after the War . In terms of stability of Yttan’s regime the demands
diverted opposition from Yttan to Japan. Yttan seemed pleased with the
. 79eventual outcome and remained friendly towards Britain . Perhaps, 
underneath this was the belief that war was not going to last long, 
Japan against the Monarchy
Jordan began reporting to the Foreign Office on the monarchical 
movement when the Ch’ou-an Hui published its first manifesto in the 
middle of August, From the outset Jordan was convinced that the 
movement had the full support of Yttan. Liang Shih-^i, Yttanfs 
financial pillar, was greatly implicated. The Chou-an Hui was subsid­
ized by the president’s office. Wellington Koo was sent to Mexico
80to obtain unfavourable reports on republican institutions .
As can be expected, Jordan agreed to the principle of monarchy
in China and Yttan was the obvious choice for the throne. He admitted
that the success of the movement might settle "the vexed question of 
81the succession" which was causing considerable apprehension amongst
77. Alston’s and Langley’s minutes on Jordan to Grey, no. 83, conf.,
7 Apr. 1915, Ch. Correa, vol. 2324,
78. Jordan to Grey, tel, 106, conf., 3 May 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2324.
79. Jordan to Langley, private, 10 Jun.1915, Jordan Papers, vol,13
see also La Fargue, China and the WorId War, pp.76-8.
80. Jordan to Grey, flo. 214, 25 Aug, 1915, Ch. Corres, vol# 2338.
81. Jordan to Langley, private, 19 Aug, 1915, Jordan Papers, vol,13.
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British merchants in China, However, he objected strenously to 
the choice of time for the change. For nearly two months after the 
establishment of the Chou-an Hui Jordan tried his best to stave off 
the monarchy. He warned the Chinese government of possible opposition 
in the south and advised postponement until the European War was over.
Yttan Shih-k’ai made what appeared to be the first serious sound­
ing of Jordan’s opinion at the beginning of September. On 3 September 
Liang Shih- i saw Jordan privately. From this and other interviews
with Liang it appeared that Jordan’s chief worry was that Japan would
82certainly fish in troubled waters . After the twenty-one demands
incident Jordan prophesised that there would be further mischief from
83Japan as long as war lasted in Europe . Thus in his first interview
with Liang he expressed his fear of Japanese interference and indicated
that the question could be more suitably considered after the War.
Shortly afterwards a short lull occurred in the movement which Jordan
84
naturally interpreted as the result of his advice . A check on the 
dates shows that the lull stemmed more likely from a shift of organisa­
tional centre from the Ch’ou-an Hui to the Ch’ ing-yttan Lien-ho Hui
82. Liang has been condemned as the greatest sinner in the monarchical 
plot. However, in the more authoritative works it is suggested 
that Liang objected to the movement in the beginning, see, for 
example, Huang, Yttan-shih tao-kuo chi, pp, 24-6, and Tsen, 3 
Liang, nien-p’u, vol-1, pp. 267-71. Tsren in his anxiety to defend 
his hero implied in p. 280 that Liang was still uninvolved by
19 September. This is rendered doubtful by his interview with 
Jordan on 3 September, see Jordan to Grey, rio#234, 10 Sept.1915,
Ch. Corres;,, vol. 2338, and Jordan to Langley, private, 7 Sept, 1915, 
Jordan Papers, vol#13.
83, Jordan to Langley, private, 13 May 1915, Jordan Papers, Vol. 13.
84. Jordan to Langley, private, 23 Sept. 1915, Jordan Papers, Vol, 13.
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(Joint association for petition) which was officially established
85on 19 September under the auspices of Liang Shih- i
The movement took a new and vigorous turn. Petitions for a
monarchy came incessantly to the government from labourers , merchants,
86educationalists, and woman leaders . On 21 September Liang Shih- i
again saw Jordan and tried to convince him that public opinion (min-i)
was too strong for Yttan to oppose. Writing to Langley, Jordan said
that he told Liang "quite frankly that statement of this kind deceived
nobody. Foreigners knew perfectly well that the whole agitation was
engineered from Peking". Even granted that China was weak such strong
language could not easily be justified. It reveals Jordan’s earnestness
in discouraging the move. He again stressed the folly of making the
change when "international equilibrium, so essential for her fchina’sj
87safety" was being upset . The remark was an arrow pointing at Japan.
At the same time Jordan was greatly puzzled by Japan’s reaction 
to the Chinese situation during the first two months of the Ch’ou-an 
Hui*s existence. The movement was strongly supported by Ariga who was 
the Japanese political advisor to Yuan Shih-k’ai and known to the
88Chinese as a trusted friend of Japan’s prime minister, Okuma Shigenobu
85. Huang, Yttan-eihih tao-kuochi, pp. 31-2, also Liu chen-yi/ , Hung-hsien 
chi-shih-shih pen-shih-pu-chu, [poems on the Yttan dynasty] in
Shen Yttn-lung (ed.) , Yttan Shih-k’ai shih-liao hui-k’an, (Taipei, 
1966), ptl , j.4-7.
86. A list of the associate organisations of the Ching-Yuan Lien-ho Hui 
is given in Huang, ibid. p.33; also Chen, ChTieh-kuo ta-tao Yuan 
Shih^k’ai, p.50.
87. Jordan to Langley, private, 23 Sept. 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13.
88. Liu, Chung-kuo wai-chiao shih, p.446; and Hu, Ti-kuo chu-i yu
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At the beginning of September Okuma was supposed to have
made an informal statement, which was widely circulated by both
the Chinese and Japanese press, that monarchy was more suitable
for China and Yttan was the only qualified person for the throne.
He added this was essentially a domestic matter of China and the
Japanese government would merely wait and see, providing that
89developements would not jeopardise Japanese interests . In
90retrospect, historians read traps in the statement but Jordan
accepted it, if authentic, as Okuma1s public profession in favour 
91of the monarchy , Besides, eminent Japanese in China appeared to
be active advocates of the change. Hioki was then on leave and the
Japanese legation was in charge of the Councillor, Obata, who
impressed Jordan as regarding the monarchical question as China’s
own affair. Odagiri, the important unofficial personage who had
played an important role in Japan’s bid for the Yangtze in early
921914, was encouraging the Chinese along the line.
Chung-kuo cheng-ch’ih, [imperialism and Chinese politics 
1840 - 1924^ (Peking, 1961), p. 143. Also Ariga is said to 
have been responsible for drawing up the rules governing the 
royal family of the Yttan dynasty, ^iu r ,, Hung-hsien 
chi-shih-shih pen—shih-pu-chu, Pt. 1, pp. 37-8, 65-6.
89. For Okuma’s statement seeenclosurein Jordan to Langley, private, 
23 Sept. 1915, Jordan Papers,Vol 13.
90. For example, Kwanha Yim, "Yttan Shih-k’ai and the Japanese",
JAS, vol# 24, no, 1, (Nov. 1964) p.64.
91. Jordan to Langley, private, 23 Sept*1915, Jordan Papers, Vol. 13.
92. Jordan to Langley, private, 20 Oct,. 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13.
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A change of attitude took place at the end of September
simultaneously in Jordan and Japan. The monarchical movement was
then in full momentum. Under the direction of the Cheng-yuan
Lien-ho Hui petitions for a monarchypoured into Peking from the
provinces. On 6 October the Senate, sitting in its capacity of
the Legislative Chamber (Li-fa Yuan), passed a king-making bill which
provided elaborate regulations for referring the question to a
93provincial referendum . Japan then spoke officially for the first
time. She opposed the change to a monarchy. Ambassador Inouye
Katsunosuke was instructed on 29 September to sound the opinion of
the British Foreign Office on a possible Japanese proposal of joint
94action to oppose the monarchy . In the interview on 5 October
Inouye told Grey that Japan opposed the monarchical movement because
95she feared that it would cause serious disturbance m  the south
The Foreign Office was not as surprised by Japan1s action as Jordan
96
later was because Okuma*s statement was yet unknown to the office 
On the other hand, Jordan thought that the movement had to 
be accepted. Instead of joint Anglo-Japanese opposition Jordan 
advised that "we should accept the inevitable and come to a 
close understanding with the Japanese Government as to the best 
course for minimising whatever risks the change may involve".
93. Description of the movement at this stage is found in Jordan 
to Grey, no*253, 1 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.
94. Yim, "Yuan Shih-k’ai and the Japanese" p.64; Okuma to Inouye, 
no, 255, 29 Sept. 1915, NGB, vol. 81 (1915), pp. 60-1.
95. Grey to Jordan, tel. 214, 8 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.
96. The letter, Jordan to Langley, 23 Sept. 1915, in which Jordan 
refers to the statement had not been received by the Foreign Office, 
see Langley to Jordan, 14 Oct. 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 14;
also Grey to Jordan, tel. 217, 12 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.
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Reasons for the volte face were given in the same telegram.
Chiefly, the movement had gone so far that outside opposition at
this stage would do more harm than good, Jordan was obviously
impressed by the success with which Yuan forged popular support
for his scheme. Secondly Yiian succeeded in convincing Jordan that
there would be no internal trouble. Yuan was particularly success-
97ful in this respect in his interview with Jordan on 2 October .
Thirdly, earlier Japanese utterances did lead Jordan into thinking
that Japan had accepted the change despite his basic apprehension.
Jordan1s language in writing privately to Langley almost amounted
to accusing Japan of deliberate deceit:
"it is a great pity that they jj:he Japanese^ did not 
make their views known two or three months ago when a 
decisive word from them would probably have been sufficient 
to stop movement".
The fact that Jordan was instructed to be in close association with
his Japanese colleague clearly implied the reserve with which Whitehall
99received his change of attitude.
97. According to the Japanese archives it appears that Jordan was 
again made use of by Yiian after this particular interview. 
Apparently Jordan was more than usually convinced by Yiian1 s 
argument. This did not escape the astute Yuan. The next day 
it appeared in the press that Jordan had explicitly supported 
the monarchy in the interview. Despite the fact that the 
Wai-chiao Pu corrected the statement afterwards, the desired 
effect was achieved, see Obata to Kato, no, 550, 8 Oct*1915,NGB, 
voljSl (1915), pp. 68-72, enclosed are a passage from The
Peking Daily News of 7 October which gives a dialogue between 
Yuan and Jordan and a passage from The Asiatic Daily News, the 
notorious Yuan-bribed organ, cancelling the statement. Also
Li Nai-han, Hs in-ha 1 Ko-ming Yu Yuan Shih-k* ai, [The 1911 
Revolution and Yiian Shih-k’aiJ, (Hongkong , 1948), pp. 119-20.
98. Jordan to Langley, private, 20 Oct.1915, Jordan Papers, vol, 13.
99. Grey to Jordan, tel. 217, 12 Oct, 1915, Ch. Corres., tfol„ 2338.
310
9
In the next two-and-half months Japan made firm objection to 
Yiian1 s monarchy purely through diplomatic channels. Advice was 
twice tendered to the Chinese government to halt the change. On 
both occasions Japan carried her allies with her. It was a period 
of unprecedented embarrassment for Jordan, especially in terms 
of his friendship with Yiian Shih-k’ai.
During the first half of October a plan to undertake a demarche 
to frustrate the Chinese plan was quickly drawn up in a select 
political circle in Japan. It received the formal approval of the 
cabinet on 14 October when Ishii, late ambassador to France, took 
up the post of foreign minister.
Ishii instructed Inouye on 15 October to inform the British 
government that a joint advice should be given from the Allies and 
America to China to desist from the monarchical plan^^. Japan’s 
reason was again the fear of the movement resulting in internal 
disorder which would be prejudicial to British and Japanese interests. 
To reinforce the argument Ishii sent a second urgent telegram later 
the same day to Inouye pointing out that important officials like 
Hsii Shih-ch’ang, Li Yuan-hung, Feng Kuo-chang, Tuan Ch’i-jui, and 
Chou Hsueh-hsi were in passive resistance to the change of government^ 
Three days later Grey was presented with a memorandum embodying the 
proposal of joint advice and the rationale behind it.
100. Ishii to Inouye, no, 265, urgent, 15 Oct. 1915, NGB, vol. 81 
pp. 74-6.
101, Ishii to Inouye, no, 266, urgent, 15 Oct, 1915, NGB, vol, 81 
p. 76.
Grey asked Jordan if he had any objection to Britain’s
102acceptance of the proposal . As before, Jordan subordinated
his opinion to the greater interests of his country. But he did
not submit silently. He called on Obata twice, after receiving
Grey’s telegram, and expressed the view that external interference
at that stage would embarrass Yiian Shih-k’ai; thus, more likely to 
103have trouble. Jordan refuted Japan’s other reason for interference
by stating that no serious importance should be attached to opposition 
. . 104of the high officials and that consular reports from Shanghai,
the Yangtze ports, and Canton showed no apprehension of trouble^**.
To Langley he emphatically stated that unless foreign intervention
was applied in time it would not be able to forestall the result of
106provincial elections which were being zealously organised . In any 
advice to be given*Jordan stressed the importance of American participa­
tion in addition to that of the Allies. American participation would 
strengthen the advice by giving it unanimity and by countering the 
effect of Goodnow’s memorandum"^^. However, the more serious reason 
for American participation appeared to be Jordan’s bitter awareness
102. Grey to Jordan, tel. 221, 18 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.
Notice that Grey does not ask for Jordan’s opinion; the telegram 
is so worded as to show that acceptance of Japan’s proposal is 
intended.
103. Obata to Ishii, Ho. 570, 18 Oct; and t\o, 576, urgent, 20 Oct. 1915,
NGB, vol. 81, ....... pp. 81-3.
104. Jordan to Grey, tel. 260, 19 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol.2338.
105. Jordan to Grey, tel. 262, 21 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.
106. Jordan to Langley, private, 20 Oct. 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13-,
107. Jordan to Grey, tel. 262, 21 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338;
and Jordan to Langley, private, 20 Oct. 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13.
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of the inability of the Allies to stand up against Japan. American
help was naturally thought of because of her obviously pro-Yuan and
. , 108 anti-Japanese attitude
The Foreign Office understood and sympathised with the
reasoning of the British minister. Langley suggested that Britain
should bide her time and hope that the problem might solve itself
by the declaration of the monarchy as a result of the provincial 
109referendum . But Japan was too fast and alert to be out-witted.
Two days before informing the American ambassador Guthrie* of the 
proposed advice to China, Japan suggested to Britain that it should 
be given without waiting for the reply from the powers^^. Jordan 
learned of the new move of Japan from Obata on 25 October and objected
to it^^. Grey, however, concurred with Japan and instructed Jordan
. - . 112 to consult Obata in giving the advice at once
In the afternoon of 28 October Obata led Jordan and the Russian
minister in giving the advice to the Wai-chiao Pu . The Chinese
foreign minister, Lu Cheng-hsiang, replied that the monarchical
question was an internal affair resulting from popular sentiment and
114that it would not give rise to chaos . The interview was completely
108. For Woodrow Wilson’s pro-Yuan attitude see Li, Woodrow Wilson’s 
China Policy 1913-1917, pp# 139-50.
109. Langley minutes on Jordan to Grey, tel. 262, 21 Oct., 1915,
Ch. Corres., vol, 2338.
110. Japanese memorandum, 24 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.
111. Jordan to Grey, tel. 265, 25 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.
112. Grey to Jordan, tel. 225, 25 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.
113. It was obvious that Japan was solely responsible for the advice,
see, for example, the headline of the news in The Times, 1 Nov.1915.
114. Jordan to Grey, tel. 272, 28 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.
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embarrassing and distasteful to Jordan. He firmly declined to be 
the spokesman of the interview although he was still the doyen.
He also regarded his association with Obata as a personal betrayal 
of Yiian Shih-kfai "whose memoryis a very long one” "^*. From then 
onwards Jordan became increasingly critical of Japan’s China policy.
China did not answer the powers until 2 November when she reit­
erated her ability to maintain internal order. Japan regarded the
answer as China’s rejection of her advice. During the next week
116pressure was continually applied to the Chinese government . However,
the advice succeeded in slowing down the movement. On 9 November
Jordan was informed by the Wai-chiao Pu that the change would not
take place that year^^. Two days later the ministers of the powers
were informed by Lu Cheng-hsiang that the grand ceremony of instituting
118the monarchy would be delayed . This did not satisfy Japan who
decided to maintain "an attitude of vigilance as to the further develop-
119ment of the situation" ,
In reality Yuan Shih-k’ai had not the slightest intention of 
slowing down the movement. During the next month provincial voting 
continued. Yuan’s determination was not daunted by Ch’en Ch’i-mei’s
115. Jordan to Langley, private, 4 Nov. 1915, Jordan Papers, Vol. 13.
116. Telegrams from the Chinese minister in Tokyo, Lu Tsung-yu, show 
that warships were being mobilised, a second warning was being 
prepared and that Lu was being repeatedly threatened by the 
Gaimusho, Wang, Liu-Shih-nien-lai Chung-kuo yu Jrh-pen, vol. 7 
pp^  14t15.
117. Jordan to Grey, tel. 287, 9 Nov. 1915, Ch. Corres,, vol. 2338,
118. Jordan to Grey, tel. 294, 11 Nov* 1915, Ch. Corres» vol. 2338,
119. Inouye to F.O., 18 Nov# 1915, Ch. CorreSi, Vol. 2338.
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attempted revolution on 5 December at Shanghai, By December voting
,120 . m  the provinces was completed , Delegates from the provinces
assembled at Peking and constituted the so-called Peoples Representives
Convention (Kuo-min ta-hui) which was to finally decide on the
question of monarchy. On 11 December the 1993 delegates of the
convention voted unanimously on a constitutional monarchy and twice
121petitioned Yiian to ascend the throne , The petition was granted next
day, but Yiian was still to function as president until the ceremony
inaugurating the dynasty took place, Yiian1 s action was not expected
by Jordan who told the Japanese minister, Hioki, on 2 December that the
Chinese were serious about a postponement.
The Japanese would not accept the situation and decided on a
second advice which was made on 15 December with Jordan and the ministers
of Russia, France, and Italy, Hioki warned China that the powers would
assume an attitude of watchfulness and would intervene if trouble arose 
122
from the change. The joint advice was unheeded judging from the 
happenings during the next few days. Between 19 and 23 December Yiian 
was busily conferring titles on his friends, high officials in Peking, 
and tutus of the provinces, Yet it was obvious at the same time that 
the attitude of the powers was a spoke in Yiian1 s monarchical wheel. 
Despite Yiian1 s eagerness to proceed with the scheme, on 20 December
120, In this Yiian was severely implicated for having forged the result 
see Huang, Yiian-Shlh tao-KuO chi, pp, 90-1; Liang, Tun-pi chi,
Pt, 4, pp# 23-43; and a booklet entitled Yiian Shih-feTai wei-tsao 
min-i chi-shih, [The peoples1 will: an exposure of the political 
intrigues at Peking against the Republic of China], (1916),
121, For details of the convention, see Huang, Yiian-shih tao-kuo chi, 
pp. 68-83,
122, For interview with the WaWhiao Pu sde, Jordan to Grey, tel, 345, 
14 Dec, 1915, Ch, Corres,, vol, 2338,
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Hioki and Jordan were told that the formal inauguration of the
Hung-hsien reign would not take place until the Chinese New Year
123which would be in early February 1916.
On the other hand, there was a change of attitude amongst 
the powers, except Japan, after Yiian’s formal acceptance of the 
crown, Russia was the first to suggest to Britain that the Allies
should recognise Yiian Shih-k’ai when he was formally proclaimed
12A X25emporer . France followed shortly . At that time the Allies
were anxious for China to join the War on their side. They wanted 
China’s help in expelling German nationals from China, and Russia, 
in particular, was eager for Chinese supply of arms and ammunition.. 
Britain was not less anxious in this respect. She was anxious about 
German underground activities at Tsingtau and Shanghai which threate­
ned sedition in India. The Allies were also apprehensive of the fact
that the Germans and Austrians had been ingratiating themselves with
126Yuan during the monarchical movement . The London Foreign Office
realised that the monarchy was a fait accompli and could not be
127postponed until after the war . Grey accepted the Allies’ view of
recognising Yiian Shih-k’ai should he formally assume the throne. On
16 December Jordan was informed of Grey’s decision, Ris opinion was
sought before the Foreign Office would finalise its policy in antici-
128pation of a new move on the part of Japan . Encouraged by his
123. Jordan to Grey, tel. 353, 21 Dec. 1915, Ch. Corres,, vol* 2338.
124. Buchanan to Grey, tel. 1874, 14 Dec. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol, 2338.
125. Bertie to Grey, tel. 1032, 21 Dec.1915, Ch. Corre^, vol, 2338.
126. Jordan to Grey, tel. 354, 21 Dec,1915, Ch. Corre^, vol. 2338,
127. Alston’s minute on Buchanan to Grey, tel.1874, 14 Dec,1915,
Ch. Corres, vol, 2338.
128. Grey to Jordan, tel, 293, conf., 16 Dec, 1915, Ch. Corres., Vol. 2338.
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government’s change of attitude, Jordan spoke forcibly in fav^our
of immediate recognition for the first time since he had done so
two months before. Re stressed that since the beginning of October
he had been convinced that prolongation of the uncertain situation
129would produce unrest and eventually dislocate trade . Jordan 
also became more outspokenly anti-Japanese in his correspondence.
Re wrote bitterly to Langley that the Allied diplomatic representatives
in Peking felt that they were ”so many puppets pulled by Japanese
*  • ..130strings.
Whether it was because she anticipated an imminent outbreak in
south-west China or she felt it diplomatic to humour the Allies
slightly at this point, Japan expressed willingness to soften her
131attitude provided that China remained peaceful ,
The Ru-kuo Movement (Movement to protect the republic)
Yunnan was the first province which rebelled against Yiian’s 
monarchy. Independence of the central government was declared by 
the two governors of the province on Christmas Day, 1915. There was 
one month’s interval before the second province, Kueichou, seceded.
In Jordan’s opinion the monarchy still had a great chance of 
success before the independence of Kueichou had it not been for 
Japan’s obstruction. Actually, Jordan had not expected the Yunnan
129. Jordan to Grey, tel. 347, conf., 17 Dec. 1915, Ch. Corres, vol*2338.
130. Jordan to Langley, private, 21 Dec. 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13.
131. Grey to Jordan, tel. 299, 18 Dec,1915; Jordan to Grey, tel.351,
19 Dec, 1915, Ch. Corre^ ., vol. 2338.
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revolt to take place. He was too much under the spell of Yttan1 s
132guarantee of internal control , Twenty days after the revolt was 
confirmed Jordan attached little significance to that "ordinary
133incident" which "marked the beginning of all dynasties in China,"
Hioki was impressed by his optimism that the revolt would be suppressed. 
Also, he instructed Goffe, consul-general in Yunnanfu who was in
134close touch with the insurgent government, to discourage the movement
Jordan had reasons to be hopeful. He learned from Goffe that
the Yunnanes^ though they had no special affection for YUan* generally
135preferred the peaceful inauguration of a monarchy to internal strife ,
The military movement of the Yunnanese was not impressive. The
Yunnanese revolutionary army (Hu-kuo chun) was grouped into three
divisions under the respective command of Ts’ai Ao, Li Lieh-chiin, and
Tang Chi-yao, ^s^i’s First Division was to enter Szechuan and
occupy the posts of Suchou, Luchou, and Chungking, Lifs Second Division
was to operate in Kuangsi.. , and T?angfs Third Division to infiltrate 
136Kweichou , The military Junta in Yunnanfu was short of financial
resources, Goffe reported to Jordan that Tang, as military governor
of the province, negotiated strenously with the foreign representatives
for access by the Yunnan military government to the monthly subsidy
137from the salt revenue of the province , But, facing Ts’ai’s poorly-
132. Jordan to Grey, tel 358, secret, 24 Dec, 1915, Ch, Corres,, vol, 2338.
133. Jordan to Langley, private, 14 Jan. 1916, Jordan Papers, vol., 15
134. Jordan to Grey, tel. 361, 15 Dec, 1915, Ch, Corres,, vol* 2338,
135. Goffe to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, tel. 6, 5 Jan, 1916, Ch.
Corres.% Vol. 2644.
136. Detailed description of the military plan is given in Yu En-yang, 
Yttn-nan shou-i yung-hu kung-ho shih-mo chif [History of the Yunnan 
rising of 1916 against Yttan Shih-kTai~l in CCS ts^ng-^an, pt, 1, 
pp. 127-9. '
318
equipped army were two divisions and three mixed brigades under
General Chfen Huan of Szechuan. Moreover, Jordan understood that
Yiian Shih-k’ai had mobilised several divisions in the north to the
aid of Szechuan where the main campaigns were expected to be waged.
He considered the military arrangements of the government sufficient to 
138meet the revolt . . In fact most historical sources accord with
Jordan’s assessment of the situation. For example, General Feng
Yii-hsiang recalls in his autobiography that although he was in
sympathy with Ts’ai Ao, for a long time he could not change sides
139because he was hemmed in by government troops . Also, Ts’ai*s
tuberculosis deteriorated in the bitter cold of December and January.
Even when Kueichou seceded Jordan thought that the province was too
poor to make substantial military and financial contributions to the
14°opposition movement
Japan remained the greatest obstacle in the period. At first, 
the Yunnan revolt actually accelerated the monarchical movement.
Peking became eager to remove all diplomatic difficulties before 
concentrating on suppressing the internal opposition. The government 
announced officially that the inauguration of the monarchy would take 
place on New Year’s Day. Russia, France, and especially America were 
ready to recognise Yuan. Jordan argued with the Foreign Office that 
it was unreasonable not to recognise Yiian when America and the Central
137. For example, Goffe to Jordan, tel. 66, 27 Dec. 1915, Ch. Emb. Arch., 
(F.O. 228), vol. 1952.
138. Jordan to Grey, no. 6, 5 Jan. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2644.
139. Feng Yii-hsiang, Wo ti Sheng-huo [My lifel, (San-wu tu-shu-she,
1944), pt. 2, pp. 1-21.
140. Jordan to Grey, tel. 49, 30 Jan. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2644.
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Powers were ready to do so. The danger of non-recognition by the
Allies was two-foldJ the rebels would be encouraged; and Yuan
would be thrown into Germany’s arms. He again attempted to bring
141Hioki round to his views , Jordan’s attitude was largely responsible
142for the anti-British spirit of the Japanese press at the time ,
The London Foreign Office was still inclined towards recognition as 
a solution.
On the other hand, the Yunnan revolt was Japan’s pretext to 
strengthen her opposition to the monarchy. On 12 January Jordan 
reported to Grey that the Chinese vice-minister for foreign affairs 
informed Hioki that the inauguration of the monarchy would not, after 
all, take place in February, Grey was told that the Chinese govern­
ment was indecisive because of Japan’s attitude and a Chinese mission
143was to go to Japan to gain her favour • Shortly afterwards, Yiian
• * * Vwas openly humiliated when the special mission, headed by Chou Tzi»-
clii was rejected by Tokyo at the last minute.
In Japan, an attempt was made to assassinate Okuma on 12 January
in denunciation of his weak China policy. The kokuryukai. the ronin,
and the army were determined to capitalise on the Yunnan revolt to
144oust Yiian from the Chinese scene . On 19 January the Japanese 
cabinet decided not to recognise the monarchy irrespective of her
141. Jordan to Grey, tel* 10, 7 Jan. 1916, Ch. Corres*, vol, 2644.
142. Jordan to Langley, private, 14 Jan. 1916, Jordan Papers, vol#15.
143. Jordan to Grey, tel. 20, 12 Jan. 1916, Ch. Corres,, Vo Is 2644.
144. Yim, ’’Yiian Shih-k’ai and the Japanese”, p.70.
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Allies* inclination. During the interval between Japan*s rejection
of China*s mission and the Japanese cabinet*s decision, the Wai-
chiao Pu was in constant receipt of telegrams from Lu Tsung-yu,
Chinese minister at Tokyo, advising the immediate abandonment of
the monarchy because of Japan’s attitude. On 21 January Yiian was
told by Lu that the Japanese government had decided on taking free
action in future (tzu-yu shin-tung) and was inclined towards recogni-
145sing the Yunnan military government as a belligerent body . That 
day Jordan was told by Lu Tseng-hsiang that the ceremony of enthrone­
ment was postponed. Knowing Japan’s state of mind, Jordan commented
146that the postponement was the "wisest decision in the circumstances'*
At that time Kweichou was still loyal to the central government. The
monarchy was thwarted in the first place by Japan’s opposition rather
than internal defection.
A month later, on 23 February, Yiian issued a mandate postponing
enthronement indefinitely. At the time although Ts'ai Ao’s troops
were making successes in Szechuan^ they did not justify such a
retreat on the part of Yiian. In fact Jordan himself was optimistic
despite the insurgent successes because the main body of the
government reinforcement had not yet arrived at Szechuan. He was
certain that Ts'ai would not be able to withstand the overwhelming
147odds of the northern troops . Richard Dane, the inspector-general 
of the salt administration, was sent to Jordan by Yiian a week after
145. Wang, Liu-shih-neln-lai Chung-kuo yii Jih-pen, Vol*7, pp#34t7.
146. Jordan to Grey, tel*37, 21 Jan.1916, Ch. Corres., Vol* 2644.
147. For example, Jordan to Grey, iio, 62, 28 Fefy 1916, Ch. Corre^, 
vol. 2645.
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the mandate was issued. Yuan feared that the mandate was not
effective enough to save his situation and asked if a further
mandate should be issued abandoning entirely the monarchical idea.
Jordan advised against it. The internal situation did not yet
justify a further humiliating gesture. Yiian should wait for a
major military victory when he could announce the abandonment
148gracefully. Dane agreed with Jordan .
However, Yiian Shih-kaifs military position was vitally altered
by Kuangsi*s independence which was declared on 15 March. It
directly precipitated the disaffection of General Lung Chi-kuang
of Canton, who had been the crux of the situation in the south-west
and, to a lesser extent, that of General Ctien Huan of Szechuan.
Lung admitted frankly to Wilton, acting consul-general at Canton,
that the defection of Lu Yung-t?ing, tutu of Kuangsi, was a severe
and unexpected blow on him. The event threw his brother, Lung Chin-
kuang, who was then on the Yunnan-Kuangsi border with his troops,
149into a precarious situation . Also the safety of his son, Lung
150Ti-chien was in question , Harrassed by the unfavourable change of
4
military balance Yitan decided to renounce all intention of becoming 
emperor. Before issuing the mandate he again sent Dane to Jordan for 
advice. This time Jordan expressed it as his personal opinion that 
the renunciation should be clear cut and unmistakable in order to be 
effective'*''^ . On 23 March the Hung-hsien regime was declared at an end.
148. Jordan to Grey, tel. 80, conf., 1 Mar. 1916, Ch. Cotres., vol. 2645.
149. Wilton*acting consul-general in Kuangtung, to Jordan, tel, 29,
16 Mar; and tel. 36, 23 Mar. 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch. (F.0.228) vol. 2736.
150. Jameison to Jordan, No 60, 3 Apr.1916, Ch. Emb. Arch,, vol» 2736.
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Again, in Jordan’s opinion, between 21 January, when Yttan
first notified the legations of postponement of the enthronement
ceremony, and 15 March, when Kuangsi became independent, Yttan could
have quientened down the situation had it not been for Japan. There
had been rumours concerning the loyalty of Yttan’s old trusted generals,
Feng Kuo-chang and Chang Hsttn. Japanese officials in China were
152convinced of Feng’s positive anti-Yttan spirit . Jordan came to a
different conclusion through reading consular reports of the first
two months of 1916. Fraser told Jordan that he was told by Major
Kah, Feng Kuo-chang’s trusted man, that Feng would not fight against
153Yttan although he was definitely jealous , After visiting Feng,
Morrison told Fraser that Feng had openly declared that he would do
nothing against his ’’old friend the president" as long as he was
154left in power in Nanking , According to the intelligence report
from the British consulate in Wuhu, Chang Hsttn was, at least super-
. 155
ficially, maintaining order and behaving loyally in Anhuei.
Thus Jordan thought that until the eve of Kuangsi’s independence 
there was no major reason for Yttan to despair over the south-west.
In fact the insurgent troops suffered immediate reverses as soon as 
they came in touch with the main body of the northern troops which
151. Jordan to Grey, tel. private & secret, 20 Mar. 1916, Ch. Corre^, 
vol. 2645,
152. For example, Ariyoshi, Consul-general at Shanghai, to Ishii, 
no. 134, 11 Nov, and tio.166, 23 Dec. 1915; and Hioki to Ishii,
5 * 3 4 *230ni  " * ^  Dec. 1915, NGB^ * v o l. 81, PP.
153. Fraser to Jordan, private, 15 Jan.1916, Ch.Emb.Arch., (F.O. 228) 
vol. 1966.
154. Fraser to Jordan, private, 26 Jan. 1916, Ch.Eitib.Arch., vol* 1966.
155. The report only reached Jordan after Yttan’s death, see Intelligence 
Report for April - June, Porter to Jordan, 17 Jul*1916, Ch. Emb. 
Arch., (F.O. 228) Vol. 1985.
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arrived at Szechuan at the end of February. Tang Chi-yao feared 
that the penetration of government troops into Yunnan was imminent 
and he confided in the British consul-general his intention to flee^ 
Jordan told Goffe not to discourage the flight unless it might
157 . J
endanger the safety of British subjects . At a point Tang’s
position was extremely precarious in that the Yunnanese gentry
secretly plotted to prevent his flight and then hand him over to Yttan 
158Shih-kTai . A little more than a week after the northern army
reached Szechuan Jordan learned that it had recaptured from the
159insurgents Suifu, Nachi, and Chiangan . It was no surprise that
he drafted a telegram to Grey on 5 March saying that the
160!lprogress of rebellion now appears to be checked11 . As late as
14 March, the day before Kuangsi*s independence, Jordan wrote to
161Langley in an optimistic mood . Thus it was natural for him to 
think that had it not been for Japan’s obstinate diplomatic opposi­
tion there would have been ample time for Yttan to establish the
monarchy as a fait accompli, even granted that Kuangsi became 
independent at the time it did.
Japan was not only obstructive diplomatically. She was 
actually assisting the insurgent movement, Jordan had numerous 
proofs of Japan’s complicity. The Yunnanese troops were mostly
156. Goffe to Jordan, tel. 44, v. conf,, 29 Feb, 1916, Ch. Emb. Afch»» 
Vol. 2736.
157. Jordan to Goffe, tel 21, v. conf, 2 Mar. 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., 
Vol. 2736.
158. Goffe to Jordan, tel, 46, 2 Mar. 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch», vol* 2736,
159. J.L. Smith to Jordan, no, 11, 5 Mar* 1916, and Smith to Jordan,
no. 12, 11 Mar* 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch,, vol* 2736
324
equipped with. Japanese arms and ammunition . Jordan learned
from reliable sources, which he did not specify, that Tsfai Ao
was assisted by retired Japanese military officers in his campaign'*'^ ,
Japanese officials in different places were in close contact with
anti-Yttan elements. For example, T’ang Shao-i and his friends in
Shanghai were in constant communication with the Japanese, Jordan,
on the other hand, instructed Fraser to have no transaction with
Tang^^. Hioki1 s interference with the administration of the salt
money, which had hitherto been directed by Dane, was interpreted by
Jordan as a Japanese device to deprive Yttan Shih-k’ai of funds to
165which he had an indisputable right and to hamper him in his efforts 
to suppress the rebellion in the South,
Not only were the local Japanese officials implicated, special 
agents were sent to the different centres to fan the opposition move­
ment. Despite Goffe*s good impression of a Major Yamagata, Jordan 
was convinced that he was sent to help the Yunnanese in obtaining 
ammunition and other assistance from Japan through Tongking. Goffe 
pointed out, however, that the new Japanese consul was a proof of 
Japan’s sympathy for Yunnan. Ever since December, General Aoki Nobuzumi
160. Jordan to Grey, tel. 83, 5 Mar. 1916, Ch. Emb. Archt% Vol. 2736.
161. Jordan to Langley, private, 14 Mar. 1916, Jordan Papers, vol*15.
162. For example, Goffe to Jordan, tel. 50, 4 Mar. 1916, Ch.Emb.Arch,* 
VOU2736.
163. Postscriptum of Jordan to Grey, no. 67, 8 Mar. 1916, draft, Ch.
Emb. Arch., Vol. 2736,
164. T’ang had repeatedly approached Fraser to ask Jordan to co-operate 
with his group and the Japanese in securing Yuan’s removal, Jordan, 
to Grey, tel, 87, secret, 8 Mar. 1916, Ch. Corres.. vol. 2645.
165. Jordan to Langley, private, 29 Feb, 1916, Jordan Papers, Vol.15.
By the end of March, salt surplus in the group banks was^l9,298,000.
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had been in Shanghai, having been transferred from Port Arther,
166
where he was actively engaged in anti-Ytfan activities . Even the 
ordinary Japanese residents in China adopted a most unrelentingly 
anti-Yflan attitude and considered the time as an unprecendented 
opportunity for Japan"^ to strengthen her position in China.
Jordan could no longer conceal his anti-Japanese feeling. After 
Yuan had postponed the monarchy at the end of January, he wrote to 
Langley bitterly that it "marked the parting of ways" between Japan
168
and Britain. He had originally intended China as a commercial asset
during the war years. Although the War did cause a decrease in
169China's foreign trade in 1915 , the decrease was not colossal and
Germany, Britain1 s strong rival, was ousted from the China market"*"^ .
By the Reorganisation Loan Agreement of 1913 the Chinese govern­
ment had the right of access to the surplus for general purposes. 
Because of Japan1s objection, the Consortium could not release all 
the sum requested by Yiian despite the fact that Richard Dane had 
given his consent, Dane to Addis in Jordan to Langley, 16 Apr.
1916, Jordan Papers, vol. 15; also F. L. Pratt "Four Years of the 
Chinese Republic**, Quarterly Review, vol, 226, (Jul.9 1916), p. 170. 
Yiian appealed to Jordan through Liang Shih-i for the sum that was 
held up, Jordan to Grey, tel. 129, v. conf.,15 Apr. 1915,
Ch. Corres., vol. 2655.
166. For details of Aoki, a nationalist expert on China who was extremely 
anti-Yuan*and his mission at Shanghai, see Yim,"Yuan Shih-k'ai
and the Japanese", p.68; and Jordan to Langley, private, 12 Sept. 
1916, Jordan Papers, vol. 15, also Jordan to Grey, tel. 87, secret,
8 Mar. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2645; and Jordan to Grey, no. 70, conf.fl 
draft, 13 Mar. 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol*2736.
167. Peking Gazette. 8 Feb. 1916, enclosed in Jordan to Grey, no, 50,
17 Feb. 1916, Ch. Corres.. vol- 2645.
168. Jordan to Langley, private, 1 Feb. 1916, Jordan Papers, vol, 15.
169. Particulars of trade at treaty ports in China of 1915 are available 
from . London and China Telegraph (1915), vol, 57,
170. Jordan expresses this idea to Alston, private, 9 Oct,1914 and
to Lord Bryce, private, 23 Feb. 1916, Jordan Papers, vols, 12,15. 
Also Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 13, no 10^  (1916) p.7.
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In 1915 Britain retained her leading financial position in China, with
Japan running up'*'^ . Trade came to a standstill when civil war was
waged on the monarchical question. What concerned the Foreign Office
most was perhaps Jordan's sense of guilt. For the first time
he could not avoid identifying himself with China's suffering.
He had often expressed his preference for the Chinese rather than
the Japanese but never had he before found difficulty in submitting
his sympathy to the higher cause of British interests in China. Just
before Kuangsi declared independence he wrote:
"...for a person who is troubled with a conscience it is 
not always easy to make one's sense of public duty square 
with one's private idea of what is right"!72.
The Downfall of Yiian Shih-k'ai
When the monarchy was officially abolished on 25 March only 
Yunnan, Kweichou and Kuangsi were independent. When Yiian Shih-k'ai 
died two months later, five more provinces, Kuangtung, Chekiang, Shansi, 
Szechuan and Hunan, had seceded from the central government. The 
fight was no longer for a principle,but for thedownfall of Yiian. The 
two characteristics of the period were the want of unity amongst 
the non-Yiian elements, and Japan's determination to remove Yiian 
for ever. They reinforced each other in strengthening Jordan's con­
viction of Japan's guilt in the eventual death of his friend.
The lack of unity amongst the anti-Yiian elements suggested that
had Yiian been backed up by the powers the last five provinces were
173likely to have remained faithful . Of the five provinces Kuangtung 
and Szechuan were the most important. Lung Chi-kuang was not a sympa-
171. This is according to the statement given by Alfred Sze, Chinese 
Minister in London, in his interview with the Lond on tin A Chin a 
Telegraph, see paper, 24 Dec. 1915, vol. 57*
172. Jordan to Langley, private, 14 Mar. 1916, Jordan Papers, vol. 15.
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thiser of the Hu-kuo movement. It has been seen that his defection
was forced on him by circumstances created by the independence of
Kuangsi, Furthermore, Lung’s hands were forced by the mutiny of the 
174Kuangtung navy . The mutiny could have been forestalled by ample
cash from Peking as in the revolution of 1913 when Yuan had the
financial backing of the powers, Jordan also learned that even after
Kuangtung had declared independence and was entering a loose federation
with the other three southern provinces, Lung was still distrusted by
the governors of Yunnan, Kueichou and Kuangsi who wanted to oust him
from Canton^'*, As late as one week before Yiian*s death Lung gave a
strong hint to Jamieson, consul-general at Canton who reported to
Jordan, that if Yiian took a strong stand Kuangtung would revert to 
176his side ,
In Szechuan Clien Huan held out longer; the province declared its
independence two weeks before Yiian died. It was within Jordan’s
knowledge that soon after the independence of Kuangsi Ch’en Huan
entered into communication with Ts’ai Ao to relieve the situation of
Szechuan. Ch’en, however, declared that his negotiations with Ts’ai
were done on behalf of the central government and not an independent
177action of his own. He appeared to have followed a course which
173. For a lucid analysis of the non-Yiian and anti-Yiian elements,
see Li Shu, Hsin-hai Ko-ming ch’ ien-hou ti Chung-kno Cheng-ch’ ih, 
[Chinese politics before and after the 191!TrevolutionJ (Peking, 
1961), pp. 130-5.
174. Jamieson to Jordan, tel*42, 6 Apr. 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch,,vol* 2736.
175. Jamieson to Jordan, tel. 51, 19 Apr, and tel. 53, 20 Apr.. 1916,
Ch. Emb. Arch., Vol* 2736. On the other hand Li Ken-yiian,
Northern Expedition Commissioner of the Military Council, points 
out that Lung’s attitude had been hostile and had threatened to 
murder himself and Liang Chi-ch*ao soon after the council was
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avoided humiliating Yiian too much. But as a result of the pressure
exerted on him by prominent members of the Szechuan gentry, Ch’en
sent a telegram to Yiian on 7 May urging him to retire. The later
declaration of independence was largely due to the influence of what
is known as the Szechuan party which advocated independence to expel
all non-Szechuanese, particularly Yunnanese, troops from the province.
To Jordan, the defection of Ch’en came only after a prolonged
vacillation between the Szechuan party and the conservative party
178which stood for loyalty to Yiian .
Perhaps the Nanking Conference, convened in May by Generals 
Feng Kuorrchang, Chang HiSfitn, and Ni Ssu-ch’ung to settle the question 
of Yuan’s presidency, was the clearest manifestation to Jordan of the 
divided spirit of the non-Yuan elements, A month after the independence 
of Kuangtung a united military council (Chiin-wu Yiian) was established 
over the four southern independent provinces at Shui-hing (romanisa- 
tion from Cantonese) in Kuangtung. T*ang Chi^yao, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao,
| 1 1 Q
Ts’ai Ao and Tsen Ch’un-hsilai occupied important posts in the council . 
It insisted on the abolition of Yiian’s presidency irrespective of Yiian* s
established, Li Ken-yiian, Hsiieh—sheng nien-pti, ^Biography of 
Li Ken-yiian] in CCS ts’ung-k’an, p.70; Liang Clfi-ch* ao confesses 
his distrust of Lung, Tung-pi chi, pt.4, p. 83.
176. Jamieson to Jordan, tel. 63, 30 May 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch. (F.O.
28$ , vol. 2738.
177. Smith, consul in Szechuan, to Jordan, tel. 23, 4 Apr. 1916,
Ch. Emb. Arch,» vol. 2736.
178. Smith to Jordan, no* 24, 13 May, Ch. Emb. Arch,, vol. 2738; for 
details relating to Ch’en Hiian’s position between the two factions 
see Feng Yii-hsiang, Wo ti sheng-huo, pt#2, p.5.
179. For details of the Chiin-wU Yiian, see Jamieson to Jordan, no, 76,
9 May, 1916, Ch. Emb. Atch^Vol* 2738.
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repentent measure of instituting a responsible cabinet under Hsu 
Shih-ch’ang.
Ten days after the establishment of the Chtin-wu Yuan Feng
Kuo-chang called for a conference at Nanking to be attended by
governors of the loyal provinces. As one of the most influential
military figures of the time Feng’s attitude and movement was closely
followed by Jordan through consular reports from Nanking, Consul
Giles reported to him that Feng had no "sympathy with the Yunnan
rebellion, attributable though it be to the monarchical movement of
180which he disapproved" , As a result Feng adopted a strictly neutral
attitude, diverting his energy to preserving order in Kiangsu which
meant putting down all Hu-kuo activities in the province. The Nanking
conference met between 19 and 23 May with no result despite Feng, Chang,
and Ni’s ostensible support for the unconditional retention of Yuan,
Jordan’s interpretation of the conference is the important matter. He
regarded it essentially as the product of a rift between the generals
in the north and the leaders in the south-west:
"Military leaders generally in the north of China, while 
prepared if necessary to sacrifice Yuan Shih-kai to 
pressure of public opinion, are not disposed to let political 
agitators have a large share in future settlement"
Jordan’s observation was correct, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao telegraphed
182
Feng on 12 May insisting on the removal of Yttan , The south 
condemned the conference as being a tool of Feng for his personal ends,
180 Giles to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, i’o , 62, 28 Feb, 1916, Ch,
Corres,,Vol,2645
181 Jordan to Grey, tel, 141, 9 May 1916, Ch, Corresn Vol#2645,
182 Liang, Tun-pi chi, pt,3, pp,26-7.
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Feng was bitterly nicknamed as "Yttan Shih-k'ai II” by the native
press which recalled Yuan's alleged double dealings during the 1911
183 184
revolution . In Kiangsi the conference was despised and ridiculed .
Again Jordan thought that had it not been for Japan's insistence
on Yttan's complete removal, Yttan might have been successfullytable to
exploit the dissension in order to retain his presidency. At the
end of March the Foreign Office informed Jordan that the Japanese
government held that support to Yttan was not conducive to an early
settlement of the crisis and she would continue to watch the course
185
of events "with vigilance". Jordan objected to Japan's attitude.
He admitted that Yttan had lost much of his prestige, but his total 
elimination would only result in large-scale confusion. He officially 
criticised Japan as being unreasonable now that the monarchy was already 
cancelled. He asked Grey to put forward his views to the Japanese 
ambassador .
Britain was embarrassed by the divergent views of Japan and her
minister in Peking. The Foreign Office faced a dilemma whichwas
clearly put by its official, J.D. Gregory:
"We are ill-armed to face a repetition of the 1912-1913 crisis.
Then we had the wherewithal at our disposal to finance a strong
man, and in an extreme case troops and ships. Now we have neither..., 
The only money that could be forthcoming would be American money,
183. For example, Giles to Jordan, no.63, 17 May 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch.* 
vol- 2738.
184. Kirke, consul in Kuangsi, to Jordan, no«28, 30 May 1916, Ch. Emb. 
Arch.* vol. 2738.
185. Grey to Jordan, tel. 61, 31 Mar-1916, Ch. Corres., Vol-2645.
186. Jordan to Grey, tel. 107, 3 Apr. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol-2645.
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but, if we avail ourselves of that for the purpose of 
pursuing a policy with which the Japanese don't agree, 
we risk raising one of the great questions of the future 
viz. our choice between the U.S. and Japan11!^.
The embarrassment of the Foreign Office was aggravated by
188American support of Yuan Shih-k'ai . Grey decided on a last
attempt to change Japan's attitude. He asked the Japanese ambassador
to find out if the Japanese minister of foreign affairs would agree to
189
a situation which would leave Yuan with only constitutional powers 
On 8 April Ishii telegraphed the Japanese ambassador that the com­
promise suggested by Grey was impracticable because the South was
190
adamant on Yiian*s removal . Britain had to throw YUan Shih-k'ai
overboard. To the Americans who insisted on the status quo in China
Grey expressed his inability to take exception to the course adopted 
191
by Japan . The change to a more favourable tone by the Japanese
192
press reflected the change of British policy
During the same period Japan actively assisted the four southern
provinces and instigated new troubles elsewhere in the country. Jordan
learned that three days after the independence of Kuangsi the Japanese
consul-general at Canton spent a whole day trying to induce the two
193governors of Kuangtung to join Yunnan and Kuangsi without success 
He also learned that shortly before Kuangtung eventually seceded the 
same consul-general secured the help of Lu Yung-t'ing, the disaffected 
military governor of Kuangsi, in bringing pressure to bear upon
187. Gregory’s minute on Jordan to Grey, tel. 107, 3 Apr, 1916,
Ch. Corres., vol. 2645.
188. For Woodrow Wilson's support of Yuan Shih-k'ai throughout the 
monarchical movement see Li, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, 
1913-1917, pp. 146-58.
189. Grey to Greene, no. 97, 5 Apr. 1916; and Grey to Jordan no. 90,
13 Apr. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2645.
194Lung Chr-kuang
Japan continued to be the supplier of arms and ammunition to
195the insurgent provinces . The resources of these provinces remained
limited even after their amalgamation under the Shiuhing military
council. Jordan implied that the council might have collapsed had it
196not been in receipt of foreign financial assistance . He had a 
strong reason to suspect that the Chttn-wu Yuan was under Japanese 
influence. Jamieson did not report on its establishment until some 
time after the event took place because of lack of official confirma­
tion. Jordan, however, learned of the change from Hioki before 
Jamieson's report. On being asked about the delay in giving the informa­
tion Jamieson explained that Hioki must have learned of the news from
the Japanese consul-general at Canton "whose activities in the matter
197of trying to create a Southern Republic have been great"
Apart from being heavily involved in the south Japan created new
embarrassment for Yttan in Shantung. In reporting to Jordan in the
second week of May the consul at Tsinanfu stated categorically that
Japanese military authorities were giving every possible help to the
anti-Yttan elements in Shantung, and that strong pressure was being put
198
on the governor to declare independence. This explained to Jordan 
why at the Nanking Conference ten days later the Shantung representatives
190 Grey to Jordan, tel. 69, 8 Apr. Paraphraseof Ishii's telegram
in Grey to Greene flo. 106, 11 Apr. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol* 2645.
191 Grey to Spring-Rice, tel* 923, 11 Apr. 1916, repeated to Peking;
Grey to Spring-Rice, tel* 926, 12 Apr. 1916, Ch. Corres^ Vol» 2645.
192 Greene to Grey, no* 176, 20 Apr. 1916, Ch. Corres^ , vol. 2645.
193 Secret and confidential clause of Jamieson to Jordan, tel*34,
19 Mar. 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch.,Vol 2736.
194 Kirke to Jordan, tel. 11, 3 Apr, 1916* Jamieson to Jordan, ho, 17,
3 Apr* 1916, vol* 2736.
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199raised the strongest objection to the retention of Yttan as president
The thorny question of the treatment of Yttan was solved
suddenly and finally by his death on 6 June. This was a shock to
Jordan whose immediate reaction was highly emotional:
"As to Yuan Shih-kai, you will not expect a balanced 
opinion from me at this moment. I had a great personal 
liking for the man and feel both his loss and the manner 
of it acutely. The appreciation contained in my official 
despatch is a very imperfect estimate of the loss we have 
sustained by his death.,., and to his last day he remained 
a firm friend of Great Britain, He could not speak a word 
of English, but he could repeat the names of all his English 
friends and often told me anecdotes of his association with 
them. Almost the last time I saw him he said that he had 
been on very friendly terms with Englishmen since his early 
manhood and that he had learned to trust and like them.
Of this he gave innumerable proofs.,..
I could go on indefinitely reciting acts to the credit 
of my dead friend - for simply as a friend I shall always 
remember him,... He fell in an unequal struggle and to me 
he was greater in his bitter adversity than he had been even 
at the height of his power"200^
In this letter and his official despatch on Yttan1s death Jordan
talked about Yttan more in terms of friendship than British interests.
Perhaps that was too unreal a time to think concretely of British
interests when Japanese influence in China was so overwhelmingly
predominant. There was no doubt that Jordan regarded Yttan as a victim
of Japan. In emphasising Yttan1s trust in Britain Jordan was indirectly
195. For example, Goffe to Jordan, tel, 63, 25 Mar. 1916, via Canton,
Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2736.
196. Jordan to Grey, no. 122, draft, 10 May 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol.2738,
197. Jamieson to Jordan, no. 79, 10 May 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2738.
198. Pratt, consul in Shantung, to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, tel. 142,
9 May 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2645.
199. Giles, consul in Nanking, to Jordan, tel. 10, 22 May 1916, Ch. Emb. 
Arch,, vol. 2738. However, it appears that Jordan was not too concerned 
about Japan being implicated in the separatist movements in
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criticising his government for being unjust to Yuan. In fact he 
had for some time been irritated by Langley*s accommodating attitude
towards Japan. In reproaching the Foreign Office Jordan also suffered 
from self-reproach. It was obvious that Yiian drew closer to Paul 
Reinsch, the American Minister, just before his death. One month 
before the end Yuan approached Reinsch on the probability of his 
seeking asylum in the United States. To this suggestion Reinsch 
reacted favourably^^.
In concluding, Jordan held firmly that Japan was mainly respon­
sible for the collapse of Yiian*s monarchy, which in turn led to his 
tragic death. She pretended to encourage the movement at its beginning 
and opposed it at its height. On the whole an objective study of the 
course of events justifies Jordan’s view. The rising in Yunnan would, 
of course, have taken place with or without the dallying of the Japanese 
government. It was a well-planned plot of Liang Ch*i-ch*ao and his 
Changsha student, Ts*ai Ao, One day after the Ch’ou-an Hui announced 
its existence Ts’ai visited Liang in his Tientsin home where they 
decided to unseat Yiian. The conspiracy at Yunnan was properly hatched 
in October between Liang, Ts’ai and Tai K’an, late civil governor of 
Rueichou. Yunnan was to be the starting base because Ts’ai was 
influential amongst the Yunnanese troops. Then the province would be 
reinforced by the secession of Kueichou and the Liang-Kuang. Later
South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, see Tanaka Giichi Denki 
Kanko-Kai, Tanaka Giichi denki [Biography of Tanaki Giichi]
(Tokyo 1958), Vol. 1, pp# 629-30; and Iwanami Koza, Nihon Rekishi,
Ja Course in Japanese history] (Tokyo, 1963), Vol»19, PP. 73-5.
200. Jordan to Langley, private, 13 Jun.1916, Jordan Papers, vol. 15.
201. Jordan to Grey, tel. 162, 26 May 1916, conf. Ch. Corres,, Vol. 2645. 
also Reinsch. An American Diplomat? p. 192; Li, Woodrow Wilson’s
China Policy, 1913-1917, p. 157.
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events justified Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s boast that the movement followed
202its original plan closely , But it is still an open question if
T’ang Chi-yao, tutu of Yunnan, supported the Hu-kuo movement whole-
 ^ 203heartedly.
However, Liang and his colleagues realised the scanty resources 
of Yunnan and the vital importance of the cooperation of the three 
neighbouring provinces^\ Kueichou did not join Yunnan until well 
after one month. Yet, more than a week before this happened YHan 
had already decided on an indefinite postponement of the monarchy.
The decision was thus obviously irrelevant to the military situation 
in the south. The more convincing view is that the decision was due 
to Japan’s rejection of YCtan’s special envoy whose real mission appeared 
to have been the winning of Japan’s favour to the monarchy. The first 
act of weakness quickly led to the second and the third. Diplomatic 
frustration not only lowered the morale of the central government, it 
had a decided adverse effect on the government troops who were hoping 
that their service would be rewarded with titles and gold in the new 
dynasty*
Most works on the period state sweepingly that the failure of the 
monarchical movement was attributable equally to Japan’s diplomatic 
pressure and internal opposition. It is more true to say that Japan
202, Liang, Tun-pi chi, pt.4, pp, 81-2; and Levenson, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao 
and the Mind of Modern China, pp# 181-2.
203, For example, Chin Chao-tzu, Chin-shih Chung-kuoshih, (History of 
Modern China] (Shanghai, 1947), p. 180. Shen Yun-lung (ed.) T’ang 
Chi-yao, in CCS ts’urtg-K’an pt*3, p^ 32-4 support the view that 
T’ang took the leading part in the revolt to counteract views to 
the opposite effect.
204, Most observers agree on the point, for example, London and 
China Telegraph, 27 Mar. 1916, in vol. 58; NCH, 8 Jan. 1916.
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gave Yuan and his monarchy the first and most important blow. The 
opponents of Yuan benefited from Japan’s obstruction and made full 
capital out of it in bringing about Yuan’s final elimination.
Jordan did not seem to have realised that Japan’s influence in 
China would increase as long as war lasted whether she chose to support 
Yuan’s monarchy or not. Assuming that the Yunnan revolt was an invariable, 
Yuan’s success depended heavily, as in the revolution in 1913, on the 
support of the powers in terms of hard cash. Yuan had severe difficul­
ties at the later stage in financing the heavy movement of troops from 
the north to the defected provinces. The manifestedly loyal provinces 
withheld remittances to the government on the plausible ground that 
funds were needed for local military purposes. In the end a moratorium 
suspending payments by the Bank of China and Bank of Communications was 
resorted to. Had Japan not obstructed the monarchy she would have 
been the only power in the position of giving substantial aid to Yiian,
If it were so, Japan’s influence would have increased all the same.
It was the War that should be blamed, but Japan was, of course, a more 
tangible substitute.
By the time Yiian Shih-k’ai died Jordan had become irrevocably anti-
206Japanese. Henceforth he "saw behind every bush a Japanese" . He
205. London and China Telegraph, 21 Feb. 1916; 27 Mar; and 29 May,
1916, in vol, 58. For details of the moratorium, see Huang,
Yiian-shih tao-kuo chi, pt. 1, pp. 143-5; Ts’en, Liang, nien-p’u, vol.l, 
pp. 338-9. It is interesting to see Jordan’s reaction to the 
moratorium. On 12 May the cabinet issued the moratorium ordinance.
The Shanghai branch of the Bank of China decided to defy the 
ordinance to avoid panic in the city. To give the appearance of 
security, the Shanghai branch asked a British barrister, White 
Cooper, and a Japanese to be the trustees. Jordan objected because 
it was "very undesirable that any British subject should be 
associated in a measure which aims at setting aside a mandate 
issued by recognised [Yuan’ s'] government of the country". Later 
on, with the Chinese government’s approval, a foreign loan of
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had lost that sense of political balance which had, until the incident 
of the twenty-one demands, enabled him to divorce personal views from 
national interest. His unconcealed bitterness against Japan proved a 
constant source of embarrassment to Whitehall and was chiefly respon­
sible for the violentattack on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by the
207Japanese press until the monarchical movement drew to a close . The
Foreign Office, eager to maintain good relations with her Far Eastern
ally, decided to send out Alston in May (arriving in Peking on 4 August)
with a view to taking over chief responsibilities from Jordan. It
208appeared that Jordan was bitter about Alston’s presence . The
Japanese ambassador, Inouye got the impression that the Foreign Office
209
would recall Jordan for good.
However, although for a time the Foreign Office might have felt 
it more convenient to be without Jordan’s presence in China it was 
unlikely that it would recall him. Grey in particular would be reluctant
$2,000,000 was made to liquidate the notes of both the Banks of 
China and Communications in Shanghai, Jordan to Grey, tel. 145,
12 May; tel. 147, 14 May; tel. 150, 17 May; 1916, Ch. Corres., 
vol. 2656.
206. Sir E. Teichman, himself a consular official in China, Affairs of 
China, (London 1938) p.46
207. . London and China Telegraph, for example, 20 Mar. 1916, in vol.
58; according to Coleman, The Far East Unveiled, p. 21, the Japanese 
declared that their anti-British press campaign ’’was aimed against 
the English in the Far East rather than against Britain as a power”, 
for more details of Japan’s objection to the English in China in 
particular, see pp. 22-3.
208. Alston to E. Drummond, private, 16 Aug. 1916, Grey Papers, (.F.O. 800),
vol. 44, Alston was sent as the councillor of the legation in Peking
and the original councillor, Macleay, was recalled soon after Alston’s 
arrival.
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to take the step. In fact there were rumours of Jordan*s retirement
soon after Alston*s appointment to Peking was made known, but Grey
hastened to assure Jordan with what he had apparently told the Chinese
minister in London when the latter enquired about the matter:
"I regretted that any statement should have appeared that 
you were retiring because it was not true. We wished you 
to stay as long as you could"210
Despite Grey*s assurance, when Jordan left China in November
1916 it was expected in the Foreign Office that he would not return
211
to the country again. To alston’s disappointment Jordan asked to 
be sent back the next summer and he returned to Peking in November, 1917.
209. Inouye Kaoru-ko Denki Hensankai, Segai Inouye—ko den, [X biography 
of Inouye KaoruJ, (Tokyo, 1934), voL 5, pp. 245-6. Here it is said 
that Inouye was told by Grey himself that Jordan would be recalled. 
However, Japanese official documents on the monarchical movement
in 1916 until Yuan’s death do not confirm this finding, see 
NGB, vol. 84 (1916), pp. 1-187.
210. Grey to Jordan, no.112, 19 May 1916, Ch. Corres,,vol> 2656.
211. The expectation that Jordan would not be going back to China is 
shown in Alston’s letter to Langley in which he resents Jordan’s 
return which makes it necessary for him to make other arrangements 
because he had expected to succeed as the new minister, Alston to 
Langley, private, 6 Aug. 1917, Langley Papers, vol«30. Thus it 
appears that Jordan was given the choice whether or not to return 
to China, but it was generally expected that he would choose not 
to because of the frustration that he had during the first two 
years of the War, When he asked to return to China in late 1917, 
the Foreign Office did not object; by then the War was turning
to the better for the Allies.
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CONCLUSION
Between November, 1917 and March, 1920 Jordan continued to be 
extremely critical of Japanese activities, especially the Nishihara loans 
which he regarded as Japan* s means of consolidating her influence in 
north China. At the same time he became increasingly friendly with the 
Americans, especially the American minister, Reinsch, who, apart from 
having become Britain’s ally in the European Var, were knowifor their 
suspicion of Japan*s designs in China. And over and above his anti- 
Japanese and pro-American attitude, Jordan became much more concerned 
about China being able to develop the country herself and for her own 
good. Because of his consistent concern for China and his identification 
with China in her suffering at Japan’s hands, Jordan was generally thought 
of as being stronger and more stable in his last two and a half years in 
China.* The details about Jordan during this short period, however, are of 
little direct relevance to the theme of this thesis.
Between 1906 and 1916 Jordan’s policy, whether generally or with 
special reference to the 1911 revolution and Yuan Shih-k’ai, was essentially 
conditioned by his concept of Britain’s role in China. During the years 
before the War he was primarily concerned with the expansion of Britain’s 
commercial, industrial, and financial foothold in China. Apart from the 
obvious material considerations in carrying activities to this end, he 
steadfastly believed that Britain deserved more concessions because she, 
more than any other country, Could achieve more out of what she was given
F^or example R. Gilbert, "Forty-four Years in China", in Far Eastern 
Review, vol, 16, no, 3, (Mar. 1920), p. 136.
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for the general good. The attitude was typical of an age in which the 
cry of the "Whiteman1s burden" was raised, except that Jordan thought 
more in terms of a British burden in China. The attitude, too, explained 
partly his aversion to cooperation of any kind with other countries. It 
was only during his last year in China that he advocated internationalism 
in dealing with China's finances and railways and in this, apart from a 
concern for China's interests, there was certainly a desire to retain 
a British share which would otherwise be devoured by Japan.
That Jordan was in the first place the trustee of British 
interests explains both his behaviour in the 1911 revolution and his 
attitude towards Yiian Shih-k'ai. During the 1911 revolution the 
immediate decision of withdrawing financial aid from the Manchu government 
was made in order to safeguard British life and property. The two 
subsequent examples of departure from the policy of financial neutrality 
were motivated by the desire to stabilise the Shanghai money market which 
was vital to both China's internal and external trade, and, more 
significantly, to sustain Yiian Shih-k'ai's ministry as long as possible, 
since it guaranteed law and order, at least in the north. His mediation 
between Yiian and the revolutionaries aimed, first, at the restoration of 
peace, which was essential to British trade. Secondly, it aimed at 
initiating negotiations, the result of which might still be the retention 
of the Manchu dynasty as a constitutional government, with the real 
power in Yiian's hands. This, too, was an outcome which Jordan thought 
would serve Britain's interests best.
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The relationship between Jordan and Yiian was essentially
I based on mutual interests. From the point of view of British interests,
!
| it would have been unnatural if Jordan had rejected the overture of
t
r
j friendship from Yiian Shih-kfai who was not only the most influential
political figure in China from 1906 to 1916, but was outspoken in his 
reliance on Britain’s support. This, however, does not exclude the 
fact that Jordan was truly friendly and even respectful towards Yiian 
Shih-k’ai. At the same time, Yiian also made full use of Jordan’s 
support. In this connection, that Jordan was the representative of 
Britain, the most important power in China until the War, was significant. 
It is doubtful if Yiian would have taken the trouble to befriend Jordan 
if he had represented, for example, Italy. Indeed, when it suited his 
purpose, his friendship with Jordan did not prevent him from giving away 
to Japan railway rights in the Yangtze region in 1913 and 1914.
All the same, Jordan’s behaviour during the 1911 revolution 
and his friendship with Yuan Shih-k’ai were not free from a genuine 
concern for China. Compared with the Foreign Office, and such important 
consular officials in China as Goffe, Fraser and Wilkinson, Jordan 
definitely gave more thought to China’s interests. The Foreign Office 
of course had other considerations which it regarded as more important 
than Britain in China. For instance, during the Reorganisation Loan 
negotiations in 1912 and 1913 the Foreign Office was chiefly preoccupied
2
For instance, Jerome Ch’en implies that Yiian remained pro-British 
after the 1911 revolution because he w a s t h e  illusion that 
Britain was still the strongest power in the Far East, Yuan Shih- 
k’ai, p. 254. '
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with the problem of internal opposition to the consortium. As
i
i
for Goffe, Fraser, and Wilkinson, they quickly abandoned support for
| the Manchu government in the 1911 revolution and for Yiian Shih-k’ai
i
E
I in 1916, when they thought British interests made this necessary.
Jordan, too, understood the dangers of continued support from the
point of view of British interests in each case, and in the end he
had to act like Goffe, Rraser and Wilkinson, but he showed much
greater reluctance in abandoning what he conceived as best for China.
In this connection Jordan1s attitude to the revolutionaries,
later the Ruo-min Tang, can also be considered. On the one hand he
deserves to be praised for upholding as consistently as circumstances
allowed him what or whom he believed to be good for China. On the
other hand, he seems to have shown little desire to find out more
about those whom he thought obstructive to his ideal China. Even
if we accept that Sun Yafcsen was indeed more a visionary than a 
. . .  3practical politician, Jordan’s criticisms of Huang Hsing, as an
koutstanding example, seem toAunfairly harsh. The harshness is at 
first sight justified in that during both the 1911 and 1913 
revolutions Huang occupied the key military positions in opposing the 
Manchu government and Yuan Shih-k’ai respectively. However, Jordan 
was not justified in accepting so readily the accusation made by 
Yuan’s government of Huang’s corruption in the disposal of the
3Sun was considered as an idealistic visionary even by some members 
of the Kuo-min Tang, for example, Sh^en, "Pu-hsin ti erh-t’zu ko-ming”, 
, p. f$; Wilkinson to Jordan, no. 12, 9 Feb. 1912, Ch.. Emb. Arch.,
(F.O. 228) vol. 1836 in which Jordan was tpld that when Sun was the 
provisional president in 1912 he was considered as an inexperienced 
statesman by many in the Nanking provisional government.
Belgian loan.^ Opposition to what Jordan considered to be politically 
right in China did not necessarily mean a want of integrity and 
morality. In fact most people who knew Huang personally had a high 
opinion of him.^ Jordan1 s criticisms of Chfen Ch'i-mei were equally, 
if not more, outspoken. Assuming, in the extreme case, that both 
Huang and Chfen were criminals, it is still true that Yuan Shih-k'ai 
was equally guilty of criminal acts, the most abominable of which was 
his ruthless annihilation of his political enemies. The distinction 
he made between Yiian, Huang and Ch'en in this respect was most unbecoming 
of him, who was renowned for being just. Does it mean that Jordan too 
shared the view that what was considered to be just in the western world 
did not necessarily apply to China, and that morality was relative 
rather than absolute?
Jordan himself has been unfairly criticised for being timid, 
muddled, and lacking in determination during the years before the War. 
Ironically, the sharpest attacks came from Morrison who had strongly 
recommended Jordan's appointment as minister to Peking. Morrison once 
wrote that Jordan was "the most industrious quill driver ever known", 
always "bemuddled" arid "immersed in details".^ Judging from his
4
See chapter 5, p.2J.9,
^See, for example, Sh^en, "Pu-hsin ti erh-t'zu ko-ming"; Li YHn-han, 
"Huang K'o-ch'iang hsien-sheng nien-p'uIcaojand Hsdeh, Huang Hsing and 
the Chinese Revolution; Huang, Yuan-sheng i-chu, Vol. 1, p. 246*
In Ch'en1 s case Jordan's criticisms were more justified because Ch'en 
did have connection with members of underground societies to further 
the cause of the revolution, Sh'en, "Pu-hsin ti erh-t'zu ko-ming", p. 19.
^9 Dec* 1909, Morrison Papers, vol. 82 (?)
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correspondence Jordan was far from being bemuddled, although it
is true that he had the details of matters at his finger tips. It
appears that Morrison’s change of attitude stemmed more from his
disappointment in Jordan’s attitude towards China than the mere
question of competence. China had been Morrison’s main interest
throughout his life. Between 1898 and 1912 he was The Times
correspondent to Peking. From 1912 to his death in 1920 he was
political adviser in the Chinese government. His straightforwardly
pro-Chinese attitude was unmistakable. In 1903 Morrison prayed for a
Russo-Japanese war which would oust J^ fe Russian influence from 
8Manchuria. During the Russo-Japanese War Morrison and Jordan found 
a basis of congenial friendship in being anti-Russian and pro-Japanese. 
Soon after becoming the British minister in China, however, Jordan 
became a disappointment to Morrison, in that Morrison found Jordan too 
concerned about Britain’s, and not enough about China’s interests. After 
the Russo-Japanese War Morrison’s pro-Chinese feeling became synonymous 
with his antagonism against Japan whom he regarded as the pretender to 
Russia’s position in Manchuria. Jordan’s fairly friendly relations with 
the Japanese in Peking until 1913 must therefore have been annoying to 
Morrison.
8Nish,"Dr. G. E. Morrison and Japan", Journal of the Oriental Society 
of Australia, vol. 2, no. 1, (Jun. 1963), p. 43; and Nish, "Morrison 
and the Portsmouth Conference", Journal,of Royal Australian-Historical 
Society, (Mar. 1963), vol. 48, pt. 6, pp.26-7.
9One example of such speeches was that given to the China Association at 
Shanghai, Jordan to Campbell, 12 Dec. 1907, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.
Another example was Morrison’s farewell speech to England before leaving 
for Peking to take up the advisership, Pall Mall Gazette, 16 Sept. 1912 in 
Ch. Corres., Vol. 1348, in which Morrison says that it is wrong to think 
that a republic is not suitable to China; for this, Jordan criticises
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On the other hand, Jordan found Morrison unrealistically 
optimistic about China. Both before and after the 1911 revolution 
Morrison's speeches on China were so coloured by his enthusiasm that
9Jordan found them to be incongruous with the real state of the country.
The differences between them came to head in 1912 over the Birch Crisp 
Loan, which Morrison urged on the Chinese in order to break the monopoly 
of the consortium. Jordan indignantly described Morrison's share in the 
matter as "a disservice1*^ both to China and Britain. Nevertheless, 
relations between the two men appear to have taken a better turn after 
the outbreak of the 1914 war because Jordan became increasingly anti- 
Japanese.
The crux of the matter is that until 1914 Jordan and Morrison 
looked at China from almost directly opposite angles. Morrison's position 
meant that he could unflinchingly follow his pro-Chinese tendency, 
especially when he was in the service of the Chinese government. Indeed, 
he was not unique in his loyalty as an employee of the Chinese government. 
Sir Robert Hart was another outstanding example.^ By contrast, as the 
British representative in China Jordan's first duty was to protect Britain's 
interests. This duty had to be carried but especially in the 1911 revo­
lution through a vicissitude of changes. Since the circumstances changed
Morrison for being "absurdly optimistic", Jordan to Langley, private,
21 Sept. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.
^Grey to Jordan, private, 3 Oct. 1912; Jordan to Grey, private, 23 Nov.
1912, Grey Papers, (F.O. 800), vol. 43.
**Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs, p. 819.
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rapidly, it was natural that Jordan’s policy had to be frequently 
adjusted to the turns of the events if the best interests of Britain 
were to be maintained. In fact, Jordan wa£ adaptable rather than 
indecisive. A more indecisive person would have taken much less than 
the almost ten years that Jordan took to reverse his attitude to Japan 
after the Russo-Japanese War, A less adaptable person would have taken 
longer to suggest the policy of internationalisation in accordance with 
his realisation of Britain’s vulnerability in the Far East after the War, 
It has been suggested that Jordan is to be considered at his strongest 
during his last two and a half years in China, because he had become 
consistently anti-Japanese and pro-Chinese. It has to be borne in mind, 
however, that circumstances then offered him no alternative.
Whether Jordan liked it or not, diplomacy in China during the 
greater part of the ten years dealt with here was characterised by 
growing internationalisation, forerunner to the later storm. Thus it is 
often difficult to assess Jordan’s influence in a given situation. It 
can be asserted with confidence that Jordan’s influence was greater than 
that of his colleagues in Peking at any time before the War, because 
Britain was still the leading power in China, having much residual 
influence and still taking a leading position in the bank consortium. 
Nevertheless, Jordan’s influence was weakened by the fact that the period 
had definitely begun in which diplomacy had to be conducted on a world 
wide basis. It was no longer an age when what was to be done about China
12Unlike Alston, a much more unsteady person, who got extremely anti-
Japanese during the short time in which he was in charge for Jordan
in 1913.
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could be considered strictly within the Chinese context. This explains
what appears to be the:,Foreign Office’s loss of confidence in Jordan
during the first half of the War. It also suggests that, with or without
Jordan as minister, British policy would have followed the same broad
lines towards the 1911 revolution and Yiian Shih-k’ai as in fact it did.
Jordan’s initiatives bore fruit only when they could fit into the overall
structure of British diplomacy.
Finally, Jordan’s ministry was one of irony. During the 1911
revolution he was forced by circumstances to abandon the ideal of a
limited monarchy for a republic which he had hitherto been sceptical
about. In 1916 he had to oppose Yiian Shih-k’ai’s monarchial movement against
4.
his wishes. After the War he advocated international cooperation in. China*
an aversion to him until before the War. Perhaps, most ironical of all
is the fact that until the present day he has been severely criticised
13by the Chinese for whom he professed to have a true liking. He has 
been almost uniformly denounced by the nationalists, followers of Sun 
Yat-sen, as the arch-supporter of Yiian Shih-k’ai’s political crimes, and 
by the communists as the instrument of Britain’s imperialist aggression 
in China.^
Jordan to Alston:"That is the experience of all of us who knew the 
Chinese individually, they are really a far more likeable people than 
the Japanese," 7 Jan. 1910, Jordan Papers, vol. 6.
W^hen the news of Jordan’s death reached China in 1925 it is said that 
"not a single Chinese newspaper., .contained any appreciation of the 
services of the late Sir John Jordan to China", NCH, 19 Sept, 1925,
An obvious example of attacks from the communists is Shao Hsun-cheng,
"Hs in-hai ko-ming wu-shih-nien-chien wai-kuo ctfin-lieh-che yti Chung-kuo 
mai-pan-hua chiln-fa Kuan-liao shih-li ti kuan-hsi", [ the relationship 
between foreign aggressors and militarist’s powers in China. ] in 
Li-shih yen-chiu, [ Chinese Historical Journal ] , (Peking 1954), no.4,
pp. 62-3. An obvious example of attacks from the nationalists is Wu, 
"Hai-wai hsin”c^ien Chung-kuo hsien-tai-shih shih-liao", p.62.
4Glossary.
List of British'Offieials Whose Names Appear Mora Than 
Three Timas la'the ~ Thesis
A. In the Foreign Office
Alston, B. F., Acting senior clerk 1 Apr.,1906 - 30 Jun.,1907.
Senior clerk, 1 Jul., 1907 - 22 Sept. 1911.
Acting-counsellor at Peking, Jan, - Jul., 1912.
Resumed duty at the Foreign Office from 30 Sept.,
1912. Again acting counsellor at Peking, 3 May 1913, 
and charge d'affaires at Peking 6 Jun. - 24 Nov., 1913. 
Again acting counsellor at Peking, 17 Jun., 1916 and 
charge d'affaires 16 Nov., 1916 - 8 Oct., 1917.
Campbell, F.A., Under- secretary of state, 1 Aug., 1902 - 28 Dec., 1911.
Gregory, J.D., Acted as junior clerk between 7 Oct., 1909 and 30 Sept., 
1913; and assistant clerk from Oct.,1913, with short 
periods of service abroad.
Grey, E., Secretary of State for foreign affairs, Dec. 1905 -
Dec., 1916.
Langley, W., Senior clerk 1 Oct., 1902 - 30 Jun,, 1907. Assistant
under-secretary of state 1 Jul 1907 - 30 Sept., 1918.
Lindley, F.0. Acted as clerk from 18 Oct., 1911 to 17 Jan., 1912.
Nicolson, A.R. Under-secretary of state 23 Nov., 1910 - 19 Jun., 1916.
Tyrrell, W.G. Assistant clerk 14 Apr., 1903 - 6 May 1907. Senior clerk 
7 May, 1907 - 30 Sept., 1918. He was also private 
secretary to Grey, 7 May, 1907 - 14 Jun^, 1915.
6 .List complied from the Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular 













D.H., Consul-general at Hankow 1 Jul., 1901 - Jan., 1911.
Consul-general at Shanghai from 20 Jan., 1911.
L.E.f Consul-general at Mukden 6 Aug., 1906 - Jan., 1911.
Consul-general at Hankow, 20 Jan., 1911 - 30 Sept., 1912,
but was absent during the 1911 revolution. Acting 
consul-general at Shanghai 9 Jun., 1913, 8 Feb., 1914.
Acting consul at Changsha, 27 Dec. 1905 - 4 May, 1907.
Acting consul at Tsinan 1908 - 1910. Acting consul at 
Nanking 4 Nov., 1914 - 15 Dec., 1915 and from 19 Jan,, 1916 
Acting consul-general at Chengtu 11 Apr., 1905 - 13 Jan., 
1907. Transferred to Wuhu Sept., 1908, and to Nanking,
21 Jan., 1909. Acting consul-general at Hankow 1911 - 1912 
Consul-general atYunnanfu from 1 Oct., 1912,
J.W., Consul-general at Canton from 21 Jan., 1909.
!.A., Acting vice-consul at Hankow in 1911 and 1912. Acting 
consul at Chefoo 1912 - 1914, and at Nanking 1914,
Consul at Wuchou and acting consul-general at Canton 1915. 
.., Acting consul-general at Chengtu 1914 - 1916.
W.H., Consul-general for the provinces of Yunnan and Kueichou 
5 Apr., 1902 - Jan., 1909. Transferred to Chengtu 
20 Jan.,1911. Transferred to Mukden, 25 May 1911. 
Consul-general at Hankow from 1 Oct., 1912.




A. Sources Available in the British Public Record Office 
Jordan Papers
There are 16 volumes in the Jordan Papers which are Jordan1s 
private correspondence mostly with Foreign Office officials and the 
consular staff in China. Jordan certainly expressed his thoughts more 
freely in his private letters than in his official correspondence. The 
Jordan Papers, therefore, are an important source of material for this
thesis, and need to be described in greater detail:
(F.O. 350)
1. From Campbell, Langley, Grey and Tyrrell, Dec. 1910 - 
Dec. 1912.
2. From Alston, Nov. 1911 - Dec. 1912.
3. To F.O., British representatives in China and Japan, 
and British naval authorities, 1901 - Oct. 1905 as 
Minister resident and consul-general in Korea.
4. To General, Sept. 1906 - Oct. 1907.
5. To General, Oct. 1907 - Jul. 1909.
6. To General, Jul. 1909 - Jan. 1910.
7. To General, Dec. 1910 - Dec. 1911.
8. To F.O., 1912.
9. Registers of correspondence, 1903 - 1906.
10. Registers of. correspondence, 1907 - 1908.
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11. From Langley, 1913 - 1914.
12. To F.O., 1913 - 1914.
13. To F.O,, 1915.
14. From F.O., 1915.
15. To Langley, 1916.
16. To and from F.O.* 1917 - 1919.
Foreign Office General Correspondence, political, China, after 1906 
In this series is found Jordan’s official correspondence with 
the Foreign Office between 1906 and 1916. The following volumes are 
quoted:
(F.O. 371)
22 35 38 213
217 220 221 223
224 229 230 231
233 409 422 425
612 613 622 624
626 634 636 851
858 1080 1093 1094
1095 1096 1097 1098
1310 1311 1312 1313
1314 1315 1316 1317
1318 1319 1320 1321
1322 1323 1324 1325
1348 1590 1591 1592
1593 1620 1623 1624
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1625 1940 1941 1942
2322 2323 2324 2338
2644 2645 2655 2656
Foreign Office Consular and Eiiibassy Archives, China
The official, and sometimes private, correspondence between 
Jordan and the consular officials is available in this series. 
The following volumes are quoted:
(F.O. 228)
1081 1082 1084 1085
1086 1836 1841 1952
1966 1985 2306 2348






Foreign Office Confidential Print, China.
(F.O. 405)
168 171 173 174
175 178 179 182
183 187 190 191
195 196 199 200
201 204 229.
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Foreign Office General Correspondence, Political, China, before 1906 
(F.O. 17)
1245 1246 1281 1282
1284
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